Do zombies rise when interest rates fall : A relationship banking model

Titelangaben

Herweg, Fabian ; Kähny, Maximilian:
Do zombies rise when interest rates fall : A relationship banking model.
In: European Economic Review. Bd. 182 (2026) . - 105218.
ISSN 0014-2921
DOI der Verlagsversion: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105218

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Abstract

A relationship bank or market investors finance an entrepreneur’s risky project. Unlike investors, the bank can identify and liquidate bad projects at an interim stage. If the entrepreneur can provide only limited capital, the optimal loan contract induces an inefficient continuation decision, i.e., the bank engages in zombie lending. In the short run – for a given contract – the bank’s incentive to roll over bad loans is enhanced if the base interest rate drops. In the long run, however, the bank adjusts the contract to a drop in the interest rate, and the effect on zombification is reversed.