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*NON-CITIZEN – NON-POLITICS?*  
CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP PROJECTS AROUND A  
REFUGEE CAMP IN BAMBERG

Master thesis

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the tension between state practices of subjectification and camp dwellers' daily self-positioning around a refugee camp in Bamberg. By analyzing the camp's social production, I discuss how it is created as a *borderspace*, positioning camp residents as 'legible non-citizens', who, however, situate themselves in relation to the camp's regulation to claim rights and get recognized. I will show that state citizenship and its legal framing regarding economic categories and kinship definitions are not only experienced as excluding but unravel as a site of struggle to make claims for rights. Furthermore, other practices regarding work activities and self-organized in-groups through which rights are exercised besides the relation to the state will be addressed, proposing alternatives to state membership. I will highlight concepts describing citizenship and belonging in their relation to practices of claim-making. Thereby, the interplay between being positioned by state authorities and self-positionings will be central guidance through the thesis and the question: How are struggles for rights resolved in line with citizenship's framings and beyond? The analysis of the camp and its various practices will contribute to understanding political practices in a context where legal citizenship is denied, and the spatial right to reside is only temporarily granted.

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 RESEARCH TOPIC: A CONTESTED BORDERSPACE

*It was a rainy day when I had a walk with Rich and Gabriel, who is known as Gaby, two Ghanaian residents of the 'AnKER Center', a refugee camp in Bamberg. We were on our way to the so-called 'Lockbridge,' centrally located that leads across the right arm of the river 'Pegnitz'. Two weeks before, I met Gaby with his friend Rich for the first time during my research in the 'Café Welcome', a café led by an association in the camp. Rich introduced himself, saying "I am Rich but not rich" with a reserved smile. They could not be more different: Gaby is a tall man with a loud voice and, usually, a ribbon tied casually around his head, very talkative and fills the rooms with confidence. In contrast, Rich is small and moves around with careful silence, rarely making himself heard. When he talks, it is in a soft and careful voice.*

*On that gloomy day, the bridge was deserted. Usually, many people living in the camp spend their days on the bridge to use the free WIFI. Besides, the bridge is known for "making business", as camp dwellers refer to it. Substances are sold, and cans are collected to drop them off at the supermarket to earn some money. Also, the benches on the bridge are usually popular meeting spots for people having lunch together. But that day, it was quiet and empty. When we reached the benches, we walked down the concrete stairs to the riverbank of the 'Pegnitz', which is approximately 50 meters broad. While talking about the situation in the camp, Gaby explained that he was waiting for his "transfer" to his son, who he has with a German woman living in Cologne. When I asked Rich, who had been quiet so far, how he imagined the coming weeks, he explained, "I just want to have papers. Then I'm done. But I have 'Dublin', so maybe they will send me back to Italy." He added, "Once I wanted to go to the German class in the camp, but when I went there, a police car stood in front of the building, and they took one person with them who had also Dublin with Italy. I went away very fast, and I will never go to this German class again. Maybe they will also catch me there. No, no, no, no." He shook his head resolutely, and Gaby confirmed, "You never know when and where they come. You must be careful."*

*While we were going along the river and talking about their experiences in the camp, after a few minutes, I noticed how Rich somehow got nervous jumping from one leg to the other.*

*And suddenly, out of nowhere, he started talking about the people in Libya. Not typical of his behavior so far, he spoke louder and faster. Upset, he said, “The people in Libya are weak and just kill. Just like that.” I had the feeling that the water was making him nervous. Again and again, he looked at the river surface, which was flowing calmly and revealed nothing about the currents inside. He seemed absent in his thoughts. Suddenly he said, “We were sinking in the boat. When we went from Libya to Italy, the boat was sinking, and we had to swim, and the Bangladeshi, they could swim so fast, fast, fast.” He mimicked with his arms how fast they had swum, crawled with his arms in the air, and in front of us, he dashed along the path, his arms drawing swimming movements in the air. Gaby and I walked behind him in silence. When we caught up with him, he stressed, “I couldn’t swim. You can’t just swim like that.” He made breaststroke motions with his arms and stared ahead, looking off into the distance, at the water, not looking at Gaby or me. He seemed elsewhere and, at the same time, wanted to communicate. It burst out of him, “You will sink. You have to learn how to swim. But the Bangladeshi, they could swim so fast,” he said again with amazement in his voice, “I had to do it somehow!”*

*Gaby, usually easy-going and extroverted, became quiet and stared at the ground in front of him, away from us, in the opposite direction. He seemed distant and reserved. After a while of walking in silence, Gaby mentioned, still looking straight ahead, that in Germany, all children learned how to swim. He took us back to that gloomy day in Bamberg, to the river flowing next to us. We resumed the conversation when Rich started repeating, “But the Bangladeshi, they could swim so fast!”*

*While Gaby asked for my bike now and rode away from us, also increasing spatial distance to Rich thoughts, I continued walking silently next to Rich, being with him in the Mediterranean Sea, hearing in my ears the frantic flapping of arms in the water. I saw the Bangladeshi swimming away from us, mixed with pictures from newspaper articles, showing sinking inflatable boats and people trying to hold on to collapsing plastic. Suddenly Rich turned to me and asked, “Is the water here deep enough?” I heard my heart pounding rather loudly and noticed how I looked at him with startled eyes. I was no longer sure of what water and depth he was talking about, for what the water should have been deep enough. For learning how to swim? For the danger of drowning? I just said quietly, “I don’t know. I guess it is deep,” referring more to the pictures of the Mediterranean Sea in my*

*head. Only at the next bridge Gaby waited for us, and we left the river, and with that, the Bangladeshi, who were swimming away from us with arms crawling fast. (Protocol 8\_23.08.21)*

Rich and Gaby have been central research participants through my research practice in and around the refugee camp *AnKER Center* in Bamberg. They let me participate in their experiences through their practices and narratives and took me with them through their daily life. The question of how to navigate life in the camp became a central topic in our talks during the time we shared with each other. That afternoon was one of the central experiences which influenced my further research focus. The situation on that day described how traumatic border experiences were crucial in shaping residents' lifeworlds, even when they have crossed the borders geographically already months before. The river in Bamberg became the Mediterranean Sea, and the past intersected with the present while thoughts of the future were evoked. Rich embodied this transformation of place in the change of his physical movement and let us participate in his experiences through his body. He no longer just walked along the path but transposed it into his lived experiences on the Mediterranean Sea with his swimming movements. The changes in his usually reserved behavior showed his strong connection to his memories. His question about the depth of the water revealed a reference to the future, to the possibility of learning how to swim or getting into danger in the water again. The interconnection of his experiences draws attention to his embodiment of various movements across borders. The border experiences in Libya, on the Mediterranean Sea, and now in Bamberg are linked to his desire to "just get papers". His fear of being deported and excluded again because of his Dublin procedure, i.e., his registration in Italy, is connected to the border technologies and policies of the *European Union* (EU). Thereby, he experienced the practices by the EU at the border in form of his Dublin procedure in his daily life. They influenced his decisions about which services he engaged with, and which places he avoided in the camp. Although Rich had physically crossed the border between Libya and Germany and arrived in Germany from Italy, he lived with the fear of being taken to Italy or deported to Ghana altogether. Due to the fear of deportation, he did not participate in the German course in the camp and tried to learn German through a YouTube channel. He thus reflected his border experiences in his daily practices. His quest for papers demonstrated his desire to get

recognized in the form of a secure residence title, i.e., to cross the border to Germany also in terms of legal recognition.

Gaby, on the other hand, reflected on his situation differently. He detached himself from Rich's experiences on that day. Also, in other conversations, he repeatedly distanced himself emphatically from the camp life and the other residents. Gaby emphasized that he had come to Germany by plane and was no longer in the asylum system but would get a stay through his son. Thus, he considered his right to stay spatially in Germany to be in a more secure state. However, the close relationship between Rich and Gaby also revealed their mutual solidarity and support, which bonded them despite their different experiences. They spent most of their daily life in the camp together, Gaby called offices for Rich, and they went together to the city to go grocery shopping and to get some distance from the daily routine in the camp, as they explained.

The time I spent with camp residents, volunteers, and employees<sup>1</sup> in the *AnKER Center Bamberg* and the city during my research from August 2021 to December 2021 offered me the possibility to gain insights into the different everyday experiences in the camp and into the ways camp dwellers navigated their daily life and positioned themselves as political subjects through practices of claiming rights. By the methods of walking, talking, and sharing time, we thematized not only the camp situation, but these topics also led to reflections about experiences beyond the camp situation. In this process, it became apparent to me how theory can be grounded (Strauss and Corbin 1994) and in which way the empirical material, which was produced in mutual learning situations, is decisive for the theories around citizenship and belonging that my work should rely on. Experiences during my research practice emphasized that I could not examine the processes in the camp with a focus on administrative practices only nor by addressing practices of camp dwellers in separation to state authorities' politics. Moreover, there was an increasing and apparent need to address administrative practices and regulations, as well as camp dwellers' narratives and practices as interwoven in multilayered relations that also move beyond the

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<sup>1</sup> In what follows, I will refer to people living in the camp as "*camp dwellers*" or "*camp residents*", to people experiencing the situation in the camp only during their volunteer work through the association *Fsf* as "*volunteers*", and to people working in the camp in the social services, offices or the management as "*employees*". The aim is not to homogenize their experiences through these categories but to highlight the differences in positions and access they have to everyday life in the camp.

camp's spatial border. Relations between camp dwellers, volunteers, and employees questioned assumptions of exclusion and inclusion and emphasized the complexity and fuzziness of belonging and citizenship.

In this regard, I spent approximately four days a week in the camp, first in the *Café Welcome* led by an association, and I later moved more independently through the area. Based on my access to the camp via the café, I got to know camp dwellers, volunteers, and state employees through my activities within the project and got into contact with my research participants through *snowball sampling*. I conducted qualitative interviews with employees, volunteers, and camp residents to learn about their reflections on regulations and state politics. Furthermore, I spent much time with participant observation and observing participation to understand what the daily camp life signifies and how regulations shape the space's experiences. Later I spent more time with volunteers and residents in the city and got to know other frequently visited places such as the *Lockbridge*, or a council for social service led by *Friend instead of stranger* (*Freund statt fremd / Fsf*), the association also organizing the *Café Welcome* in the camp.

Through the methods of walking (Kusenbach 2003; Pierce and Lawhon 2015) and informal interviewing (Bernard 2011:211), I gained insights into daily experiences in the camp and into the ways borders were reflected spatially but also in terms of rights to work, to move independently, or to reside. I documented what I experienced during the shared time of participant walking, talking, and observing as fieldnotes in a digital and analog diary in the evenings, "at the desk, creating scenes on a page" (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 2011:45). Due to my aim to focus on daily life in the camp but the restricted access to the camp area, which I got officially through the camp management, I did not only document the camp situation visually in photographs myself but also drew on visual documentation by camp dwellers. By using photo elicitation as a method (Harper 2002), camp dwellers sent or showed me photographs, and later, we talked personally or exchanged thoughts in messages about their pictures. Semistructured interviews (Bernard 2011:212ff.) with volunteers, state employees, and camp dwellers enabled me to further deepen topics and address specific questions in talks with employees who had limited time to spare. In these more official settings, I could also reflect more directly with my research participants on



the shifting topic of my research and on not only their position in the camp but also my positionality.

Based on the application of these mixed methods, experiences of regulations in the camp appeared as a crucial topic. It guided me to focus on how camp dwellers were positioned in the camp and how they positioned themselves. Without having sampled in this regard, the asylum application of camp residents, who were part of my research, was mainly already rejected, and they were granted a “Duldung” (§ 60 Residency Act). This status of a *temporal suspension of deportation*<sup>2</sup> is a temporal authorization to reside on the territory. It involves minimal access to rights while it carries the possibility of not getting extended (see Suerbaum 2021:4). The question that I was, thus, confronted with was what it means to live excluded from a variety of rights in a camp situation and to what extent camp residents claim rights in their everyday practices while navigating through their daily life in the camp. Due to the high significance of legal statuses and regulations, I analyzed some significant laws and official government statements more closely and will draw on this analysis as additional material. Furthermore, through the higher number of residents, who refer to themselves as male, my research participants living in the camp were mainly men, which will be echoed in my material. Furthermore, most participants lived in the camp without family and were aged between 20 and 40 years.

Thereby, it is my goal to consider citizenship not as an abstract form, but to ask in which way it is lived in everyday life (Kallio, Wood and Häkli 2020) in the camp. Thus, I approach phenomenologically how (non-)citizenship, belonging, and struggles for rights come into being intersubjectively within a “field of inter-experience, inter-action, and inter-locution” (Jackson 1998:3) through everyday practices. I will ask (1) how camp dwellers are positioned as legible ‘non-citizens’ in the production of the camp as *borderspace*<sup>3</sup>, (2) in which way they navigate this space by performing relations of state citizenship and, (3) to what extent other forms of membership and belonging are shaped to claim rights and to get recognized, proposing in this way alternatives to the state citizenship project. In doing

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<sup>2</sup> In the following, all citations of legal regulations and government statements are translated by the author.

<sup>3</sup> *Borderspace* here as reference to Henry Lefebvre’s theory to the “Production of space” (Lefebvre 2016) related to specific “border work” (Hess and Kasperek 2017:59) in refugee camps (see chapter 2.2.).

so, I will provide a basis for understanding citizenship in its entanglement with political practices, forms of membership, and belonging.

