Why Deontologists Should Reject Agent-Relative Value and Embrace Agent-Relative Accountability

Titelangaben

Schuessler, Rudolf:
Why Deontologists Should Reject Agent-Relative Value and Embrace Agent-Relative Accountability.
In: Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie. Bd. 3 (2020) . - S. 315-335.
ISSN 2522-0071
DOI der Verlagsversion: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-020-00084-2

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Abstract

This paper claims that deontological and consequentialist ethics are best distinguished with reference to different assumptions concerning moral accountability and accounting. Deontological ethics can thereby be defended against the accusation of inordinate concern with the moral purity of agents. Moreover, deontological ethics can and should reject being based on the concept of agent-relative value. Even under the assumption that deontological ethics can be consequentialized, agent-relative value need not play a fundamental role. This is not the same as denying agent-relativity a key role in deontological ethics. Deontological moral accounting of universal value should be regarded as agent-relative, whereas consequentialist accounting assumes a shared moral account of all moral agents.