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Vertical mergers without foreclosure

DOI zum Zitieren der Version auf EPub Bayreuth: https://doi.org/10.15495/EPub_UBT_00008437
URN to cite this document: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-8437-9

Title data

Kadner-Graziano, Alessandro:
Vertical mergers without foreclosure.
In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. Vol. 34 (2025) Issue 2 . - pp. 593-611.
ISSN 1530-9134
DOI der Verlagsversion: https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12611

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Abstract

The typical concern about vertical mergers is the foreclosure of downstream rivals. In a vertically related industry where downstream firms have a common supplier, margins can reveal whether upstream competition constrains that supplier. I develop a test (based on margins) to identify whether the supplier is constrained premerger and, consequently, cannot raise input prices postmerger. However, even without foreclosure in equilibrium, vertical mergers can harm consumers. Vertical mergers increase consumer prices and benefit all firms, including downstream rivals, when downstream (horizontal) competition weakens sufficiently. This theory of harm differs from typical theories, which pit the merged entity against downstream rivals.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VIII - International Competition Policy > Chair Economics VIII - International Competition Policy - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Fabian Herweg
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics VIII - International Competition Policy
Language: English
Originates at UBT: Yes
URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-8437-9
Date Deposited: 07 May 2025 07:45
Last Modified: 07 May 2025 11:56
URI: https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/8437

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