## 1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis is structured into three main chapters. The second chapter deals with the question of how the *AnKER Center* in Bamberg is produced as a *borderspace* and experienced in everyday life by camp dwellers. Chapters three and four focus on the camp dwellers' practices of self-making while navigating the camp situation and positioning themselves to claim rights.

By taking the fence as a significant material dimension of the camp as an entry point to the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion, in chapter two, I will focus on the production of the *AnKER Center* as a social space, in particular, as a *borderspace* entangled with the EU border regime. I will describe the historical and legal situatedness of the camp and ask about the meaning it creates and in which it is shaped. Based on that, it will be theoretically considered in which way borders and *borderspaces* are approached and how refugee camps can be examined regarding consideration of citizenship and political practices. Further, I will address the special production of the *AnKER Center* by drawing on camp dwellers' narrated experiences of daily life and the *camp script*, consisting of regulations, and their subjectification as 'legible non-citizens'.

The third chapter ties in with the expressed critiques of the position in the camp and deals with practices of performing the state citizenship project in the struggle for rights and navigating the camp situation. I will consider how camp dwellers relate to legal definitions of the *state script*. Therefore, I will first look at practices directed at the position of the 'to be skilled worker' and address practices and narratives that relate to the legal category of an apprentice to be granted a more permanent status to reside and to claim rights in the camp. Here, especially the intersection between state citizenship and economic discourses will be thematized. Secondly, the position of the 'citizen's parent' will be focused on. In this section, the entanglement between kinship images and citizenship will be crucial, and the ways in which recognized kinship ties are performed by camp residents to get recognized by state authorities beyond their position as rejected asylum seekers. In a third step, I will

reflect on these practices regarding the form of political practice they render visible and what they reveal about claim makings linked to state membership.

Going on from there, in the fourth chapter, I will discuss *acts of citizenship* as ways of accessing rights beyond the legal script of state citizenship and challenging its underlying requisites of membership. First, it will be examined to what extent practices of *doing business* and self-shaped work domains express a form of political practice as rights-claiming through practicing them. Following this, *in-groups* of camp dwellers as forms of relations and communities through which rights are exercised even when not entitled will be thematized. After that, I will ask what these acts beyond the state project of citizenship and its enforcement of rights propose regarding membership and political practices in contrast but also in entwinement with state membership.

The thesis ends with concluding remarks about what the analysis of the camp and its various practices reveal about the understanding of citizenship and political practices in a context where permanent legal entitlement is denied and the spatial right to reside is only temporarily granted. I will argue that camp dwellers write their own scripts and create their own scenes of being political and of claiming rights and propose, in this way, an understanding of political practices as holistic *life-politics*.

It is crucial to highlight that practices within the state project and beyond are not understood as detached from each other but in a relational interplay, even when separated through chapter borders. Performances and acts of citizenship were practiced simultaneously and relate to each other, as well as to the formal expression of the state citizenship relations in laws and regulations. However, this structure captures my empirical material in a way expressed to me in my research. Legal formulation, practices of addressing these definitions made by the state, and practices beyond these attempts of formal recognition, shaped different dynamics and were referred to in distinct ways.

### 1.3 STUDYING BORDERS, CAMPS AND CITIZENSHIP

In this section, I will consider different research approaches that deal with refugee camps and perspectives on citizenship. My purpose here is to point to the multiple forms of focuses and situate myself in the broad field of research conducted at the intersection of migration studies, critical citizenship studies, and research on social movements.

Furthermore, I will point out the specific contribution that my work can add to these insights while reflecting on the problematic dimension of representing another research conducted around a refugee camp.

In the last decades, various disciplines have paid increasing attention to migration processes around borders and refugee camps. Some research beyond anthropology has dealt with *AnKER Centers* in Germany in particular, highlighting different aspects of this specific type of institution. By examining the spatial dimension of the camp in connection to the city, they are, for instance, referred to as “(p)laces and spaces of the others” (Göler 2020). Researchers analyzed political borders and processes of boundary-making (Hartmann 2017), or the *Centers* are approached in terms of camp dwellers’ protests and the researcher’s goal “to make their voices heard” (Goebel 2021:239). Others have examined in which way processes of producing “target groups” create uncertainty (Münch 2022) or how the camps are structured as part of asylum management (Schmitt 2020). Thereby, research about *AnKER Centers* in Germany is situated in the field of sociology, human geography, and migration studies.

Recent anthropological research about refugee camps in Germany underscores various aspects of camps. Some focus on refugees’ protest practices to claim rights (Volk 2021), while others address administrative practices (Leutloff-Grandits 2019). Gender dimensions are highlighted by stressing the experiences of women in refugee camps (Dilger and Dohrn 2016) or focusing on influences on bodily and mental health (Namutebi et al. 2021). Nevertheless, the space of the refugee camp has also attracted particular attention in anthropological and sociological research beyond Germany, with an emphasis on camps in African countries and the Middle East, but also on camps in Europe, especially since the increased migration movements and emergence of refugee camps in 2015. Some works examine administrative practices in camps (Fassin 2005; Jaji 2012), while others analyze the limit of sovereign control (Turner 2005). Camps are also referred to as emerging cities of the “undesirables” (Agier 2011), or as places of creating feelings of “home” (Dudley 2011; Hammond 2004), as spaces of newly emerging class and gender conflicts (Turner 2010), and as locus of policy-making practices among refugees (Omata 2017). While closures of camps are studied (Weima and Minca 2022), others deal with the historical emergence of camps and the formation of ‘the refugee’ as an object of study (Malkki 1995).

Some studies focus mainly on the spatial dimension of camps (Ramadan 2013; Sanyal 2011) or highlight the complexities of relations within these spaces (Martin, Minca and Katz 2020).

Interestingly, most of the research circles around the poles of describing the camp either in terms of an Agambean “outplace” (Agamben 1998) and an Augéan “non-place” (Augé 2006), or emphasizing counter-politics and practices of resistance of migrants, arguing for “the autonomy of migration” (Genova 2017; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013). The latter describe the camp as a site of political struggle (Maestri and Hughes 2017; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013) and as a “space(s) of the political” (Hartmann 2017). Considerations revolve around the question of whether camp residents are “abjects or agents” (Redclift 2013), emphasizing either their subjectification by authorities (Göler 2020) or their agency (Goebel 2021). Within the latter understanding, it is argued for a change of analysis towards “thinking about camp’s ‘from below’” (Tsianos and Karakayali 2010:384), shifting the gaze “(f)rom spaces of exception to ‘campscapes’” (Martin, Minca and Katz 2020), to a “political space” (Redclift 2013), and a “contested space(s) of citizenship” (Maestri and Hughes 2017). By highlighting the possibility of political action by camp dwellers and examining “border activism” (Mezzadra 2020), especially struggles around processes of inclusion and exclusion and citizenship have been stressed (Ataç, Rygiel and Stierl 2016), addressing “(c)itizenship from marginal spaces” (Turner 2016), arguing for “transgressive citizenship” (Rygiel 2012), and developing the idea of “campzanship” (Sigona 2015). Maestri (2017), for instance, addresses the political subjectivities of Roma in camps in Italy and describes their claims regarding the urban space and neoliberal discourses. Others focus on refugees’ “acts of citizenship” (Isin and Nielsen 2008) through digital devices (Palmberger 2022). It stands out that camps are considered as specific spaces for negotiations around citizenship, analyzed in multilayered ways: in connection to economic discourses (Anderson 2015; Ataç 2019; Fontanari 2022; Maestri 2017; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Wilcke 2018), with a focus on legal entitlements (Anderson and Hughes 2015; Suerbaum 2021), or emphasizing the entanglement with kinship discourses (Andrikopoulos and Duyvendak 2020; Carsten 2020; Suerbaum and Richter-Devroe 2022).

At this intersection of critical citizenship studies, refugee and mobility studies, and social movement research, recent work is concerned with the tension between increasing

mobility and flows of people, things, and technologies and the state-bound notions of citizenship. The territorial boundedness of citizenship to a nation-state is stressed as being at stake, and new approaches to citizenship are proposed. Aihwa Ong expresses this shift in her work on “mutations in citizenship” (Ong 2006) caused by the fluid entanglements of people, technologies, and economic markets. She talks about “partial citizenship” (ibid.:500) of migrant workers, “commercialized citizenship” (ibid.:501), intersecting with global capitalist markets, and “flexible citizenship” (ibid.) due to the fluidity of market activities. Others discuss “postnational membership” (Soysal 2007) ascribed to migration movements. Critique is expressed that these approaches bear the risk of fostering the installation of a hegemonic regime while rights would not be addressable anymore and thus merely abstractions (Isin and Turner 2007). Some authors call thereby for moving away from research that focuses on citizenship by situating political practices and claims for rights “after citizenship” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013).

Moving in this field of refugee and mobility studies, critical citizenship studies, and social movement research, my analysis speaks to the important contribution, which anthropological research can add to the insights of the *AnKER Center* by enabling a deep understanding of everyday experiences and practices of navigating and claiming rights in the space of the camp. Based on the broad field of the conducted research, I will come back to this discussion of describing the camp either as an exclusionary institution or as a political site, citizenship either as deeply bound to the nation-state or as an appropriated tool of claiming rights within the different chapter of this thesis. I assume that looking at citizenship from an angle where the state, to borrow the expression from Ferguson, “is not the only game in town” (Ferguson 1990:286), but that the nation-state and its citizenship project play a decisive role in the struggle for rights can contribute to an understanding of the complex relationship between citizenship and daily struggles for rights and recognition within the specific *borderspace* of the *AnKER Center*. Thereby, my work widens the perspective on refugee camps and negotiations of citizenship by combining the lens of the material and social dimension of the space with everyday practices and legal categories. This perspective on the entanglement of social space and its material dimension, legal definitions, and everyday practices and experiences enables an understanding of the political subjectivities of camp dwellers located at the intersection between citizenship’s

legal definitions, daily lived citizenship and its spatial production. These specific aspects of my work are echoed in the particular methods I applied and propose, in this way, a form of diverse research practice consisting of spatially focused methods such as walking, methods applied to focus on everyday experiences such as participant observation, interviewing and photo elicitation combined with the method of analyzing legal descriptive material.

However, by reflecting on this brief overview of the literature, it became evident that a vast body of research in social science and especially in anthropology was and is concerned with refugee camps and border regions, addressing struggles for rights and dynamics around citizenship. In short, the “fascination with refugees” (Cabot 2019:261) seems to be widely spread. Heath Cabot examines this tendency of anthropologically studying refugees in her article *The business of anthropology and the European refugee regime* and argues for a necessary critical reflection when conducting research within the field of refugee studies while being part of the *refugee regime*. Cabot criticizes in her stimulating intervention the “kind of savage anthropology of the refugee crisis” (ibid.:262), which developed increasingly since 2015 and led to a tendency to study refugees like before anthropologists focused on *the savage*. She calls for research with deep empirical practice and emphasizes consciousness and reflexivity about one’s own entanglement with structures of power and political and economic agendas (ibid.:263). By stressing the risk of affirming a crisis around migration movements, which leads to legitimizations of state interventions and supports essentializing logics of people, places, and movement, Cabot highlights the importance of a cautious anthropological practice. She proposes considering the diverse actors entangled in a camp, the heterogeneity within taken-for-granted categories, and concrete practices.

Situating my research within this *risky frame of refugee studies*, my positionality as part of the apparatus of the *refugee regime* was a crucial aspect of reflection.<sup>4</sup> Due to my collaboration with the volunteer association *Fsf* and the camp management, I was directly engaged with institutions and association managing life in the camp and thus involved in shaping specific projects. To write this thesis and contribute to the vast literature on camps and refugees could be seen as a contribution to the anthropological fascination of studying “the suffering subject” (Robbins 2013). It could be categorized in Sherry Ortner’s terms as

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<sup>4</sup> For a more detailed reflection on positionality, see Götze (2022).

“dark anthropology and its others” (Ortner 2016), studying forms of oppression and power. However, by considering Cabot’s proposals of careful research, I will highlight the concrete processes, which *make* categories and positions, and how they are negotiated and reshaped. Taking the camp as an entry point but not a dead end, I analyze the entanglements of “border work” (Hess and Kasperek 2017:59) of different actors involved through which struggles around citizenship, rights, and recognition are acted out in practices. I therefore take the stand to focus on everyday practices and narratives and the doing and undoing of positionings and self-positionings to recognize their transforming formations. The intensive exchange with my research partners and the joint reflection on our positionality, as well as the mutual openness and familiarity that developed during the research, represent essential points of reference in order to reflect on my research practice, which extended beyond the reproduction of dynamics of dominance. The experiences of everyday life and the expressed multi-layeredness of life in the camp transcended a consideration of refugees as *the new savage*. Rather, my research moved to the question of how dominant categories are experienced in an ambivalence and in which way they unfold as both enabling and constraining when appropriated, thereby actively shaping and reshaping positions.

#### 1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMING: CITIZENSHIP, BELONGING AND POLITICAL PRACTICES

In order to understand my approach to citizenship, belonging, and political practices, I will briefly outline the concepts that will be crucial for the further course of this thesis and speak to my empirical material.

