SPEKTRUM

FOCUS

Africa

Dear Readers,

■ *Prof. Dr. Stefan Leible, President of the University of Bayreuth.*

Since the foundation of our university, African Studies has been one of its outstanding interdisciplinary focal points, both in research and teaching. In the meantime, globalization has brought the neighbouring continents of Europe and Africa closer together. Anyone who takes a realistic look at current political, economic, and social developments knows that the key issues of the future – from food security to climate protection – cannot plausibly be addressed with fences, but only by working together.

Africa today presents itself as a continent of surprising, often confusing diversity. Examples of progress in business and technology, humanitarian disasters, political corruption, and cultural creativity are often juxtaposed in media coverage all at once. African Studies therefore sees itself challenged to contribute to a better understanding of this interweaving of actual or apparent opposites by networking different disciplines, locations, and research perspectives. This is another reason why „multiplicity" and „relationality" are key concepts of our Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence, which began its work at the beginning of 2019, and is one of Europe's leading centres for African research.

This diversity of the African continent is reflected in our new edition of SPEKTRUM. It explores, for example, the uncertainty of life in refugee camps, the future visions of urban middle classes, growing economic interdependencies between countries of the Global South, and the linguistic diversity of Africa.

In exemplary fashion, these contributions show how African Studies at the University of Bayreuth deals with such current and exciting topics: with field research on the spot, often over many years, with worldwide scientific networking, and with one eye always on the often underrated future prospects of Africa.

Yours sincerely,

Prof. Dr. Stefan Leible
President of the University of Bayreuth

Further SPEKTRUM issues

On the homepage of the University of Bayreuth you will find previous issues of SPEKTRUM on the following topics:

1/2019:	Batteries
2/2018:	War
1/2018:	Planet Earth
2/2017:	Sustainability
1/2017:	Governance
2/2016:	Molecular Bioscience
1/2016:	Innovation
2/2015:	Digitization
1/2015:	Cultural Encounters & Transcultural Processes

• **www.uni-bayreuth.de/de/universitaet/presse/spektrum**

„Research on Africa only with Africa" is the motto of African Studies at the University of Bayreuth, established as one of our university's internationally competitive, interdisciplinary research priorities over four decades ago. To this day, its scientific excellence continues to provide crucial impetus for intensifying and expanding the efforts of the University of Bayreuth for global cooperation.

A University of Bayreuth Gateway Office in Bordeaux is scheduled to be established in the early summer of 2020. Alongside the gateway offices in Shanghai and Melbourne, it will already be the third office of its kind and is expected to further strengthen our international networking at a European level. Having an office in Bordeaux will also play a key role in our European network in the area of African Studies – in fact, that was one of our reasons for choosing this location.

Working together with renowned partner institutions on all continents, we hope to establish multilateral research projects and degree programmes in the field of African Studies, thus developing and implementing new approaches to internationalisation. In close cooperation with four partner universities, the African Cluster Centres (ACCs) and others, the

Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence will harness the potential of digitization, amongst other approaches, for transdisciplinary cooperation and at the same time link very different scientific cultures.

Bayreuth's spirit of excellence in African Studies is now also reflected in our latest issue of SPEKTRUM, in which a number of African scholars have contributed their research ideas and insights. The research projects behind these contributions would not have been possible without the close cooperation between the University of Bayreuth and its partner institutions in Africa. I highly recommend the articles in this issue as a basis to provide new and unexpected insights into the wide-ranging field of African Studies.

Yours faithfully,

Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheibel
Vice President for Internationalisation,
Equal Opportunities & Diversity
at the University of Bayreuth

■ *Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheibel is the Chair of Biomaterials at the University of Bayreuth.*

Africa

Contents

Research & Study

Shopping bags made of natural materials
replacing plastic bags (Photo: O.R. Owino).
22

Life in refugee camps is characterised by uncertain future prospects (Photo: A. Behrends).
40

Law & Politics

Flight & Migration

Kenya's capital Nairobi – an example of the emergence of urban

At the Université de Mayotte. The Comoros island is part of the European Union (Photo: R. A. Tchokothe).

Language Media Art

In the legal systems of African societies, very different ideas about the belonging of children overlap (Photo: Ercan.Araz / Shutterstock.com).

Society & Economy

Brazil, China and other countries of the Global South have a growing influence on Africa's future (Photo: Ungureanu Catalina Oana / Shutterstock.com).

Health

„middle class" milieus (sst).

For his paintings, the South African artist Mbongeni Buthelezi uses a material he obtains from plastic waste (Photo: K. Fink)

■ Sabine Greiner

A Centre of Excellence for African Studies

The University of Bayreuth's Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence

■ *The Campus of the University of Bayreuth (Photo: © Christian Bay).*

In January 2019, the newly established Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence started its work at the University of Bayreuth. The Cluster is inspired and supported by the commitment of outstanding partner institutions on the African continent. Funded by the Excellence Strategy of the German federal and state governments, the cluster is based on a renowned field of expertise at the University of Bayreuth: Over the past four decades, the University of Bayreuth has developed into one of the internationally leading institutions for African Studies.

Taking an inter- and transdisciplinary approach, the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence cooperates closely with African universities and research centres in order to advance interdisciplinary research and early-career support, and to further integrate these two elements in its expanding international network. The Cluster builds a firm basis for African Studies by connecting innovative research methods from a wide range of academic disciplines, including the humanities and social sciences, literature and linguistics, history and politics, law and economics, as well as geography and engineering sciences. By working together on research projects, scholars participating in the Cluster seek to achieve transdisciplinary synergies and to develop new perspectives with and for the African continent includ-

ing its diasporas, i.e. the people with African roots living in other parts of the world.

The Cluster comprises six thematic areas organized into „Research Sections": „Moralities", „Knowledges", „Arts & Aesthetics", „Mobilities", „Affiliations", and „Learning". In addition, new and innovative approaches linking or going beyond these areas are encouraged. All research activities within the Cluster share a common theoretical framework based on the key concepts of „multiplicity", „relationality", and „reflexivity":

- Here, „Multiplicity" means more than just the diversity of Africa. The concept is meant to capture the simultaneity of heterogeneous and mutually influencing ways of life that we find in Africa and its diasporas.
- The concept of „relationality" emphasizes the complex processes of relating to one another and the understanding of „Africa" as the constantly updated product of relations. This re-

„By working together on research projects, scholars participating in the Cluster seek to achieve transdisciplinary synergies."

■ *Fig. 1: International cooperation partners of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence (Illustration: Andreas Gaube / sst).*

■ BIGSAS Partner Universities

■ African Cluster Centres (ACC)

○ Close cooperation partners

● Centres for African Studies

■ *Fig. 2: The international conference „Africa Multiple: Conversations and Building Networks" of the Cluster of Excellence in October 2019 concluded with a concert in the Margravial Opera House Bayreuth. From left to right: Prof. Dr. Muyiwa Falaiye, University of Lagos, Nigeria (ACC); Prof. Dr. Yacouba Banhoro, Université Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (ACC); Prof. Dr. Ute Fendler, Deputy Spokesperson of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence; Prof. Dr. Peter Simatei, Moi University, Kenya (ACC); Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Seesemann, Spokesperson of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence; novelist and satirist Elnathan John (Berlin); Prof. Dr. Stefan Leible, President of the University of Bayreuth; Prof. Dr. Enocent Msindo, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa (ACC) (Photo: Robert Götze / Fabrica Lux).*

AUTHOR

■ Sabine Greiner is Academic Journalist of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence.

search approach opens up new perspectives on African ways of life that go beyond common dichotomies such as „north vs. south", „global vs. local", or „modern vs. traditional".

■ „Reflexivity" refers to the fact that relational processes always have a reflexive character, as they influence and shape relationships through constant back and cross references. In addition, the concept also implies the need to reflect on the research process itself: scholars of African Studies are required to constantly question the premises and theoretical models that guide their research in Africa and other parts of the world. In view of the continuing impact of power structures going back to colonial times, it is imperative for scholars to reflect on their position in the research process and to consider unequal power relations.

In line with the credo of Bayreuth African Studies, „Research on Africa only with Africa", the Cluster pursues new research questions and theory-building together with academic partners in Africa. To this end, four African Cluster Centres (ACCs) have been established in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa to create new avenues of academic cooperation:

■ Université Joseph Ki-Zerbo in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso,
■ Moi University in Eldoret, Kenya,
■ University of Lagos in Lagos, Nigeria,
■ Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa.

The ACCs benefit from the Cluster's efficient research infrastructure and function as active partners, not merely as passive recipients of input from the Global North. From their African locations, they facilitate the exchange of ideas, the mobility of researchers, and the collection of and access to data. Above all, the ACCs offer a platform for reflexive research on the continent itself.

In addition, the Cluster maintains a number of strategic partnerships, some of which already play an important role in the internationalisation strategy

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of the University of Bayreuth. These include the Programme of African Studies at Indiana University in Bloomington/USA, the Centre Les Afriques dans le Monde in Bordeaux, the Centro de Estudos Afro-Orientais at the Universidade Federal da Bahia in Brazil, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa based in Dakar, and the Point Sud Centre for Research on Local Knowledge in Bamako and Frankfurt. The aim is to establish a global research network with regular academic exchange, joint conferences, and publications.

Furthermore, the Cluster pursues the goal of nurturing a new generation of early career scholars, who share the Cluster's objective to reconfigure African Studies through transdisciplinary approaches that create new insights into the multiplicity of Africa and its diasporas. Therefore, the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), which had already received funding through the German Excellence Initiative from 2007 to 2018, is a cornerstone and integral part of the Cluster. More than 135 doctoral students from four continents have completed their doctorates at BIGSAS, and many have since worked at international universities, research institutes and NGOs.

Another important component of the cluster is its innovative Digital Research Environment (DRE). All cluster institutions, whether in Bayreuth, Africa, or elsewhere on the globe, will be interconnected through the DRE. The DRE not only ensures communication and virtual collaboration, but also creates the conditions for integrating the highly heterogeneous qualitative and quantitative data material into a common digital research platform, thus making it accessible to all participating researchers.

Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Seesemann

is the Dean and Spokesperson of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence. He is the Chair of Islamic Studies at the University of Bayreuth.

New synergies for African Studies:
The Digital Research Environment (DRE) of the Cluster of Excellence

As a result of the „digital revolution", African Studies today is confronted with a wealth of data – on African civilizations, cultural traditions and religions, social structures and political systems, food security and climate change, and much more. This data is collected, made available, and used in a wide variety of formats. However, „silo research", in which individual disciplines separately work with subject-specific databases, has long since become obsolete.

Against this background, the Digital Research Environment (DRE) integrated into the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence will be of great use for the necessary reorientation of African Studies in a number of ways. Heterogeneous sets of research data are brought together here in such a way that they can be linked and used in a wide variety of contexts. This creates a strong potential for inter- and transdisciplinary projects – and thus also for new and unexpected discoveries. Thus, the Cluster of Excellence will demonstrate in an exemplary way how digitalization can bear fruit for the practice of research in African Studies. The openness of the DRE to data from different sources and formats, and the transdisciplinary cooperation of participating research institutions, can make an important contribution to the democratisation and decolonization of knowledge about Africa.

At present, the term „translational research", which originated in medicine, is becoming increasingly important. It is used to characterize research work that starts with findings from basic research, and builds bridges from there to various areas of society, which leads to concrete solutions to problems being found and recommendations for action. Due to the complexity of the questions to be solved, such a „translation" into practice presupposes that the respective findings relevant to a particular problem can be networked and bundled. However, this is only possible by means of digitalization and with the help of powerful computer technologies. Therefore, the Cluster's Digital Research Environment (DRE) also has the function of enabling problem-specific forms of data use. In this way, African Studies will be in a position, not only to follow future developments on the African continent with research, but also to influence these via the results of its research.

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Omar Egesah
Anne Nangulu
Christine Scherer

University cooperation in Africa

The AMAS project as a pioneer of networked knowledge production

The Main Building of the Moi University in Eldoret, Kenya (Photo: Moi University, Kenya).

In 2016, five universities in different African countries started a new project together with the University of Bayreuth. The title of the Project „Academic Mobility for African Sustainable Development (AMAS)" links the key concepts of this project with reference to Africa: Governance, social sciences, education, mobility, and sustainable development. The five actors in Africa are the Université Mohammed V de Rabat (UM5R) in Morocco, Addis Ababa University (AAU) in Ethiopia, Université d'Abomey-Calavi (UAC) in Benin, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) in Mozambique, and Moi University in Kenya as Project Applicant and Coordinator. As a „technical partner", the University of Bayreuth contributes its experience in internationalisation processes to the project.

This network originated from the Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), which was funded from 2007 to 2018 by the Excellence Initiative of the German federal and state governments. From the very beginning, BIGSAS has relied on close cooperation with universities in Africa. Together with the five universities mentioned above and the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa, it established a network that in recent years has visibly succeeded in developing and implementing new concepts of international graduate education in the field of African Studies. With the AMAS project, the universities participating in this network have now deepened their cooperation and extended it to new fields of work. Among other aspects, together they intend to:

- increase the mobility of postgraduate students and postdocs; academic and research leaders,
- stimulate the exchange of knowledge and methods, but also of social and cultural experiences,
- harmonise the framework conditions for study programmes and research projects, and promote knowledge production through intra-African internationalisation of university/higher education
- and establish new forms of higher education governance capable of supporting the development of collaborative research and study conditions in Africa and beyond.

At first glance, it might seem that AMAS is a comparatively conventional project for the internationalisation of universities. But in fact the BIGSAS network has broken new ground with this project

in many respects. Currently, there are considerable differences between different regions of Africa in the higher education sector, respectively the universities, which make cooperation more difficult. In addition, the long-standing „vertical" North-South relations have masked the potential for South-South cooperation between universities in different African countries. However, globalisation, worldwide trends towards the harmonisation and internationalisation of higher education systems, as well as expanded communication possibilities, suggest that the networking of African universities in particular could be a source of innovative knowledge production.

„Transnational processes in higher education will also be a major driver of growth and development in Africa."

The intention to explore this potential and reap the rewards through concrete forms of higher education cooperation was how AMAS was originally conceived. How far the project, which emerged from the BIGSAS network, has ventured with this vision of governance, social sciences, and higher education policy, can only be seen from a historical perspective.

More than 50 years ago: New impulses, old dependencies

In 1962, UNESCO funded the first Africa-wide conference on higher education. It took place in Antananarivo, the capital of Madagascar, and pointed the way to the foundation of the Association of African Universities (AAU). The conference report underlined the future importance of intra-African cooperation in higher education for three reasons: Education, especially higher education, is a key to economic development in Africa. It is also an essential factor for social advancement and access to management positions. Higher education should therefore become an integral part of African societies. The report points out:

„For a long time to come, African universities and institutions of higher education will have to rely for their development on assistance and support from countries, universities and private bodies outside Africa, as well as from the international organizations."[1]

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■ Dr. Christine Scherer is Coordinator for Early Career & Equal Opportunities in the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence. From 2007 to 2018 she was the Scientific Coordinator of the BIGSAS.

The report hints to the consequences that impact universities in Africa since more than half a century, mainly because of the continent's extensive dependence on international resources. One of the consequences is the paradox that African higher education „assumes the position of the most internationalized system by being least internationally engaged." [2] The interest in involving African universities in research cooperation is growing worldwide. Nevertheless, the interest in research originating and driven by Africa remains underdeveloped. International partnerships with African universities are usually organised through top-down processes initiated outside the continent.

On our way to sustainable structures of transnational cooperation

This makes it all the more urgent today to use transcontinental relations between Africa and Europe in the field of education to strengthen transnational cooperation within Africa. The focus should be on higher education structures and institutions. Their harmonisation is crucial for the creation of proper conditions for intra-African cooperation into the long term. There are already successful examples of this: The project „West African Science Service Centre on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use (WASCAL)", funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), has led to the establishment of ten graduate schools in West Africa. With its network of African partner universities, the Bayreuth Graduate School BIGSAS has created an institutionally anchored academic culture that takes the doctoral phase seriously as an important stage in life, and supports doctoral students accordingly.

AMAS is therefore another consistent step towards new structures of intra-African internationality. In addition to the objectives mentioned above, this joint project is also particularly concerned with offering joint doctoral and study programmes and integrating them into sustainable framework conditions. Today AMAS offers two framework programmes:

■ **Special Benefit Programmes (among others):** Doctoral programmes in the fields of „Tourism Management", „Federalism and Government", „Sociologie du Développement" and „Doutoramento em Desenvolvimento e Sociedade"
■ **Common Fields of Study (among others):** Courses for master's students in international

studies, anthropology, history, geography, literature and gender studies.

In order to operate these programmes successfully in the long term and to expand intra-African mobility, it is essential to harmonise higher education on the African continent. In Europe, such harmonisation began 20 years ago: In 1999, the Ministers of Education of 29 European countries agreed in Bologna on a programme of higher education reform aimed at creating a single European higher education area. This was the starting signal for the „Bologna Process": a top-down process that has since been gradually implemented in the participating European states. Initially, the reforms met with displeasure, protests and resistance from many universities, especially in Germany. But now it's clear: Without a clear vision of harmonisation at least at the European level, without growing intra-European cooperation in research, teaching, and study, without transnational university degrees and – last but not least – without the experience of common learning and research, no university in Europe today would be sufficiently prepared for the challenges of the 21st century.

Accordingly, the African Union has also developed a strategy: the African Union Harmonization Strategy for Higher Education. This strategy was further elaborated in the framework of the Joint Africa-European Union Strategy (JAES) adopted by the European Union and the African Union at their joint summit in Lisbon in 2007. Since 2014 it has been funded by the European Pan-African Programme, or more precisely by the Intra-Africa Mobility Scheme, to the tune of € 20 million in total. This also forms the funding framework for the AMAS project, the financing of which has been secured until 2022.

Internationalisation as a learning process

The achievement of the objectives initially set by AMAS is by no means progressing as smoothly as envisaged. Unexpected challenges, for which common solutions had to be found, have shown: For universities to truly live internationalisation is never easy. As in Europe, Africa also demands both an education policy coordinated „from above" in the form of a top-down process, as initiated by the African Union, and institutional incentives for scholars who have to implement the concepts of internationalisation and fill them with life. In principle, it is never

RECOMMENDED READING

E. T. Woldegeorgis, C. Scherer (eds.): Partnership in Higher Education. Trends between African and European Institutions. Leiden 2019.

E. T. Woldegiorgis: Regionalization of Higher Education in Africa. The Operationalization of the African Union Higher Education Harmonization Strategy. Beiträge zur Afrikaforschung, Bd. 73, 2017.

C. Scherer: The Hidden Balances in Higher Education Collaboration. Negotiating Forms of Capital in the Social Field of International Doctoral Research Training between Europe and Africa, in: A. Goujon et al. (eds.): Higher Education in Africa. Challenges for Development, Mobility and Cooperation. Newcastle upon Tyne 2016, 302-334.

easy to persuade partner universities from different countries to cooperate and pull together. And if mobility between African universities is to be strengthened, some deeply rooted expectations and prejudices must also be overcome: Students and teachers in Africa always ask whether they should apply to a higher education institution in Europe or to a „larger" higher education institution – and they think of higher education institutions outside Africa without considering studying in another African country.

In addition, the AMAS project shows that the EU must also learn: If it wants to sustainably promote intra-African mobility, sensitivity and realism are required. The EU should be more aware than before of the protracted efforts needed to change and replace old frameworks in higher education at the transnational level. The history of the Bologna Process provides instructive examples of this.

In the future, knowledge generation will no longer concentrate on a few key regions of the world. Transnational processes in higher education will contribute to the further „multipolarisation" of scientific productivity, research, and innovation in the coming years. They will thus also be a major driver of growth and development in Africa. At the same time, this places a demand on the agenda that African scholars clearly formulate: to revise the „master narrative" of a progressive modern age in which the continent was denied the capacity to form an independent intellectual agency. It is hoped that the ideas and experiences that have emerged from the AMAS programme will soon be incorporated into EU funding schemes and programmes. Future support programmes financed from Africa to strengthen intra-African mobility will also be able to build on this foundation.

Outlook

University cooperation in the AMAS network has shown so far that both North-South and South-South partnerships are of central importance when it comes to this on the African continent,

- to strengthen scientific teaching and research,
- develop best practices in higher education and benchmarking for innovative initiatives,
- increase the mobility of researchers and teachers in order to promote sustainable developments at universities and beyond,
- to develop the internationalisation of universities in such a way that they are competitive at regional, national and global level.

Bayreuth

Rabat (Morocco)

Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)

Cotonou (Benin)

Eldoret (Kenya)

Maputo (Mozambique)

1 UNESCO: Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa. Tananarive, 3-12 September 1962, 65. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000142840.
2 D. Teferra: The International Dimension of Higher Education in Africa: Status, Challenges and Prospects, in: D. Teferra, J. Knight (eds): Higher Education in Africa: The International Dimension. Boston 2008, 73.

Katharina Schramm

The decolonization of knowledge

Post-colonial interdependencies and new intellectual impetus

View of the campus of the University of Cape Town (UCT) (Photo: EQRoy / Shutterstock. com). Small Picture: In April 2015, after sustained student protests, the statue of Cecil John Rhodes was removed from campus (Photo: Tony Carr / wikimedia commons / CC-BY-SA-2.0).

In their book „Theory from the South", published in 2012, the anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff talk about the necessity of an epistemological reorientation in the cultural and social sciences.[1] Key issues for the future – from social inequality to migration and climate change – are becoming more acute and gain in contour when viewed from the southern hemisphere. This change of perspective not only leads to new questions, but also to new forms of theory formation, and thus, in the authors' opinion, to a new approach to the world as a whole. An anthropology of the present is not just situated in space, but also in time: It opens up access to historically intertwined global processes, and reveals glimpses on possible futures and social designs.

The following article shows how these approaches can be made fruitful for research within the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence and far beyond. As a matter of fact, the core demand formulated in the Cluster to reconfigure African Studies goes hand in hand with this shift – away from an expertise „from outside" to an exchange on equal terms. At the organisational level, this will be strengthened by new forms of cooperation, such as those developed jointly with the African Cluster Centres (ACCs). At the same time, this demand also marks the need for new forms of theory formation, which not only concern the field of African Studies but also the University as a whole. Theories „from the South" change the colonial topography of the European centre and non-Western periphery. They establish a new focus on global entanglements, demanding increased attention on the practices of knowledge production along this process. Here, a look at the history of science proves to be instructive.

cepts such as „tribalism" and called for a more differentiated view of social structures. At the same time, they denounced the existing academic and political hierarchies. They criticized the dominant ethnographic view of the „foreign" as a form of othering, i.e. as a juxtaposition of unquestioned self-image and distorting representation of the other.[3] This criticism was strongly echoed in the post-colonial debates of the 1990s, in which it was increasingly pointed out that there could be no isolated consideration of cultural, social, and political phenomena without questioning power relations.

Today, more than a quarter of a century later, the questions raised back then are by no means off the table. In Germany, for example, they are gaining new momentum as a result of a long overdue public debate on the country's colonial past. The ethnological museums, which for a long time led a shadowy existence, are currently in the limelight. However, natural history collections[4] and art museums are also being re-evaluated according to the colonial context of their origins: How did the objects get into the collections? To what extent is their appropriation a part of processes of epistemic and physical violence? What multiple stores of knowledge are locked up in them? How can the objects, and with them, the relationships from which they emerged, be redefined – in such a way that the historically conscious handling of these objects promotes a future-oriented examination of the origins and consequences of colonialism?

RECOMMENDED READING

K. Schramm: Neue Technologien – Alte Kategorien? Die Problematisierung von Rasse an der Schnittstelle von Wissenschaft und Politik." Zeitschrift für Ethnologie (2014), 139, 2, 233-252.

