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Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?

DOI zum Zitieren der Version auf EPub Bayreuth: https://doi.org/10.15495/EPub_UBT_00005539
URN to cite this document: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-5539-4

Title data

Kurz, Sascha:
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Bayreuth , 2021 . - 7 S.

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Abstract

Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we loose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games. It turns out that the deviation is relatively small.

Further data

Item Type: Preprint, postprint
Keywords: power measurement; weighted games
Subject classification: Mathematics Subject Classification Code: 91B12 (91A12)
DDC Subjects: 000 Computer Science, information, general works > 004 Computer science
300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
500 Science > 510 Mathematics
Institutions of the University: Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Mathematics, Physics und Computer Science > Department of Mathematics > Chair Mathematical Economics > Chair Mathematical Economics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Jörg Rambau
Profile Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields
Profile Fields > Emerging Fields > Governance and Responsibility
Language: English
Originates at UBT: Yes
URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-5539-4
Date Deposited: 19 May 2021 06:31
Last Modified: 19 May 2021 06:32
URI: https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/5539

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