The origin of citizenship in Europe can be traced back to the Greek *polis*. It referred to the relationship between the rulers and the ruled and was a way of political participation (Isin and Turner 2007; Yuval-Davis 2006). Later, it strongly became associated with the nation-state, either understood in the liberal tradition as a relation of rights and duties or in terms of a community based on shared values and mutual loyalty (Marshall 1998:98; Yuval-Davis 2006). In her famous work *The origins of totalitarianism* from 1951, Hannah Arendt analyses citizenship as “the right to have rights” (Arendt 2017 [1951]:388). According to her, citizenship is strongly bound to belong to a political community. She argues that as a recognized member, one enjoys not only the right of freedom and the right to think but also the right to action and an opinion (ibid.). Conversely, being excluded from membership



in a political community causes the denial of acting and having an opinion, resulting in a position as “human being in general” (ibid.:395). She explains,

*“The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion (...) but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them.”* (ibid.:387)

As she states, people excluded from a political community do not lack fundamental rights. However, since they are not part of any community through which rights can be enforced, they are *rightless*. Drawing on the experiences of the Second World War, she assumes that enforcements of rights are bound to be recognized as a member of a nation-state. Arendt regards this membership as essential to act as a political subject. She argues that “the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights” results in a “loss of polity” (ibid.:389) and leads to a loss of humanity (ibid.). Human rights or “the rights of Man” (ibid.:390) cannot be enforced when not belonging to a nation-state because “a sphere that is above the nations does not exist” (ibid.:391). Being excluded from membership in a state does then implies, to put it the other way around, the impossibility of acting as a political subject and accessing rights. Thus, in Arendt’s understanding, citizenship depends on state membership, which is the condition to be recognized in one’s thoughts and practices, enabling an opinion and action.

However, Arendt’s conception of citizenship was later expanded by others, especially Thomas H. Marshall (Marshall 1998). In his work, which is situated in the context of the emergence of the *British Welfare State* after the Second World War, he distinguishes three dimensions of citizenship rights: civil, political, and social (ibid.:94). Marshall assigns each to a century (ibid.:95ff.). While civil rights established equality before the law in the 18th century, the rights to vote and political participation emerged as political rights in the 19th century (ibid.:96). Later, with the emergence of the welfare state, social rights were introduced to compensate for the inequality between citizens (ibid.:107). Marshall reflects on citizenship in terms of a community based on shared values, calling for an understanding of citizenship beyond its liberal perception of a linear relationship of rights and duties

between a state and its citizens (Marshall 1998:105). Through this crucial intervention, the concept of citizenship was expanded in its scope to a relation of loyalty, rights, and responsibilities (Yuval-Davis 2006).

Recent work on citizenship addresses multidimensional formations of membership, and the concept is linked to forms of belonging. Nira Yuval-Davis (2006) contributes with her concept of “the politics of belonging” (ibid.:197) to this discussion around citizenship and links it to aspects of belonging. She analyzes belonging in three dimensions: social location, ethical and political values, and emotional attachments. Hence, belonging to a community can be approached through analyzing the actual social position in relation to intersecting axes of divisions, the valuation of these positions, and the emotional identification with them (ibid.:199ff.). Politics around belonging relate to these levels and describe “the maintenance and reproduction of the boundaries of the community of belonging by the hegemonic political powers but also their contestation and challenge by other political agents” (ibid.:205). Struggles around belonging draw on these dimensions, which can become “requisites of belonging” (ibid.:209) through which boundaries are made but can also be reshaped. Following Yuval-Davis, the question is posed, “what is required from a specific person for him/her to be entitled to belong” (ibid.). She demonstrates this by reflecting on specific “political projects of belonging” (ibid.:209ff.) and argues that citizenship is one layer of belonging, implementing its different dimensions (ibid.:207).

Following these approaches, tension emerges between understanding citizenship as a recognized membership and relation between a state and its citizens, and citizenship as a relation of belonging, regarding social location, emotional attachment, and values. I want to rely on Engin Isin’s approach to deliberate further on this tension and focus on citizenship as practice in relation to claim-making. He takes up Hannah Arendt’s understanding of citizenship and evolves it differently, focusing on claim-making practices. Isin argues for an understanding of citizenship as “the right to claim rights” (Isin 2012:109) and states that claims for rights establish the disposition of rights in the first place. These claims already imply the position of people as political subjects, even if they do not have rights. Thus, even if rights are denied and people are excluded as ‘non-citizens’, they can position themselves as political subjects and act. By transforming Arendt’s phrase of citizenship as *the right to have rights*, Isin stresses in his approach that first, people position

themselves as political subjects to have rights later, “If we think that we have rights by virtue of being human, then this phrase reminds us that we have gained the right to say so only because we have struggled for it as political subjects” (ibid.). This perspective highlights the capacity of people to *claim* rights as political subjects, even when excluded from *having* rights. In short, ‘non-citizens’ can act as if they are ‘citizens’. The critical distinction is here that Arendt understands citizenship as a necessary condition for having an opinion and being enabled to action, whereas Isin describes the possibility to act and make claims as precondition to become a right bearing subject.

Continuing the discussion, Kristine Krause and Katharina Schramm propose an approach to look at citizenship “through political subjectivity” (Krause and Schramm 2011). They focus on processes through which people are subjected and through which they position themselves to be recognized by authorities (ibid.:126),

*“First and foremost, this means not to take the existence of subjects for granted, but to ask how political subjectivity emerges in the first place, that is, how individuals or groups gain a position which makes them recognizable as such. It is only through these forms of recognition that they gain voice and are therefore able to address authorities, but it is through the same processes that they can in turn also be addressed as subjects. If we now put greater emphasis on these processes of subjectification, citizenship becomes but one aspect of political subjectivity, and a specific one, linked to legal and institutional practices and ultimately to the nation-state.”* (ibid.:127)

The authors stress that this perspective on subjectification and self-positionings considers the “relational dynamics through which power comes into being” (ibid.:128). They highlight with reference to Judith Butler that subjects are made and underline, drawing on Michel Foucault’s work and Aihwa Ong, the “double face of self-making and being made” (ibid.). In their aim to keep the analytical boundaries of citizenship sharp, the authors argue that considering political subjectivities can provide a tool to maintain the strong connection between citizenship and the nation-state as one part of political subjectivity and also to recognize other forms of belonging and membership (ibid.:127f.). I will draw on this approach as a helpful lens to address subject positions in the camp and to consider legal regulations, practices by state institutions, and camp dwellers’ self-makings as related to

state authorities' recognition while keeping other communities and alternative forms of belonging as significant relations in the struggle for rights in mind.

To analyze citizenship and belonging through political subjectivity, I will draw on Isin's model as orientation. He distinguishes three ways of approaching citizenship: as status, performance, and act (Isin 2012), focusing on regulations and practices. He states, "Thinking about citizenship as performance or enactment enjoins, follows and departs from recent developments in social and political thought towards understanding subjectivity as a performative process" (ibid.:119). Hence, *citizenship as practice* stresses processes through which political subjectivities emerge and come into being while practiced. Going further, Isin elaborates on the overlapping and intertwining of regulations and practices as "status and practices of citizenship presuppose each other and also call each other into question" (Isin 2009:370). This perspective on the entanglement of legal regulations and practices within citizenship allows for considering the multidimensional practices in the camp, i.e., in which way rights are claimed by adjusting to and thereby transforming legal categories, thus moving "within given scripts" (Isin 2012:123), and to what extent other relations and forms of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2006) can be traced, through which rights are exercised and propose, in this way, alternatives to the relation to the nation-state.

I will draw on the term "citizenship project" (Rose and Novas 2005:439), borrowed from Rose and Novas, to highlight the unstableness of citizenship and belonging. The authors, although in a different context on *biological citizenship*, consider "projects of citizenship" as "the ways that authorities thought about (some) individuals as potential citizens, and the ways they tried to act upon them" (ibid.). Yuval-Davis draws similarly on the notion of a *project* to describe "(t)he politics of belonging" (Yuval-Davis 2006:197) to express changing political agendas and shifting aims entangled in citizenship and belonging. The notion of citizenship and belonging as *projects* emphasize the flexible and surprising character of membership and of practices that *aim* or *try* to position people or groups. To understand citizenship, belonging, and claims for recognition and rights through political subjectivities in the camp, the notion of different projects acknowledges that positionings *may* take a different form and *may* produce other effects than expected. Hence, to regard citizenship and belonging as *projects* emphasizes their openness and flexibility, which can be reshaped repeatedly and produce often-unintended consequences. Thus, in the

following sections, I will apply the term *state citizenship project* to express the dimension of never entirely signified and changing membership to a nation-state. In contrast, I will discuss alternative projects as other forms of membership. Without blurring the boundaries of legal entitlement and enforceable rights, which play a crucial role in the struggle for rights by camp dwellers, considering political subjectivities makes it possible to acknowledge these *alternative projects*. They can be regarded as counter proposals for the state citizenship project while still recognizing its conceptual boundedness to the nation-state.

Following this, I will approach these projects by focusing on everyday practices and locate the emergence of political subjectivities and *the right to claim rights* within daily life. Thereby, I consider Papadopoulos' and Tsianos' concept of "non-politics" (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013:188), who understand migrants' politics in terms of Asef Bayat's (2015) "quiet encroachments of the ordinary" (Bayat 2015:34) and "social nonmovements" (ibid.). Papadopoulos and Tsianos argue that *non-politics* shape contentious movements as living situations are challenged through these calm everyday practices. They argue that migrants question an existing order by creating their own visions practiced in daily life and, thus, call for a shift in understanding political practices,

*"Migrants' politics develop their own codes, their own practices, their own logics which are almost imperceptible from the perspective of existing political action: firstly, because we are not trained to perceive them as 'proper' politics and, secondly, because they create an excess that cannot be addressed in the existing system of political representation."* (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013:188)

Hence, Papadopoulos and Tsianos frame practices of migrants as *non-politics* as they take place in everyday practices and have been broadly overlooked even though they form acts of counterclaims and can transform living conditions. They argue that migrants develop their own way of being political. In contrast to Arendt, they express an understanding of action and political practices, largely disengaged from existing dimensions of being political. They locate these practices not in relation to the nation-state but conceptualize political practices largely detached from it. It is this tension between (non-)citizenship and

political practices, entanglement with state institutions and at the same time detachment from it, which I will consider further.

To sum up, I understand citizenship, on the one hand, as a state project, as a way of how camp residents are thought of and subjected by authorities, expressed in a script of regulations and laws. Furthermore, I consider it as a lived experience and part of camp residents' lifeworlds, who position themselves towards these scripts, developing their own projects of state membership, entangled with other forms of belonging, proposing in this way alternatives through their practices. As one form of belonging, I consider citizenship as deeply entangled with requisites to belong, articulated through regulations and scripts, and challenged through camp dwellers' self-making. In doing so, these practices lastly question the dichotomy between state citizenship and other political communities, an "activist citizen(s)" (Isin 2009:381) and a "human being in general" (Arendt 2017 [1951]:395). Gaby's practice of establishing a legal claim through his son and Rich's practices of navigating by avoiding places in the camp and their relatedness to each other offer first insights into the substances of these "quiet encroachment of the ordinary" (Bayat 2015:34) and "non-politics" (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013:188).

## **2 THE ANKER CENTER IN BAMBERG – PRODUCING A BORDERSPACE**

In this chapter, I will focus on the production of the camp as a *borderspace* and as part of the state citizenship project. My understanding of *space* is based on Lefebvre's approach, which illuminates space as "*work and product* – a materialization of 'social being'" (Lefebvre 2016:102) and as a "result and cause, product and producer" (ibid.:142f.). Following his argument, I consider the camp not only as a fixed place<sup>5</sup> but as socially produced and producing, consisting of social relations and social beings. To understand space as a product and as producing, Lefebvre argues for examining three dimensions: "spatial practice" (ibid.:33) as material practice, the "representation of space" (ibid.) in terms of thinking and representing space in discourses, and thirdly "representational spaces" (ibid.) as a total sensual experience of space within people's lifeworld. Looking at space and its communication with people and things through the lens of Lefebvre's theory

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<sup>5</sup> I will refer to a "place" or a geographical "area", what Lefebvre understands as an actual location or "spot" (Lefebvre 2016:37), a space in Lefebvre's sense as a socially made product and producer (ibid.:147f.) and to a "site" in Isin's terms as location, through which struggles around rights take place (Isin 2012:133).

is interesting because it highlights the entangled dimension of a space's production: materiality, practices, discourses, representations, and experiences. Following Julian Thomas' argument, "A place is not simply a region of space, but is experienced by people as having meaning" (Thomas 2017:49), looking through the lens of the socially produced camp, the *campspace*, and its reflection can offer a first insight into the way residents are positioned and position themselves. The question occurs: Which *meaning* is produced in the camp, and which *meaning* does the camp produce? Michel Foucault argues, "A whole history remains to be written of spaces – which would at the same time be a history of powers" (Foucault 1980:149). The omnipresence of power, in Foucault's understanding as a "way of acting upon an acting subject by virtue of their acting or being capable of action" (Foucault 1982:220), is thus strongly connected to spaces. Examining space means then also looking at forms of power and in which way subjects are made through space and produce a space themselves. Spaces socially made and experienced as meaningful are thus also domains through which power is exercised and actions are influenced. Hence, analyzing the *campspace* in the intersection of materiality, narratives, practices, and experiences also signifies looking at power dimensions and the meaning that it has *for* and is created *by* people.

## 2.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CAMP

To take these considerations about how space is produced within dynamics of power further, I want to start examining the specific *campspace* in Bamberg and focus on its establishment. Much of the talking and reflecting on the *AnKER Center* in media discussions and negotiations between volunteers, state employees, and political parties were directed to the green barbwire fence surrounding the area. Claims were made by talking about the functions, causes, and consequences of the material border, and the fence's location served as a place to express political claims. One of the right-wing parties in Germany, *Alternative for Germany* (AfD), claimed space by expressing demands such as "We think our pension does not belong to the whole world"<sup>6</sup> (see figure 1) or "For what did my father come to Germany back then? For German *Leitkultur*"<sup>7</sup> (see figure 2). Claims of who belongs and who has the right to access resources as a pension were thus made legible at the

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<sup>6</sup> translated by the author.

