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Beyond the last term : Analyzing politicians' responsiveness in a no-term-limit context

DOI zum Zitieren der Version auf EPub Bayreuth: https://doi.org/10.15495/EPub_UBT_00009437
URN to cite this document: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-9437-2

Title data

Frank, Marco ; Maaser, Nicola ; Stadelmann, David:
Beyond the last term : Analyzing politicians' responsiveness in a no-term-limit context.
In: Journal of Comparative Economics. (2026) .
ISSN 0147-5967
DOI der Verlagsversion: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.004

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Abstract

We investigate the willingness of politicians in the German Bundestag to interact with voters, drawing on data capturing direct interchanges between citizens and their elected representatives to measure their responsiveness. In a setting without term limits, we examine whether electoral incentives influence politicians’ engagement with citizens. Our theoretical model predicts, and empirical results confirm, that politicians who are not seeking reelection become less responsive to voters, especially as election day approaches. This decline is attributed to a behavioral response resulting from a decrease in intra-party standing, rather than to a change in motivation or personal ideological convictions. Politicians retiring due to age or health reasons maintain consistent levels of interaction with voters, in contrast to those leaving due to pressure within their party or due to career changes, who exhibit decreased engagement with voters. Our findings offer novel insights into the role of incentives and constraints for political behavior in countries without mandatory term limits.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Keywords: Reelection incentives; Term limits; Accountability; Elections; Political representation
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Professor Economic Policy and Development Economics > Professor Economic Policy and Development Economics - Univ.-Prof. Dr. David Stadelmann
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Professor Economic Policy and Development Economics
Language: English
Originates at UBT: Yes
URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-9437-2
Date Deposited: 16 Jun 2026 14:56
Last Modified: 16 Jun 2026 14:57
URI: https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/9437

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