J. and J. Comaroff: Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa. Boulder / Colorado 2012.

S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni: Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization. London 2018.

L. Nordling: How Decolonization Could Reshape South African Science: A Generation of Black Scientists Is Gearing Up to Transform the Research Landscape. Nature (2018), Vol. 554, 159-162. DOI: 10.1038/d41586-018-01696-w

„The South African debates are a crucial catalyst for the reorientation of African Studies."

Science and colonialism

The consolidation of scientific disciplines in the 19th century – from medicine and zoology to geology and statistics to archaeology and palaeontology – was closely linked to the practices of colonial rule, which still reverberate to this day.[2] This becomes particularly evident in those fields which made colonized people and localities their subject of investigation, i.e. today's area studies or anthropology. Within social and cultural anthropology, the debate about the decolonization of the field already gained momentum along with the global independence movements after the Second World War. For example, African scholars such as Bernhard Magubane and Archie Mafeje from South Africa formulated a sharp critique of con-

These debates, which often take place under the heading of „restitution", by no means only concern legal, economic, or ethical aspects. They also provoke far-reaching epistemological, theoretical, and political questions that lead far beyond the walls of the museum.[5] The colonial collections are by no means dusty relics from a bygone era, but often continue to be used in current research projects. Certain procedures and practices are still interwoven with colonial genealogies of knowledge.[6] Indeed, colonial knowledge hierarchies and academic structures are far from being fully broken up. Worldwide, therefore, demands for further decolonization are becoming louder. This movement takes up the title of a well-known book by the Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o: „Decolonizing the Mind".

Impetus from South Africa for an epistemic reorientation

A look at South Africa shows how strongly questions of representation, memory, and knowledge are interlinked. The „Rhodes Must Fall" campaign started at the University of Cape Town (UCT) campus in February 2015. It was directed against the continuing presence of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes, one of the most notorious actors and profiteers of colonialism in southern Africa. The campaign was the beginning of a comprehensive student protest movement producing offshoots globally. The focus was originally on matters of cultural heritage and the politics of memory. At the same time, however, the University as an institution, and the social conditions reflected in it, were put to the test. Rhodes, whose vision of the British colonial empire in Africa stretched from the Cape of Good Hope in the south to Cairo in the north, had, in the eyes of the protesters, illegally acquired and donated the land on which the University was built. Moreover, he stood symbolically for the colonial foundations of academic knowledge production and transmission.

The South African university landscape is still characterised by knowledge hierarchies, and economic and racialised inequality.[7] The student protests were therefore directed on the one hand against the continuing neo-liberalization of the University. Under the hashtags #insourcing and #feesmustfall, demands were formulated for a socially inclusive university that creates decent working conditions for all employees – from students, to cleaners, to teaching staff. On the other hand, they were about inclusivity in relation to knowledge itself: The critical questioning of the established canon, a stronger sensitization of researchers with regard to their methods and the consequences of implementing them, as well as the inclusion of local forms of knowledge (#decolonize science) were demanded. The debates that followed were and are by no means only related to the situation in South Africa. Nor are they limited to day-to-day political demands. Rather, they are the expression of a structural and epistemic reorientation encompassing all areas of knowledge, as summarized by the South African historian Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni under the term „Epistemic freedom in Africa".[8]

For African Studies in Bayreuth, numerous points of reference result from this. Of particular interest here is the question of how knowledge is made and unmade in specific constellations, how potent such knowledge is, and how it is politically embedded.[9] These South African debates are therefore more than a mere subject of research: They represent a major driving force for the reorientation of African Studies.

„Decolonizing the Mind"

The Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o in his book „Decolonizing the Mind. The Politics of Language in African Literature" calls for the African continent to emancipate itself self-confidently from the dominant influence of Western languages and cultures, and specifically promote its own linguistic diversity. His line of argument has developed in recent debates on epistemic decolonization, and extended to fundamental epistemic questions of knowledge production and theory formation. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o wrote a substantial part of his work in 1984, when he was a visiting professor at the University of Bayreuth. Thirty years later, in May 2014, he was awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Bayreuth for his life's work. The photo shows him at his acceptance speech. (Photo: Peter Kolb).

Colonial war, sheep farming and knowledge production in Namibia

In a joint research project, the social and cultural anthropologist Katharina Schramm (University of Bayreuth) and the historian Memory Biwa (University of Cape Town) investigate the connections between colonial power structures and knowledge production on the basis of the interwoven history of Germany and Namibia. Karakul sheep (also called Swakara in Namibia) are entwined with postcolonial history in many ways. In 1903 the German

Fig. 1: A statue in the Namibian town of Keetmanshoop commemorates the arrival of the first Karakul sheep in 1907. It was ceremoniously unveiled by the President of Namibia in 2017 (Photo: wikimedia commons / CC-BY-SA-4.0).

agricultural scientist Julius Kühn brought the first Karakul sheep from the Caucasus to the University of Halle. In 1907, during the genocidal colonial war waged by the German Reich against Herero and Nama, the first sheep were exported from Halle to the former German South-West Africa. Here sheep breeding quickly developed into a central economic factor, the curly pelt of the lambs ("Persian lamb") being processed into coveted fur coats. At the same time, the sheep played a large part in the colonial land seizure by white settlers. Today, the Swakara breed is considered part of Namibia's national cultural heritage. Beyond these economic and political aspects, sheep played an important role in the formation of disciplinary knowledges in zoology, agriculture, and genetics, as well as in colonial race science. The project has three priorities:

- The investigation of the practices by which the Karakul sheep were integrated into 20th century race science is particularly concerned with how disciplinary knowledge migrated between zoology and human biology, and how the boundary between humans and animals was repeatedly abolished, newly drawn, and shifted. The ideas of "purity", "indigeneity", "degeneration", and "hierarchy" are critically examined and tested for how they have been associated with certain racialized bodies, and continue to have an effect today.

- At the same time, the focus is on the concrete interaction between people and sheep, and the (knowledge) economies linked to them. The project will also investigate the tension between the knowledge of Namibian farm workers and a hierarchical construction of expertise shaped by colonial power relations.

- In addition, the project deals with the connections between silence, memory, and forms of resistance, especially with regard to the experience of colonial violence in the course of the genocide, and the continued expulsion of the local population and its livestock from their land. Following on from Sylvia Wynter's reflections on the coloniality of being, the question of how racializing attributions in colonial knowledge formations have an identity-forming effect but are also undermined will be addressed. The aim is to create an alternative archive that combines historical sound recordings with current material and creates a space for non-discursive knowledge through affective references.[10]

AUTHOR

Prof. Dr. Katharina Schramm is the Chair for Social & Cultural Anthropology at the University of Bayreuth and Member of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence.

1   J. and J. Comaroff (2012), see Recommended reading.

2   Numerous studies point to these connections, including H. Tilley: Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870-1950. Chicago 2012.

3   A. Mafeje: The Ideology of Tribalism. Journal of Modern African Studies (1971), Vol. 9, Issue 2, 253-261. – B. Magubane: A Critical look at Indices Used in the Study often Social change in Colonial Africa. Current Anthropology (1971), Vol. 12, Issue 4-5, 419-431.

4   See, for example, I. Heumann et al.: Dinosaur fragments: The history of the Tendaguru expedition and its objects, 1906-2018. Göttingen 2018.

5   The discussion was recently triggered anew by a report commissioned by French President Macron. Abbreviated version in German: F. Sarr, B. Savoy: Give it back. On the Restitution of African Cultural Heritage. Berlin 2019.

6   This applies above all to the life sciences. Vgl. K. Schramm (2014), see Recommended reading.

7   See also S. Dubow: Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa. Cambridge 1995. – The term "racialization" refers to the processes of the historical construction of physical and cultural diversity along categories such as white, black, etc. The term refers to the embedding of these processes in colonial power relations and does not mark any "natural" differences.

8   S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018), see Recommended reading.

9   This question is also a central topic in the "Knowledges" section of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence.

10   S. Wynter (2003): Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation -- An Argument. CR: The New Centennial Review, Vol. 3, No 3, 257-337. DOI 10.1353/ncr.2004.0015.

■ Carolin Herzog

Legal Studies in the East African Community

Experience and prospects in cooperative research and teaching

■ *In the library of the Tanzanian-German Centre for Eastern African Legal Studies at the School of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam (Photo: TGCL).*

When the Tanzanian-German Centre for Eastern African Legal Studies (TGCL), a cooperation project between the Universities of Dar es Salaam and Bayreuth, was founded eleven years ago at the University of Dar es Salaam, nobody would have dreamed that it would one day become one of the most important research centres and networks for regional integration in Africa. The research focus is on the law of the East African Community (EAC), comprising of the six member states Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. With a study programme on EAC law and regional integration law, the TGCL qualifies outstanding East African lawyers to assume leadership responsibility in their region. The programme not only focuses on legal education at the highest level, but also attaches great importance to the personality-building of its students, as well as interdisciplinarity and intercultural exchange.

The TGCL has been funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) since 2008. To date, it has trained 131 master's and 27 PhD students from all six member states in the law of the East African Community and the law of regional integration. The TGCL has already acquired a reputation as a leading research and training institution in this field of law.

Comparative law teaching in view of regional integration

Regional economic communities are playing an increasingly important role in the economic and social development of African countries. For EAC countries to operate successfully and achieve their objectives, a consensus on economic policy among member states is indispensable. Removing barriers to the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital is an essential aspect in promoting cross-border activities. A central instrument for strengthening regional integration is legal harmonisation. Only if there is a common environment in the field of economic law will it be possible to permanently reduce or eliminate obstacles to international trade within a regional community. The EAC is therefore also working to create a favourable climate for flourishing trade, investment, production, and positive competition in the individual member states, and thereby in the region as a whole, through legal harmonisation. These aspects of EAC law form part of the central study programme of the TGCL.

The TGCL study programme comprises a master's programme (LLM) and a doctoral programme (PhD) and is characterised by a comparative law approach. Students therefore not only acquire knowledge of the law of the East African Community, but also familiarise themselves with the legal and political conditions of other regional economic communities, such as the European Union. The Centre benefits from Tanzanian-German cooperation, which provides East African students and researchers with valuable insights into German and European law.

Professors and lecturers of the School of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam supervise the LLM and PhD students, and hold the core legal courses of the TGCL study programme. Instruction is also provided by numerous renowned and proven teachers from the East African region, Southern Africa, and Europe. In this way, professors of the University of Bayreuth are regular guests in Dar es Salaam teaching at the TGCL.

Annual study trips to an East African capital and to Europe strengthen the comparative approach of the TGCL, which is reflected in the LLM dissertations and doctoral theses. Visits to EU institutions enable students to deepen their theoretical knowledge and establish comparative links between East Africa and Europe. The comparison between the integration processes in East Africa on the one hand and in Europe on the other is of great interest to both sides - particularly because each of the two integration alliances is made up of states whose legal systems are shaped on the one hand by common law and on the other by civil law. Therefore, both the EAC and the EU face the challenge of bringing these different traditions of their member states together in a common legal environment.

„With the aim of advancing regional integration in East Africa, the TGCL has been a pioneer in training experts in research and decision-makers in politics since 2008. I am proud and above all grateful to be part of the young generation of TGCL graduates and their dynamic network – especially in a historic situation where a growing number of African countries are preparing to strengthen their links with each other through trade and the free movement of persons."

Louis A. Gitinywa, LLM
(TGCL Alumnus 2016/17),
Lawyer, Rwanda Bar Association

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■ Carolin Herzog is Manager of the Tanzanian-German Centre for Eastern African Legal Studies (TGCL).

„Studying at TGCL has opened my eyes to a variety of opportunities to explore economic integration in East Africa from a new perspective. Stakeholders in this integration should make it their business to promote legal education and research related to the East African community through TGCL."

Cecilia Ngaiza, LLM
(TGCL Alumna 2017/18), research associate and BIGSAS doctoral researcher at the University of Bayreuth

Cooperative research, living integration

In the field of research, the TGCL organises conferences and numerous workshops. Experts from Africa and Europe come together here to reflect on the goals and challenges of regional integration and to develop new approaches. For example, a research workshop in August 2015 was devoted to the topic: „Eastern African Common Legal Space in Economic Law: State of the Art and Future Perspectives, with Consideration of the European Experience". The focus was on the harmonisation of private economic law in East Africa and in the European Union, in particular in the areas of commercial law, competition law, intellectual property law, labour law, and private international law. Together the participants identified the impact of regional economic communities on national laws and obstacles to regional integration – in relation to the EAC, and in relation to other African regional economic communities and the EU. The results were published in 2018 in the „TGCL Series" and attracted international attention.

A special feature of the research projects and workshops is the high rate participation by TGCL alumni. Numerous graduates of the Centre continue to be active in research and teaching in the member states of the East African Community. They deepen their legal competencies in the field of regional integration and act as multipliers by passing on their knowledge to the next generations of students. Joint networking is a model for living integration: The exchange of experiences between students helps to familiarise them with the different legal systems of the EAC member states, and with inter-

Fig. 1: Students of the TGCL in front of the Weston Building, where the School of Law is located on the campus of the University of Dar es Salaam (Photo: TGCL).

> „The comparison between the integration processes in East Africa and in Europe is of great interest to both sides."

> *„Studying at TGCL has been one of the highlights of my career so far. Not only have I made lifelong contacts, but I have also gained in-depth access to the theory and practice of regional integration through research excursions in the East African Community and the European Union."*
>
> Emmanuel Sebijo, LLM
> (TGCL Alumnus 2016/17), founder and research associate, Centre for Law, Economics and Policy on East African Integration, Kampala, Uganda

> *„In essence, TGCL is concerned with the excellence of EAC law. I hope that the resulting research will show the member states of the East African Community how the difficulties associated with legal integration can be alleviated."*
>
> Dr. Denis Bikesha (TGCL Alumnus 2012-15), Ag. Dean, University of Rwanda School of Law

cultural differences within the region. The contacts established in the process remain in place well beyond the one-year joint master's programme. Sustainable cross-border cooperation has thus emerged in recent years. This was also reflected in two alumni conferences, which the Centre hosted in 2018. The large number of professional positions in which TGCL graduates today hold responsibilities in government, business, and civil society was impressively demonstrated here.

Future prospects

When the TGCL was founded in 2008, it was one of five institutions that the Federal Foreign Office supported via the DAAD within the framework of the „Aktion Afrika – Fachzentren zur Eliteförderung" (Action Africa – Centres of Excellence). In line with the concept of „Action Africa", the programme and structure of the TGCL were designed for sustainability from the outset. The integration into the University of Dar es Salaam School of Law will guarantee that in the future, under the full direction of the School of Law, the TGCL will further develop and expand its role as a centre for excellence in law. It will continue to support and promote regional integration within the East African Community with its legal expertise. Interdisciplinarity is to be given greater prominence here than in the past. Having already established regular seminars on economic fundamentals in the study programme, interdisciplinary teaching and research activities in political science, economics, and law are to be further intensified.

The lively scientific exchange that has developed between the Faculty of Law of the University of Dar es Salaam and the Faculty of Law, Business and Economics of the University of Bayreuth also forms the basis for research projects that will be promoted in the coming years under the umbrella of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence. For example, the pro-

ject „Human Rights, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Interacting Markets in Africa" will address human rights and corporate responsibility in the context of African regional economic communities. The focus here is on collective human rights, which can be seen as a peculiarity in the African context. Several African countries have recently enacted laws that prescribe corporate social responsibility (CSR). This practice seems to contradict the „Western" view of CSR as a voluntary commitment; however, this view is also undergoing a process of change.

„The regional integration of countries is similar to the interdependence of people with one another. It is crucial that the participating countries benefit from each other's economic advantages."

Miriam Mbole, LLB (TGCL student 2018/19)

For this reason, the overlap between human rights granted by the state and social responsibility taken over by companies will be examined more closely, particularly in the areas of the environment, renewable energies, and climate change in interacting regional markets. In these analyses, the effects of the multi-layered relationships between state and non-state actors also play a major role, which in turn are influenced by the legal framework.

In the future, this and other planned projects will further deepen the successful research cooperation that the Tanzanian-German Centre for Eastern

African Legal Studies has initiated as a cooperation project of the Universities of Bayreuth and Dar es Salaam.

RECOMMENDED READING

J. Döveling, H. I. Majamba, R. F. Oppong and U. Wanitzek (eds.): Harmonisation of Laws in the East African Community. The State of Affairs with Comparative Insights from the European Union and Other Regional Economic Communities. TGCL Series Vol. 5. Nairobi 2018.

K. Kasanga: Protection of Human Rights in East Africa by Human Rights Commissions: A Case Study of Tanzania. TGCL Research Series Vol. 6. Dar es Salaam 2018.

J. L. Kanywanyi, U. Wanitzek, A. Nahayo and J. Döveling (eds.): Regional Integration and Law: East African and European Perspectives. TGCL Series Vol. 4. Dar es Salaam 2014.

O. R. Owino: Trans-Boundary Resource Cooperation in the Lake Victoria Basin: An International Environmental Law Perspective. TGCL Research Series Vol. 5. Nairobi 2017.

■ *Fig. 2 (upper right): International exchange in the work rooms of the TGCL (Photo: TGCL).*

■ *Fig. 3: The TGCL students of the year 2018/2019 (Photo: TGCL).*

■ Gilbert Hagabimana
Omondi Robert Owino
Daniel Shayo
Ulrike Wanitzek

Plastic, no thanks!

**Plastic bans
in the states of the
East African Community**

■ *Shopping bags and baskets made of natural materials, as here in Kenya, are increasingly replacing the formerly popular but environmentally harmful plastic bags (Photo: Omondo Robert Owino).*

The member states of the East African Community react with increasing attention and concern to the health and environmental consequences of using disposable plastic goods. Rwanda led the way by introducing a partial ban on such goods as early as 2008. Hon. Patricia Hajabakiga from Rwanda, a member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), took the first transnational initiative in 2011: She introduced a bill in this legislative body on the EAC-wide control of polyether materials. However, this project ultimately failed due to objections from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, where a decline in investment was feared. The same fate befell another bill, which was introduced in the EALA by the same MP in 2016, but has not been passed to this day. Thus, it remains up to the individual EAC member states to monitor and reduce the environmental and health impacts of plastics through their respective national legislation. As a result, there are significant differences within the EAC, both in terms of legislation and enforcement. These become particularly evident in the use of plastic bags in people's everyday lives.

Rwanda

The small East African country Rwanda has developed into a role model in many respects. Its achievements in environmental protection have gained worldwide attention – and they are indeed remarkable. Today, Rwanda is seen as a pioneer of sustainable environmental policy. Indeed, it was the first EAC member country to implement a permanent ban on plastic bags.

In 2000, the Rwandan government published „Vision 2020", which gave high priority to environmental protection. Following on from this, the University of Rwanda, in collaboration with the Rwanda Environment Management Authority of Rwanda (REMA), developed a scientific study that showed the serious side effects of widespread use of plastic bags. Because a reliable system for recycling plastic bags could not be implemented in a timely manner, the government decided to ban them through Law No. 57/2008 of 10 September 2008 which prohibited the production, import, use, and sale of polythene plastic bags in Rwanda.

This ban was implemented in two stages. In the first few years, government measures focused on raising public awareness of the harmful effects of plastic in the environment, and on bringing about a

sea change in awareness. Only then did the government introduce sanctions and state controls. Violations of the ban on plastic bags were punishable by prison sentences of between six and twelve months, or fines of €100 - 500. As a result of the comprehensive ban and its rigorous enforcement, the Rwandan capital of Kigali is now one of the cleanest cities in Africa. This new-found image has contributed to the trend of more and more tourists visiting Rwanda – visible proof that the actions of legislators and government are having an effect.

But Rwanda's commitment to protecting the environment did not stop at banning plastic bags. It has recently reached another milestone on the road to better protection of the environment and health through the adoption of Law No. 17/2019 of 10 August 2019 relating to the prohibition of manufacturing, importation, use and sale not only of plastic carry bags but also of any single-use plastic items.

■ Fig. 1: Founded in 2000, the East African Community (EAC) comprises the founding states Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as well as their neighbouring states Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. There is already a common market; in the long term, a monetary union and the creation of a federal market are to be established (Illustration: Michael Wegener / Julia Blauhut).

The law entered into force on 23 September with the publication in the official gazette and replaced Law No. 57/2008. Apart from the much wider scope of the new law – including any single-use plastic items – it also introduces severe sanctions towards any kind of violation of its provisions. For instance, in the case of manufacturing of the above-mentioned items, apart from dispossession of the items, an administrative fine equivalent to € 9,700 is due whereas their importation is liable to their dispossession and an administrative fine equivalent to ten times of their value.

Critical observers have pointed out, however, that these successes would not have been possible without the decidedly authoritarian style of government prevalent in Rwanda.

„It remains up to the individual member states of the East African Community to monitor and reduce the environmental and health impacts of plastics through their respective national legislation."

Kenya

It's a sunny Saturday in late June 2019 in Nairobi. The supermarkets are overcrowded with customers intent on replenishing their stocks of food and daily commodities for the next month. The attentive observer won't fail to notice that most shoppers are carrying eco-friendly fabric bags, baskets and re-

usable synthetic bags bearing colourful logos. There is no trace of the infamous plastic bags that otherwise appear scattered all over Kenya.

This turnaround would have been unthinkable just one and a half years ago, when supermarkets in Kenya supplied their customers with tons of free plastic bags. It is estimated that before the plastic bag ban, up to 86,000 plastic bags were distributed daily in Nairobi alone, while 24 million plastic bags were consumed nationwide each month. Because

supermarkets didn't charge extra for the bags, it was more convenient to throw them away carelessly instead of reusing them. This resulted in serious environmental damage in most major Kenyan cities, and even in rural areas. Plastic bags spoiled the landscape in most areas. They accumulated on landfills, blocked sewers and got into the food of farm animals. They provided breeding sites for malaria-transmitting parasites, besides polluting rivers and damaging marine life.

On 14 March 2017, the Kenyan government intervened: According to Gazette Notice No. 2334, not only the manufacture and import of plastic bags was banned on the basis of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act, which provides the legal framework for the Kenyan plastics ban, but also their use as packaging materials in private households and commerce.

The Kenya Association of Manufacturers, however, took the case to court, arguing, among other things, that the ban would impose unnecessary social and economic costs on the population. In addition, they claimed the ban was doomed to failure, anyway, judging by the fate of similar initiatives in other countries. The Environment and Land Court in Nairobi, however, was not to be deterred. On 6 June 2018, it reiterated its view that the ban on plastic bags served the common good. The legislature imposed tough sanctions to enforce the ban: Anyone who is caught manufacturing, selling, or using bags or other prohibited objects made of plastic must expect a prison sentence of up to four years or a fine of €17,000 - 34,000.

Technophile critics have come down hard on Kenya for this rigorous approach. But in view of the fact that industrial recycling of plastic waste in Kenya is sorely underdeveloped, and modern recycling technologies remain lacking by and large, an unconditional prohibition on plastic bags is currently the only sensible option.

Tanzania

Plastic bags – anyone can carry them, at any time, and virtually any everyday object can be carried in them. In Tanzania, the plastic bag is still called „Rambo" today, like the world-famous film character who was pictured on many of these bags in the mid-1990s. At the time, the plastic bag had driven all other types of carrier bags out of the market. It became customary not only to transport clothes, medicines or schoolbooks in these bags, but even to pack food such as French fries in them. It is estimated that between twelve and 15 plastic bags were needed for everyday purchases of food such as fruit and vegetables. They were cheaper, and almost everyone could afford them. Baskets and paper bags, on the other hand, were considered inefficient, short-lived and more expensive from the early 1990s to the early 2000s.