<sup>7</sup> translated by the author.

location of the fence while *culture* was applied as a marker of differentiation between camp dwellers and people outside the camp. At the same time, volunteers reflected on the material separation,

*“I am absolutely against it. So, I see that such a separation of people basically has a negative atmosphere and, indeed, a negative influence on the people themselves because they live behind a fence, ‘guarded’, in quotation marks, I admit, by security. The sight alone is also already certainly not so pleasant, moreover, only among themselves. This is intentional, I know that, but I still think it’s wrong. Thus, it has a negative impact on the residents and on the population, who, of course, think to themselves, if they do not look further into the issue: Ah, these people, they must be dangerous, there is a big fence between them, and then they are also guarded with loads of security and the police come in all the time, which is because there are arguments and fights. And that, in turn, has negative, really demonstrable, negative influences. I can’t imagine it’s a coincidence that the percentage of ‘AfD’ voters around the camp is blatantly different than in the city.”*  
(Interview 12\_22.09.21)

Heike<sup>8</sup>, one volunteer in the café in the camp, reflected on the fence as a separating border between residents and “population”, which she interpreted as a reason for the rejection of camp dwellers by people living outside the camp and explained the separation as a cause of occurring conflicts among residents. The fence was reflected as an obstructive border



FIGURE 1: "WE THINK OUR PENSION DOES NOT BELONG TO THE WHOLE WORLD"  
(PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE AUTHOR)

between camp dwellers and people living outside the camp. She understood it also as a reason for the representation of residents as dangerous and as in need to be “guarded with loads of security”. She further

<sup>8</sup> In accordance with research participants, pseudonyms are used to protect personality, except in cases where it was explicitly requested otherwise.



highlighted the high elective share of the right-wing party in the camp's surroundings. Hence, the fence appears not only as a material border but is reflected as a separating institution between people living inside and outside. She considered the fence not only as a spatial marker of differentiation but also as a producer and an expression of social distance. In this context, the distinct reflection of the fence by the camp management of the facility is interesting:

*“The fence has a function, indeed. We did not build the fence. The US-Americans erected the fence after 09/11 to protect the families in the barracks. So there have always been families here. And I don't think the American families have complained about the fact that there is a fence. And that's what is so exciting. Especially in regard to the aspect that this was actually a big topic at the time of the opening of the facility because an attack was supposed to be carried out here by a right-wing extremist cell in Bamberg. Fortunately, this was detected and prevented. But in principle, this is what shows the necessity of protective measures. Of course, it would be nice if I could have an open area here and everybody could meet everybody and so on. Unfortunately, the reality is that asylum seekers, in particular, are not seen as friends by everyone. We have these posters hanging outside.”* (Interview 2

\_ 14.09.21)



FIGURE 2: “FOR WHAT DID MY FATHER COME TO GERMANY BACK THEN? FOR GERMAN LEITKULTUR” (PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE AUTHOR)

In contrast to Heike, the camp manager emphasized the function of the fence as a protecting material border for camp dwellers from practices of right-wing parties. He argued for its necessity regarding an already planned attack of a right-wing movement in Bamberg and based his opinion on the posters at the fence, while expressing his vision of having an area without a material border to make encounters possible. At the same time, he reflected on the historical background of the fence, which was not initially constructed for the refugee camp. Moreover, he situated the fence in his former function as a material

protection for US families in the former US army barracks due to the terrorist attack on 09/11.

What is interesting in considering the fence is its highly political character. It is reflected as the product and producer of differentiation, the figure of making claims, the cause and consequence of conflicts, and a site for assigning rights. Also, the place is related to claims of exclusion and inclusion and to questions about who has the right to access resources. The fence serves as a material ground to explain current processes of separation and differences while future claims are made, and the past is inscribed in the materiality. Returning to Lefebvre and Thomas, the fence is not only green materiality but, moreover, is made of social relations and is experienced by people as meaningful. It is also connected to power as people's positions are negotiated through the fence. Lefebvre states in his theory that the material dimension of space has a significant influence on the body as it "commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes or distances to be covered. It is produced with this purpose in mind; this is its 'raison d'être'" (Lefebvre 2016:143). Following him, the relationship between bodies and space is one of commanding, influencing, and controlling. It poses a variety of questions concerning the camp: Whose bodies are controlled? What *makes* the space commanding? To which practices does the influence of space refer in the camp? Taking the material dimension of the camp as an entry point but not as dead, the question occurs of which forms of control and commands are formed in and by the *campspace*. Lefebvre emphasizes the historical importance of understanding spaces' actuality and argues,

*"The history and its consequences, the 'diachronic', the 'etymology' of locations in the sense of what happened at a particular spot or place and thereby changed it – all of this becomes inscribed in space. The past leaves its traces; time has its own script. Yet this space is always now and formerly, a present space, given as an immediate whole, complete with its associations and connections in their actuality. Thus, production process and product present themselves as two inseparable aspects, not as two separable ideas."* (Lefebvre 2016:37)

In consequence, the production of space is not limited to the present but carries its past, inscribed in it and influencing the present space. Lefebvre argues against a linear

understanding of time-space and rejects the idea that space has only an actual presence that can be experienced. In regard to the *AnKER Center*, it is at the same time produced in relation to its past and a product in the making. Thus, in what follows, I want to dig deeper into the space's production by examining its historical and legal establishment to understand everyday practices and their link to negotiations around citizenship and belonging.

For around 69 years, the area of the camp was part of the approximately 450-hectare big *Warner Barracks* in Bamberg, a military base for the US army, including housing for US families but also military facilities, such as a firing range and a military airport. However, the history of the in the very east of Bamberg situated area and their function as a military site reaches beyond this historical episode. During the historical shifts in Bamberg, a small town located in the north of Bavaria (see figure 3) with around 76,700 inhabitants (Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik 2022), the shape of the area changed in connection with the respective socio-political context. As I was told by state employees and how it is reported in various newspapers, it was already transformed for the purpose of military barracks by the cavalry regiment and the federal police of Bavaria in the 1890s (Hupfer 2014). In 1935, the military base was expanded, and the so-called *Tank Barracks* were added to the eastern side of the area (Nordbayern 2015). Tanks of the German military were stored there during the Second World War. After the end of the war in 1945, US allies



FIGURE 3: LOCATION OF BAMBERG (FREECOUNTRYMAPS N.D.)

used the buildings to accommodate families of soldiers who administered the city and the surrounding countryside. Later, the US military force controlled the nearby border to the DDR. During the period of the Cold War in the 1970s, up to 12,000 soldiers were said to have been accommodated in the barracks (ibid.). In 2012, plans to withdraw the soldiers were announced, completed in the fall of 2014. After the departure of around 8 000 US soldiers

and their families, the area was handed over to the federal government, and plans were developed for the use of the place, which covered almost the area of today's Bamberg's old town (Rohr 2021). Housing was to be created for students and families, as well as commercial spaces and rooms for various services (Nordbayern 2015). While the city council bought, in this process, parts of the area from the federal government, others are still in their ownership.

There are still plans in the making for some parts of the spot, while others, especially the former apartments for US families, are already in use again. In August 2015, the Bavarian state government decided to install accommodation for refugees in the former family buildings in the south-eastern part of the area regarding the rising numbers of asylum seekers during the "long summer of migration" (Kasperek and Speer 2015:59). The decision to form the buildings into a refugee camp was accepted by the city council of Bamberg five days later. In the middle of September, the first asylum seekers were accommodated in the former US barracks (Regierung von Oberfranken 2016:4). Now, the federal police installed a training center in the other part of the remaining apartments, directly adjacent to the camp and separated only by a fence.

While an *Arrival Center* operated previously in the inner city of Bamberg for registering asylum seekers, in this process, the former *Arrival Center* was incorporated into the newly founded *Reception and Repatriation Facility* (ARE II) in September 2015 (Regierung von Oberfranken 2016). When the facility was commissioned, it contained 400 beds, and three buildings were in use, two of which were utilized for housing, and one was shaped as an administrative building. As already said in the name, the ARE II was mainly applied for the *reception and repatriation* of refugees, especially for people coming from countries in the West Balkans. By the strict tightening of asylum law, the countries in the West Balkan were declared as "safe countries of origin" (§ 29a (2) Asylum Act), allowing fast asylum procedures. The camp became one of the so-called *Balkan Centers*. Due to plans to expand the center to place more refugees there, the facility was transformed into a camp with 1430 beds in February 2016. In July 2016, the preexisting *Arrival Center* in Bayreuth was merged with the ARE II to the *Reception Center Upper Franconia* (AEO), not only housing asylum seekers from countries of the West Balkan anymore but broadening its spectrum of responsibilities for asylum applications from other countries.

Since 2018, the camp has been one of the nationwide installed *AnKER Centers*. The principle of *AnKER*, i.e., the “arrival, decision, municipal distribution or repatriation” (Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2018:1), was incorporated into the facility. The official intention was to centralize the asylum application process by conducting interviews, making decisions, and further distributing or repatriating in one place (ibid.). The federal parliament expressed a demand to speed up the bureaucratic processes in response to the increased number of asylum applications. Thus, an “accelerated procedure” (§ 5 (5) Asylum Act) was legally enforced, and the “special reception facilities” (ibid.) should be established by the federal states. These decisions were taken by the federal government, while the responsibility for designing appropriate facilities was left to the federal states. As a result, *AnKER Centers* were not installed in all federal states but exist under that name only in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Saarland.

Thereby, asylum seekers are obligated to stay in the camp for the time of their asylum application (§ 47 Asylum Act). This “obligation of residency” (ibid.) applies for a maximum of 18 months, for families for a maximum of six months. However, it can be extended if the so-called “obligation to cooperate” (ibid.) is not fulfilled, for instance, if no practices can be officially proven to obtain identity documents. The official logic of the state is to increase the efficiency of the asylum procedure, as the *Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)* states,

*“Through the close cooperation between the actors involved in the asylum procedure, the aim is to make the procedures even more efficient. Central elements are short distances and direct contact between the involved persons. This ensures mutual exchange and the interlocking of individual process steps. In the AnKER Centers, the competencies of the federal government, federal states, and local authorities are pooled to ensure efficient and secure asylum procedures.”* (Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2018:1)

This call for efficiency is translated into an installation of all institutions inside the camp. In the *AnKER Center* in Bamberg the *Central Immigration Office* is responsible for *deportations* and *voluntary returns*, the *BAMF* for interviews and decisions of the asylum



FIGURE 4: THE CENTRAL PLAYGROUND (PHOTOGRAPHED BY HANDREN)

application, the camp management for coordinating the whole facility, and the *coordinator for violence prevention* to “improve the feeling of security for residents” (Interview 20\_14.10.2021) as he

stated. Teachers in the camp’s school hold courses for children and young juveniles, the job agency registers job qualifications and work possibilities, the social services are responsible for the social demands of residents, and the medical service deals with health checks (Regierung von Oberfranken 2016:6ff.). In addition, local projects, such as the *Spielzimmer* founded by the local association *Fsf*, offer a place for children to play and the *Café Welcome* provides coffee and information regarding procedures of the asylum application and social demands. In addition, private service provider work in the canteen and the employees of a private security company are integrated into the camp. Thus, the space of the camp consists of a whole arrangement of governmental institutions, private service providers, and local projects administering the space and managing legal, medical, and social demands during the asylum application and after its decision.

Linked to that, the single buildings are classified as administrative, accommodation, or supply buildings. The administrative buildings in blocks A and B are set up close to the entrance for people accessing the camp by car. Volunteers, residents, and state employees refer to the street leading to these buildings as “office road”. The local organizations, the *Café*, the school, and the *Spielzimmer* are located in Block 2, close to the administrative buildings. Blocks 1 and 3 are utilized as special blocks for women and children only, located close to the administrative buildings and the entrance for the residents. All the other blocks are mainly arranged around a central playground (see figure 4). Furthermore, the camp is spatially separated from the dwellings surrounding the camp by a green barbed wired fence. At the establishment of the *AnKER Center*, the US base with 400 sleeping places was

enlarged so that today the apartments contain 3400 places (Regierung von Oberfranken n.d.). The rooms are equipped with bunk beds, so that the expansion of the occupancy rate did not entail broader structural adjustments regarding the buildings. In interviews with state employees and on the official webpage of the government of Upper Franconia, it is said that this capacity should only serve “as an emergency reserve” (ibid.) and that the “occupancy of 1,500 persons is not to be exceeded in the future” (ibid.). In August 2021, about 1100 people were living in the camp, and the camp management’s explicit aim was to reduce the number again to under 900 (ibid.).

