URN to cite this document: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-4880-8
Title data
Kurz, Sascha:
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
Bayreuth
,
2020
. - 7 S.
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Abstract
Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we loose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games.
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