Fig. 4: The spread of plastic waste in the proximity of residential areas, as here in Kenya, led to the rigorous legal ban on plastic bags (Photo: Luvin Yash / Shutterstock.com).

RECOMMENDED READING

P. Behuria: The comparative political economy of plastic bag bans in East Africa: why implementation has varied in Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda. GDI Working Paper 2019-037. University of Manchester. Manchester 2019. www.academia.edu/38499498

Fig. 5: Sale of alternative carrier bags and baskets on Zanzibar (Photo: Denis Zagoskin / Shutterstock.com).

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In light of the harmful effects on the environment and health, this „customer's best friend" proved to be a wolf in sheep's clothing. Because recycling facilities and efficient waste disposal were lacking, the flood of plastic bags developed into a universal threat that – among other harmful effects – clogged urban sewage systems. In view of these problems, the governments of mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar responded with legal measures against the production and use of plastic bags.

However, the regulations issued in 2006 and 2015 for mainland Tanzania were a failure because they contained only limited bans. On 1 June 2019, the new Environment Management (Prohibition of Plastic Carrier Bags) Regulations came into force. They completely banned the manufacture, distribution, import, and use of plastic bags, and provided incentives for the use of alternatives. In the same spirit, the 2009 and 2011 regulations for Zanzibar had already been replaced in 2018 by the Ban on Plastic Carry Bags Regulations, which are still in force today.

The enforcement of mainland Tanzanian regulations involves institutions such as the police, the immigration authorities, the Tanzanian tax authorities, environmental inspectors, and local regulatory authorities. The latter, in particular, are obliged to implement programmes in support of the plastic bag ban with the aim of increasing public information and awareness. In addition, a number of sanctions have been imposed in support of the ban. For example, a manufacturer in mainland Tanzania who violates the ban on plastic bags may face a fine of up to €395,000, or a prison sentence of two years or more. In general, the population in both parts of Tanzania has adhered to the ban on plastics. The environment has become cleaner! Hard sanctions are not just provided for in law, they are actually implemented. For example, in May 2019, 621 kilograms of plastic bags were confiscated on Zanzibar and 149 people were arrested.

Nevertheless, there are mixed feelings among the population. On the one hand, the positive effects of the ban on plastics for both the environment and people are unmistakable. For example, the ban on Zanzibar opens up new markets for alternative carrier bags produced in the country. Plastic bags, in contrast, are imported goods. On the other hand, there are complaints that the cost of living has risen as a result of the ban, because alternative bags are up to ten times more expensive than plastic bags. While a plastic bag costs the equivalent of four cents, an alternative bag of the same size is sold for 40 cents. However, it is expected that financial and economic incentives instituted politically will make the production and import of alternative bags cheaper, and thus lower their selling price. It certainly doesn't help that the alternative carrier bags currently available are said to be of poor quality. The Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) sees this as only a temporary problem, and is urging manufacturers to comply with the standards recognised by the TBS.

The debates about the inflated cost and poor quality of alternative bags and packaging are an indication that the government did not sufficiently prepare the country's manufacturers for the plastic ban. Again, the departure from the popular but dangerous plastic bags and the resulting long-term benefits do have their price.

Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan

In Uganda there were strong endeavours to ban plastic bags completely, just like in Kenya. But numerous attempts have failed in the hands of a government that half-heartedly stopped short of a complete ban. In fact, over the past twelve years, legislators have repeatedly banned plastic bags, most recently in the 2009 Finance Act. But the necessary political will to enforce such bans has repeatedly been lacking, especially when met with resistance from plastic bag manufacturers. As a result, the cultural transition to a society without plastic bags is still pending.

Meanwhile, Burundi recently followed in Rwanda's footsteps: In August 2018, a presidential decree came into force prohibiting the import, manufacture, marketing, and use of bags and other plastic packaging. The aim was to promote the production of alternative packaging – such as biodegradable sacks and bags – and their use in private households, trade, and various sectors of industry. The state ban allowed for reasonable exemptions: The use of plastics is still permitted in the field of

medical services, for the packaging of pharmaceuticals or industrial goods, as material for sewage pipes, in the construction industry, and for research and teaching purposes.

In contrast to the legislation in Rwanda, however, the decree does not contain any clear provisions regarding its implementation. There are still some hurdles to overcome in this respect. The decree requires that plastic bottles and other plastic waste be returned to the dealers, who in turn must ensure the storage, recycling or valorisation of the waste. It is doubtful that this can be achieved, given that there are still no recycling facilities in Burundi. This is probably one of the reasons why the decree has not led to any significant changes in everyday life. But it is still too early for a final assessment. The period of grace expires on 7 February 2020. By then, private households, traders, and companies are expected to be able to comply with the decree.

Finally, in South Sudan, the newest member state of the EAC, plastic bags are mainly imported from Uganda, but also from Sudan and Kenya. They are mainly used in large cities like Juba, where it is not uncommon for scattered plastic bags to pollute the environment. Thankfully, rural areas have so far been spared. Therefore, it seems that plastic carrier bags in South Sudan, unlike in the other EAC states, have not become a countrywide problem so far.

The South Sudan Ministry for the Environment and Forestry allegedly banned the import and use of plastic bags in 2015. But no decree or other legislative instrument to bring about such a ban can be verified. The legal basis for the alleged ban is unclear. It was not until 2015 that Parliament approved the 2015-2025 National Environment Policy – until then there had been no clear, reliably documented environmental policy in South Sudan. This was not least due to the protracted, sometimes civil war-like conflicts that stood in the way of the development of a solid, legally sound environmental policy. If it is true that a ban on plastic bags has actually come into force, it could be said that to some extent it is a preventive measure in order to prevent a flooding of the country with plastic waste.

■ *Fig. 6: The Ham Shopping Mall in Makerere, a district of the Ugandan capital Kampala (Photo: Andreas Marquardt / Shutterstock.com).*

AUTHORS

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Alexander Stroh-Steckelberg

Africa's presidents in competition

Election losers as object of democratization research

Democracy as a model of governance is all too often linked to the politics of the West. Scepticism about its transferability to non-Western societies remains strong. For many years, the relevant specialist literature has endeavoured to emphasise and explain the different paths of development, and the differentiation of forms of rule in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Yet this does not always penetrate into the prevailing social, political, or even scientific discourses.

For comparative research into democratization, a look at the 55 states of Africa is tantalizing indeed.[1] Even since the days of political independence, the continent has had a wide variety of different stories to tell. More recently, Nigeria and Ghana, for example, have made positive headlines because their presidents have had to admit defeat in democratic contests. Botswana and Mauritius have been ruled democratically since the 1960s. Benin and Cape Verde [2] are examples of democratic consolidation following the epochal wave of democratization in the early 1990s.

Elsewhere, attempts at democratization triggered by this wave have led to a surprisingly persistent grey area between democracy and autocracy, for example in Kenya or Zambia. In some states, such as the Central African Republic, they have collapsed completely. Cameroon and Rwanda, on the other hand, have, like other states, only taken superficial steps towards democratization: Although such procedures were anchored in constitutional law and multi-party elections were formally introduced, these measures have not woken any „democratic spirit" capable of shaping public life or the behaviour of political leaders. Hence, national elections in which different political groups are allowed to participate may be a necessary indicator, but are by no means sufficient proof of democratic rule. Eritrea and the Kingdom of Eswatini are currently the only African states to de jure waive national multiparty elections.

Selected centres of power

However, as a necessary element of democracy, electoral contests deserve special attention. Presidential elections deservedly attract the greatest public and scientific attention. On the African continent, there are predominantly presidential systems of government that have a directly elected head of state who cannot be deposed for political reasons, and who has direct power to govern. Some government systems in Africa can also be described as semi-presidential because a prime minister formally heads the government. Yet even in these cases, African presidents overwhelmingly enjoy much greater power than the prototypical US president or the French president.

African presidents are not all equally powerful, but formally and informally they are typically more powerful than most other elected executive leaders in the world. This power often goes hand in hand with


Fig. 1: African presidential elections with at least two candidates from 1990 to 2018 (n=195), blue = respect for term limits (n=23), red = incumbent's election defeat (n=23), green = incumbent's re-election (n=122), grey = other cases (author's presentation using www.iconarchive.com).

Number of elections in which incumbents stood for re-election

Number of all presidential elections

Percentage of presidential defeats in all elections

Percentage of presidential defeats in elections for which the incumbent ran

Percentage of elections in which a limitation on terms of office was respected

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Fig. 2: Economic cycle of electoral defeats of incumbent presidents compared to the effectiveness of term limits (data basis: AfriPrElDa 4.2).

Gambia

South
Sudan

Eritrea

Somalia

■ Regular multi-party elections before 1990
■ No multi-party elections planned (today)
■ No multi-party elections conducted for many years

Mauritius

Botswana

Eswatini (Swaziland)

■ *Fig. 3: Map of Africa
re multi-party elections
(Illustration: Map source:
GeoCurrents Customiz-
able Base Map).*

strong personalization and a weakening of the role of political parties. On the one hand, strong presidents are regarded as anchors of stability in many places. On the other hand, the constitutional legislators of many countries have tried to throw out a lifeline against excessive presidential power at the same time: They have limited the maximum term of office of presidents, usually to two terms. Since 1990, there have been constitutional limitations on the terms of office in 38 African states.[3] There is a lively debate in the literature about the effectiveness of these regulations.

Elections are lost in democracies

Between 1990 and 2018, 195 presidential elections were held in sub-Saharan Africa. In 122 of these elections, incumbents were re-elected. In 23 cases,

„Since 2010, the number of actively voted out presidents has risen sharply. Indeed, every fifth president standing for re-election has been defeated by a competitor."

i.e. about every ninth election, incumbent presidents respected a ban on re-election. So the lifeline held. In at least 15 cases, the incumbents managed to push through a constitutional amendment in time to allow them to be re-elected.[4] On closer inspection, however, one might question critically whether an incumbent's respect for limitations to their term of office is generally suitable as an indicator for progress in democratization. In ten of the 23 cases, respect for term limits has opened the door to succession from within the ruling party. Tanzania has provided three such instances. There are therefore many indications that well-organized predominant parties with a limited will to democratize can not only afford to respect the limitations of their terms of office, but can also use them as a source of legitimacy.

Another interesting statistic has been largely overlooked in the research so far: In another 23 cases between 1990 and 2018, incumbent presidents lost an election and accepted defeat. Here, peaceful changes of government resulted. The potential significance of these cases was expressed in a simple formula by the renowned democracy researcher Adam Przeworski: „Democracy is a system of government in which parties lose elections." [5] In presidential government systems, it is all the more true that the democratic character of rule manifests itself in the electorate exercising its right to vote out incumbent presidents. One can argue conclusively as follows: The peaceful change of power based on an immediate election decision corresponds to the appropriation of democratic opportunities by the electorate; while on the other hand, the limitation of term of office forestalls an electorate forcing the implementation of democratic changes of government.

Increase in presidential defeats

It therefore seems obvious that presidential defeats signify a gain for democratization. However, even in these 23 cases it is worth taking a closer look. In fact, the field of election losers can be divided according to which of the last three decades they belong: In the 1990s, former autocrats in particular, who were presidents in office but had not come to power through pluralistic elections, were defeated. Among them were such illustrious names as Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, and Mathieu Kérékou, President of Benin. Both had overestimated their chances of succeeding in a democratic ballot. In the 2000s, electoral ejection of incumbent presi-

dents was rare. The effectiveness of term limits was critical for regime change.

Since 2010, the number of actively voted out presidents has risen sharply. Indeed, every fifth president standing for re-election has been defeated by a competitor. In contrast to the 1990s, these were people who had themselves come to power via the ballot box – with the exception of the President of Gambia, Yayah Jammeh. He accepted his defeat in 2016 only after massive international pressure – especially from the West African Community of States ECOWAS.

The President of Côte d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, who was elected in 2000, did not go to the polls for ten years, ostensibly because of the violent conflict in his country, until he was voted out of office in 2010. The outcome of the election was highly controversial due to the dubious behaviour of all concerned, including the National Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Court responsible for announcing the results. Deep mistrust among the political competitors did not allow for an amicable solution. Gbagbo did not accept defeat and, with the support of France, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations, had to be forcibly expelled from office. The removal of Manuel Pinto da Costa from office in the island state of São Tomé and Príncipe in 2016 also remains controversial. The incumbent complained of alleged fraud and boycotted the run-off election, but ultimately did not block the takeover of power by his elected successor.

Somaliland also offers a remarkable example of a presidential election defeat: President Dahir Kahin lost office in 2010. It is doubtful, however, that his voting out reflects any seizing of democratic opportunities by the electorate. In fact, the powerful clans in Somaliland had agreed on a rotational procedure to fill the presidential office, which ruled out a re-election of the incumbent. Dahir Kahin „had to" lose.

In a number of countries, the sometimes close and sometimes unforeseen voting out of presidents can be seen as an indication that democratic procedures have been consolidated, and that the electorate is making confident use of its democratic opportunities. This is true, observers largely agree, at least for the defeats of presidents in Zambia (Rupiah Banda, 2011), Senegal (Abdoulaye Wade, 2012), Malawi (Joyce Banda, 2014), Nigeria (Goodluck Jonathan, 2015), and Ghana (John Mahama, 2017).

In view of this broad spectrum of different developments, researchers should not allow themselves to be distracted in trying to explain the phenomenon of „presidential deselection" in Africa in general. This temptation is particularly great for quantitative comparative research, since it is an easily measurable event – just like compliance with or disregard for term limits, by the way. It would be better to ask when presidential defeats can actually act as aids to democratization. At least none of the explanations for the voting out of John Mahama in Ghana [6] seem likely to lead to a generally applicable theory. More recently, African presidents have lost elections even in countries where there has been little experience of peaceful transition, where there has been no open political atmosphere, and where the incumbent president could not have been blamed for an economic slump.

Conclusion

It is noteworthy that the new trend of presidential defeats in Africa is opening up an interesting field of research. At first glance, the electoral expulsion of incumbent presidents appears to be a better indicator of gains in democracy than the much-discussed existence of and compliance with constitutional limitations on terms of office. However, any euphoria needs to be reined in. The observed election defeats of the current decade tell very different stories as we near its end, ones which can only be properly classified through precise case studies and systematic comparative research.

1 With the internationally unrecognized, state-like entities of Somaliland and Western Sahara, the number rises to 57.

2 Samuel Huntington coined the term „wave" with his widely acclaimed book „The Third Wave" (Norman, Oklahoma 1991).

3 D.M. Tull, C. Simons: The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa. Africa Spectrum (2017), 52 (2), 87.

4 Ibid., 86.

5 „Democracy is a system of government in which parties lose elections." – A. Przeworski: Democracy and the Market. Cambridge 1991, 10.

6 N. Cheeseman et al.: The Ebbing Power of Incumbency. Journal of Democracy (2017), 28(2), 92-104.

■ Fig. 4: Kenneth David Kaunda, Zambia's first president, served from 1964 until he was voted out of office in 1991 (Photo: wikimedia commons / William M. Firaneck).

■ Fig. 5: Muhammad Buhari, President of Nigeria, won the 2015 presidential election against the incumbent Jonathan Goodluck. From 1983 to 1985, after a military coup, he had already been head of state of his country once before (Photo: wikimedia commons / Chatham House).

■ Amal S. M. Obeidi

Local reconciliation in Libya

An evaluation of the local agreements since 2011

■ *Street of houses in Benghazi in September 2019 (Photo: Amal S. M. Obeidi).*

Local reconciliation is among the most important aspects underlying settlement and conflict resolution processes within communities, and usually adopts a traditional form through traditional actors such as traditional leaders, tribal elders, tribe members, notables or wise men. The mechanisms adopted by these reconciliation processes depend largely upon local customs, and whether or not they are socially accepted as an alternative to adjudicating disputed matters. Customs derive their strength from their inherited social appreciation, meaning and respect, in addition to their moral authority, which strongly influences the parties in conflict to not resort to violence again after they have accepted the result of the customary reconciliation process.

Local reconciliation may be defined as a social process that reflects collective efforts at the local community level. It includes the processes, initiatives, and activities of interest to communities involved in conflict, aimed at reaching settlements agreed upon by the parties in conflict.[1] Local reconciliation in Libya is one of the most prominent conflict-solving mechanisms at the local level, contributing significantly to the alleviation of conflict during different historical periods. It has played a big role since the fall of the Qadhafi regime in 2011 that left an institutional and security vacuum in which tribes and their traditional leaders managed to substitute these institutions.

Local reconciliation based on traditional mechanisms, like customs, are among the most prominent tools for settling conflicts at the local level in Libya. These conflicts have often been tribal, territorial, murder-related, or social, such as marriage and divorce. However, after 2011, most of these conflicts were politicized and rekindled as a result of the political divisions that emerged after the classification of cities and

tribes into either pro-Qadhafi regime or supportive of the February Revolution. These armed conflicts resulted in social schism and displacement that plagued many areas. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the Misrata-Tawergha case, where the armed conflict and its repercussion after 2011 led to the displacement of the citizens of Tawergha to various areas in Libya. The Misrata-Tawergha issue is one of the most important cases of reconciliation in Libya. Resolving it would support the process of community and national reconciliation in general.[2]

An evaluation of local reconciliation agreements since 2011

Since 2011, local reconciliations of any conflict have taken on a traditional character, carried out through committees formed by tribal sheikhs in the region or proposed by tribes from outside. Civil society activists are sometimes invited to take part in the reconciliation processes. Conditions and mechanisms are usually set in order to initiate the settlement of disputes at the local level. The results of such settlements often take the form of crisis management rather than genuine reconciliation between the conflicting parties. These initiatives seek to end the violence, establish cease-fires between the conflicting parties, and allow the exchange of prisoners and the wounded. They are often temporary demands by all parties. In general, many of these agreements are breached, and problems soon begin to reappear between the conflicting parties because the solutions were not radical enough, and no guarantees were made for peace to continue between the parties.

The most prominent local reconciliation agreement since 2011 has been the document drawn up by the

This section and certain parts of this article are based on in-depth interviews with several sheikhs, local tribal leaders, civil society members concerned with national and local reconciliation issues in Libya, who have participated in many of the activities related to the process of reconciliation at the local and national levels.

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■ *Fig. 1: The signing of the treaty between Misrata and Tawergha in Misrata city, 3 June 2018 (Photo: Reprint with kind permission from Emad Shnab, one of the members of Misrata youth who witnessed the agreement).*

„A lack of the State's role, particularly the security aspect, is one of the most important challenges of the reconciliation projects."

■ *Chart 1: Overview and key data of the agreements in Libya since 2011.*

Obeidat tribe on the killing of the Libyan army chief of staff and two of his comrades who had been kidnapped by extremist groups. This happened after the public prosecutor summoned the former for interrogation at the behest of Chairman of the National Transitional Council Mustafa Abdul Jalil. Other prominent agreements include the National Transitional Council Convention with the Tuareg Tribes (2011), the Toubou and Tuareg Agreement (2014), the Toubou and Tuareg Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (2015), the Agreement on Cooperation and Peaceful Coexistence between the Qadhadfa and Awlad Suleiman Tribes (2016), the Reconciliation Agreement between the Toubou and Awlad Suleiman Tribes (2017), the Misrata-Tawergha Agreement on the Return of the Displaced and the Compensation of Victims (2016), and the Peace Treaty between Misrata and Tawergha (2018), as shown in the table below.[3]

Through a general evaluation of the reconciliation agreements and an analysis of its terms, the following observations can be made:

■ Most agreements involved a comprehensive and lasting reconciliation between the two parties without installing the mechanisms and means to achieve this.
■ Therefore, many of these agreements were not successful in the implementation of their provisions.

The most prominent example of this is the Misrata-Tawergha agreement, which has several outstanding obstacles that hinder its implementation. These obstacles include the security situation impeding the provision of services in the city. The security situation is one of the most important obstacles impeding the return and stability of the people of Tawergha city, which still lacks the basic requirements of life. Therefore, re-establishing security services and facilitating the search for the missing are considered the most important conditions for the return of citizens, not to mention rehabilitating the city and providing necessary services such as electricity and the maintenance of schools.[4]

■ In cases where there was international involvement in the reconciliation processes, reference was made to the issue of „reparation" and compensation. The agreements generally stipulated that the external mediator (namely Italy and Qatar) shall pay the amount of compensation to the affected parties. In the Libyan-sponsored agreements, the reparation and damages were not mentioned except for the Misrata-Tawergha agreement and the peace treaty between the two cities in June 2018, which emphasized the commitment of executive authorities in the Libyan state to implement the conditions of the agreement signed between the two parties.[5]

■ Absence of strong state institutions and political will is the main reason for the failure of many of these agreements on the ground, especially since the implementation of measures like reparation and accountability in particular requires the support of the State.

Document	Type of Document	Actors	Location	Sponsored
El-Obeidat tribe statement July 2011	Statement	El-Obeidat Tribe	Benghazi	The Obeidat tribe with the support of other tribes
NTC Agreement 2011	Agreement	NTC and Tuareg tribes	Ghadames	Chief of Staff of Libyan Army
Tebu and Tuareg agreement 2014	Agreement	Tebu and Tuareg	Sabha	The Social Council of Werfala tribes-Bani Waid and the South
Tebu and Tuareg peace and reconciliation agreement (2015)	Agreement	Tebu and Tuareg	Doha	The Government of Qatar
Accord of peaceful coexistence agreement between Qadhadfa and Awlad Suleiman tribes 2016	Agreement	Qadhadfa and Awlad Suleiman Tribes	Sabha	Zintan, Tarhouna and Souq El Juma tribes
Tebu and Awlad Suleiman Tribes Agreement 2017	Agreement	Tebu and Awlad Suleiman	Rome	Italian Government
Misrata-Tawergha Agreement, 2016	Agreement Minutes	Misrata and Tawergha	Tunis	UNSMIL and Presidential Council
Misrata-Tawergha Agreement, 2018	Reconciliation Covenant	Misrata and Tawergha	Misrata	Misrata Municipal Council, UNSMIL; and some municipal councils in Libya

Challenges to the local reconciliation process

There are a number of challenges facing reconciliation at the local level in particular and the national level in general. Among these challenges are the spread of weapons, armed groups, and institutions that are parallel to state security institutions, obstructing any reconciliation agreements. A lack of provision of the State's role, particularly the security aspect, is one of the most important challenges of the reconciliation projects because the existence of the State and its institutions ensure adherence to the provisions of these agreements and contribute to their implementation. In addition, putting self-interest – whether tribal or regional – before the national interest is another challenge. Interference by external parties, especially if their objectives do not serve the reconciliation brief in Libya, is one of the most important challenges. The phenomenon of vigilante justice is prevalent in some regions and cities, as is the absence of a culture of tolerance and reconciliation. A lack of material resources to help parties communicate and contribute to the reconciliation process, and the lack of logistical aspects are also among such challenges.

Guarantees for the success of local reconciliations

To ensure the success of local reconciliation in Libya, emphasis should be placed on moral and ethical aspects, including religious restraint, loyalty to the homeland, respect for covenants, trust among parties, and the genuine desire for peace. There should also be a focus on the importance of the State's role and its institutions in ensuring a successful implementation of various reconciliation initiatives, especially with regard to redress and accountability procedures. Among the most important guarantees of success is the role that national dialogue can play in promoting reconciliation at the local and national levels. There should be an emphasis on the independence of the parties from any external interference or attempts to politicize a case, while ensuring that national interests prevail over personal, regional, and tribal interests. In addition to this, there should be Libyan ownership of reconciliation projects, both local and national, and reconciliation meetings should be held in Libya itself. Other guarantors would be disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons, while focusing on promoting a culture of tolerance and acceptance of the other, through education and information programmes.[6]

Conclusion

Since 2011, local reconciliation efforts in Libya have mostly adopted traditional reconciliation mechanisms. Customary solutions to conflict have played a major role. Tribal groups have also contributed to the settlement of disputes through the formation of reconciliation committees consisting mostly of traditional leaders. The reasons for accepting these traditional mechanisms include the local community's acceptance of these traditional mechanisms and commitment to customs and the resulting settlements. The State's weakness since 2011 and the absence of its various institutions, especially security and judicial establishments in many parts of the country, have enhanced the traditional role of tribes and their emerging institutions, such as tribal councils at the local, regional and national levels.