To summarize, the place was transformed in different ways in close connection to the changes in the socio-political environment. The place’s long history as a governmentally owned area intermingles with its actuality through the arrangement of the buildings, the infrastructure of pathways, the architecture of houses, and the ownership of the area. To return to Lefebvre, he stresses that also the future unfolds in space, which means that “it is also at stake, the *locus* of projects and actions deployed as part of specific strategies, and hence also the object of wagers on the future” (Lefebvre 2016:142f.). Lefebvre highlights thereby that spaces are entwined in the negotiation of projects in the making. Following this, the *AnKER Center* is not only a space regarding processes of the past and a product and producer in the present but also a *locus* of shifting future visions. One aspect of the *AnKER* is the officially proclaimed state project of “efficient and secure asylum procedures”, inscribed by the institutions located there, themselves constantly adapting and shifting in interplay with political decisions across national borders. While these projects change from time to time, as the historical consideration of the camp’s area demonstrates, the question occurs what constitutes projects practiced in the *AnKER* beyond the proclaimed *effectivity* of asylum procedures? Let’s return to the afternoon with Gaby and Rich. Their experiences and descriptions of everyday life in the camp narrate a different project. They refer to borders, border crossings, EU policies, and practices of navigating dynamics of exclusion, thereby shaping lifeworlds in the camp. In order to understand these multilayered projects unfolding in the *AnKER* and shaping its space while being shaped by the space, I want to ask: What is the camp’s significance in its production not only as a social space but especially as a *borderspace*? Hence, in the following, I will discuss considerations of

understanding the refugee camp as a specific kind of space and *locus* of projects around citizenship, belonging, and political practices.

## 2.2 TALKING ABOUT BORDERSPACES

In recent studies, borders are approached not as fixed geographical lines. Rather, the focus is placed on dynamics and practices that produce borders in a processual way. Borders and border regions are analyzed as “borderscapes” (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007), “border regimes” (Cabot 2019; Hess and Kasperek 2017), “borderlands” (Agier 2016), “border struggles” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) or “border (as) conflict” (Hess and Kasperek 2017). In this respect, continuing actions to produce and maintain a border are highlighted, directing research topics to “border work” (ibid.:59). Moving away from the assumption of a natural existence of borders as static situations, which separate territories, for instance nation-states, more emphasis is placed on actors and institutions *doing* or *undoing* borders. In this regard, the notion of *border regime* is a common expression that highlights the multilayered apparatus involved in producing borders and their regions.

Hess and Kasperek analyze practices of “doing border” (ibid.) to describe practices of producing border situations by the EU. They examine the specific processes of destabilization regarding the *European border regime* since 2011. In their understanding, the notion of a *European border regime* refers to a network of “European Union agencies, European legislation, processes of standardisations and harmonisations – especially around the practices of border management – and a growing military-industrial-academic complex largely funded by the EU” (ibid.:60). Looking at the term *border regime*, Hess and Kasperek explain its significance in reference to Foucault to “indicate the multiple levels and dimensions at play constituting the ‘border’ as a dynamic and somehow contingent apparatus based on laws and regulations, institutions, technical devices, moral beliefs and representations, discourses, actors, and practices” (ibid.). Similarly, Tsianos and Karakayali argue that an approach to nation-state borders as a whole apparatus of elements makes it possible to “understand regulations of migration as effects, as condensations of social actions instead to taking regulation functionalistically for granted” (Tsianos and Karakayali 2010:376). Thus, examining borders not as static lines but as complex networks of practices open the possibility of thinking about social practices that produce border situations in a way that includes the interplay of regulations, institutions, and representations.



Based on the specific changes regarding the European border regime, Hess and Kasperek argue that the increasing number of migrating people due to the revolutionary changes in North Africa in 2011 did not cause a challenge to nation-states for maintaining control over a territory but led to struggles over access to resources and participation (Hess and Kasperek 2017:58f.). Thus, they situate border practices not only in the expression of territorial sovereignty but in terms of negotiations of resources and demands for participation. By describing the practices of the EU to keep control over their borders, the authors determine different strategies which attempt to block migrants from reaching the territorial border of the EU, one of them the “externalization” (ibid.:63) of the border to the periphery of Europe. The strategy was developed and resulted in cooperation with *Frontex*, *Eurojust*, and *Europol* to register, identify and classify people at the periphery of European territory. This *hotspot approach* describes one of the “re-bordering efforts by the EU and its agencies” (ibid.), or in Fassin’s terms, “the European Union’s dirty work: a summary human triage with the aim of massive rejection” (Fassin 2016). Hess and Kasperek determine that besides this practice, other inward-looking strategies were applied, such as the modification and the tightening of asylum law within the EU territory (Hess and Kasperek 2017:62f.).

I understand the installation of the *AnKER Center* situated in this entanglement with EU policies, in which first people from the West Balkan and later from various countries were positioned, who crossed the border of the German territory. In this sense, the camp is a central space of negotiations around participation and access to resources. Its installation in 2015 is linked to the tightening of asylum law and became enshrined in law. Looking at the shifting border projects and shapes of the camp, entangled with the European border regime, the complex landscape of actors, practices, and regulations involved in its production becomes apparent. States, supranational associations such as the EU, private companies in the service for the EU as *Frontex*, and technologies such as *EURODAC* are at work in producing borders, causing complex interconnections, and led to the camp’s establishment and its shape today. Thereby, the EU’s practices make visible that borders can be shifted and move in regard to political decisions and projects. It demonstrates that permeability and fluidity are inherent properties of borders, which can thus be moved from Greece to Turkey or Libya or set up within the territory. Borders are not only shaped as

static materiality in the form of a fence or a wall. Moreover, they also appear in the form of a match in EURODAC and the following exclusion from an asylum procedure in a state, influencing the lifeworld of border crossers. Nevzat Soguk argues,

*“A border can move inward and become a policy of denial of rights to migrants and refugees. Or it can fold outward and translate into a policy of intercepting refugee ships and forcing them to return to worlds of insecurities. It is in this sense that I say borders are alive, mobile resourceful, and operating to multiple rhythms under different temporal and spatial conditions.”* (Soguk 2007:285)

Borders appear in this sense as highly mobile and fluid that can fold inward and outward. Mainly understood here in terms of their exclusionary dynamic, Soguk describes the rhythm of borders linked to keeping refugees away from claiming rights and accessing resources. Also highlighting the exclusionary practices of nation-states, Liisa Malkki (1992, 1995) traces the specific management of border crossers back to the practices of producing ‘the refugee’, which legitimizes the state’s border work, practices of exclusion, and state intervention. She assumes that the world is structured in a “national order of things” (Malkki 1995). People are seen as connected to the soil by their birth culturally and identically, and people leaving *their soil* are represented as threats to this *order of things* (ibid.:58). Leaving places and crossing borders is described as an “inner, pathological condition of the displaced” (Malkki 1992:33), who are positioned as people without a historical context and homogenized in the constructed identity of ‘a refugee’ (Malkki 1995:510). Due to the naturalized and essentialized connections between people, nation, culture, and identity, the placement of noninstitutionalized border crossers in extraterritorial spaces is represented as a legitimize consequence (ibid.:511). People crossing national borders are situated as the exception, the nation-state as a natural entity (ibid.). The refugee camp emerged thereby as a spatial institution of state intervention to maintain the *national order of things*. Following this, refugee camps can be understood as historically made *borderspaces*, produced to maintain a *national order of things*, while border crossers are positioned as to be managed homogenous group due to their movement across territorial nation-state borders, and thereby their overstepping of the ideological border of the *national order of things*. Mobility is produced as the exception while staying in one place as the naturalized order. Thus, camps appear not only as spaces

of negotiations over resources, participation, and membership but also over the relationship between the nation-state, border crossing, and *the national order of things*.

Linked to this discussion, Michel Agier locates refugee camps in relation to mechanisms of managing noninstitutionalized border crossing (Agier 2011; 2016). He designates the institution of the camp for refugees or, as he calls it, the “camp of the undesirable” (Agier 2011:74) as an “ideal-typical figure of distancing” (Agier 2016:65). Agier describes a specific characteristic of camps in the localization of people in isolated spaces, in places of extraterritoriality, separated from people living outside the camps (ibid.). In line with many others, he draws on Giorgio Agamben’s influential work (Agamben 1998) on camps as exceptional spaces where people are reduced to living a *bare life*. In his famous work *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (1998), Agamben addresses the question of what constitutes the political in today’s world and how life is subjected to dynamics of power. Thereby he differentiates between *political life (bios)* from *biological life (zoē)* and stresses their significance in today’s politics, “The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion” (ibid.:21). He analyzes the camp “as space of exception” (ibid.:188), in which political life as “qualified life, a particular way of life” (ibid.:15) is absent. Following his argument, people in camps are excluded from creating their own way of life, thus from political life, and exist only as *bare life*. At the same time, they are also included as they are positioned under state sovereignty. He explains this “inclusive exclusion” (ibid.:20),

*“The state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the juridico-political order, now becomes a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare life that more and more can no longer be inscribed in that order. The growing dissociation of birth (bare life) and the nation-state is the new fact of politics in our day, and what we call camp is this disjunction.”* (ibid.:188)

Based on this statement, the institution of the camp is consequently one that demonstrates the dissolution of the continuum between birth and nation-state inscription. The movement of people points out that birth is no longer inextricably related to nation-state sovereignty. It can escape it, thus stripping the core of sovereign power and challenging, in Malkki’s words, the *national order of things*.

Agamben draws on Michel Foucault's concept of *biopolitics* (Foucault and Hurley 1998) and Hannah Arendt's work on citizenship (Arendt 2017 [1951]). Arendt relates to the specific situation of people in camps in her work,

*“There is no question that those outside the pale of the law may have more freedom of movement than any lawfully imprisoned criminal or that they enjoy more freedom of opinion in the internment camps of democratic countries than they would in any ordinary despotism, not to mention in a totalitarian country. But neither physical safety – being fed by some state or private welfare agency – nor freedom of opinion changes in the least their fundamental situation of rightlessness. The prolongation of their lives is due to charity and not to right, for no law exists which could force the nations to feed them; their freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course; and their freedom of opinion is a fool's freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow.”* (ibid.:387)

These remarks illustrate how she relates the situation in camps to the position of a *rightless human* in terms of not being able to enforce any right. Even if able to move and think freely, neither thoughts are recognized as opinions by a political community nor results the right of movement in the right to reside. Following her, physical safety in camps does not change the position of camp dwellers as rightless human beings “and nothing else” (ibid.:395). Following Arendt and Agamben, acting and thinking or a political life is strongly connected to the position of a recognized member of a political community. They understand people in camps as excluded not only spatially but moreover stripped from leading a political life; in Agamben's understanding, due to their exclusion from developing a specific way of life beyond bare existence; in Arendt's terms, due to their lack of membership to a state and thus their rightlessness and exclusion from recognized action and an opinion. It connects to Arendt's understanding of citizenship as strongly bound to recognized membership in a nation-state as the central condition to even have rights and exist beyond being a *human in general*.

Isin and Rygiel place emphasis on another aspect of borderspaces and camps linked to Isin's understanding of citizenship. They designate borders, frontiers, and camps as “other global city spaces” (Isin and Rygiel 2007) and stress the camp's specific role in positioning people.

The authors differentiate various forms of zones, frontiers, and camps and explain their common character in producing *objects* insofar as they

*“aim to render their inhabitants and occupants as being neither subjects nor objects but objects. Since these spaces can be found nestled within existing territories and boundaries that constitute cities and states, they are immanent within these known spaces, but they constitute their otherness insofar as they render other subjects as objects.”* (ibid.:170)

Thus, the authors regard the *otherness of campspaces* in shaping not *bare lives* but *objects*. This poses the question of what exactly positions people in these spaces as *objects*. Isin and Rygiel go on to explain,

*“These extraterritorial spaces keep the object from accessing state and city spaces in which they have the opportunity to exercise social, political and economic rights, recognizing that the ability to do so is a first step in becoming political and claiming legal citizenship status.”* (ibid.:171)

According to their argument, the ambiguity of camp dwellers' positioning as *objects* is shaped by their inability to claim rights. They are not excluded from political life through denied membership but, moreover, through their exclusion from claiming rights and from positioning oneself as political subject. Whereas camp residents are already spatial within a territory and have crossed borders, they are positioned isolated in these *borderspaces* and denied the *right to claim rights* through the lack of possibilities to engage in the city and to exercise rights while demanding legal entitlement. Thus, the authors relate the *otherness of borderspaces* to their dynamic of excluding people from positioning themselves as political subjects by making claims. Linked to Isin's approach to citizenship as *the right to claim rights*, they stress that it is not a matter of having rights but claiming and exercising them, which enables becoming political and relates to claims of legal citizenship entitlements.

To summarize, the exclusionary power written in the camp as a specific *borderspace* is analyzed in terms of its dynamic of stripping camp dwellers from the political aspect of life. In Agamben's sense, *bare life* is managed in the absence of political life as shaping a specific form of living. In Arendt's understanding, the *rightless* are stripped from being political due

to the lack of being a member and thus recognized in actions and opinions, whereas Isin and Rygiel talk about *abjects*, kept from being political through the denial of making claims. Following their approaches, the separated situatedness of the camp and its *otherness* is related to the positioning of camp dwellers as excluded *bare life*, *rightless*, or *abjects*, stripped from the possibility of positioning themselves as rights-bearing and political subjects. One way to think about the green fence and the geographical location and separation of the camp in distance to the inner city of Bamberg is its formation as marker of a space where people are excluded from political participation, from enforcing rights, from recognized membership but also from claiming rights and from the possibility to position themselves as recognizable political subjects. In this perspective, camps *command bodies*, to link it back to Lefebvre, not only spatially but the constructed space positions people apart from acting politically, thereby expressing a political project of the EU border regime.

