Title data
Kaniovski, Serguei ; Kurz, Sascha:
Representation-compatible power indices.
Bayreuth
,
2015
. - 28 S.
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Abstract
This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions being proportional to the distribution of weights in the average representation. This makes these indices representation-compatible, a property not fulfilled by classical power indices. Average representations can be tailored to reveal the equivalence classes of voters defined by the Isbell desirability relation, which leads to a pair of new power indices that ascribes equal power to all members of an equivalence class.
Further data
Item Type: | Preprint, postprint |
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Additional notes (visible to public): | erschienen in:
Annals of Operations Research. Bd. 264 (April 2018) Heft 1-2 . - S. 235-265. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-017-2672-3 |
Keywords: | average representation; power index; proportionality between weights and power |
Subject classification: | MSC: 91A12, 91A80 |
DDC Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science 500 Science > 510 Mathematics |
Institutions of the University: | Faculties Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics Profile Fields Profile Fields > Emerging Fields Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility |
Language: | English |
Originates at UBT: | Yes |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-2080-6 |
Date Deposited: | 26 Jun 2015 11:08 |
Last Modified: | 28 May 2021 09:08 |
URI: | https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/2080 |