One of the most prominent weakness of the local reconciliation processes is the absence of women from these processes. In fact, it is socially unacceptable for women to attend meetings, consultations, negotiations, or reconciliation activities, which are seen as tasks for men only. Similarly, youth are absent from local reconciliations, as they are often seen as the source of conflict between tribes and families. Moreover, reconciliation councils often rely on decision-makers who are the senior sheikhs. It is therefore important to engage youth and women in community and national reconciliation initiatives, and to recognize their role in promoting security and social peace. It is also important to establish reconciliation committees of young people and women to improve their capacities to participate in such endeavours, including mediation and peace-building skills.

In general, traditional reconciliation efforts can contribute to reducing the burden on the judiciary system, but do not replace it. There are some issues that can only be resolved through the application of the law, while other cases can be solved through the court with the assistance of conciliation and arbitration committees, which often consist of traditional tribal leaders. Reconciliation processes at the national level have not gained much support until now, due to lack of supervision and mostly because they often require state intervention to achieve justice and reparation. Conditions of stability and security, but also rules on the protection of victims and witnesses, are also needed for the establishment of a Truth Commission and a Missing Persons' Commission.

1 Cf. A. S. M. Obeidi (2018), see Recommended Reading.
2 According to the general census of the population in Libya in 2006, the Tawergha population was about 24,223, where Tawergha was part of the city of Misrata, among 25 major people's congresses according to the administrative division during the period of Qadhafi rule. According to UNHCR reports, 35,000 Tawergha refugees have been displaced to various locations throughout Libya, of whom 16,000 are in the eastern provinces and 12,000 in the western region, particularly in Tripoli. See also M. Cherif Bassiuni (ed.): Libya from Repression to Revolution: A Record of Armed Conflict and International Law Violation, 2011-2013. Leiden 2013, 617-619.
3 Cf. note 1, 9-14.
4 Bawaba alwasat, http://alwasat.ly/news/libya/209418. 17 June 2018.
5 Treaty between Misrata and Tawergha in Misrata city, 3 June 2018.
6 This section and certain parts of this article are based on in-depth interviews with several sheikhs, local tribal leaders, and civil society members concerned with national and local reconciliation issues in Libya, who have participated in many of the activities related to the process of reconciliation at the local and national levels.

■ Joël Glasman

Discipline
and nourish

**Africa in the global history
of the refugee camp**

■ *Refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya (Photo: © Brendan Bannon/
IOM/UNHCR). Small picture: Somali refugees in Dadaab, Kenya
(Photo: Sadik Gulec / Shutterstock.com).*

Refugee camps have become a key tool in the global management of migration. About a quarter of the 65 million refugees worldwide currently live in a refugee camp. There are now refugee camps the size of cities: The fifth largest city in Jordan (Zaatari), the fourth largest city in Kenya (Dadaab), and the third largest city in Sierra Leone (Gondama) are refugee camps.

The French anthropologist Michel Agier described Africa as the „continent of refugee camps in the 21st century".[1] While most refugee camps in Europe are closed soon after their construction, in Africa they often remain in place for long periods. Refugee camps in Europe are seen as a temporary emergency solution, but when set up in Africa, they are often idealised as a magic formula for overcoming problems that actually or supposedly result from refugee movements. According to Agier, 14 per cent of refugees in Europe live in a camp, but in Africa the figure is around 83 per cent.[2]

In light of past experience with refugee camps, the current trend towards setting up new camps in Africa is a mystery. Here it's „reception centres", there new „regional disembarkation platforms", and elsewhere again „controlled migration centres" that are set to be established with the support of International Organisations and Western donor countries. However, once they are built, refugee camps have the tendency to survive longer than originally expected. In 90 percent of cases, they remain in place for more than five years. Some even survive much longer. The Meheba Settlement in Zambia will celebrate its 50th anniversary next year. The Oruchinga Settlement in Uganda has been in existence for 58 years. It is now well documented that living conditions in refugee camps are often catastrophic. Camp inmates often suffer from hunger or cholera epidemics, or are threatened by attack from armed groups.

In some regions, refugee camps are developing into such urgent challenges for internal security that the respective states would like to see them disappear – for example in Kenya, where the government has repeatedly announced its intention to close the Kakuma and Dadaab camps. Even the United Nations Refugee Agency now advocates „alternatives to refugee camps".[3] Instead of setting up new refugee camps, the local integration of refugees in villages and towns should be supported. But if refugee camps are often part of the problem and not part of the solution, why are new ones always being built?

Fig. 1: Refugee camp in the Somali capital of Mogadishu (Photo: Sadik Gulec / Shutterstock.com).

At this point it is worth taking a look at the history of the 20th century: the century in which refugee camps became the standard solution of global migration management.

> **„In the colonial mindset, African migrations were seen as a pathological phenomenon in need of diagnosis and treatment."**

Historical review

When the United Nations Organization was founded in 1945, war had uprooted people on an unprecedented scale: demobilized soldiers, former forced labourers, prisoners of war, liberated concentration camp prisoners, displaced persons, civilians fleeing the Red Army or the Allies, and many more. In Europe alone there were about 60 million people on the move, and worldwide about 175 million people – and this with a world population that was only one third as large as it is today.[4] Given these figures, it is easy to understand why historians are taken aback when it is occasionally claimed that there are more refugees today than ever before.

Refugee camps were established in the context of the Second World War because the Allies saw

Fig. 2: The Moria refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesbos. It is designed for 3,000 people, but there are currently around 13,000 people living here, many of whom have fled from Africa (Photo: Nicolas Economou / Shutterstock.com).

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Fig. 3: The Nyarugusu refugee camp in Tanzania, one of the largest refugee camps in the world. A large number of people from Burundi have found refuge here (Photo: © UNHCR/Dominic Nahr).

refugees as a military and strategic problem. They were regarded as an unpredictable, disruptive factor in the control of roads and trains, troop transports, the distribution of resources, and logistical planning. Even before the official founding of the United Nations, the Allies established the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in 1943. This organization, which was subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), soon established a vast network of refugee camps stretching from Egypt through southern Italy to northern Germany. Refugees were seen on the one hand as victims in need of help, who had to be cared for, but on the other hand also as a risk. There was talk of the risk of „contagion": Refugees were thought to be a source of diseases (cholera, typhus, diarrhoea) and dangerous ideas (fascism, national socialism, communism). It was about help, but it was also about surveillance.

When the Second World War ended, UNRRA's expertise was transferred to new UN agencies: first to the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), then from 1952 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These continued the techniques of administration and surveillance which merged the two functions of refugee management: care and control. A large part of the refugee camp vocabulary („refugee camps", „transit centres", „waiting zones") and the legal-sounding categories („refugees", „stateless persons", „displaced persons", „exiled intellectuals", „unaccompanied children")

were coined in these post-war years. Soon, however, responsibility for refugee administration shifted from the UN to the nation states. As early as 1951, when the UNHCR was founded, it was clear that the institution was needed more in an advisory capacity than for large-scale logistical projects. The lawyers of the UNHCR, which was mainly financed by the USA, were meant to keep a close eye on the governments of European countries in dealing with refugees.

The geopolitical caesura of decolonization opened up new countries for UN organizations: In the 1950s, eleven countries became independent in the Americas, in Asia, and in Africa, and in the 1960s, it was 44 – soon to become members of the United Nations. The High Commissioner for Refugees recognized new fields of activity for his organization in the emerging „Third World". The division of India and Pakistan had already forced millions of people to flee in 1948. Now the colonial wars in Algeria and Kenya had displaced thousands of civilians. This was followed by pogroms in Rwanda and Burundi, and military coups in Congo and Togo. The UNHCR offered its „good offices" to the newly founded states, but as soon as the UN experts arrived on the ground, they were confronted with another tradition of migration management: the colonial legacy.

The legacy of colonialism

Refugee movements were not uncommon in colonial African territories. Many people fled European conquests, colonial reprisals, forced recruitment, new epidemics, and other threats to life and limb. The UNHCR was to learn that colonial officers and

administrators already had a certain preference for setting up camps: Already at the beginning of the 20th century there were concentration camps in the South African Boer War, camps for prisoners of war in German Southwest Africa, camps for sleeping sickness patients in the Belgian Congo, camps for forced labourers in the French Colony of Côte d'Ivoire, camps for miners in Britain's South African Colonies, camps for convicts, opposition members, or migrants in almost all African colonies. The functions of the camps were very different – but the colonial administrators, officers, doctors, and lawyers had often gained experience in several of these institutions. They shared certain ideas, certain experiences, and certain hopes. Above all, they had one conviction in common – and this was soon adopted by their post-colonial successors and by international organisations such as the UNHCR: Development requires a mobilization and concentration of manpower.

Migration, temporary migration flows, and nomadism were therefore regarded as obstacles to development. Accordingly, African societies were idealized as traditional village communities destabilized by migration. There was talk of „vagrancy" and „de-tribalization" as causes of backwardness, poverty, and crime. The fact that migration was a normal part of African social orders was overlooked: In the colonial mindset, African migrations were a pathological phenomenon in need of diagnosis and treatment. The means for this were „planning", „concentration", „sedentariness", and „discipline". Spatial planning and organisation were expected to overcome obstacles to development, in particular low population density, labour shortages, and the high cost of social services in sparsely populated territories.

Uncontrolled migration was seen as a danger that, it was believed, would upset the traditional balance, divide families and ethnic groups, and lead to moral decline. But in some places there was also a shortage of labour or farmers to grow products desirable to the colonial administration. Labour camps offered a solution here: The „stabilisation" of the labour force was seen as a prerequisite for social security and progress. These labour camps and state settlement projects were further important precursors of later refugee camps. Accordingly, they were not seen exclusively as a necessary transitional solution, but as a lever for economic growth. In refugee camps, like in small laboratories, all the infrastructural technology and facilities necessary for rural development could be tested and demonstrated: Irrigation, drainage, road construction, health centres, schools. Mobilising work in the camp was thus a decisive step towards „modernisation".

A closer look at the refugee camps in particular reveals the extent to which the colonial legacy influences our dealing with migration and refugee movements.[5] The concept of „technical path dependency", developed in the social and economic sciences, applies very neatly to the camp in its various functions. Since the colonial period, the camp has been an ambivalent technique that at first glance links opposing functions – that of caring and that of controlling – with one another. It is part of a variety of other techniques that use both the language of modernization and the language of monitoring: Passports, visas, biometrics, border posts, drones, remote sensing. The anthropologist Katharina Inhetveen describes refugee camps as „the predominant form in the world in which refugees are accommodated, administered, and fed."[6] Historical scholarship is in a position to fathom out how this came to be, and what alternatives were neglected along the way: whether unknowingly or on purpose.

■ *Fig. 4: The Bulengo refugee camp in DR Congo (Photo: Ben Houdijk / Shutterstock.com).*

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P. Gatrell: The Making of the Modern Refugee. Oxford 2013.

J. Glasman: Seeing Like a Refugee Agency: A Short History of UNHCR Classifications in Central Africa (1961-2015). Journal of Refugee Studies (2017), 30/2, 337-362.

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1 M. Agier: Managing the undesirables: Refugee camps and humanitarian government, Malden 2011.
2 Ibid.
3 UNHCR: Policy on alternatives to camps. 2014
4 P. Gatrell (2013), 3; see Recommended reading.
5 This after-effect of the colonial legacy is one of the topics that will be investigated over the next few years in the „Mobilities" section of the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence.
6 K. Inhetveen: The political order of the refugee camp. Actors. Power. Organization: An ethnography in Southern Africa. Bielefeld 2010, 60.

■ Christian Wißler

INTERVIEW WITH PROF. DR. ANDREA BEHRENDS

Living in uncertainty

Experiences of an anthropologist in the border region of Chad and Sudan

Over the last two decades you have repeatedly travelled in the border region between Sudan and Chad, and witnessed the Darfur conflict that began in 2003, but also its prehistory. In the meantime, these violent clashes have claimed many hundred thousand lives. What are the main reasons for this conflict? Who are the actors and what are their objectives?

The question is not easy to answer because there are multiple historical and political reasons for the ongoing conflict in Darfur - especially for the violent escalation phase between 2003 and 2010. Ironically, the peace talks between the north and south of Sudan, which began in 2001 as a result of international mediation, were particularly important in the outbreak of the conflict. The emerging Power and Wealth Sharing Agreement ignored those regions of the country that were not directly involved in the conflict, but which had also felt severely disadvantaged politically and economically for decades. The rebel attack in Darfur, in western Sudan in February 2003 was directed precisely against this discrimination. The Sudanese government responded by shelling Darfur. It supported armed, mounted combat troops who attacked the civilian population, set villages on fire, raped and murdered.

The fact that these government combat troops, the so-called Janjawid, were assembled so quickly is partly due to the policy of land allocation established by the British colonial power, which ruled Sudan until the mid-1950s. Certain „ethnic groups" were awarded land by the British, such as the Fur – in Arabic „Darfur" means: „The land of the Fur". On the other hand, the nomadic sections of the population, who also lived in the region, were left empty-handed. With the expansion of the Sahara Desert to the south, serious land conflicts between settled farmers and cattle breeders have occurred with increasing frequency in recent decades.

The recurrent rivalry between the governments of Sudan and Chad is also fuelling the conflict in Darfur, a region far removed from the capitals of both countries. Several political upheavals in Chad have begun here. In the 1970s, the Arabization policies of Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya and Omar al-Bashir, then President of Sudan, also contributed massively to the regional conflicts.

Perspectives of social anthropology

In your research, you investigate the living conditions of people who fled to Chad as a result of the conflict across the Sudanese border to the west, and who have been living here for decades in some cases. How do the questions and methods of social anthropology differ from those of other social sciences, such as political science, with regard to the topics of „flight" and „migration"?

Social anthropologists often start from individual fates and biographies; they look at the everyday practices in the regions they investigate. The fact that this research necessarily includes personal relationships with the people in the respective region is part of the methodological canon of the discipline. Social anthropologists try to develop the relevance of a topic from the point of view of the people they meet locally. Political science, on the other hand, often approaches its topics through institutionalized structures.

In your experience, which anthropological research approaches are particularly revealing when it comes to flight and migration in Africa, or regions that are often portrayed in the media as African crisis regions?

Social anthropology – like other sciences – comprises various sub-areas that often overlap in practice. With regard to flight and migration processes, multi-sited social anthropology has established itself in recent decades: research that starts at several locations simultaneously while trying to understand their connections to one another. In addition, areas of medical or legal anthropology are relevant for research in crisis areas, which can complement each other with their different approaches. I would describe myself as a political anthropologist with a focus on conflict research. That said, one question which interests me greatly is that of social effects of resource extraction, such as oil or other raw materials.

Research on post-colonialism often calls for a change of perspective: Social, economic, and political questions ought to be described anew from the perspective of the Global South and approached theoretically. What does this mean for research into flight and migration processes?

„No one is ever just a refugee. No one is ever just one thing."

Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie
in a speech to the United Nations (2016)

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RECOMMENDED READING

A. Behrends: The Long History of Conflict, Integration and Changing Alliances on the Darfur/Chad Border, in: S. Calkins et al. (eds.): Emerging Orders in the Sudans. Bamenda 2015, 39-58.

A. Behrends: Securing livelihoods. Economic practice in the Darfur-Chad displacement arena, in: A. Hammar (ed.): Displacement Economies. Paradoxes of Crisis and Creativity in African Contexts. London, New York 2014, 35-56.

A. de Waal: Refugees and the Creation of Famine: The Case of Dar Masalit, Sudan. Journal of Refugee Studies (1988), Vol. 1, Issue 2, 127-140. DOI: 10.1093/jrs/1.2.127

A. Behrends: Staying. Displacement, Emplacement and Aid in the Chad-Sudan Borderlands (forthcoming).

In my view, good research is characterised by the fact that we work closely with our colleagues in the regions we research. In Chad, for example, an anthropological research centre, the Centre de Recherche en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines (CRASH), has been up and running since 2007, and I was involved in its foundation. The Chadian researchers of this centre are now much sought-after partners in research cooperations and international contract research. They deal, for example, with current challenges in areas such as radicalization, climate change, and infrastructure, or with the effects of governance on flight and migration movements. Working on subjects like these involves discussing the perspectives of local and external researchers right from the start of a project, and to incorporating them into the research. This approach has always worked very well for my research partners and me!

„Participant observation" plays an important role in anthropological research. How has this influenced your personal view of events in Chad and Sudan? Have you experienced suspicious reactions and reservations as a researcher coming „from outside"?

Participant observation means that we, as social anthropologists, spend a long time in a place or region and experience the everyday life of people. In this context I came to know the uncertainties of the people in the border area between Chad and Sudan very closely. Because of my special position as a foreigner, I was able to move back and forth between different social strata and groups, unlike

■ *Fig. 1: Musa, a long-time resident of the UNHCR camp Farchana. When the camp opened in 2003, he was „President of the Réfugiés" for some time (Photo: Andrea Behrends, 2011).*

many locals, and get to know their perspectives. This comparative work also makes research a particular challenge: There are expectations of solidarity on all sides and everyone would want their own perspective to be emphasised. The art lies in the transparent presentation of the results of analysis, into which we also always have to reflect upon our own point of view as researchers. Therefore, it has become normal and even necessary in our subject area to include the author's perspective in our writing.

I have rarely experienced negative reactions to my presence. What has happened more often is that people have mistaken me for someone providing development aid, or they feared that I wanted to missionize them. In my experience, however, these misunderstandings can always be cleared up quickly, especially with the help of local staff and translators.

Are there insights in social anthropology that should be given more attention by politicians and aid organisations when dealing with migrants and refugees?

Generally speaking, social anthropology is particularly strong where different perspectives and ways of dealing with differences are concerned. The Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has put it in a nutshell with regard to refugees: „No one is ever just a refugee. No one is ever just one thing." She speaks here from her own experience and the pain it has caused her to be reduced to a single category. In this respect, as anthropologists, we can provide many relevant insights for the practice of working with refugees: facilitating the situation of those who have fled – whether on arrival, in making a life in a new environment, or with regard to hopes and fears for the future. And that means including the perspectives of all actors involved!

Living in a refugee camp

Many people who fled from Sudan to Chad now live in refugee camps near the national border. What is their everyday life like? Are there any fixtures that emerge in their daily routine? For example, are there jobs with clearly defined responsibilities, or schooling for children?

Life in the refugee camps along the Chad-Sudan border is comparable to life in artificially over-popu-

lated villages, where people have little private space and poor access to land for agriculture or raising cattle. But these were the main occupations of most fugitives in the area where I conducted research. They often have to walk long distances to find farmland that is sufficient for their needs. However, there are certainly occupations to pursue in the camps, such as teachers, hairdressers, tailors or traders, and there are opportunities for training as such. Schools also exist in the camps. People's life situations vary: Some are very successful in building up large trade networks, while others subsist mainly on the food rations of aid organisations. For this reason, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the non-governmental organisations working with it run an integration programme that categorises the people in the camps according to their prosperity and living conditions. Those who are better off are increasingly left alone. Only those who are regarded as vulnerable – i.e. particularly in need of help – will continue to receive support.

The UNHCR has long intended to withdraw from the region. But the people in the camps are strictly against this, and fight for the support to continue. Although most would rather live independently again, they do not yet see any opportunities for this because the security situation in their regions of origin has not improved.

The Bayreuth historian Joël Glasman points out in his contribution to this issue of SPEKTRUM that refugee camps on the African continent have a long history. Some techniques and structures of their administration have survived since the colonial era's prisoner-of-war and labour camps. How aware are the people you have met in Chad and Sudan of this dimension?

The camp's inhabitants are certainly not aware of historical connections such as those quoted. But they can all draw on the experiences of earlier generations. For many years, war and displacement have been among the things that people in this border region have experienced repeatedly. In the 1980s, for example, refugees moved in the other direction, from Chad to Sudan. At the time, a brutal war raged on the Chadian side of the border. However, as both countries were experiencing a severe drought at the same time, the aid organisations in Sudan had not properly prepared for the long duration of the flight, and it developed into a serious famine. Alex de Waal described this situation in a publication entitled „Refugees and the creation of

famine". He criticizes the aid organizations in the strongest terms. They learn from such mistakes – and so do the people who flee. With the experience of the 1980s in mind, those who were in a position to do so decided against moving into the refugee camps – even if it made things much harder for them for a while.

In recent years, designs for African futures have been a focal point of research on Africa in Bayreuth. What does the future mean for the people in the Chadian-Sudanese border region?

A stable future is hardly an option for people living in this area. However, there are variations that depend, for example, on whether someone has completed a school education and learned a profession. Then future prospects for looking after a family are often better. Nevertheless, one must always reckon with sudden uncertainty that most people here in Bayreuth could not imagine in their own lives. A Sudanese refugee to Chad once told me that his

■ *Fig. 2: The Border region of Chad and Sudan (Illustration: Jutta Turner / Andreas Gaube).*

■ *Fig. 3: The UNHCR's food rations do not provide meat, so lucrative meat markets are formed in this area, in which the local population also participates (Photo: Andrea Behrends, 2011).*

decisions for the future could be described as constantly having to choose between losing an arm or a leg. Because in all important areas, be it health, education, nutrition, or housing, people experience extreme shortages. However, some people living in this region do relatively well. They often work for external aid organisations, for example as contractors, office clerks, or translators.

Categories of affiliation

What was the focus of your research in recent years?

I have been mainly interested in dealing with war, flight, and what some have called „emplacement" in this border region, the mutual adaptation of newcomers and host populations. By chance, my research began several years before the war in Darfur. At that time, I met many different people during extended stays in villages and towns of the region, and when the war broke out, I was able to study their different ways of dealing with uncertainty and war. Most impressive for me was the extremely fast dissemination of knowledge, and the fact that people constantly had to find new ways of dealing with crisis.

From a theoretical point of view, I am interested in categories of belonging, such as the category of „refugee". The decision if someone is recognized as a „refugee" or excluded from assistance by being categorized as a „resident of a war zone", for a while dominates life to such an extent that everyone has to deal with it. These processes caught my interest, and I admired people's creativity very much. During my visit in 2007, during the time of the war, those who did not move to the refugee camps asked me to provide the aid organisations with a list in which they had all registered their names and the size of their families. With this list, they had created evidence of their existence, and on this basis they asked for seed to start farming again. By doing that, they wanted to rebuild their independent way of life. I was very impressed by people's knowledge about how categories have an impact on social life.

■ *Fig. 4: Abdallah used to fight in the war. Since he opened the shop in the refugee camp, he and his family have been much better off. He has business relations in Sudan and Chad (Photo: Andrea Behrends, 2011).*

Is it not unusual for migrants from Africa arriving in European societies to be confronted with definitive attributions? In Germany, for example, they are classified as refugees from war zones, asylum seekers, and migrant workers, each with very different legal and social consequences.