Shifting the attention away from these excluding aspects of *borderspaces* and the border regime's practices and projects, Michel Certeau describes borders as paradoxical spaces,

*“since they are created by contacts, the points of difference between two bodies are also their points of contact. Connecting and separating is one here. To which of the bodies that have contact with each other does the border belong? Neither to the one nor to the other. Does it mean to no one?”* (Certeau 1988:233)<sup>9</sup>

Certeau stresses the ambiguity of borders and describes one dimension of borders in their connecting formation relational to its separating face. Borders are highlighted as separating and connecting at once. The border is considered not only as separating, but also as potentially uniting. While a border excludes, the potential of crossing it points to its porosity and its resourcefulness. Returning to Rich's movement across borders, his practices were motivated by the border's potential to open. When he arrived in Italy, his aim to cross the border to Germany highlighted the border's dimension as an object of aspiration. The border was not aspired to in its rigidity but precisely in its potential for accessing rights. Thus, other dimensions of these spaces get visible by looking at border practices by border crossers. Connecting it back to the assumption of Agamben that a camp

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<sup>9</sup> translated by the author.

is the gap between birth and nation, this space in-between can also be understood as a space for challenging the *national order of things* in a connecting way. The space could thus not only be regarded as one of *bare life* or the *rightless* but, heading in a different direction, as one of political contestation and for challenging the naturalized relationship between nation and birth. Without ignoring the border regime's powerful and often brutal practices of border work, this perspective points to the assumption that camp dwellers are significantly involved in producing the border. Hess and Kasperek talk about "migration as a co-constitutive factor of the border" (Hess and Kasperek 2017:60). Also, Soguk describes the movement of migrants across borders as "insurrectional movements" (Soguk 2007:286), not only challenging the nation-state's territorial sovereignty but also a political order of hierarchy. This approach is also highlighted by Tsianos and Karakayali, drawing on the approach of *the autonomy of migration* to understand migrants as part of the border work, creative agents and active participants in struggles around borders (Tsianos and Karakayali 2010:385). This approach to migration movements (Genova 2017; Isin and Nielsen 2008; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) recognizes border crossers as a transformative force and in terms of "an autonomy that, in turn, defies the sovereign power of the state" (Isin and Nielsen 2008:189). To shift the perspective to border work by migrants as a form of protest sheds light on the ambivalent character of borders, which on the one hand restricts people spatially, economically, and politically and on the other hand is shaped by border crossers' own projects, transforming the space and let the border bend under their rhythm. When focusing on people crossing borders and their experiences, other practices of *border making* get visible, leaving the one-dimensional focus on its exclusionary dimension. Tsianos and Karakayali criticize the Agambean approach to refugee camps and place emphasis on the agency of migrants. Calling for an understanding of campspaces beyond their examination as *out-places* and camp dwellers' lack of political life, they demand an analysis of the camp as a "spatialization of social relations" (Tsianos and Karakayali 2010:384). This approach, as they state, "reveals migration to be a constituent creative force which fuels social, cultural and economic transformations" (ibid.:386).

Rich's physical movement across borders, starting in a small village in the north of Ghana and heading to the north of Libya, crossing the sea to Italy, and walking from there to Germany, points to the way he got involved in diverse *borderspaces*, parts of the border

regime and projects around borders. Crossing the sea by getting engaged in the human trafficking industry and getting in touch with various NGOs in Greece while collecting state regulations in the form of multiple documents that he always carried with him in a transparent folder, he practiced diverse national borders. His acts of crossing them via train, boat, and foot make the border appear in its fluid and porous qualities. He did not stay in Italy, where he was registered with his fingerprints, but moved on to the destination he wanted to reach. The border between Germany and Italy was not a separating border but a space of imagination and aspiration he reached for. At the same time, he was now in the Dublin process, so he still waited for his Dublin decision and, thus, has not entirely left this border between Germany and Italy. He reflected on this by saying that he just had to wait and hope they may just forget about him so that he would not be brought back to Italy. Taking this further, he still performed the border between Italy and Libya in his bodily practices at the river in Bamberg. Through the swimming movements, he transferred himself back to the Mediterranean Sea, connecting this to his experience of the river in Bamberg. His border experiences did not stay physically at the geographical place of the border but moved with him to other places and interacted with experiences of other *borderspaces*. He feared being deported to Italy, and thus, he experienced the excluding face of the border in his daily life, while geographically, he already had crossed the border a few months ago. His border experiences and border practices intersected in multilayered ways. This stresses the fluid form of borders, which are not bound to a fence or wall but travel through laws and regulations, through memories and lastly link material environments. This leads back to the material dimension of *borderspaces*. Whereas they are moving and flowing sites, borders are also experienced bodily and within the materiality of everyday life. Thereby Rich's border experiences point to the border regime's practices of exclusion. However, it also poses the question of how migrants nevertheless position themselves as political subjects in claiming rights even when living in an *othered campspace*. Rich's movement through borders, his engagement in the city of Bamberg, and his daily avoidance of getting in contact with state organizations cannot be explained by addressing people in camps as stripped from a political agency. Moreover, these practices point to the "quiet encroachment" (Bayat 2015:34), the "non-politics" (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013:188) practiced silently in daily life.



To sum up, camps as *borderspaces* can be examined in a variety of ways, expressing different layers of exclusion and inclusion. They can be seen as separated *out-places*, where residents are positioned as *rightless, objects, or bare life*, and where political life is prevented. In this perspective, the *AnKER Center* emerges as a “locus of projects and actions” (Lefebvre 2016:142f.), which attempts to keep people from accessing or even claiming rights. A different *meaning* and project of the camp becomes apparent when they are considered spaces through which rights can be claimed and *the national order of things* is placed under uncertainty. *The AnKER Center* then becomes a space of relations and is entangled with actions of rights claiming. It can then be understood in its potential to make resources tangible and to question naturalized bonds between nation and birth. Here, the *AnKER Center* is approached as a space of demands and potential transformation, a space of detaching the nation from birth and proposing alternatives for membership and political communities. In what follows, I will contribute to this discussion by focusing on the specific shape of the *AnKER Center* as a product in the making and in its entanglement with expressions of projects. In the aim to understand the tension between its separating and connecting face and how this specific *borderspace* comes into being, I will draw on narratives of camp dwellers and their reflections on the camp’s regulations.

### 2.3 REFLECTING ON THE CAMP SCRIPT

“Here in the camp, you think it’s not Germany”, Sina, one camp resident from Iran in her twenties, explained, “The camp is a whole different world (...). You can’t feel comfortable as a person who lives outside the camp” (Interview 27\_n.d.). Gaby differentiated his experiences outside the camp from what he experienced inside, “I am not talking about the camp. I am talking about Germany” (Interview 13\_24.08.2021). Camp dwellers mainly reflected on the camp in this way: as a separated space and as a distinct experience from what people are confronted with outside the camp. The questions that these quotes pose are: How are these *meanings* of the camp produced? On which practices do they rely on? What produces this perception of separation? In what follows, I want to examine: What *makes* this very specific *borderspace*?

The production of the *AnKER Center* as a socially made *borderspace* is crucial in order to understand the “relational dynamics through which power comes into being” (Krause and Schramm 2011:128) between camp residents’ positions produced by authorities and their

practices of self-making. By looking at some of the frequently stressed camp regulations or some aspects of the *camp script*<sup>10</sup> and questioning how these were narrated and experienced, I will address in which way camp dwellers are subjected by authorities in their daily life and how they position themselves towards this subjectification. Based on Isin's approach and his reference to Bourdieu<sup>11</sup>, I will be interested in the "habitus" (Bourdieu 2018; Isin 2012:110), which is shaped by camp regulations. Isin proposes to understand the practices of 'citizens' and 'non-citizens', when in line with regulations, as *habitus* and states, "If we were to approach citizenship as habitus, we would be interested in how citizens and perhaps non-citizens practice the rights that they do have" (Isin 2012:110). Hence, I will address the production of the space through regulations that influence the everyday practices of camp dwellers and shape a specific *camp habitus*. The focus is on the one hand on the "given script" (ibid.:123) in the form of the camp regulations. On the other hand, attention will be paid to the narratives of residents, who position themselves critically towards this *camp script* and *camp habitus*. Drawing on Henrik Vigh's concept of "crisis as context" (Vigh 2008:8) and his emphasis on people's activity in environments of "uncertainty and volatility" (ibid.:21), I assume that camp residents do not take their position for granted but navigate<sup>12</sup> through the campspace by narrating on the regulations in connection to their self-made visions. Vigh highlights narratives as one dimension when trying to understand people's navigation through contexts of crisis, "As people struggle to find their bearings and gain possibilities of action, within a terrain over which they have very little control, they imagine the possible unfolding of their social environment and negotiate this in dialogue" (ibid.:20). Hence, crisis as "a state of somatic, social or existential incoherence" (ibid.:9) is a central frame to which people adjust by narrating and verbally negotiating experiences.

Later, the focus will be on how this script is reshaped through practices and how camp residents write their own scenes. The goal is not to naturalize the camp in a functionalist way and to regard residents as determined by regulations but to consider the everyday

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<sup>10</sup> Isin refers to a *script* not as "a written text of a play, film, broadcast, talk, etc" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary n.d.) but in the form of formalized regulations and legal definitions (Isin 2012:123).

<sup>11</sup> See Bourdieu (2018).

<sup>12</sup> "To navigate" is understood in Henrik Vigh's terms as „the way people not just act in but interact with their social environment and adjust their lives to the constant influence (in potentia and presentia) of social forces and change" (Vigh 2009:433).

experiences in the camp, which were experienced as essential issues. The approach to examine the camp regulations through reflections and narratives of camp residents connects to the approach of “thinking about camps ‘from below’” (Tsianos and Karakayali 2010:384) and the attempt to not take the institution in their legal establishment for granted but to pay attention to the significance of regulations in camp dwellers’ life. By focusing on positions that are created through regulations and their translations within practices by authorities, thus how authorities act upon and think about people, but also on how people in the camp reflect on these positions, I will consider the interplay of “self-making and being made” (Krause and Schramm 2011:128). Therefore, I will highlight some of the crucial aspects of the *camp script*, which camp dwellers frequently narrated.

The material segregation of the area was the most visible form of separation and the entry point of the camp’s otherness for my eyes. My preparation for research in terms of the camp’s discussion in media placed my initial focus on this apparent aspect of the space. The fence also played a crucial role in conversations with volunteers and state employees, as was shown above. In contrast, other aspects of everyday life in the camp were emphasized in conversations with residents. They often reacted with a gentle smile and, without answering the question about the fence, began to tell me about the food in the camp or the problems with bureaucratic procedures. Jonas, one research participant, explained when I asked about the location outside the city and the material separation, “That is nothing compared to all the other things. Nobody can ever enter any cooking materials and so on and so on. You, see? You can’t cook your own food!” (Interview



FIGURE 5: POSTING IN FRONT OF THE SUPPLY BUILDING (PHOTOGRAPHED BY THE AUTHOR)

15\_04.09.2021). For residents living in the camp and spending most of their daytime there, the space was experienced in a different way, and daily routines and procedures were highlighted. The

difficulties of cooking one's food were a central aspect of reflection. Food was offered as a contribution in kind by the camp canteen three times a day. Based on the regulations of the *Social Welfare Act for Asylum Seekers (AsylbLG)*, camp dwellers received basic services. The respective institution decides which services are paid as benefits in kind and which are offered in cash. However, the government called for the "principle of benefits in kind" (Forschungszentrum Migration, Integration und Asyl 2021:16), determining to disburse most of the essential services in kind. In Bamberg, per month, around 130 euros were offered in cash for all the needs beyond housing, food supply, basic medical treatment, and essential supply of everyday life. For instance, products like toothpaste or toilet paper had to be picked up from one of the supply buildings at a particular time once a week (see figure 5).

Regarding food, every camp dweller got a specific card out of paper that needed to be taken to the meals. For each day, three sections were marked, which were cut with a stapler if the person had appeared for the meal. Cooking facilities in the apartments, which were equipped with stoves and refrigerators when the American families still lived there, were removed. After camp dwellers complained, the camp management installed cooking containers in front of the buildings. Nevertheless, with the offered amount of money per month, camp dwellers described the possibility of buying their own food as very limited. Almost in every encounter during my research, participants stressed the topic of eating and cooking. It was a central field of negotiation between volunteers, residents, and camp management. While the management and some volunteers stressed the food's quality or the temporariness of residence and thus the temporal limitation of eating the food, camp



FIGURE 6: FOOD IN THE CANTEEN (PHOTOGRAPHED BY HANDREN)

dwellers and some other volunteers mainly described it as an imposition to eat the food every day. One of my research participants, Handren, sent me a picture of his food in the canteen

(see figure 6) with the comment, “It’s our dinner and breakfast. Tell me, you can eat that for the next seven or eight months or even for one year?” While critique was based on the quality and variability of the food, other aspects of food and eating were highlighted. Jonas stated, “A lot of people even want occasionally to remember home. So, eat and prepare something like home that brings up some nostalgia, and so on and so on. This is emotional and psychological, it really is a big help for people to feel more comfortable like home” (Interview 15\_04.09.21). The aim of deciding over one’s food and preparing the kind of food one wishes to eat rested not only on the dimension of the materiality of the food but also on the aspired experience of “feeling more comfortable like home.” Thus, the restricted opportunities to prepare own food, due to the lack of money and the low infrastructure for cooking, caused an experience of being excluded from creating a feeling of comfort and *home*. Besides that, residents stressed that they wished to decide independently and “without staying in line” (Interview 19\_22.09.2021) what, when, and where they eat. This call draws in what Sandra Dudley determines related to her research on the sensory aspects of camp life at the Thai-Burma border. She explains that eating and cooking are central ways of remembering and that the “productive activity, especially in relation to food and houses, also helps to establish a sense of having some control” (Dudley 2011:749). While the sensory experience around food is thus connected to remembering and feelings of home, it can also relate to experiencing control. While the management and government relate to aspects of efficiency, the practice of eating and cooking in the camp has a deeper meaning for residents in terms of remembering and shaping feelings of *home*, thereby also creating a sense of independence and control over one’s own daily life.

