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International trade and income distribution : The effect of corporate governance regimes

DOI zum Zitieren der Version auf EPub Bayreuth: https://doi.org/10.15495/EPub_UBT_00008001
URN to cite this document: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-8001-9

Title data

Egger, Hartmut ; Egger, Peter H. ; Nelson, Douglas:
International trade and income distribution : The effect of corporate governance regimes.
In: Review of International Economics. (29 January 2024) .
ISSN 1467-9396
DOI der Verlagsversion: https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12728

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Project information

Project financing: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

Abstract

This paper introduces a model of corporate governance into the general oligopolistic equilibrium theory of international trade. Corporate governance defines the influence of workers and capital owners on manager contract and, through this contract, the scope of these two groups for subsequent rent extraction in the wage/employment negotiation between firms and unions. If capital owners have dictatorship over the manager contract, they can extract the full bargaining surplus and eliminate the union wage premium. If workers have dictatorship over the manager contract they can achieve a wage premium, driving the income of capital owners down to zero. In this setting, opening up to trade is to the detriment of the income group whose interests are decisive for the manager contract. This shows that distributional conflicts materializing from trade can be considerably different for countries with differing corporate governance regimes. Foreign investment allows capital owners in unionized industries to flee from disadvantageous corporate governance regimes at home, eliminating union wage premia and lowering manager remuneration in countries with corporate governance regimes that give workers dictatorship over manager contracts.

Further data

Item Type: Article in a journal
Keywords: corporate governance; foreign investment; international trade; labor unions; rent extraction
DDC Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Institutions of the University: Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics II - International Macroeconomics and Trade > Chair Economics II - International Macroeconomics and Trade - Univ.-Prof. Dr. Hartmut Egger
Faculties
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics
Faculties > Faculty of Law, Business and Economics > Department of Economics > Chair Economics II - International Macroeconomics and Trade
Language: English
Originates at UBT: Yes
URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:703-epub-8001-9
Date Deposited: 15 Oct 2024 08:24
Last Modified: 15 Oct 2024 08:25
URI: https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/id/eprint/8001

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