URN to cite this document: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-9081-4
Title data
Rottner, Claudio:
Auctioning Off Budgets in Procurement.
In: The RAND Journal of Economics.
Vol. 56
(2025)
Issue 4
.
- pp. 655-667.
ISSN 1756-2171
DOI der Verlagsversion: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70028
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Abstract
This article investigates a multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auction where the auctioneer fixes total spending and maximizes the quantity procured with their predetermined, secret budget. Previous literature has analyzed fixed-quantity auctions, where the traded quantity is fixed but unknown to the bidders. Compared to such auctions, budget auctions lower the auctioneer’s costs by introducing an additional interaction between a bidder’s bids; bidders not only weigh a higher profit margin on a unit against a lower probability of supplying that unit; a higher margin on some unit also reduces the probability that the budget suffices to procure more units from the bidder.

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