Besides, work opportunities and the right to work were issues regularly raised in conversations. Many people in the camp expressed their demand to work in terms of getting access to economic resources but also to experience some sense in their daily life, “to break the same day” (Interview 16\_05.09.2021). Legally it is regulated that asylum seekers are not allowed to work for the first nine months of their asylum application. Otherwise, they need a work permit which is linked to certain requirements. Hence, many camp dwellers were excluded from working in an authorized sense and reduced to monthly payments by the state. In a talk with Handren, he reflected on this position of being

excluded from documented economic activities. His legal status prohibited authorized work based on his lack of an acknowledged identity document,

*“It gets me so hard. You should have a safe job. For example, I am Iraqi; I am Iraqi. I don’t know about Syrian, or I don’t know what else. For me, they ask about my Iraq pass. Iraq passport. Can you imagine? Five years ago, I left Iraq. Do you really think right now I can get my passport? They tell me: Go to Berlin or Frankfurt, to the Iraqi consulate. (...) Okay, I will go, but it costs a lot of money. With those hundred euros, should I go? What should I eat? What should I smoke (...)? Really, that money is not enough. But what should I do? I have to hold on. For four months, I am here; I am on a ferry. Really...”* (Interview 19\_22.09.2021)

Handren reflected on his situation as wishing to work but being excluded from the possibility of reaching a legal work permit. Whereas it is granted through the legal formulations in case he could obtain a recognized proof of identity or demonstrate his efforts to obtain such proof, he argued that the fulfillment of this requirement is an impossibility in his financial situation. In August 2019, a new legal status was introduced, which is called “temporary suspension of deportation light” (§ 60b Residency Act). This specific entitlement denies the right to a legal work permit. It defines a reduction in benefits and cash payment if the person does not proof attempts to obtain official identity documents. Due to this legal position, Handren worked for a while in the camp, the only authorized job opportunity open to him without a work permit. Regulated in the *AsylbLG*, these “work opportunities” (§ 5 *AsylbLG*) are set for the purpose of “maintaining and operating the facility” (§ 5 (1) *AsylbLG*) connected to an “expense allowance of 80 cents per hour” (§ 5 (2) *AsylbLG*). Legally, it is a form of obligatory opportunity through the possibility of benefit reductions in the case of refusal of such an activity by “benefit recipients who are capable of work and not gainfully employed” (§ 5 (4) *AsylbLG*). Thus, the only possible authorized work in the camp is very low paid, while residents are excluded from other documented work activities beyond the camp’s border.

It was not only access to work tied to certain conditions and riddled with necessary state authorizations. Movement beyond the camp’s fence was also embedded in regulations. According to the camp management’s explication, camp dwellers were authorized to move

within the city area but needed extra permission to leave the city area. This spatial restriction of movement was extended in terms of time. Residents had to apply for an additional authorization if they leave the camp for more than five days. Gaby states,

*“You are only allowed to leave the camp for five days. Otherwise, you must go to quarantine, sometimes for one night, sometimes for two or three days. The boss of the camp decides. He decides everything. Who else? The boss just deals with it how he wants. It would be great to just be allowed to come and go whenever you want. Like, to feel independent.”* (Interview 13\_24.08.2021).

The restriction of movement, connected to the Covid regulations sharpening it even further, was experienced as an arbitrary practice that gave him a sense of dependency and being at the mercy of the decisions of the “boss of the camp”. The spatial segregation and restriction of movement were experienced not only as a spatial exclusion but moreover caused a sense of loss of independence and a feeling of being unable to calculate the decisions made by an authority. Although the possibility of leaving the camp area always existed, as the management emphasized, residents described feelings of being restricted in one’s freedom of movement due to the dependence on permissions and the management’s decisions; thus, also of being excluded from deciding independently from authorities.

The experiences of being dependent on decisions were also reflected in terms of the only temporally permitted right to reside and the resulting uncertainty. Handren explains,

*“I told you, all right now, really this feeling is like fifty-fifty, for example, half of the body is on the ferry, that is burdened. And half of your body is in the water like you will die for oxygen. In the camp, it is the same. For example, you don’t know what will happen for you by decision; you don’t know what will happen for you in the future; you don’t know when you will get a transfer.”* (Interview 19\_22.09.21)

He expressed his feelings in the camp regarding his dependence on decisions to get transferred to another camp and in terms of the decision of the asylum application he experienced beyond his control. Handren framed the feeling of uncertainty in the image of being half saved on a ferry, half still in the water and in danger of drowning. It can be understood in terms of a felt in-betweenness and uncertainty. Handren described his

position as an experience of powerlessness to influence his further life and make plans for his future. Camp residents, who took part in my research, already got a legal rejection of their asylum application, and were only authorized to reside temporarily, or waited for their asylum decision, planning for a possible rejection. According to the statistics of the *BAMF*, the legal recognition rate of refugees has decreased since 2015 (Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2022). At the same time, many rejected asylum seekers live with a “temporal suspension of deportation” (§ 60 Residency Act) in Germany.<sup>13</sup> Living with a legal situation of an only temporary right to reside was also a common experience of rejected asylum seekers and camp dwellers in the *AnKER Center* in Bamberg. Not separately listed for rejected asylum seekers, some of the main reasons for the *suspension of deportation* are “missing travel documents”, “unproven identity”, and “family bonds to other people with temporary suspension of deportation”<sup>14</sup>. This temporal permission of residency is granted for three months only. It must then be renewed, including a review of whether the “obstacles to deportation” (*ibid.*) still exist. Thus, many people in the camp who already received the rejection of their asylum application were legally positioned as ‘temporarily authorized rejected asylum seekers’ or, in Ataç’s terms, as “non-removed rejected asylum seekers” (Ataç 2019:2).

As Cecilia Menjívar describes, who conducted research with migrants in similar status situations in the USA, people find themselves in a situation of “liminal legality” (Menjívar 2006). This *liminal legality* is caused by the legally denied durable membership and access to citizenship rights, and it positions people in a liminal situation of “between and betwixt” (Turner 1973:97), as she argues. Similarly, Magdalena Suerbaum argues in her work on migrants in Berlin that their categorization under a temporary status situation results in experiences of “legal precarity” (Suerbaum 2021), which includes multidimensional insecurities and forms of exclusions. In a very related way, the position of camp dwellers with a *temporal suspension of deportation* in Germany expresses a very restricted access to rights and evokes uncertainty about the extension of the status. This also draws into what Rich mentioned, the day at the river. He did not join the German class out of his concern about getting deported without any previous official statement. Thus, his decision

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<sup>13</sup> Bundestag document 20/890:34.

<sup>14</sup> Bundestag document 20/1048:28f.



speaks of great uncertainty and distrust in the bureaucratic processes in the camp and led to his avoidance of spaces and his decision not to claim benefits, although he saw in the German course a possible improvement of his situation in the long term, as he told. In this sense, Rich's movement was restricted not only by the definitions of the official entitlement itself but also by its consequences of felt uncertainty regarding state practices and the interpretation of his legal status.

Overall, the camp appears in these reflections as a space highly riddled with regulations and structural restrictions. Everyday life is linked to contact with authorities, whether by stamping the card in the canteen or asking for the necessary permission to leave the city or to work. Dependency on authorities is connected to perceived uncertainties regarding the practices of authorities. A transfer to another camp, deportation to another country, and the decision of the asylum procedure were experienced as processes on which little direct influence could be exerted. Handren summarized his feeling in terms of

*“being in a zoo for animals. You see yourself like an animal. You talk about a system; we don't have a system. You talk about respect; we don't have it. You talk about private; we don't have. For example, if you have Dublin with another country, the police come to your room at five o'clock in the morning, at four o'clock in the morning while you are sleeping. At six o'clock, at seven o'clock. Where is privacy? No. While you are going to the restaurant, you are going to land like an animal. I am very sorry, but I am not an animal. I can get my food without staying in line. You know what I mean?”* (Interview 19\_22.09.21)

His reflection describes experiences of being excluded from the right to have private space as a lockable room, from having a system in the form of a daily routine, as he explained later, from respect between each other, which he referred to in terms of the frequent disputes between camp dwellers, the uncertainty caused by the legal status and the dependency on offered food. He summarized these experiences in terms of feeling treated as an animal rather than a human. Based on the former considerations, it can now be argued that this feeling of being positioned more as an animal than a human is due to the lack of basic rights such as the freedom of movement, the right to work, the right to privacy or the right to develop a self-chosen structure of the day.

Camp dwellers were thus not only spatial segregated but also subjected to different regulations that shaped their experiences of everyday life as highly uncertain while relying on authorities. As Laura Hammond argues regarding her research about daily life in a refugee camp in Ethiopia, camps are produced as “extremely politicized places” (Hammond 2004:73) in the sense that all spheres of life are characterized by state contact. Similarly, Simon Turner analyzes the offering of food in a refugee camp as a “mechanism of equalization” (Turner 2010:77), hindering individual decisions detached from state control. The described processes in the *AnKER* illustrate in which way camp dwellers are made legible through documents and authorizations. James Scott emphasizes this dimension of state practices and assumes that “state simplifications” (Scott 1999:79), such as documents, maps, or statistics, schematize societies. He argues that authorities shape and organize people’s daily life within this “project of legibility” (ibid.:80), by which categories and regulations are created as an “authoritative tune to which most of the population must dance” (ibid.:83).

The quotes by Sina and Gaby, who reflected on the camp in terms of an othered space distinctive to the space beyond the camp’s border, could thus be explained by the highly structured daily life in the camp, flowed through by an *authoritative tune*, combined with feelings of uncertainty and resulting in the felt inability to influence one’s situation. The camp appears not only as a *borderspace* in terms of the negotiation of membership through *effective asylum procedures* but also as space of regulations and state interventions through which camp dwellers’ everyday life is influenced and they are positioned as ‘legible non-citizens’. Leaving this state-made position is connected to a possible criminalization in terms of staying out of the camp too long or moving too far, which in turn could cause negative effects on the asylum application or the temporary status situation and thus to get some form of residence permit.

The material border addressed at the beginning of the chapter represents thereby not only the figure of spatial separation but also a separation marking the *locus* in which camp dwellers are subjected to authorities’ power. The place appears in this perspective as an *out-place* in the sense that camp residents are positioned as ‘non-citizens’. Camp dwellers are positioned apart from people living outside the camp in terms of being hindered from engaging socially, economically, and politically in the city and are thus positioned in form

of Isin and Rygiel's *abject*. Moving and working as practices to engage in the city are linked to authorities' permission. Grocery shopping and own cooking are limited through the state's payment and the material equipment of the apartments. As Isin and Rygiel refer to it, a "new form of a ghetto (...) whereby subjects are constituted as strangers and outsiders" (Isin and Rygiel 2007:183) is the result of the encampment, by which residents are limited in their practices by necessary authorizations and permissions. Furthermore, one can also understand residents' reflections as experiences of exclusion from developing a way of life and future plan. In Agamben's words, the camp's regulations and circumstances shape a *bare life*, while political life as a specific way of living is prevented from being shaped by attaching practices to authorizations and control. In this perspective, the lack of permanent legal entitlement and denied membership also points to a lack of political life and strong dependencies. In Arendt's terms, the lack of recognition of being member results in the position of a *rightless human being in general*, even when provided with food, housing, and basic supply.

Gaby explained his experiences in the camp, especially referring to the medical service, which he criticized for not taking enough time, in terms of his position as a 'non-citizen', "They don't take time for us. And always say, 'Next day, next day'. It is because we are no citizens yet, right?" (Protocol 5\_20.08.21). Thus, he did not take his position for granted but questioned it and linked it to negotiations of citizenship. He drew on the position of a 'non-citizen' to explain the treatment in the camp and to make sense of the experienced rejection to be treated. At the same time, he implicated the possibility of becoming a citizen by using the "yet" and thus getting treated in another way. In this sense, "the otherness of citizenship" (Genova 2015) is shaped on the stage of everyday life, expressed within daily practices and experienced within everyday life in the camp. Genova examines citizenship as a tool of states to act out their sovereign power and legally bound people spatially, socially, and economically. He states that the "inclusive and egalitarian mystique" (ibid.:192) of citizenship builds on individuals being equal before the law, whereas it carries an "exclusionary and divisive framework for the production of various degrees of non-citizenship" (ibid.). The camp is, in this regard, a space of positioning camp residents as 'non-citizens' in terms of being only temporarily permitted to stay, relying on authorizations to work and move beyond the camp's border while purchases of products

of daily use and everyday practices such as cooking are shaped by state authorities, causing experiences of uncertainty, insecurity, and the loss of independence. Authorities' power is projected on camp dwellers as they face daily state control and are subjected to incorporate camp regulations as a "given script" (Isin 2012). A *camp habitus* of 'non-citizens' is produced within this script, insisting on practices of standing in line for products of daily need, moving only in the city area, eating the canteen's food three times a day, and working only inside of the camp. In this regard, the fence as a produced border is the material marker of difference between membership and non-membership. Abstract border work of the nation-state materializes thereby through regulations and their expression in daily practices in the camp. While the space carries its past as a governmentally owned area and expressed different political projects related to the specific contexts, its current form links to a specific meaning and state project around citizenship, shaping in this process a specific camp script and commanding bodies within a camp habitus. The *borderspace* reveals in this perspective as a part of the border regime (Hess and Kasperek 2017; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010), an exceptional space (Agamben 1998), and a space of distancing (Agier 2016), a space of the rightless (Arendt 2017 [1951]) and the abject (Isin and Rygiel 2007), a locus of producing legibility (Scott 1999), and a site of legitimized state intervention (Malkki 1995).