Yes, every exclusive categorization is a great challenge. On the one hand, clear-cut attributions are useful to reduce complexity and to manage crisis quickly. It is mainly about distributing aid fairly or granting asylum to those who need it most. On the other hand, individuals face the problem that

so many other areas of their lives remain hidden, which often leaves them desperate. My research shows that people never stop trying to cope with crisis situations. They try out very different directions and sometimes they have to make very hard decisions. In Germany, people are often forced to wait for a long time in uncertain situation; meanwhile their opportunities for personal initiative are severely restricted. This contradicts the above-mentioned creativity, to try out several avenues in such situations, and to organize „help themselves". Perhaps more opportunities could be created here through appropriate support. Social contacts in one's own environment also have an important function. My colleague Julia Bauman did research on refugees in Brandenburg: For example, they like to help with gardening in their neighbourhood, or participate in the local sports club. They want to learn the language and show their gratitude for being here. Unfortunately, they are often frustrated in their willingness to engage; depression or alcoholism are not rare. Here it would be helpful if the people were not just labelled as refugees, but perceived as people with many different abilities and interests - just like the quote from Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's says.

Multidimensional research

To come back to the beginning of our conversation: On closer inspection, the actors involved in the Darfur conflict, their affiliations and motivations, seem to be very complex and do not provide one-dimensional patterns of explanation. Is the Africa Multiple Cluster of Excellence, which is programmatically oriented towards the key terms „Multiplicity" and „Relationality", therefore a particularly suitable forum to get to the bottom of such complex structures and processes?

The Cluster has set exactly the right course for complex research questions, also in regard to „migration" and „flight". Especially important for me is the premise of „doing research with" instead of „researching on". I also very much like the idea of multiplicity – the multiplicity of practices, positions, perspectives, and experiences – and their interconnectedness. The first research projects are already underway, and more will follow. I am also particularly pleased that the Cluster attaches great importance to good public communication of research results. This could be done using the wide range of media available today, from blogs and hypertexts, to public discussion forums. Here I see an opportunity, especially for anthropology, to raise its public profile.

■ **Florian Stoll**

Urban „middle class" milieus in Africa

On the heterogeneity of future visions in Nairobi

■ *Panoramic view of the Kenyan capital of Nairobi (sst).*

With the rise of many emerging and developing countries, economic growth and associated changes on the African continent have been the subject of renewed interest. Around 2010, international media, financial institutions, and development organisations discovered middle-income groups in African countries that had previously received little attention. These groups, located between the poor and the rich, were mostly described as the „Middle Classes" in reports and articles. The mere existence of these middle income strata in Africa caused a worldwide sensation at the time. Furthermore, there was speculation as to what consequences this would have for future economic and political development in Africa. The dominant image of a homogeneous underdeveloped continent in Europe and North America was shaken forever.

Many of the texts formulated by the media and financial institutions, however, were based more on hopes for economic and social progress (and the need for effective headlines) than on well-founded analysis of the respective local contexts. The scientific community consequently objected to such inadmissible generalisations, lack of theory on „middle classes", and the absence of any link to empirical research. Nevertheless, the debate about middle income groups made it clear that a significant number of people in many regions of Africa enjoy considerable opportunities for a consumer lifestyle. Since then, research has been increasingly interested in the question of how peculiarities of African contexts and new urban lifestyles influence middle income strata in Africa. A particular difficulty is that the concept of the „middle class" was developed in Europe and North America. How do particularities like urban-rural relationships, the extended family as a household unit, and the significance of ethnic groups modify ways of life in Africa?

Since 2013, the Bayreuth Academy of Advanced African Studies research project „Middle Classes on the Rise" has been investigating the composition of the „middle class" of an African country using urban Kenya as an example. This article summarizes the results of a case study from the sociological component of the project.[1] The starting point of the study was the question of whether there is a relatively homogeneous middle class in the large cities of Kenya that has distinctive characteristics compared to upper and lower „classes". Because the economic middle strata of Nairobi and Mombasa have very

heterogeneous conducts of life, the researchers developed an empirical research approach to identify different milieus, i.e. groups with different ways of life.

The main subject of the study were the respective future visions of these milieus. The term „future" did not only include individual plans and strategies for advancement, but also, for example, moral ideas about the good life and utopias for society as a whole. Future visions, for example, can show whether members of the middle income stratum concentrate primarily on their own progress and on the well-being of their nuclear family, or whether social units such as the wider family or ethnic networks are also relevant to them. In addition, the study examines to what extent religious convictions, humanistic principles, or more practical considerations guide action in the various milieus. This is because ideas for the future are also embedded in daily consumption and savings behaviour.

RECOMMENDED READING

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F. Stoll: The City and its Ways of life. Local influences on middle-income milieus in Nairobi. in: C. Ammann, T. Förster (eds.): African Cities and the Development Conundrum, International Development Policy Series, No.10. Geneva, Boston 2018, 275-301. Online: https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/2576

„Most *Young Professionals* come from privileged families and have little reference to their relatives in rural areas."

„Middle class" milieus: Future visions in Nairobi

With around three million inhabitants, Nairobi is the largest conurbation in Kenya. It is the political capital and economic centre of the country. The Kenyan parliament and the government are located there. Kenyan industrial enterprises, trading companies, and banks have their headquarters mostly

■ *Fig. 1: There is no uniform middle class in Nairobi. The research distinguished six main milieus, but they are not clearly separated from each other. Many middle income households can be assigned to more than one milieu. The graph shows also overlaps of these milieus (Illustration: Florian Stoll).*

Fig. 2: Houses of middle income families in Nairobi (Photo: Christian Wißler).

AUTHOR

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Fig. 3: The iHub Nairobi, a centre for the young high-tech community in the Kenyan capital. (Photo: rvdw images / Shutterstock.com).

in Nairobi. Many international companies and several thousand non-governmental organisations are also based here, as is the United Nations Headquarters for Africa. This economic strength, but also its urban flair and vibrant night-life, make Nairobi an attraction beyond the country itself. This has led to a constant influx to and rapid growth of the city, which was only founded by the British colonizers in the 1880s. Today, 50 to 60 percent of Nairobi's population live in poverty. One third of those living in households with one middle-income. Indeed, even an economic, income-based definition of the middle strata is not easy to determine. This is shown by the fact that differing amounts of income are used in the research literature to classify households or individuals as belonging to the middle income group. Such definitions appear to be objective, but are in fact always influenced by subjective assessments [2] In the following, as in the Bayreuth case study, all those inhabitants of Nairobi who are neither rich nor poor are counted among the „middle class".

Six main milieus can be distinguished within the middle income stratum of Nairobi:

■ **Young Professionals:** These are mainly adults between the ages of 20 and 35. Characteristic of their way of life are a hedonistic-individualistic consumer orientation (clothing, smartphones, cars, parties, etc.) and ambitious career goals. They usually work in well-paid jobs that require a relatively high level of qualification, but some of them are still studying. Most of these Young Professionals come from privileged families and have very few ties with their relatives in rural areas, and a commensurately stronger connection to Nairobi.

■ **Christian Milieu:** This milieu includes all age groups. The Commandments and values of the Bible, as well as the way their Church interprets the Christian faith, are seen as decisive in their own lives. Active participation in Church life (Bible study, choir, Church service) and daily orientation towards Christian norms shape their way of life. Typically, their circle of friends and business partners also have a strong relation to the Church. At the same time, one's own life is very strongly oriented towards economic success.

■ **Cosmopolitan-Liberal Milieu:** The members of this milieu are committed advocates of civil rights and civil liberties. They oppose corruption and believe that ethnicity should not have a dominant influence on politics or society. This attitude often goes hand in hand with individual career goals. Many of these cosmopolitan-liberal Nairobi residents work in non-governmental organisations, or are involved in human rights, women groups and environmental initiatives.

■ **Pragmatic Domestic Milieu:** Individual career ambitions are rather weak here. It is much more important to maintain the standard of living of the nuclear family, for which a balance between consumption and thrift is considered advisable. One's own apartment serves as a focal point, even in one's free time. Social ties to extended families, churches, and ethnic groups are often cultivated, but are not central to this way of life.

In addition, two further milieus are significant in Nairobi, which have proven themselves as Neo-Traditionalists and as Social climbers:

Neo-Traditional Milieu

Most people in Kenya identify with a regionally based ethnic group, of which the four largest are Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin. Almost all the inhabitants of Nairobi have moved from the interior of Kenya to the capital. Due to family relationships and socio-cultural ties, ethnicity has an emotional dimension for them. However, the intensity of these ethnic references is varyingly pronounced among the different milieus. In the Neo-Traditional Milieu, relationships with the extended family, the home village, and the ethnic group are the guiding principles of action. For members of this milieu, it goes without saying that they support relatives, whether for training, medical care, or to supplement their income. Joint investments within the extended family, for example in agricultural projects, are also an expression of this solidarity. The identification with a rural community and references to traditions – some of which have only recently been established – also influence future visions. Individual goals such as marriage and career are developed in consideration of extended family and community. Interviews with Neo-Traditionals revealed they have a particularly strong sense of responsibility for their own community, and a desire to support its development.

The Neo-Traditional Milieu comprises several generations. It is not limited to the middle income stratum, as many poor and some rich people also live in networks that have a strong connection to extended families and local communities. Communication takes place mainly in the language of one's own ethnic group. It is a means of everyday communication, but can also function as a distinguishing mark and medium of ethnic belonging, because Neo-Traditionals usually also speak the two main languages of Kiswahili and English.

Social Climbers

The Social Climbers form a milieu that pursues individual advancement strategies. Their goal is a better life for the nuclear family. They come from modest backgrounds, but have already achieved success, for example by accumulating savings, completing a course of study, or gaining access to a relatively well-paid and stable career. This distinguishes them from the poor, meaning they belong in the middle-income group. Climbers achieve their advancement through a reduction in consumption, a high savings rate, and long working hours. They have also found a way to keep payments to relatives at a level that does not jeopardise their own progress.

The high savings rate, which can exceed 50 percent of the monthly family income in certain phases, illustrates the extent to which social climbers are geared to the future. For the possibility of a better life in the future, they spend little money on housing, food, clothing or electrical goods. Consumption is geared strongly towards practical use, and owning a smartphone or even a car is part of their acquisition strategy rather than for private consumption. Self-expression, the short-lived promise of happiness from luxury goods, and the joy of owning beautiful things are all put on the back burner in this milieu. They minimize all other expenses for the sake of having their own business, for a university education, or to enable their children to attend private school. Even though most „middle class" members, when asked, affirm the importance of investing in the future, Social Climbers pursue their goals more rigorously than members of other milieus. Despite these efforts, however, they remain highly dependent on economic growth, so their advancement remains an uncertain project.

■ *Fig. 4: View of the business centre of Nairobi (Photo: wikimedia commons / CC-BY-SA-4.0 / Africanmodern).*

The bottom line

The research on milieus and visions of the future in Nairobi offers empirical insights into the heterogeneity of the middle income strata and their specific life realities. In the case study of Kenya's capital, it was shown that the sociological concept of the milieu and the investigation of visions of the future form a productive approach to justify the concept of the „middle class", often used without any theoretical foundation, and to combine it with empirical research into African societies.

■ *Fig. 5: Road traffic in Nairobi (Photo: Florian Stoll).*

■ David Stadelmann
  Raymond Frempong

Higher food prices, more child labour

Empirical results from Uganda

The International Labour Organization (ILO) reported a success in its 2017 report „Global Estimates of Child Labour": Child labour is declining worldwide. Nevertheless, around 152 million children between the ages of five and 17 are still engaged in child labour, almost half of them in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is worst affected, where on average around 20 percent of children have to work.[1] Poverty is often seen as the most important cause of child labour. However, this explanation remains superficial because „poverty" is a complex and not clearly defined phenomenon. This makes it all the more important to identify the underlying causes of child labour, because only on this basis can concrete political measures be planned and implemented with any chance of success.

Child labour can significantly affect a child's well-being and further development. It often has harmful effects on health, compromises safety, and weakens both physical and mental resilience. In many cases, it leads to a child having to forego an education. As a result, child labour also limits the future potential of children to generate income in later life. At the same time, the economic and social development of a country suffers from this impairment of its human capital. As Nobel Peace Prize laureate Kailash Satyarthi stresses in his book Every Child Matters, child labour can contribute to the persistence of poverty, inequality, illiteracy, population growth, and other social problems.

Low-income households spend between 40 to 60 percent of their income on food. Unexpected increases in food prices therefore significantly reduce disposable income in these households, and may have a negative impact on their food security. Fig. 1 shows the increase in food prices in Uganda between 2008 and 2014. It is noticeable that food prices rose significantly faster than the consumer price index. This index measures the inflation of a representative basket of goods, which includes both food and other goods. In fact, a sharp rise in food prices was observed worldwide for the same period. A Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report cited the increasing use of agricultural products for the production of fuel as an important reason for this. Another factor was the increased demand for meat and dairy products in emerging markets such as China, but also in developed economies. In addition, an increase in extreme weather events and speculation could also have driven prices up.

Fig. 2 compares directly the proportion of children in child labour and the rise in Ugandan food prices. While in 2009 about 27.3 percent of Ugandan children were already working, by 2012 it was as many as every third child. The statistical calculations thus clearly show that the development of food prices correlates with the development of child labour.

But is there a causal effect relationship? In individual cases, there is no doubt that many factors determine whether higher food prices will lead to more child labour: labour market conditions, family structure, parent education, and child age. However, the following considerations speak in favour of the assumption of a general causal relationship: Poorer households spend a large part of their income on food. Therefore, an increase in food prices would not only reduce their disposable income but also weaken their food security. This in turn would mean that they might resort to child labour to ensure that all family members are provided for. It should be noted here that in poorer countries such as Uganda there are numerous households that have a comparatively low incomes but own their own land. Consequently, they may use their children to pursue more intensive farming.

However, the fact that in Uganda – as in other poorer countries in Africa – a relatively large number of households are employed in agriculture, one could argue against the assumption that inflation in food prices will lead to an increase in child labour. Rather, these households could benefit from rising prices as they generate higher revenues as food producers. In this respect, they would not necessarily be

1 International Labour Organization: Global Estimates of Child Labour: Results and trends, 2012-2016. Geneva 2017.

Figs 1 and 2: Increase in food prices, consumer index, and child labour in Uganda from 2008 to 2014 (Illustration: R. Frempong, D. Stadelmann 2019) (see Recommended reading).

forced to resort to child labour to increase disposable income. At the same time, households that own their own land have the possibility of attaining a degree of self-sufficiency, so that as consumers they are less dependent on more expensive food.

In view of these conflicting considerations, the authors of this article wanted to gain more clarity on the extent to which the statistical correlation between rising food prices and child labour expresses a causal relationship. A joint study, the main results of which are summarised below, led to a fairly clear finding.

„The statistical calculations thus clearly show that the development of food prices correlates with the development of child labour."

Frequency and intensity of child labour

The data from the Uganda National Panel Survey is highly revealing when it comes to determining the number of cases of child labour and their intensity – i.e. the number of hours worked. These annual surveys cover household characteristics, such as income, education, and consumer behaviour, and also include questions on child labour. Statistical analyses of the data thus obtained show a significant positive correlation between food prices on the one hand and the occurrence and intensity of child labour on the other. This relationship becomes apparent even if the analyses use modern econometric methods to take into account both changing and constant characteristics of individuals, households, and regions. So what becomes clear is: Child labour is higher in the same families when food prices rise, and child labour in these families decreases again when food prices fall.

Fig. 3: A boy in Kisoro, Uganda, carries bananas to market (Photo: Gudkov Andrey / Shutterstock.com).

The assumption that fluctuations in the frequency and intensity of child labour are indeed due to changes in food prices is confirmed when international food price trends are taken into account. Uganda, with its comparatively low gross agricultural production, hardly influences these prices, but is strongly affected by international price increases. The impact of international price pressures on local food prices in Uganda can therefore be used to assess the causal impact of increased food prices on child labour. Once again, it becomes clear that the rise in food prices between 2008 and 2014 was very likely one of the reasons for the simultaneous increase in child labour. The calculations show how a ten percent increase in food prices affected the frequency and intensity of child labour:

- Due to the price increase, a child who had previously not had to work was required to do so with an eight percentage point higher probability.
- A child who had already worked had to work 1.6 hours more per week on average.

Differences in sex and age

The proportion of boys in child labour in Uganda is higher than that of girls. In addition, child labour is more common among older children than among younger ones: In Uganda, an average of 26 percent of five- to 11-year-old children and 53 percent of 12- to 14-year-old children have to work. This falls far short of ILO standards, which require that children between the ages of five and eleven should not be involved in work at all. Children aged 12 to 14 are allowed to do light work, provided it does not present health or developmental risks, and does not discourage school attendance. Household help – such as washing dishes, cooking, caring for family members, and similar household activities – is not part of economic work in the narrower sense and therefore not child labour.

The influence of food prices on child labour can be differentiated according to the sex and age of the children. More expensive food increases the likelihood of having to work, more for boys than for girls. At the same time, however, it means that the number of working hours increases more for girls who already have to work than for boys in the same situation. In addition, the analyses show that the probability and intensity of child labour as a result

of more expensive food increases more among older children than among younger children.

Agriculture is crucial

The results of the study point to a widespread household coping strategy: Rising food prices are inflation shocks to which households must respond. Parents generally try to avoid their children having to work as long as the household income is high enough. As soon as they are confronted with less favourable economic conditions, they first try to generate more income themselves – given, in part, that their own productivity is higher than that of their children. Only when the household income is still insufficient do the children have to work.

Fig. 5: A large proportion of children in Uganda work in agriculture. A herd of cattle on the Abuket River in Uganda (sst).

Fig. 4: Children in the surrounding area of Nairobi collect firewood for heating and cooking (Photo: Ramiz Allafi / Shutterstock.com).

Data from the Uganda National Panel Survey shows that agricultural activities are the most common form of child labour: Between 26 and 34 percent of all children worked on family farms in agriculture between 2008 and 2014. The question therefore arises whether an increase in food prices will have a stronger or weaker impact on child labour in those families that are employed in agriculture and own land. In order to investigate this in more detail, the impact of food prices was analysed in relation to whether a household owns land and does

or does not engage in agriculture. The results show that children are more likely to work in households employed in agricultural activity. However, the effect of higher food prices is smaller if the household also owns land. In other words: Land owned by farming families protects their children from the potential effects of food inflation. This finding confirms the assumption that these families can benefit from higher food prices without having to put their children to work.

The bottom line

In summary, it can therefore be said that: Food price inflation in Uganda between 2008 and 2012 contributed to an increase in both the frequency and intensity of child labour in that country. Households owning land were better able to compensate for such a price shock, which had a negative impact on them as consumers. However, the study also revealed that child labour, especially in agriculture, is still highly relevant and widespread. Uganda may serve as an example of how rising prices can affect income and child labour in African countries that import food. In order to continue the success in combating child labour as mentioned by the ILO, enormous efforts are therefore necessary. The study shows: In addition to generally improving growth and development opportunities in poorer countries, it is important to ensure that food does not become unexpectedly and drastically more expensive in these countries, and that households have the means to protect themselves more effectively against such inflationary trends.

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■ **Manfred Stoppok**

Growing energy consumption with increasing well-being?

Household energy consumption in Kenya, Spain, and Germany

■ *Residential house of a middle income family in the Mumias region, western Kenya (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).*

The sufficient and at the same time environmentally compatible supply of humanity with energy is undoubtedly one of the most pressing socio-political challenges of the 21st century. In 2015, the United Nations adopted „Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development", which aims to make the global future socially, ecologically, and economically sustainable. It postulates a total of 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), including the goal of „affordable and clean energy". This is particularly about „securing access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all". Above all, this means that the world's population should have nationwide access to electricity, and be supplied with clean fuels and modern cooking technology.

This places the private household in the focus of energy policy and energy industry considerations: It is a key unit for the assessment of individual wealth and for the realisation of sustainable development. Of crucial importance is the access of all people to modern household, communications, and leisure electronics. Equally important, however, is the reduction of health risks resulting from indoor air pollution in the absence of exhaust air systems – for example, when traditional biomass (firewood or charcoal) is burned for cooking or heating in enclosed spaces.

In general, as a country's economic and technological development progresses, not only its overall national energy consumption but also its per capita energy consumption rises sharply. However, what is true in this macroeconomic context does not necessarily apply to every single economic sector. This is shown by the following studies on the household energy sector in Kenya.

Three examples from Kenya

As for most countries of the Global South, providing households with affordable and clean energy throughout the country is a major challenge for Kenya. In recent decades the country has experienced a sharp population increase, which will continue in the future. However, the annual per capita primary energy consumption of 0.5 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) is low by global standards: It is well below the global average (2 toe per capita) and thus far below the average in the OECD countries (4 toe per capita). In 2018, around 73 percent of the population had access to electricity, compared with only 20 percent eight years earlier. Nevertheless, more than

80 percent of households continue to use traditional biomass instead of electricity for cooking.

While per capita energy consumption in Kenya is significantly below the global average, a disproportionately large proportion of energy is consumed in the household. On a global average, this share is only 21 percent, but in Kenya, it is over 70 percent. The household level is therefore of particular importance in the Kenyan energy sector. At first glance, it seems obvious that a wealthy household with a large number of electrical appliances consumes more energy than a poorer household with a smaller number of energy consumers. However, the empirical verification of this thesis in households in Western Kenya shows that there is no such linear relationship between the material well-being of a household and per capita energy consumption. This is illustrated by the following three examples from the western Kenyan town of Mumias and the region of the same name.

- In a middle income family household in the town of Mumias, annual final energy consumption per capita is 0.28 toe, slightly above the Kenyan national average (0.22 toe in the household sector). More than 35 electrical appliances are in use in this household. However, cooking is still mainly done with firewood and charcoal. LPG and electricity are only complementary energy sources in this area (fuel stacking).

Fig. 1 (above): Traditional hearth in a Kenyan household (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).

Fig. 2 (below): Hearth with exhaust air extraction, as recommended by the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).

Chart 1: The information was obtained by the author in the course of seven months of field research in the Mumia region of Kenya.

	Urban middle income household of a family in the town of Mumias	Village household of a family in the Mumias region	Single household in Nambale, a small town in the Mumias region
Total energy consumption per capita in the household			
Final energy (TFC)	0,28 toe	0,29 toe	0,08 toe
Primary energy (TPES)	0,42 toe	0,44 toe	0,10 toe
Energy sources: Consumption per capita in the household			
Firewood	550 kg	620 kg	0 kg
Charcoal	55 kg	70 kg	0 kg
Petroleum	0 L / kg	3,3 L / 2,6 kg	30 L / 24 kg
Electricity	228 kWh	<1 kWh	192 kWh
Liquified petroleum gas	190 kg	0 kg	28,8 kg
Biomass waste	n.a. kg	n.a. kg	0 kg
Energy-consuming devices in the household			
Total energy-consuming equipment	> 35	> 17	10
Various types of energy-consuming equipment	20	12	10

Fig. 3: Residential house in the in the rural surroundings of Mumias (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).

„A disproportionately large part of the energy is consumed in the household."

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■ In a similarly family-organized but materially much worse off household in the rural outskirts of Mumias, the annual per capita energy consumption of 0.29 toe is almost at the same level. This is surprising as this household has no access to the electricity grid and uses only half as many energy-consuming devices (17 instead of over 35). Although electricity consumption is negligible, energy consumption, including all energy sources, is no lower than in the household of the much wealthier family.

■ Indeed, technological change can even go hand in hand with a drastic reduction in energy consumption at household level. This is shown in a third example: In the single household of a young woman in the village of Nambale, not far from the town of Mumias, annual per capita energy consumption is more than 70 percent lower than in the other two households, at only 0.08 toe. This household does not contain many energy-consuming devices either. The basic energy requirement for cooking and hot water preparation is covered by liquid petroleum gas and petroleum.

The three example households illustrate a trend that energy researchers have also observed in other regions of the world: The total energy consumption of a household depends largely on the energy sources and technologies used for cooking and hot water production. The presence of a larger number of large and small electrical appliances significantly increases the electricity consumption of a household. This is also shown by the example of the middle class household in Mumias, where –

in contrast to the other two households – the following electrical appliances are in operation: TV, SAT / TV set, tablet PC, laptop, DVD player, electric cooker and refrigerator. Yet even here, the share of electrical appliances in total energy consumption is relatively low at 23 percent. In the household in the rural environment, it is in the negligible range, as only small batteries and rechargeable batteries are used. Therefore, electricity consumption has no decisive influence on the overall energy consumption of a household.

International development programmes are therefore working to ensure that new technologies for cooking and hot water generation permanently increase energy efficiency in households. These innovations may also be accompanied by a change in the energy sources used (fuel switching). Experience in different countries shows that households with increasing prosperity use different energy sources permanently (fuel stacking) and only switch completely to electricity and gas consumption at a very high income level. It should also be borne in mind that the envisaged switch from solid biomass to „cleaner" energy sources such as electricity and liquefied petroleum gas is a switch from – at least potentially – climate-neutral and renewable raw materials to fossil fuels. As a rule, electricity is (still) generated on the basis of fossil raw materials.

Household energy consumption in Kenya, Spain and Germany

What applies at the micro level to households in various social milieus in Western Kenya continues at the international level. This is illustrated by a comparison of household energy consumption in Kenya, one of Africa's largest economies, and in two OECD countries – Spain and Germany. Total primary and final energy consumption (TPES and TFC) in Spain and Germany is five and eight times higher than in Kenya respectively. However, the differences are much smaller if we look at the household sector instead of the economy as a whole. In the household sector, annual per capita energy consumption in Spain is only 50 percent above the Kenyan average, but in Germany, it is around three times as high. This is mainly due to the much colder climate. If the energy used for heating in Spain and Germany is excluded, the annual energy consumption per capita is 0.22 toe in Kenya, 0.23 toe in Germany and 0.17 toe in Spain – roughly the same level. It should be stressed that this consistency is only true if all ener-

gy sources used in a household, including firewood and charcoal, are included in the calculation. Per capita electricity consumption in Spain or Germany is many times higher than in Kenya, and the availability of a number of energy sources (energy access) in Kenya is often non-existent.

There is no doubt that the general energy demand of a country rises sharply as economic development progresses. However, although the household is a key unit of individual wealth, increasing material well-being is not necessarily accompanied by an increase in household energy consumption. This apparent contradiction dissolves when one distinguishes between direct and indirect energy consumption in households. The previous sections of this article deal with the direct energy consumption of households or entire nations. Every energy-consuming device used in the household (TV, refrigerator or small electrical appliance) must first be produced and thus also causes indirect energy consumption. Therefore, when examining the relationship between energy consumption and wealth levels in households, the indirect energy consumption of household appliances should be included in per capita energy consumption.

This applies not only at the household level when looking at poorer and richer households within a country, but also when comparing different countries. Over the past 20 years, OECD member states have managed to maintain or even reduce their per capita energy needs as prosperity has increased. They have achieved this in part because they have outsourced energy-intensive production chains to China and South East Asia. This happens to be where a large part of the household electrical appliances later used in other countries is manufactured.

Fig. 4: Primary and final energy consumption (toe per capita and year) in relation to the total economy (TPES, TFC), as well as at household level (TFC, households) and at household level excluding energy for heating (TFC, households excluding heating energy) (Illustration: Manfred Stoppok).

Conclusion

The empirical studies in Kenya have shown by way of example that typical household appliances such as refrigerators, televisions or other small electrical appliances do not drive up energy consumption in the household sector per se. They increase electricity consumption exponentially, but in the overall energy mix of a household these appliances make up only a small proportion of the total. If the energy used by a household for cooking and hot water can be reduced through more efficient use, or can be produced locally from existing biomass, the energy thus saved can be used for new energy consumers. The comparison of Kenya with the OECD countries Spain and Germany shows that technologically higher quality household equipment is not necessarily accompanied by higher per capita energy consumption. Intelligent planning and use of modern technologies could therefore lead to a higher standard of living for large parts of the world's population without increasing per capita energy consumption at the household level.

RECOMMENDED READING

M. Stoppok, A. Jess, R. Freitag, E. Alber: Of culture consumption and cost: A comparative analysis of household energy consumption in Kenya, Germany and Spain. Energy Research and Social Science (2018), Vol. 40, 127-139. DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2017.12.004

RECOMMENDED LINK

The United Nations: 17 sustainable development goals that will change our world by 2030. Issue 2019.
www.un.org/Depts/german/de/neuedok.html

Worldwide progress towards target 7 „Affordable and clean energy" is documented by the Energy Progress Report:
https://trackingsdg7.esmap.org

Fig. 5: The Mumias region in western Kenya (Photo: Manfred Stoppok).

■ Jeannett Martin

Childhood and belonging

**New perspectives
for African Studies**

■ *On a farm in northern Benin, children pound grain while the adults work in the fields (Photo: Jeannett Martin).*

„Whom does a child belong to?" Most people in Germany would probably answer this question with „It's parents, of course". However, as soon as we look beyond our own cultural habits and beyond the boundaries of parenthood and family, new questions and research approaches open up – especially in relation to Africa. On the continent with the youngest population in the world, the majority of the population in most countries consists of children actively shaping their environment. From a social science perspective, childhood is not understood as a clearly defined biological state, but rather as a socially, culturally, and historically variable category.

For a better understanding of childhood(s) in Africa, the term „belonging" is most revealing. This generally refers to the membership of people in „us" groups, such as families, ethnic groups, religious communities, or nations, who share a more or less pronounced sense of togetherness. The term also encompasses the processes and practices that constitute membership in these us-groups. Belonging, for example, involves protection and care as well as obligations and expectations, such as the expectation to contribute to the reproduction of the community. The affiliations of children are not fixed once and for all in this view. Rather, they are the subject of social constructions and negotiations and embedded in wider social, economic, legal, and political contexts.

Notions of childhood and childhood-related practices of living together in African societies are subject to rapid change. At the same time, children are central to the reproduction of any us-group. Analysing the processes of childhood-related affiliations – a perspective that goes far beyond pure socialization research – opens up new research perspectives and insights into processes of social transformation. This is shown by some examples from childhood-related African research.

Family affiliation and legal transformations

Ideas about the family and kinship affiliation of children and about how and with whom children should grow up are expressed in various customary, religious, national, and international legal norms. In the plural legal systems of African societies, they overlap, interact dynamically, and change in specific ways. The following example from Benin in West Africa, among others, documents this.

Here it is a widespread and recognized, although changing practice in large parts of the population not to let children grow up with their biological parents, but for example with a maternal uncle, a paternal sister, or with classificatory grandparents.[1] This practice points to an understanding of parenthood that is multiple and more flexible than in wide areas of „modern" European societies. Benin's national family law (Code de la Personne et de la Famille), which has been in force since 2004, and is strongly oriented towards European legal texts, describes a „family" as first and foremost a heterosexual family based on marriage, in which a parental couple is equally responsible for the children they have together. The Benin Child Law (Code de l'enfant), adopted in 2015, also sees this form of „family" as the best situation for the well-being of children, which is why the State has made it its task to protect them. However, this also means that other constellations are regarded as less worthy of protection or not worthy of protection at all. This often leads to conflicts over the affiliation of children - for example, when local practices entrusting children to others are classified as „child trafficking" by the police or gendarmerie, or when young people resorting to labour migration are „liberated" and returned to their families.[2]

In most African societies marriage and matrimony are a way to determine the affiliation and thus also the rights and obligations of children in a legally binding way. But changing family practices raise new questions. In Southern Africa, for example, there has been a tendency for several decades to live together in mono- or polygamous relationships without formal marriage. What does this mean for

■ Fig. 1: Members of a family in the province of Nampula, Mozambique (Photo: naTsumi / Shutterstock.com).

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the children born in such relationships? How are societies changing in which the legal regulation of entitlement to maintenance is increasingly being dispensed with?

Refused kinship, creation of new affiliations

Questions of affiliation specifically arise in conflict and post-conflict societies. The example of the terrorist organisation Boko Haram, which violently kidnapped several hundred schoolgirls in northern Nigeria, and still embroils thousands of other children and young people in achieving its political goals, is a reminder of this. It is also known that rebel groups and terrorist militias in Somalia, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo continue to recruit children, often by violent means.[3] What does this change of affiliation mean for children's lives, and beyond this, for their families and communities of origin? Questions of belonging also arise when young people leave terrorist groups but are no longer accepted in their communities of origin. Although great efforts and some progress have been made in recent years, the social reintegration of former child soldiers remains one of the major challenges facing conflict and post-conflict societies in Africa.

Another indication of massive social upheaval and transformation are the cases in which children are denied kinship. In Kinshasa, the capital of DR Congo, which has been marked by decades of wars and economic crises, tens of thousands of children live on the streets after having being accused of witchcraft by relatives or neighbours. This new

phenomenon cannot be fully understood against the background of the country's violent history and precarious living conditions alone. It is also an expression of a deep social and spiritual insecurity within the urban population. This is caused by profound transformations of established generational relationships, which in turn are related to new income opportunities for young people - for example in diamond mining.[4]

The formation of new groups of belonging for and by children is also an expression of social transformations. In African cities such as Nairobi, Abidjan, Addis Ababa, and Gaborone, the number of children and young people growing up in middle-class families is increasing. In addition to school, they move in newly emerging social spaces such as playgrounds, sports clubs, amusement parks, and shopping malls, where they stage their middle-class affiliation with the financial support of their families. On the other hand, there are also children in the same cities who (are forced to) manage their survival outside or on the fringes of family care systems. Some of these children and young people form their own membership groups, for example in the Kenyan city of Eldoret. Here they divide the city into demarcated areas (bases or barracks), which they call „California", „Juma Haji", or „Eastleigh", and live in groups with shared responsibilities and clear social hierarchies. New members are subjected to group- and gender-specific „initiation rites", by means of which initiates hope to find community solidarity and protection if they are admitted.[5]

Institutionalization of childhood

One of the social transformations that African societies are currently undergoing is the increasing institutionalization and standardization of childhood. Groups of children in school uniforms, so prevalent in the public space, bear visible witness to this. Such processes are linked to the comprehensive school enrolment campaigns that followed the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000. One of these objectives was that boys and girls worldwide should receive full primary education by 2015.[6] In almost all the African countries, government measures led to a historic turning point resulting in more children now being enrolled in school than ever before. This is also accompanied by increasing bureaucratisation, for example through the issue of birth certificates and documentation of family affiliation.

RECOMMENDED READING

S. Maurus: Rethinking the „Global Good" of Compulsory Schooling. Combining Young People's Education and Work for Making a Future in South-West Ethiopia, in: I. Clemens et al. (eds.): Bildung und Erziehung im Kontext globaler Transformationen. Leverkusen 2019, 141-152.

U. Wanitzek: Child adoption and foster care in the context of legal pluralism. Case studies from Ghana, in: E. Alber et al. (eds): Child Fostering in West Africa. New Perspectives on Theories and Practices. Leiden 2013, 221-245.

Fig. 2: Former child soldiers in the east of DR Congo (Photo: wikimedia commons / L. Rose).

The globally initiated and nationally implemented school enrolment policies are still accompanied by intensive but scientifically underestimated negotiation processes regarding the affiliation of children. In rural regions in particular, families who live off agriculture can no longer use schoolchildren as full-fledged workers on family farms. Many families have also become sceptical as to whether the many years of investment in the education of children will pay off in the long term. In these cases, their economic and social interests and constraints are confronted with national interests and policies. Such conflicts of interest are expressed in the high drop-out rates among pupils. In some regions, such as in southwest Ethiopia in 2014 and 2015, tensions

„In almost all the African countries, government measures have resulted in more children now being enrolled in school than ever before. "

between agropastoral families and state education policies have already found expression in violent clashes. This makes it clear that school education is not always a simple solution to social problems, but can also become a problem in its own right.[7] Schoolchildren for whom their affiliation to a family group or to farming households is fundamental are constantly living in a field of tension of different interests and policies. How they „navigate" this, and how they are located in different membership groups is a current topic of social science studies.

The increasing institutionalisation of childhood is reflected not least in the fact that the number of public childcare institutions has increased in many African countries. This is due to various factors: the growing need for orphanages and similar facilities („foyers"), partly as a result of the HIV/AIDS crisis; violent conflicts, after which transit centres for demilitarised child soldiers have been created; new laws on child protection; „Western" humanitarian commitment and the trend towards „NGO-ization". Institutions for children that are categorized as „vulnerable" or „in need" are like prisms in which the norms, goals and practices of different actors are broken. Relatives, non-governmental organisations, religious communities, and state authorities are all committed to protecting „needy" children, but by no means act with the same normative ideas about what is in the „best interest" of the children.

Fig. 4: In a Catholic orphanage in Benin, children learn religious songs (Photo: Jeannett Martin).

Globalized African childhoods

The increasing globalization of African societies goes hand in hand with the fact that questions about the affiliation of children are not limited to individual states or the continent. In the course of cross-border mobility and migration, their affiliation is repeatedly renegotiated at different locations by ever changing actors.[8] Thus not only state authorities, but also migrant parents and their children deal with the topic of „belonging" in very different ways, as case studies on mothers from Cameroon living in Germany or on transnational families from Ghana show.[9] Especially in the age of globalization, in which these questions extend far beyond parenthood, family and socialization, a procedural and fundamental political understanding of belonging is helpful and necessary in order to find adequate and context-specific answers to the question „Whom belongs a child to?"

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2 Cf. E. Alber: Kinderhandel in Westafrika?, in: H. Heinen (ed.): Kindersklaven – Sklavenkinder. Schicksale zwischen Zuneigung und Ausbeutung in der Antike und im interkulturellen Vergleich. Stuttgart 2012, 43-61.
3 Cf. documentary „Slaves – Auf den Spuren moderner Sklaverei" (D 2016, ARTE), https://www.dw.com/de/slaves-auf-den-spuren-moderner-sklaverei/av-50113788.
4 F. de Boeck: At Risk, as Risk. Abandonment and Care in A World of Spiritual Insecurity, in: J. S. La Fontaine (ed.): The devil's children. From spirit possession to witchcraft: new allegations that affect children. Farnham / Burlington 2009, 129-150.
5 J. Wachira et al.: Initiation to street life. A qualitative examination of the physical, social, and psychological practices in becoming an accepted member of the street youth community in Western Kenya. BMC public health (2015), 15 (1), S. 569. DOI: 10.1186/s12889-015-1942-8.
6 „Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling." Vgl. https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/education.shtml.
7 Cf. S. Maurus (2019), see Recommended reading.
8 U. Wanitzek (2013), see Recommended reading.
9 P. Feldman-Savelsberg: Mothers on the move. Reproducing belonging between Africa and Europe. Chicago 2016; C. Coe: The Differences in Emotion among Parents and Children in Ghanaian Transnational Families, in: R. R. Reynolds et al. (eds.): Emerging Perspectives on Children in Migratory Circumstances. Philadelphia 2013, 37-42.

■ Jana Hönke
Eric Cezne

Africa's South-South relations

For instance: Mining and railway lines in Mozambique

■ *Hard coal from the mine in the Moatize district is shipped from the port of the Mozambican coastal town of Beira (Photo: Mark Zannoni / Shutterstock.com).*

At the beginning of the 21st century, Africa experienced a fundamental change: While development aid and foreign investment used to come mainly from the West, now economic relations with the emerging countries of the global South, including China and Brazil, became increasingly important. The deepening and expansion of these relations led to a geographical reorientation, which was accompanied by a growing influence of countries and companies from the South. The mining industry is an example of this development. Of the ten companies in this sector that were world leaders in terms of market capitalisation in 2018, four were based in so-called „emerging economies." [1] As early as the end of the Cold War and particularly in the 2000s due to an economic outlook of high international commodity prices, the expansion of companies in the South engaged in the mining or processing of raw materials started to gain pace. Africa in particular was the target of these efforts.

Today, it is often debated whether emerging actors of the South will integrate themselves into the existing liberal world order or rather challenge it. In this context, the question is also raised as to whether economic cooperation with governments, companies, and investors in the South offers the African continent greater advantages than traditional North-South relations – not least with regard to the aspect of equality between the partners involved.

Many scientific contributions see either South-South solidarity as an opportunity and alternative, while others dismiss it and only see neo-colonialism in a new guise. Yet one-sided representations do not go far enough. As it will be shown in the following, it is worth to take a closer look at the idea of „South-South relations", and at what the various actors in politics, business, and society actually mean when they claim the idea of „South-South relations" for themselves – and what practical consequences that can have.

Brazil's South-South cooperation

During the presidencies of Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), Brazilian politics promoted alternative international relations between equal partners in the Global South. [2] The „South-South cooperation" discourse promoted by them had three core elements in relation to Africa:

- **Solidarity:** An altruistic attitude towards Africa, accompanied by moral concerns to help Africans with a range of common historical, economic and social struggles.
- **Affinity:** A mutual empathy resulting from the cultural influence of African slaves and their descendants in Brazil. More specifically in the case of the Portuguese-speaking African countries, these affinities are also given by a common language and overlapping colonial experiences.
- **Tropical technologies:** In the areas of politics, economics, development policies, and technology, it was stressed that Brazilian approaches and concepts could be transferred to African countries in light of similar geographical and social conditions.

This South-South discourse, which accompanied and vaulted the Brazilian commitment to Africa, was by no means all „cast in the same mould". Rather, it was interpreted and translated into practice in diverse ways according to the ideas, expectations, and goals of different actors.

Vale and its foreign relations: The example of Mozambique

Vale is one of the world's largest mining companies and has its headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. Since 2011, it has been the main extractor of mineral resources in Mozambique. A former executive who

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■ *Fig. 1: Cargo ship in the port of Nacala (Photo: Eric Cezne).*

Fig. 2: Railway station on the railway line in the Nacala Logistics Corridor (NLC) (Photo: Eric Cezne).

RECOMMENDED READING

J. Hönke: Transnational Companies and Security Governance. Hybrid Practices in a Postcolonial World. London 2013.

J. Hönke, I. Cuesta-Fernandez: Mobilising Security and Logistics through an African Port. A Controversies Approach to Infrastructure. Mobilities (2018), 13, 2, 246-60. DOI: 10.1080/17450101.2017.1417774.

E. Cezne: Forging Transnational Ties from Below: Challenging the Brazilian Mining Giant Vale S.A. across the South Atlantic. DOI: 10.1016/j.exis.2019.10.007

Fig. 3 (right): On the railway line, the local population offers its goods for sale, mainly fruit and vegetables (Photo: Eric Cezne).

oversaw the company's arrival in the country explained: „Africa is the central west of Brazil."[3] He was alluding to the similarity of the Brazilian savannah-like cerrado biome with the northern and centrally located regions of the southeast African country. Moreover, Mozambique ought to be transformed from an economically backward country into a modern export-oriented country. In connection with the Vale coal mine in the central-western Mozambican district of Moatize, the company constructed the Nacala Logistics Corridor (NLC) rail link, connecting Moatize to the port of Nacala on the Indian Ocean. Here, according to the former Vale executive, the firm made use of its experience in Brazil, where it operates regular passenger train services between Belo Horizonte and the port of Vitória, and between Parauapebas and the port of São Luís.[4] The new route in Mozambique was presented by Vale as a South-South transfer and expression of social commitment. Many also argue that President Lula da Silva „used Vale" to promote „solidarity actions" in Mozambique, as exemplified by his request to Vale executives to help financing the construction of an antiretroviral drug factory to fight HIV/AIDS in Mozambique – a development cooperation project led by the Brazilian state.[5] At the same time, Vale is believed to have gained contractual advantages thanks to this kind of interconnectedness with the Brazilian government.

Political elites in Mozambique

The Brazilian government actively promoted Vale's involvement in Mozambique as an example of solidarity between two countries in the global South. Nevertheless, many studies dealing with Africa's South-South relations overestimate the influence of foreign governments and corporations, while presenting Africans as passive recipients. Mozambique's political elites, however, have framed the idea of South-South cooperation in their own way. In resorting to this idea, they referred to ideas of „national development", „strengthening Mozambique's capacity to act" or „diversifying the country's foreign relations" in order to justify Brazil's and other emerging powers' large-scale investments and their costs. At the same time, they used the South-South discourse to strengthen the legitimacy of the FRELIMO government.[6]

During the past ten years, considerable discoveries in Mozambique of coal, natural gas, diamonds, and wood have given rise to optimism about the country's future development. New partnerships with Brazil, China, India, and South Africa to tap these resources were given central importance by the political establishment in Mozambique.[7] South-South cooperation, it was claimed, would lead Mozambique out of its dependence on Western aid and release an economic dynamic driven by foreign direct investment. Mozambique's presi-

dent, Filipe Nyusi, declared: „The development co-operation led by the BRICS countries not only gives a voice to the speechless, but is accompanied by a development agenda that focuses (more) on our needs and priorities." [8] Relations with Brazil, including Brazilian foreign investment, were lauded for not being burdened by colonialism, and for breaking the vicious circle of economic dependency.

Recent research also shows, however: The growing importance of these investments have allowed Mozambique's ruling party, FRELIMO, to channel a

considerable number of contractual relations, tax payments and public investments in such a way as to strengthen its own political and economic power. These South-South relations thus represented much more than the transfer of capital and development know-how from Brazil. Vale and the idea of South-South relations also became components of the „FRELIMO party-state" [9] capable of asserting, expanding, and legitimizing its own power under the guise of „national development".

Protest and resistance: Local initiatives and their speakers

In addition to Brazil's economic and political commitment and Mozambique's political elites, there is a third, often overlooked factor in these South-South relations. Proximity and solidarity across the South Atlantic have led to grassroots initiatives and local communities to critically question Vale's presence in Mozambique. Representatives of NGOs stress, and this is also documented by research, that the company brings a problematic „baggage" from Brazil to Africa. [10]

> **„Forms of protest anchored in the idea of affinity and mutual solidarity are finding their way across the South Atlantic."**

For example, around 1,300 families were resettled to allow Vale's coal mining operations in the Moatize-Tete region. Critics of the project also refer to the tragic breach of a tailings dam in the small Brazilian town of Brumadinho in January 2019. They see it as evidence of the socially and environmentally reckless misconduct associated with Vale's mining projects at home and abroad. The initiators of protests against the harmful effects of these projects are showing transnational solidarity with the help of the common Portuguese language. „When a body part is injured and has a wound, the whole body feels it," explained the director of an organization offering legal assistance to mining communities in Tete. [11] The people living there – they call themselves Atingidos pela Vale – refer to the idea of South-South relations in order to organize a „cooperation from people to people". Forms of protest anchored in the idea of affinity and mutual solidarity are finding their way across the South Atlantic and are used to articulate criticism and resistance. [12]

Fig. 6: Hard coal mine in the Moatize district (Photo: Eric Cezne).

Fig. 7: Residential house in a local community adjacent to Vale's Moatize coal mine (Photo: Eric Cezne).

Conclusion

Vale's commitment in Mozambique shows in exemplary fashion: Simply affirming or rejecting the thesis that South-South relations have their own character different from established North-South relations, does not do justice to the complex circumstances on the ground. For in both cases one fails to recognize the different, if not contradictory potentials contained in the idea of a South-South cooperation. The ideas and practices derived from this play an important role when it comes to negotiating and distributing the costs and benefits of the extraction of mineral resources, for example. Most of the research work dealing with foreign business investments in Africa is still focussed on Western companies. However, it is just as important to get more involved in the diverse South-South commitments emanating from China, Brazil, and other countries of the Global South. They are in the process of actively shaping the future of the African continent, and beyond.

1   Vale, Brazil (4th place); Shenhua Energy, China (5th place); Coal India, India (7th place); and China Molybdenum, China (8th place) (Statista, June 2019).

2   The current government under President Jair Bolsonaro represents perhaps the biggest break with Brazil's long-standing strategy of strengthening external relations within the global South. Instead, it has sought greater proximity to politically right-wing governments in the North, especially the USA.

3   In an interview in São Paulo, Brazil, in April 2019.

4   Ibid.

5   For more details, see: https://www.reuters.com/article/health-aids-mozambique-brazil-dc/brazil-offers-drug-factory-to-aids-ravaged-mozambique-idUKL2957933720070529

6   FRELIMO is an acronym of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front). The liberation movement, founded in 1962, led the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial power and achieved Mozambique's independence in 1975. It has been a political party since 1977, and continues to govern the country to this day.

7   See C. Alden, S. Chichava: China and Mozambique: From Comrades to Capitalists. Pretoria 2014.

8   Angola e Moçambique querem apoio dos BRICS, Deutsche Welle 27.07.2018. www.dw.com/pt-002/angola-e-mozambique-querem-apoio-dos-brics/a-44857262

9   J. Sumich: The Party and the State: Frelimo and Social Stratification in Post-socialist Mozambique. Development and Change (2010), 41 (4), 679-698. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01653.x

10   According to an interlocutor in an interview (São Paulo, April 2019) conducted as part of the INFRAGLOB project.

11   According to the representative of an NGO in an interview conducted in 2018 in Tete, Mozambique, as part of the INFRAGLOB case study.

12   See Cezne 2019 in the Recommended readings for more.

Africa's infrastructure and the Global South

The EU research project INFRAGLOB

I n March 2018, the research project INFRAGLOB started under the direction of Prof. Dr. Jana Hönke. It deals with the question of how emerging powers in the Global South challenge the traditional practice of international relations, but also their understanding. The research work is carried out under the theme „Africa's Infrastructure Globalities – Rethinking Political Geographies from the Global South" and will be funded over five years by the European Research Council (ERC) with an ERC Starting Grant.

It will follow infrastructure projects in the Global South, in particular in the area of the natural resources exploitation, and in rail and ship logistics. In these areas, Chinese and Brazilian companies are currently some of the most important investors in Africa. They introduce new corporate governance practices and often shape their relationships with social actors differently to Western norms and expectations. Of particular interest is the question of what influence these actors from the South have on current efforts to regulate transnational corporate relations under social and ethical aspects.

INFRAGLOB examines these questions „from below": It uses sociological and anthropological approaches to identify changes that arise from the day-to-day negotiation and implementation

of projects and standards. The research work focuses in particular on Chinese and Brazilian port and mining projects on the African continent. The researchers follow the engineers and community managers who carry out these projects in Africa, but also mediate between company headquarters and transnational forums on social regulation. INFRAGLOB also looks at the specific transnational mobilisation against large-scale economic projects in South-South relations, and asks how these (can) influence social and ethical aspects. This SPEKTRUM contribution is the result of a case study on Vale's involvement in Mozambique.

■ *Fig. 1: Bauxite is loaded onto railway wagons and transported to the port of Kamsar in Guinea. Most of the bauxit is exported to China (sst).*

■ *Fig. 2: A cargo ship in the port of Kamsar is loaded with bauxite, aluminium, and iron ore (sst).*

■ Uli Beisel
  Martin Doevenspeck
  Kennedy Wema Muhindo

Trust in biomedicine?

Ebola between technological progress and social resistance

■ *A hand washing station set up by Unicef to prevent Ebola infections. (Photo: Martin Doevenspeck).*

The Ebola virus was discovered in the 1970s in a missionary hospital on the banks of the Ebola River in Zaire – now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Over the next 30 years, about twenty small outbreaks mainly in remote Central African forest areas followed, with the exception of one bigger disease episode the city of Gulu in Northern Uganda in the year 2000. The first time Ebola appeared in West Africa, in the Republic of Guinea in December 2013, it quickly developed into an epidemic engulfing also the neighbouring countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone to the South and lasting until 2015.

The latest Ebola outbreak in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was detected in August 2018, could prove to be as serious as the West African epidemic. Currently, the World Health Organization has counted 3,204 cases, of which 2,142 people have died and 1,004 survived the infection.[1] Although many innovative technologies such as vaccines and new drugs have been developed since the epidemic in West Africa and are utilised currently, the outbreak is still not under control. Long-lasting violent conflicts in the region, and deep resentment among the local population towards the state and international actors, make the fight against Ebola all the more difficult. Violence by armed militias occurred several times. Several Ebola treatment centres operated by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and by the MSF relief organisation have been attacked. In April 2019, for example, Cameroonian physician Richard V. Mouzoko Kiboung, who worked for WHO, was brutally assassinated.

Distrust and resistance

For the local population in North Kivu, Ebola is just one of the many diseases one lives with. Some therefore see the attention given to Ebola by the government and international aid workers as sign of a hidden agenda. There are widespread rumours that the disease is not real, but a political trick to enrich the usual suspects. This distrust is often put down to ignorance and lack of understanding, but it is not that simple. Already in the West African Ebola epidemic, a lack of confidence in biomedical interventions was a major issue. In the social science literature, three main reasons for this have been identified:

■ Ebola begins with high fever, diarrhoea, vomiting, and other non-specific symptoms, which also present with malaria and cholera, among other infectious diseases. Only in later phases do the characteristic symptoms follow. The local population in West Africa, as in North Kivu, has quickly learned to recognise these symptoms and take the necessary precautions. People have adapted established traditions such as funeral rites to be protected against infection.[2] One problem, however, remains the systematic lack of medical care for other diseases. In North Kivu, for example, there have been 18,201 suspected cases of cholera since early 2019; 325 people have died of cholera and another 3,667 of measles.[3] However, when medical care and international attention are only focused on Ebola, this is unlikely to raise confidence among the population.

■ The general lack of medical care has strengthened mistrust of biomedical care provided by national and international institutions. Particularly in rural areas, people rightly place their trust in the home care of relatives in the event of illness. An international case study on the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone[4] has shown that families only perceived the new Ebola centres as an improvement in provision of care after a certain period of time.

This change in attitude took place in three steps: First, families began to realize that those involved in patient care were also the most at risk of infection. In addition, with an increasing number of dismissed survivors, the perception that Ebola treatment centres were places where people went to die gradually changed. Families recognised that Ebola treatment centres offer better chances of survival than regular hospitals or home care. This social learning took place quickly. Many local practices were successfully adapted to the changed realities, and infection protection was successfully improvised.[5] Development of trust in Ebola treatment centres, however, depended on the effective flow of communication from the centres to the surrounding communities. However, in many situations, quarantine and isolation measures interrupted social contact and thus communication in unexpected ways. Important feedback mechanisms failed at times, and learning from positive experiences was delayed. In addition, inequalities arose between those who knew employees in the Ebola treatment centres, and those who did not know anyone there. So distrust and rumours found fertile ground. Today's Ebola treatment centres have visitor zones, and communication with the families of patients and surrounding communities is taken seriously. Nevertheless, the basic principles of the Ebola treatment

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
centres, namely centralised care in a highly secure treatment centre, make communication between patients and families, families and practitioners, as well as practitioners and surrounding communities difficult to say the least.

"The chances of survival of Ebola patients have improved significantly if medical help and treatment are sought early."

■ Lack of trust is often based on previous experiences of inadequate health systems and long years of government neglect, as well as the inefficiency or even failure of international humanitarian aid and development projects. Rumours that Ebola treatment centres were places for blood theft, or that Ebola had been invented by political elites or sha-

dowy international actors, may seem irrational and far-fetched at first glance. However, it is important to recognise that many of these issues are rooted in experiences dating back to colonial times: colonial violence was in fact often accompanied by medical experiments and the theft of body parts, and to this day the unethical practices of blood and Ebola sampling and the international export of such samples continues unabated. During the West African Ebola epidemic, tens of thousands of Ebola blood samples were exported from West Africa to Europe and the USA for research purposes without the consent of patients. There they are currently stored in bio-banks and made available for research.[6]

The Ebola outbreak in North Kivu: Obstacles to overcoming it

The situation is particularly difficult in North Kivu: The conflict, which has lasted for many years and

continues to this day, has eroded confidence in state and international actors. The relationship between the state and society in the Ebola regions in eastern DR Congo is considerably shaped by the fact that the excessive violence perpetrated against the population by militias and the Congolese army remains largely unpunished. According to the Kivu Security Tracker, which documents attacks,[7] attackers – including unpaid or underpaid state security forces – killed nearly 900 civilians and kidnapped 1,400 in the provinces of North and

They note that no one seems to care about daily deaths from malaria and other infectious diseases, the lack of clean water, or surgeries that must be performed by candlelight because there's no power. „You will leave when Ebola does," I have heard, „but we will still be here, slowly dying from the diseases that have always killed us."

Vinh-Kim Nguyen, medical anthropologist, physician and doctor, working in North Kivu for the international organisation „Médecins Sans Frontières".[13]

Fig. 2: Ebola treatment centre in Butembo, DRC (Photo: Kennedy Wema Muhindo).

Fig. 3: Patient care at the Ebola treatment centre in Butembo, DRC (Photo: Kennedy Wema Muhindo).

South Kivu in 2018 alone. In the Beni region, various armed groups, including the ADF (cf. Fig. 1), murdered around 300 people in almost 100 attacks on villages and towns. There are currently around 4.5 million internally displaced people throughout the country, 150,000 of whom have fled to neighbouring countries.

Today, the Congolese state is not in a position to enforce its monopoly on the use of violence.[8] This is due to corruption, a lack of infrastructure, and the failure of demilitarization programmes and security sector reforms. Above all, however, there is a lack of political will. As a result, more than 140 armed groups are active in the Kivu provinces alone. Ethnic massacres, rapes, looting, and forced recruitment generally go unpunished. Armed groups are usually well-connected locally and are used by actors on international, national, and regional levels to assert their political and economic interests. In

RECOMMENDED READING

V.-K. Nguyen: An Epidemic of Suspicion – Ebola and Violence in the DRC. New England Journal of Medicine (2019), 380, 1298-1299. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1902682

B. Muhire Mwanga: Land, Power and Identity : The Politics of Scale and Violent Conflict in Masisi, DR Congo. Bayreuth 2017. DOI: 10.15495/EPub_UBT_00004373

P. Richards: Ebola: How a People's Science Helped End an Epidemic. London 2016.

P. Richards et al.: Trust, and Distrust, of Ebola Treatment Centers: A Case-Study from Sierra Leone. PLOS ONE (forthcoming).

1   Status: Early October 2019.
2   P. Richards (2016), see Recommended reading.
3   WHO: Ebola, cholera, and measles: Triple threats to the poorest communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. www.afro.who.int/news/ebola-cholera-and-measles-triple-threats-poorest-communities-democratic-republic-congo
4   See page 73.
5   P. Richards (2016).
6   E. Freudenthal: Ebola's lost blood: row over samples flown out of Africa as ‚big pharma‘ set to cash in. The Telegraph, Feb. 6, 2019 (online).
7   https://kivusecurity.org
8   Cf. B. Muhire Mwanga (2017), see Recommended reading.
9   According to a United Nations report.
10   www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/democratic-republic-congo
11   S. Perazzone: „Shouldn't You Be Teaching Me?" State Mimicry in the Congo. International Political Sociology (2018), Vol. 13 (2), 161-180. DOI: 10.1093/ips/oly023
12   The Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO for short, is currently one of the world's largest UN peace missions.
13   V.-K. Nguyen (2019), 1299, see Recommended reading.

Fig. 4: Ebola treatment centre in Butembo, DRC (Photo: Kennedy Wema Muhindo).

addition, state security forces are also responsible for human rights violations in DR Congo – more than 50 percent of all cases in 2018.[9] Human Rights Watch has documented these attacks in detail.[10] Even though there are differentiated concepts in political sociology for the analysis of complex social-state relations at the local level in the DR Congo,[11] it suffices to note here that most Congolese are deeply suspicious of the state and its unpredictable security apparatus. This comprehensive loss of confidence, as the current Ebola crisis shows, can also extend to the cooperation partners of the state, not least because of the suspension of elections, especially in the areas affected by the outbreak. Despite some success, the UN peace mission MONUSCO[12] as well as international aid organisations have been discredited for large sections of the population after countless scandals concerning arms trading, sexual abuse, and financial misappropriation. They were unable to prevent these scandals, or were even suspected of being involved. „No Congo, no job," Congolese say laconically.

All three dynamics described – the medical underprovision of treatment for other diseases, the problem of centralised and quarantined Ebola treatment centres, and the many years of existential experience with state neglect and violence – complicate control of the Ebola outbreak in North Kivu. Centrally organised and isolated Ebola treatment centres will only be accepted if the local population has basic trust in a benevolent and competent state. But North Kivu lacks the necessary conditions for this. In this context, it is not irrational to mistrust the established Ebola treatment methods of biomedicine, but a rational reaction based on previous and historical experiences with the state and international actors.

The technological progress in prevention and treatment methods since the Ebola epidemic in West Africa has been impressive: two effective vaccines and one successful treatment drug are in active use, as well as many innovations in care that allow closer contact between patients, caregivers and the families of patients have been developed. The chances of survival for people infected with Ebola have improved significantly if medical help and treatment are sought at an early stage. However, this does not reduce the social challenges in North Kivu. For confidence in biomedicine to grow, it is necessary for the Ebola virus Disease to be understood in a broader societal context, in which health in general and the well-being of all citizens are at the core of epidemic containment. It is essential that national governments and the international community demonstrate in practice that they are not only concerned with isolating and combating a highly contagious disease outbreak, but also with improving the long-term health and social situation of the population. Only then can trust in biomedicine and its interventions develop.

Current research projects on Ebola

From 2016 to 2019, an international research project led by Prof. Dr. Uli Beisel of the University of Bayreuth and Dr. Sung-Joon Park of the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg investigated the impact of the Ebola epidemic on people's trust in biomedicine in West Africa. The German Research Foundation (DFG) funded the project as one of its „German-African Cooperation Projects in Infectiology".

A case study on Sierra Leone has highlighted the importance of participatory mechanisms and experience-based learning when a population is affected by such health challenges. When the epidemic broke out in the spring of 2014, the country was significantly weakened by civil war, economic structural reforms, and poverty-related diseases. As the virus was appearing for the first time in Sierra Leone, the general public was initially poorly informed about the Ebola virus and its effects. As a result, the public was largely unsympathetic to any measures that had a strong impact on social life, such as the quarantines with which government authorities and international organizations sought to curb the spread of the virus.

Interviews with patients, nurses, and doctors have revealed that many promises made by government agencies during the crisis were not kept after the epidemic subsided. As a result, local medical staff often lost their faith in any sustainable strengthening of the health system's resources and the effectiveness of its measures to treat and prevent highly infectious diseases such as Ebola. The study thus clearly shows that the prevailing approach in biomedicine, which is based on the transfer of medical knowledge and procedural guidelines, is far from sufficient when it comes to effectively combating infectious diseases. Instead, integrative concepts are required in the field of public health – concepts that take into account systemic, social, and psychological factors in sustainable trust-building. This is particularly true in countries where poverty is widespread and many people have insufficient access to public health services.

Another research project, in which Prof. Dr. Martin Doevenspeck of the University of Bayreuth is involved, deals with the social anthropological prerequisites for combating and preventing Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It is coordinated by Dr. Sung-Joon Park in cooperation with Dr. Nene Morisho, who earned his doctorate at the Bayreuth International School of African Studies (BIGSAS) and now heads the Pole Institute in Goma (DRC). The aim is to develop concrete recommendations for action in interdisciplinary cooperation between social scientists and health professionals with the aim of developing trust and significantly improving medical treatment and care for patients. The project is supported by elrha, a global NGO.

■ *Fig. 1: A road sign in the DR Congo warns of the danger of infection from Ebola (Photo: Sergey Uryadnikov / Shutterstock.com).*

■ *Fig. 2: Entrance to the Kenema Hospital in Kenema, Sierra Leone (Photo: wikimedia commons / CC-BY-SA-3.0 / Leasmhar).*

■ Eric A. Anchimbe

Identities in language

Hangovers of colonialism?

■ *Young people in Africa often construct their linguistic identity through a social code that is constitutive for membership within their own group (sst).*

In political circles, African countries have generally been attributed colonially-defined linguistic identities. These identities, implied through the terms anglophone, francophone and lusophone Africa, have colonialism lingering strongly over these independent countries. They reflect only one aspect of the linguistic plurality of these countries, that is, the official languages which are the heritage of colonialism. However, these colonial-based identities also ignore the huge range of other identities, linguistic and otherwise, that people project, belong to, engage with, or resort to in certain circumstances – sometimes on a daily basis. So, besides just projecting an identity that is embedded in a former colonial language, postcolonial African citizens also build identities on their native or ethnic languages, their repertoire of bilingualism or multilingualism, and the social codes and the mixed languages they speak (pidgins, creoles and bilingual mixed languages) co-existing in their societies.[1] Beyond these linguistic identities, they also find identity hallmarks in religion, nationality, ethnicity, social status, culture and so forth. These multiple identities can be accumulated by the same individual and could be revealed or concealed depending on the circumstances at hand.

> **„Being bilingual or multilingual is the norm in most African countries."**

It is worth investigating the different identities that Africans have acquired since the end of colonialism. Language is of central importance because these identities are articulated through language. This short essay pays attention to linguistic identities in Africa, the essence of these identities in the lives of speakers and the mode through which they are constructed. While the identity categories listed here may be similar across many African countries, the categories are not without exceptions since each country has certain dynamics that set them apart from others.

Linguistic identities and onions: What do they have in common?

Before answering this question, let us look back into the history of complex identities in Africa.

Long before colonialism started, Africa was already multilingual and multiethnic. Movements of people within the continent for trade, labour and matrimony account, to some extent, for its dense linguistic and population admixture.[2] Colonialism only added a new set of identity layers for the people – the colonial language being one of them. The new identities triggered by colonialism were easily accepted because the people were already open to similar processes in the past. There was a social base that was accustomed to new languages, ethnicities and ways of making meaning. Proof of this is in the effortless ways in which these multiple identities are negotiated in daily interactions. How they work is a complex process of integration into the society and understanding the intricacies of context, participants and message.

What do identities and onions have in common? They both have layers that open into one another. Linguistic identities are therefore like the layers of an onion. They can be piled on each time they are needed and can also be peeled off when they are not needed. These onion shape identities can be illustrated as in Figure 1. As Figure 2 shows, any identity can be prioritized anytime the need arises. The innermost layer, the core of any group-based identity, is the native or ethnic language identity. It is followed, depending on the community, context and time of acquisition of the language, by the official language identity, the dual or bilingual identity and the social code identity.

Studies have shown how postcolonial identities are negotiated linguistically in different ways and countries. In the case of the Caribbean, speakers perform acts of identity each time they choose a particular language or speech pattern in interaction.[3] In Cameroon (Africa in general), bilingual children born to parents from different cultures and languages engage in linguabridity[4]

■ Fig. 1 (above): Ideal linguistic identities.
■ Fig. 2 (bottom): Linguistic identity negotiation.
(Illustrations: Eric A. Anchmibe / Christian Göppner)

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1 R. B. LePage, A. Tabouret-Keller: Acts of Identity: Creole-Based Approaches to Language and Ethnicity. Cambridge 1985.
2 Cf. S. Mufwene: The Ecology of Language Evolution. Cambridge 2001.
3 R. B. LePage, A. Tabouret-Keller (1985), cf. n.1.
4 E. A. Anchimbe (2007), see Recommended reading.

when they construct themselves as hybrids of both. So, strategies in identity construction and identity negotiation tend to be very similar in most multilingual postcolonial African societies. Where differences exist, they are caused by:

- the specific mix of languages, that is, ex-colonial languages, pidgins, creoles and indigenous languages,
- the historical routes and duration of colonialism,
- the type of official language policy practiced, for instance, monolingual, bilingual or multilingual.

The native or ethnic language identity

It is the innermost layer of identity. It is tied to a geographical region (village, town, kingdom, etc.) that has boundaries, a culture and a language. Through these, members can easily exclude non-group members. The worldview and culture of the group is transmitted through its native or ethnic language. It is this language that offers group members a linguistic identity. Because switching to the native language cuts non-members out of communication it is central to membership in the ethnic group and adherence to its norms, customs and traditions.

In most African communities, the native language is acquired first at home. It is the mother tongue even for people who do not speak it but are born to parents who come from the ethnic group that speaks the language. This makes the native language almost a natural innermost core of the linguistic identity onion for most people. Regional lingua fancas and official languages (or educational languages, e.g. Kiswahili in Tanzania) are then learnt in school later or in the neighbourhood.

The official language identity

The notion of official languages was introduced through colonialism. Almost all African countries that were colonised have a colonial language as the sole or one of their official languages. Countries like Nigeria opted for a mixed policy with the ex-colonial language as official language and three native languages as national languages. Tanzania went in for a dual policy with Kiswahili and English as of-

ficial languages. Cameroon, colonised by France and Britain, adopted a French-English bilingual policy. Several countries allocated no status to the native languages at independence. The consequence is that their national linguistic identity is now built on colonial languages: anglophone, francophone and lusophone countries.

The official language identity is generally the second layer since the official language is learnt after the native language. This identity layer is shared nationally as medium of education, law, international transaction, etc. It is a symbol of upward social mobility, employment and social status. In some contexts, it functions in opposition to the native languages in such dichotomous categories as modern vs. primitive, progressive vs. conservative, new vs. old and city vs. village, along with the identity attributes they engender.

The bilingual identity and the dual identity

Being bilingual or multilingual is the norm in most African countries. Often this is accompanied by the linguistic cultural baggage that languages carry with them. This means some people could be bilingual, that is, being able to speak two languages and exercise active belonging to the cultures transmitted through those languages. They project a bilingual identity. It also means that some people could possess a dual identity, that is, they exercise active belonging to two ethno-cultural groups but can speak the language of only one of them. They belong to the one whose language they do not speak by birth.

If we take people's daily interactions and switches across languages in Africa into account, it will be clear that almost everyone has a bilingual or a dual identity layer. How strongly this layer is prioritised depends on the status and prominence of the languages involved. In Cameroon, for instance, the bilingual identity is built on the two official languages which form the basis of the bilingualism national policy, while the dual identity combines a native language and one official language. In other countries, the combinations could be different: a native language and a regional lingua franca or the official language and a national language. While the repertoires may be diverse, the identities built on them are similar.

■ Fig. 3: *Official and national languages in African countries (Illustration: wikimedia commons / Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa)).*

■ Fig. 4: *The spread of the former colonial languages in African countries (Illustration: Christian Göppner).*

Social group linguistic identity

Mostly youths construct linguistic identities for their social groups. The aim is to grant the group a code for in-group communication and for closing boundaries to others. The code could be a slang or a set of lexico-semantic features in an existing language, a pidgin or creole, or a new mixed language, for instance, a bilingual mixed language. In the case of a bilingual mixed language, speakers use their multilingual repertoire to create a language for their in-group. A few examples are Camfranglais (Cameroon), Sheng and Engsh (Kenya). In the case of a pidgin or creole, Pidgin English in Ghana is an identity marker mostly for male youths especially those who consider themselves tough. Membership in these groups is determined by competence in the social group code.

Identity management and social competence

Linguistic identities in Africa are therefore not static. They could be revealed or concealed in line with interactional challenges. The decision to make them visible or not depends on the stakes in every communicative situation. At one point, an official language identity may be projected as the main identity, dwarfing or completely hiding the native. At another point, circumstances may arise in which the situation is exactly the opposite. In any case, the „management" of one's own linguistic identities is a complex process which most Africans learn from childhood, and which often constitutes an important survival strategy. Those who master this linguistic identity management thus demonstrate social competence, regardless of their social level – be it as members of the ethnic group, a national or of a social group.

RECOMMENDED READING

E. A. Anchimbe: Language Policy and Identity Construction. Amsterdam 2013.

E. A. Anchimbe: Hybrid linguistic identities in postcolonial Africa: The intricacy of identity opportunism in multilingual Cameroon, in F. Heidemann, A. de Toro (eds.): New Hybridities: Societies and Cultures in Transition. Leipzig 2006, 237-261.

E. A. Anchimbe (ed.): Linguistic Identity in Postcolonial Multilingual Spaces. Newcastle 2007.

MAYOTTE
EST COMORIENNE
ET LE RESTERA A JAMAIS

Grande
Comore

INDIAN OCEAN

Moroni

▲ Karthala

Mutsamoudou

Fomboni

Anjouan

Mohéli

Mayotte
(France)

MOZAMBIQUE
CHANNEL

■ Rémi Armand Tchokothe

A European border in Africa

The Comoros in the focus of literary criticism

■ *A public sign confirms Mayotte's permanent affiliation with the Comoros
(Photo: Rémi A. Tchokothe). Small Picture: The archipelago of the Comoros in
the Indian Ocean (Map: wikimedia commons / CC BY-SA 3.0 / NordNordWest).*

A cursory glance at the world map would suggest the Comoros, an archipelago in the Indian Ocean consisting of four main islands, forms a single geographical unit. But a very eventful history, shaped in many respects by colonialism, has led to the fact that its political, social, and cultural conditions today are very complicated.

■ Since 2001, three of the four main islands – Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli – as well as some smaller islands have formed the „Union of the Comoros", an independent federal island state. In 2011, the fourth main island, Mayotte, was included as the 101st Département in the Republic of France, and has been part of the European Union since 1 January 2014. The starting point of this „split" was a referendum in 1974: On Mayotte more than 63 percent of voters opted to remain with the former colonial power France, while on the other three islands well over 90 percent voted for political independence. Strengthened by France's restrictive immigration policy, large sections of the population on Mayotte today consciously distance themselves from the neighbouring islands. In the final round of the 2017 French presidential election, Marine Le Pen, a candidate for the Front National, who had campaigned for more rigorous immigration laws, won around 43 percent of the vote. Many obviously feared that immigration from neighbouring islands would endanger their own prosperity. As early as 2016, Mayotte was the subject of protests and violent attacks against so-called „migrants", who were blamed by some groups for rising crime and unemployment. In 2018, renewed unrest led to talks with the government in Paris aimed at intensifying the fight against „illegal migration". In order to publicly demonstrate the will to bring this situation to a head, President Emmanuel Macron visited the main island on 22 October 2019 on a modern high-speed patrol boat (intercepteur) from Petite Terre, a small island belonging to Mayotte.

■ But at the same time, the islands of the Comoros archipelago have much in common: historical experiences dating back to pre-colonial times, languages, traditions and religious orientations, but also the cultural diversity of the local population. To this day, there are numerous family connections between the inhabitants of various islands. Consequently, crossings to Mayotte are not experienced as „migration" to a foreign country, but as mobility within a historically, socially, and culturally related archipelago. Against this background, the Comoros Government, the African Union, and the UN have launched various diplomatic initiatives to change Mayotte's status. They always failed, however, because France, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has now ignored 22 UN resolutions on the subject.

A closer look at these complex relationships reveals structures and developments that affect relations between Africa and Europe as a whole. Although Mayotte belongs to France and offers some advantages and privileges to its island population, many people feel disadvantaged here. An initiative in 2016 to combat the high cost of living on the island met with a broad public response. In essence, it was an appeal to France to ensure that the population of Mayotte enjoyed the same economic benefits as French citizens elsewhere. Moreover, Shimaoré, the language of the Mahorean population, is disadvantaged compared to French, the only official language. Both linguistic cultures exist side by side, without any creative development taking place through mutual exchange. The impression that Shimaoré should be deliberately pushed back is widespread. As a result, Mayotte's internal relations with France still reflect the old North-South relations between a European colonial power and its African colonies.

Seen from the islands of the Union of the Comoros, however, Mayotte does not present itself as a disadvantaged island, but as a place of longing. In 1997, for example, demonstrations were held on the neighbouring island of Anjouan, calling for union with France. It was hoped that a recolonization by France would bring economic and social advantages, as they had supposedly already been realised

■ Fig. 1: View of the harbour of Mamoudzou, the capital of the French overseas department Mayotte. (Photo: wikimedia commons / CC-BY-2.0 / David Stanley).

■ Fig. 2: Rémi Tchokothe and Samir Dupont in Domoni on the Comoros island of Anjouan. On a clear day one can see as far as the coast of Mayotte (Photo: Mr. Kamal).

■ Fig. 3: La Grande Mosquée du Vendredi at the harbour of the Comorian capital Moroni (Photo: Rémi A. Tchokothe).

AUTHOR

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on the island of Mayotte. Even today, despite the now stricter visa regulations, the people on the neighbouring Comoros islands try almost daily to transfer to Mayotte in small „Kwassa-kwassa boats". Here they want to see family members again, go to medical care centres, secure a better school education for their children, or find long-term work. But very often, the boats capsize without any chance of rescue. Unnoticed by the international public and the media, tragedies occur almost daily, like in the Mediterranean, where people from Africa die trying to reach Lampedusa and other islands belonging to European states. The 70 kilometre wide waterway that separates the Comoros islands of Anjouan and Mayotte is therefore referred to by Comorians as „the largest ocean cemetery in the world".

The historical and political geography of the Comoros also inspires literature – be it in bizarre, comedic or angry, aggressive ways. In the following, two literary works will be examined in more detail. Their authors, Nassur Attoumani and Soeuf Elbadawi, were both born in the Comoros capital of Moroni. With their works they want to challenge critical reflections on political and geographical aspects of life in the archipelago, and in doing so, make the aftermath of colonialism visible.

■ Fig. 4: Nassur Attoumani on the beach on Mayotte (Photo: Rémi A. Tchokothe).

„Death visa"

The play „Autopsy of a dead body"(Autopsy d'un Macchabée) by Nassur Attoumani is a satirical chamber play. There are four people on the stage:

Macchabée, a dead body; Mahossa, a Mayotte resident and fundamentalist Muslim; Chikungunya, a forensic pathologist named after a tropical viral disease; and Iblis, the outcast Satan. Mahossa discovers Macchabée in a mangrove swamp on the island of Mayotte. He is pleased that the villagers want to bury the body immediately in the cemetery, according to the rules of Islam. Yet Chikungunya intervenes: As spokesman for the French Republic, he calls for compliance with the laws in force on the island. He insists on an autopsy, in which he unintentionally and comically relates legal precision and scientific objectivity to each other. Thus the forensic expert marks a contrast between the cultural practices of the predominantly Muslim Mahorians and the legal claims of France. He accuses the corpse, which comes from the neighbouring island of Grande Comore, of having illegally entered French territory. He intends to use the autopsy to bring him to justice. Moreover: He implicitly accuses the corpse, and the population of Grande Comore, of having abandoned their own „paradise" by voting for political independence, and of having created the reasons for their „emigration" themselves.

When Mahossa resists autopsy, Chikungunya threatens to press charges against him for being an accessory to murder. Thus he projects on the representative of the population an accusation which should actually be directed against the French state: In the Comoros, the term ‚death visa' (Visa de la mort) is used not only to refer to the legal entry documents issued by the French authorities, but also

metaphorically to the life-threatening sea-crossing by Kwassa-kwassa to Mayotte. The majority of islanders apply in vain for a visa, but many of them risk their lives getting to the desired island anyway. In this context, the Senegalese writer Boubacar Boris Diop speaks of the „Damned of the Sea" (Damnés de la Mer) – alluding to the famous book title „The Wretched of the Earth" (Les Damnés de la Terre) by Frantz Fanon, the theorist of decolonization.

„The day of mourning"

The French visa policy and its consequences are also the subject of the poem „A mourning song for our dead, with anger between their teeth" (Un Dhikri pour nos morts. La rage entre les dents) by Soeuf Elbadawi. A dhikri is a prayer, a ritual act of remembrance, which takes place 40 days after the death of a human being. The author adapts this literary form to expose France's visa policy as an instrument of neo-colonialism: It imposes violent demarcations on the population of the archipelago that run counter to their common history, and makes people „illegal migrants" when they want to enter „the land of their ancestors". Just how much the French Republic betrays its revolutionary ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity, in the author's point of view, is expressed in a contrafaction of the first verse of the Marseillaise: „Arise, children of the Fatherland / Our day of glory has arrived", the national anthem begins; „Arise, drowning children of brothers and sisters / Our day of mourning has come," is what Elbadawi exhorts instead. While the French original appeals to citizens to fight bravely against the soldiers of tyranny, the dhikri contains the desperate resigned appeal to board the „fatal boats" and begin the journey across the sea – where voracious sharks with blood-smeared mouths wait for the next drowning passenger. The catastrophic end of the boat trip to Mayotte brings back memories of the colonial era: For it was by sea that the people of the Comoros, Mozambique, and Tanzania were abducted overseas as slaves.

Literature as critical geography

Today, the term „critical geography" encompasses a series of research approaches that regard geographical spaces as products of power structures, of claims to power, of violence and dependence, but

RECOMMENDED READING

N. Attoumani: Autopsie d'un Macchabée. Paris 2009.

S. Elbadawi, Soeuf: Un dhikri pour nos morts. La rage entre les dents. Paris 2013.

R. A. Tchokothe: „Balladur Visa" or „Visa of Death"? Questioning 'Migration' to Europe via the Comoros Archipelago. Journal of Identity and Migration Studies (2018), Vol. 12, no 2, 61-80.

R. A. Tchokothe: „Sci-en-ti-fi-que-ment, c'est la France, la France qui a un mort entre les mains": le référent spatial et la „migration" dans Autopsie d'un macchabée. French Studies in Southern Africa (2018), 48, 211-230.

T. Sellström: Africa in the Indian Ocean. Islands in Ebb and Flow. Leiden 2015.

■ *Fig. 5: Nassur Attoumani near the radar station on Mayotte, with which boats leaving Anjouan are monitored (Photo: Rémi A. Tchokothe).*

„The *internal* relations between Mayotte and France still reflect the old North-South relations between a European colonial power and its African colonies."

also of emancipation and resistance. From this perspective, spatial structures should be examined in terms of how they are shaped by processes in which questions of justice and solidarity, of freedom and emancipation, are negotiated and decided. From this perspective, the works of Elbadawi and Attoumani can be read as vehicles of committed critical geography. The political map forms the backdrop for texts that do not set out borders, but seek to change them in the memory of their victims.

Nevertheless, both authors have focused the production and marketing of their works on the French literary scene, and have written their works in French rather than in the Bantu languages of Shimaore or Shikomore. In an interview, Attoumani explained that he did not want to rely on the uncertain conditions of reception that prevail in his restrictive surroundings. If his play had appeared in Shimaore, there would have been no guarantee of it being received at all, Attoumani explained in an interview. He therefore did not wish to heed the

appeal of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'os, to use the potentials of African languages for a „decolonization of the mind" in his own literary practice. Furthermore, both authors have published their works in French publishing houses or publishing groups based in Paris. And yet, Attoumani lamented, three years after the release of Autopsy d'un Macchabée, that as a French-speaking author native to Mayotte, he was not really recognized by French publishers as a national author.[1]

But why should an author like Attoumani work towards the reception and recognition of his works in Paris? Mayotte recently hosted its second international book fair (after 2017) - with a wide range of literary agents coming not only from neighbouring islands but also from Madagascar, Réunion, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya. Those who looked around the book stands and attended the rich programme of events experienced a stirring dynamic: The borders on the map of literatures from Africa certainly seem to be changing.

1 N. Attoumani, R. A. Tchokothe (2017): „Le petit Mahorais apprend à écrire de droite à gauche à l'école coranique, ensuite de gauche à droite avec l'alphabet Latin." Unpublished interview with Nassur Attoumani.

■ *Fig. 6: View from the island of Mayotte to the lagoon of Dembéni. In the foreground, buildings of the Université de Mayotte (Photo: wikimedia commons / CC BY 2.0 / Jean-Pierre Dalbéra).*

■ **Christian Wißler**

INTERVIEW WITH DR. RÉMI ARMAND TCHOKOTHE

Swahili as a medium of decolonization

As a literary scholar at the University of Bayreuth, you have been offering regular seminars at the Université de Mayotte for several years now. How would you describe the profile of this university so little-known in Europe?

The Université de Mayotte – its official name is *Centre Universitaire de Formation et de Recherche* – opened in 2012. Currently there are about 1,500 students enrolled, many of the approximately 30 lecturers come from France. Mainly bachelor programmes are offered, which are spread over four fields of study: Business Studies/Administrative Science, Law and Geography; Literature; Mathematics; and Biology. Most of its students were born on Mayotte, foreign students come mainly from the other Comoros Islands or Madagascar.

How do students and teachers deal with their „double identity"? Do they see themselves as belonging more to the academic world of France or to an East African scholarly culture?

That is one of the key questions. Some students and colleagues from Mayotte like to emphasize their affiliation to France – one could speak of a staged identity. This is often accompanied by contempt for and discrimination against „migrants", even on the University campus!

Unfortunately, attempts have been made on African soil in recent years to offer an education oriented towards France that is quite removed from local realities and thus from the life experiences of the students. In this context, the Senegalese writer Boubacar Diop speaks of a *formation déformante*. I myself fear that under these conditions no double culture but only a kind of double inculture can emerge – a state in which a demarcation to East African cultures is drawn, but the formation of a viable French identity fails. I am therefore all the more pleased that many students and some colleagues have now recognised this, and are working to detach teaching content from colonial heritage.

■ *Fig. 1: Entrance to the Université de Mayotte (Photo: wikimedia commons / CC-BY-2.0 / Jean-Pierre Dalbéra).*

How are literary studies at the Université de Mayotte structured?

The curriculum in literary studies to this day consists mainly of the study of „French literature and culture" – and this does not mean the French-speaking literatures from African countries, but the literature of France. Especially works by writers from the 18th and 19th centuries are compulsory reading. In my opinion, that is quite anachronistic. To make matters worse, lessons are not even used to teach students stylistically good writing and speaking. In fact, stylistically, they do not speak their own national language as confidently and flawlessly as one would expect.

Do you see any chance that literatures from African countries will be acknowledged more in the future?

Three years ago I gave a public lecture at the University entitled „Ce que peuvent les Études Africaines" („What African Studies can do"). In order to promote the decolonisation of literature studies, I have proposed the establishment of a department for Mayotte studies. This idea has indeed been taken up, and the University is now organising a further training course in Société, Langues et Cultures de Mayotte. Most of the participants come from France, or have family roots there, but work on the island.

I myself offer a course on the global relevance of Swahili and literatures in this language. Especially contemporary authors from Kenya and Tanzania are important to me. Swahili is a Bantu language that has adopted many words from Arabic and is close to the Comorian languages. As an ancient trading language of the Global South, it is widespread in East Africa as far as the Arabian Peninsula and has various cultural roots. Therefore, language and literature teaching in Swahili is very well suited to broadening the cultural horizons of students to countries in their own geographic neighbourhood. It is very moving to see the enthusiasm with which students take part in this course, and how they can identify with topics and contents they have come into contact with for the first time in their lives. I have also invited the writer Nassur Attoumani, who lives on Mayotte, to this course. Because it is important that students not only get to know „old" texts from Europe, but also get into conversation with authors from Africa who are still alive and to whose texts they can relate. The students were enthusiastic about this event, which at first was just an experiment – and now my colleague Buata Bundu Malela repeats it several times a year. At his invitation, I came to Mayotte in 2015, which resulted in close cooperation. In this context he participated in the International Fellowship Programme of the University of Bayreuth.

■ Christian Wißler

Character and beauty

Artists in residence and their artistic work in the Iwalewahaus

■ *Stacey Gillian Abe: Sylvia´s Letters to my future self (2017). Small picture: Stacey Gillian Abe, Indigogo 2 (2018) (Photos: Stacey Gillian Abe).*

The word „Iwalewa" comes from the language of the Yoruba, an ethnic group in the south-west of Nigeria, and means: „Character is beauty." Founded in 1981, the Iwalewahaus of the University of Bayreuth is today an internationally known centre for contemporary African art that is unique in Europe. It does not see itself as a „Kunsthalle" in the traditional sense, but as a laboratory that combines creativity and scientific research, and attaches importance to inclusiveness. It reaches out to the public with exhibitions, publications, film screenings, and performances, for which it receives acclaim, not only in Germany, but far beyond. The exhibition „Future Africa Visions in Time (FAVT)", conceived within the framework of the Bayreuth Academy of Advanced African Studies, developed into an international event of great note. In cooperation with the Goethe-Institute, it made stops in several African metropolises, opening in the Rwandan capital Kigali in November 2019.

By combining the public presentation of art with new ideas for its creative appropriation, the Iwalewahaus possesses a strong attraction for artists and curators alike, as well as for art lovers from the most diverse areas of culture and society. In many respects, the Artists in Residence are the defining influence on the work in the Iwalewahaus: Artists from Africa come to Bayreuth for stays of several weeks in order to gain fresh inspiration, to work on pictures, films, or installations, and to convey insights into their artistic work. In the Iwalewahaus they often take part in the vernissages of exhibitions in which their own works are shown.

In 2015, the Iwalewahaus and the International Office of the University of Bayreuth launched the Iwalewa Art Award as a joint initiative. Every two years, young, up-and-coming artists from Africa who have already made an international name for themselves are honoured. The award ceremony is combined with an artist residency at the Iwalewahaus and an exhibition at the University of Bayreuth.

■ *Fig. 1 (left below): Artist Stacey Gillian Abe (Photo: Jürgen Rennecke).*

■ *Fig. 2: Stacey Gillian Abe: Seat of Honor #2 (2017) (Photo: Stacey Gillian Abe).*

Stacey Gillian Abe

The winner of the 2019 Iwalewa Art Award is the Ugandan artist Stacey Gillian Abe. In her more recent works, she draws inspiration from poetic and documentary texts compiled and archived by the founder of the Iwalewahaus, Ulli Beier, in particular an anthology of African creation myths and a collection of poems in the Yoruba language. Stacey Gillian Abe wants to

explore the emotional content of the texts, their stories and deeper relationships, and visually reinterpret them. She mainly uses video formats and photographic prints as her material, experimenting with technology (long-term exposure), materials, and technology (cyanotype). These days, her artistic work features at renowned international art exhibitions. In 2018, she was listed by „Forbes Africa Under 30" as one of the 30 most creative personalities from Africa.

Méga Mingiedi Tunde

Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, is the starting point of the artistic work of Méga Mingiedi Tunde. In his exhibition „Kinshasa – Bayreuth", which was shown at the Iwalewahaus in 2019, he linked the cultural and political heritage of both cities in order to stimulate existential reflections on networking in a globalized world. The exhibits included images of real buildings, flashbacks into history, consumer habits and advertising slogans, as well as bus tickets, bottle labels and other traces of

everyday life in both cities. Characteristic of the Kinshasa-based artist's work are large-format cartographies of imaginary urban spaces, in

which he explores the cultural imprints of architecture, mobility, and economic influences. Historical events, present living conditions, and future potentials flow into each other, and form a cosmos shaped by the „simultaneity of the non-simultaneous".

■ *Fig. 3 (left): Artist Méga Mingiedi Tunde (Photo: Christian Wißler).*
■ *Fig. 4 and 5: Méga Mingiedi Tunde, exhibition detail: Kinshasa – Bayreuth (2019) (Photos: Iwalewahaus, University of Bayreuth).*

Kitso Lynn Lelliott

■ *Fig. 6: Artist Kitso Lynn Lelliott (Photo: private).*

■ *Fig. 7 and 8: Kitso Lynn Lelliott, Video Still: Alzire of Bayreuth (2015) (Photos: Kitso Lynn Lelliott).*

In 2017, Kitso Lynn Lelliott from Johannesburg was awarded the Iwalewa Art Award for her project „Alzire". During her artistic research on the transatlantic slave trade, she discovered the court of Margravine Wilhelmine von Bayreuth. In the 18th century a woman named Alzire worked here, who probably came from Surinam in South America, where many enslaved people with West African roots worked on sugar cane plantations. With a video installation, the prizewinner brings this story back to life: Alzire appears as a ghostly figure in the New Palace in Bayreuth, where she conjures up the time of colonialism, when people were forcibly uprooted


from Africa and deported to other continents. Other works by the artist, which were created in Europe, Brazil and West Africa, also revolve around the relationship between forgetting and memory. The leitmotif of her works is to present her own history in contemporary places with the forms of expression of magic realism.

Mbongeni Buthelezi

In July 2019, Mbongeni Buthelezi from Johannesburg visited the University of Bayreuth for the first time. He had brought along six expressive portrait paintings, which at first glance could be confused with oil paintings. The colourfully structured surfaces are made of plastic, which the artist extracts from waste using original techniques he developed himself, and uses as an artistic material. By creatively dealing with the properties of sculpture, Buthelezi wants to

Fig. 9 - 12: The artist Mbongeni Buthelezi at the exhibition of his portraits in the Iwalewahaus (Photos: Christian Wißler).

point to destructive living conditions such as lack of hope for the future, impoverishment, and environmental pollution in his works, but also to show that the world can be changed for the better with courage and commitment. His works have already been shown in international exhibitions in South Africa, the USA, Germany, England, Spain, and other countries. In Bayreuth, they were also met with lively interest from scientists engaged in microplastics research – in March 2020, a joint project with the University of Bayreuth's Collaborative Research Centre on Microplastics will expand on this connection.

Yassine Balbzioui

Yassine Balbzioui, an internationally acclaimed multi-media and performance artist who lives in Marrakech, has been associated with the Iwalewahaus for many years. Since 2015, he

has also visited the Iwalewahaus at the invitation of Freundeskreis Iwalewahaus e.V. (Friends of Iwalewahaus) as Artist in Residence. The exhibition „MAD" in summer 2019 with pictures, figures, and video installations offered a broad overview of his work: a multifaceted fantasy world that radically opens itself to the public and invites them to linger, to experience creativity. Humorous, ironic, and bizarre motifs can be found, as well as images of horror and silence. As Yassine Balbzioui points out, good relations to an institution like the Iwalewahaus are of great value for one's own artistic freedom. His work in Bayreuth includes performance workshops with young people, a collaboration with the Bayreuth-based porcelain manufacturer Walküre,

and the production of the opera „Ghost Flowers" at the Richard Wagner Museum in 2018.

Fig. 13 (left): Yassine Balbzioui, Double Sight (2017) (Photo: Iwalewahaus, University of Bayreuth).

Fig. 14 (above): Yassine Balbzioui, Atelierdetail: MAD (2019) (Photo: Iwalewahaus, University of Bayreuth).

Fig. 15: The artist Yassine Balbzioui in front of the poster of his exhibition „MAD" (Photo: Christian Wißler).

„Flying Wall"

A wall painting by the Moroccan artist Yassine Balbzioui extends over two floors of the staircase in the the University of Bayreuth's Iwalewahaus. Freundeskreis Iwalewahaus e.V. (Friends of Iwalewahaus) made possible this work with the title „Flying Wall", which was created in summer 2017. Real places and scenes from the surroundings of the Iwalewahaus combine with a colourful cosmos populated by mythical creatures. „I believe we can fly together", said the artist on the occasion of the presentation of his work, which, with its abundance of colours and forms, invites you to make new discoveries over and again.

Indeed, the fantastic stories contained in the mural inspired the composer and pianist Simon Vincent to create a corresponding musical world of sound. At the opening of the exhibition „MAD" by Yassine Balbzioui, curated in 2019 by Nadine Siegert and Katharina Fink, his composition „Conférence" was experienced publicly for the first time. The piece of music is yet another contribution to the inclusive approach of the Iwalewahaus: It is a space where exhibits can be experienced with all the senses.