However, the reflections on regulations emphasize not only the experienced camp's otherness but also offer a different perspective on positions in the *campspace*. Following camp dwellers' narratives, the camp appears not only as a highly controlled *borderspace*, as a "pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space" (Agamben 1998:136). Rather, camp dwellers criticized the regulations and positioned themselves by expressing their wishes and aspirations. By examining the reflections on the rules in the camp and the camp dwellers' critique of the everyday life they ought to live, it gets apparent how they positioned themselves in relation to the experiences in the camp and situated themselves as political beings. Residents challenged their position as 'legible non-citizens', the camp habitus and the script as they criticized the denied right to work, move freely, or prepare self-organized food. They questioned their position, and claims were made through self-makings. I want to take this into consideration further and assume that narrating experiences in the camp is linked with claims for rights and practices of self-making. The

narratives above illustrate that residents did not only aim to “make sense” (Vigh 2008:9) of everyday life in the camp, but also expressed self-positionings and claim makings. For instance, by drawing on being a human rather than an animal, Handren questioned the camp situation and his position. He contested the camp on the grounds of his self-positioning as human.

Taking this as an entry point, I will examine in which way the camp script and its critique by camp residents is linked to *the right to claim rights*. I argue that camp residents develop concepts and visions and stress their independence and agency not only through narratives but also through practices. They positioned themselves as active and creative parts in shaping the border (Hess and Kasperek 2017; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010), revealed as contesting movements (Soguk 2007), challenging state interventions (Isin and Nielsen 2008) and shaping their distinctive meanings of the space, thereby stressing the ambiguity of the border (Certeau 1988) and the projects shaping it. In doing so, I will refer to narratives but especially to practices. This approach speaks to Vigh’s proposal of studying praxis as another significant dimension in contexts of crisis, in which “people attune their idea of movement and action to an opaque and fluctuating social environment” (Vigh 2008:18). Following this, the situation in the camp, with its legal definitions and regulations, influenced the practices of camp dwellers who navigated the *campspace* and their position. It will be examined, how political self-positionings question the separation and exclusion of camp dwellers as ‘non-citizens’, the cut between political and bare life, between the excluding face of regulations and their potential to be adopted as an instrument for making claims.

### **3 PERFORMING THE STATE CITIZENSHIP PROJECT**

In what follows, I will focus on practices of camp residents considering the goal of gaining a legal status beyond a temporary residency and accessing rights through fitting into a legal definition. Therefore, I will examine legal categories, or in Isin’s terms, the “script” (Isin 2009:381) of the state citizenship project. Isin explains the approach to laws and regulations in terms of *citizenship as status*,

*“If we were to approach citizenship as status, our concern would be things such as rules, regulations and laws that govern who can and cannot be a citizen in a given state.*

*We would want to know who qualifies for citizenship and the laws of acquisition and deprivation of citizenship.” (Isin 2012:109f.)*

Hence, *citizenship as status* refers to considering legal categories, entitlements, and regulations that express the requirements of being regarded as a ‘citizen’. Thereby, Isin stresses the entanglement between regulations and practices of citizenship, distinguishing performances from acts (ibid.:109). In his approach, *performing* refers to “citation, repetition and iteration of forms, repertoires, and descriptions under which political subjectivity is produced” (ibid.:126). Thus, performances signify practices of moving in the state script of citizenship without breaking its borders. Continuing, Isin proposes an understanding of practices and regulation as entangled in the sense that “status is creatively transformed by its performance and enactment” (ibid.:143). According to this, citizenship entitlements are not understood as static formations, but performances and acts shape and reshape them in practice. In short, performing the script also signifies transforming it.

This approach to citizenship captures practices of camp dwellers to navigate the campspace by relating to the state script and moving in its borders while transforming it. In the camp, especially the legal definitions of the *Asylum Act* and *Residency Act* were referred to frequently. With the aim to just “want(ing) paper, that’s all” (Interview 13\_24.08.21), everyday practices of camp residents were closely entangled with these legal scripts to navigate their position. In the following, I will consider the ways camp dwellers relate to these legal descriptions in their attempts to claim rights. I will show that the citizenship script is not a stable design but gets evident as a transforming and transformative instrument to make claims and reveals as a site of struggle.

### 3.1 THE ‘TO BE SKILLED WORKER’

*While sitting with Heike, a volunteer of ‘Fsf’, in the office rooms of the association one Saturday afternoon and waiting for camp dwellers to arrive, she told me about one of her experiences, “A man from Iran was here who was a Christian. He was totally committed to the ‘Church of the Redeemer’ and helped with quite a few services there. The court rejected him. Can you believe that? That’s crazy! (...) But then we found a training place for him as an office clerk at the church. And then it was a matter of two days. His procedure would*

*have ended two days before the training would have started, and therefore, he would not have received permission for the apprenticeship. You only get it if the procedure is still running. We then appealed, although it was clear that there was no chance of success. But because of that, he was still in the asylum process, and he got the 'Duldung'. That's when we beat them with their own weapons." She smiled cheekily to herself, and her eyes shined with vitality. (Protocol 6\_21.08.21)*

Heike was in her 70s, and for 20 years, she has been engaged in the café in the camp and knew almost every person related to the *AnKER Center* in Bamberg. She introduced me to the procedures in the camp when I met her for the first time. Always a little in a hurry to get things done, she connected me in the following weeks to all the other organizations, people, and places she knew. After some weeks in my research, I started assisting her in the weekly councils in the office of *Fsf*, the *Blaue Frieda*. On Saturdays, we sat at a long table with camp dwellers, looking through stacks of documents from the *BAMF* or the *Central Immigration Office*. Camp dwellers came to the council mainly concerned with legal questions and expressed their aspirations to get some form of legal status. To "beat them with their own weapons" was an expression Heike regularly used and was referred to find ways to get some form of legal entitlement when the asylum application was already formally rejected. In most conversations, camp dwellers expressed their goal to adjust to the legal categories defined in the *Asylum Act* and *Residency Act*. Definitions that are so tiny that "you have to flat yourself to fit in" (Interview 16\_05.09.2021), as Marcus, one camp resident, expressed. The overall aim was to be granted a more permanent right to reside. Discourses and practices addressing legal entitlements and the citizenship script with its definitions were thus omnipresent amongst camp dwellers and in interaction with volunteers. Struggles for rights appeared as deeply connected to formal categorizations as points of orientation and ways to get recognized by authorities.

In the story that Heike told me that afternoon, the specific regulations and requirements in the *Residency Act* were drawn on to fulfill the position of an 'apprentice'. It was one of the most significant resources in the attempt to reach a more permanent right to reside, the 'to be skilled worker'. Finding a place to undergo an apprenticeship was a frequently referred option to get a hold on a longer-term *suspension of deportation*. Camp dwellers also referred to it as a possibility of earning a small amount of money and moving out of

the camp. Additionally, residents understood it as a ground for potentially getting included and staying permanently in Germany when finding a job after the apprenticeship.

The status is regulated in § 60c *Residency Act*. People, who own a *temporary suspension of deportation*, can apply for a specific form *due to vocational training (Ausbildungsduldung)*. This status is granted for the duration of the apprenticeship, and camp dwellers narrated it as a way that “makes your future very secure. And then you don’t have to be skeptical of the future or have doubts about the future” (Interview 13\_24.08.2021). Throughout my research, camp dwellers and volunteers searched for places to undergo an apprenticeship, and it was a regularly occurring topic in conversations. Especially in the counseling sessions, camp dwellers asked for opportunities to find an apprenticeship and apply for this status. Thus, the legal valuation of practices of undergoing training led to them being received by volunteers and camp residents as a way to a more secure future or a perspective, especially related to the spatial right to reside but also in terms of earning money. Furthermore, the legal category was reflected on as a possible way out of the uncertainty of the camp situation and connected with thoughts about the future.

Sina, who studied Physics in Iran, was keen to undergo an apprenticeship. She was frequently in the café in the camp to learn German fast and was highly disciplined in her attempts to speak German, get into contact with German-speaking people, and write texts in German. Sometimes she sat at the table in the café, a piece of paper in front of her, writing a text about her family in German, which I should then go through with her. She told me frequently that she aspired to get connected to people speaking German more and to stay updated on the new starting German courses. When I asked her whether she would prefer to continue working in the domain of her former education, she just shook her head. She wanted to do an apprenticeship as an optician or in a ban, “No more physics, no more studying” (Interview 14\_02.09.2021). She shaped large parts of her daily life by focusing on acquiring the skills to become recognized as an ‘apprentice’ and thus obtain a more secure residency status. Thereby, she left her previous studies behind and concentrated very disciplined on the requirements to fit into the legal definition of an ‘apprentice’. Hence, the aims of being granted with rights and getting recognized by state authorities produced intensive efforts and performance of skilling oneself very disciplined and arranging



everyday life according to the requirements of the legal definition of an ‘to be skilled worker’.

The legal category, thereby, points to an entanglement between the state citizenship project and economic discourses. To get recognized and granted with a more permanent authorization to reside is based on practices of “presenting (the) body as ready to labour” (Suerbaum 2021:11) and connects to the discourse, “which demand(s) economic utility from migrants in return for legal inclusion” (ibid.). With reference to Anne Kari Drangland, Magdalena Suerbaum argues that the legal category of the ‘apprentice’ “functions as a biopolitical mechanism, filtering migrants based on their ability to become skilled workers” (ibid.). Hence, she relates the legal definition to the economic discourse that partially includes to be skilled workers and excludes people without economic gain. The camp appears in this perspective as a locus for the biopolitical exercise of power and the subjectification of people, here in relation to economic considerations. To be recognized by state institutions is linked to “performance-based deservingness” (Ataç 2019:5) in the form of performing the ‘economically active subject’. This perspective connects to research done on “neoliberal citizenship rituals” (Suvarierol and Kirk 2015), “neoliberal asylum” (Fontanari 2022) or “neoliberal citizenship” (Maestri 2017), that “centers upon a marketization and contractualization of the relationship between subject and the state, whereby the entitlement to rights is conditional and can be earned after providing one’s activation and responsibility” (ibid.:13). Fontanari especially refers to the *suspension of deportation due to vocational training* in Germany and describes it as “neoliberal asylum” (Fontanari 2022), through which nation-states economically “filter the access to territories and resources” (ibid.:120). Thereby, she stresses that the status assumes not only skills in terms of language knowledge but also to have proven one’s identity officially (ibid.:131). People with a status of a regular temporary *suspension of deportation* need to identify themselves by recognized documents or prove their attempts to get such an identification. To speak in Yuval-Davis terms, the “requisites of belonging” (Yuval-Davis 2006:209) consist not only of language knowledge and a relation to an employer but also of a recognized proof of identity. Hence, “the politics of belonging” (ibid.:199) to the nation-state create a subject position loaded with requisites, such as language knowledge, official identification, and a specific position in the asylum process, which must be actively acquired in practices

of self-making in order to get recognized. However, Yuval-Davis states that not only authorities are involved in the *politics of belonging*, but also counter-politics are part of it, and people position themselves towards these ideologies and attributes (ibid.:205). Marcus, a camp dweller from Iran with an already rejected asylum application, expressed to me,

*“You know, I told you, it’s not about a warm room with food. You should prepare everything for the people if you want to use them. For example, I have a kid, I have two or three kids here, for example. If you want to use my kids, you should prepare something for them inside the camp and then you can use them outside. If you prepare inside the camp the fitness things, the gym, nobody thinks about drugs or anything. And sometimes, for one hour, or two hours, you go to the gym and use it. It’s good for health, and if my health, my body, is working perfectly, my mind works, and you can use it for work.”* (Interview 16\_05.09.2021)

Starting with the argument that only fulfilling basic needs such as providing a room and food are not enough, Marcus demanded other services to stay bodily and mentally healthy. He referred especially to children who should be cared about in the camp based on the argument that “you can use them outside”. In difference to Sina’s practices, Marcus positioned himself not as a ‘to be skilled worker’ to get a legal entitlement. Moreover, he drew on the state-made position and the economic discourse within citizenship as a base for making claims in the camp. By positioning himself and camp dwellers as potential workers, the working body became a ground for claiming services beyond food and housing, such as a gym. Through his rhetoric of drawing on the body’s capacity to be “useful” for work, Marcus claimed a change in the camp situation and criticized the limited access to services. His positioning in his narrative speaks to Mezzadra’s and Neilson’s (2013) argument about labor relations in border regions. They state that the human body as an economic resource is exceptional in the sense that it carries with it the “*living bodies*” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013:19). The authors explain that “the border between the commodity form of labor power and its ‘container’ must continuously be reaffirmed and retraced. Therefore, the political and legal constitution of labor markets necessarily involves shifting regimes for the investment of power in life” (ibid.). According to this, frequent border work is needed to negotiate the relation between the body as a

*commodity*, in Mezzadra's and Neilson's understanding as capacity and good in the market (ibid.:19f.), from the body as a "living body" (ibid.:19), and as I would stress here, also from the body as political body. This border between the economically productive body and the body as a full living being also gets apparent when looking at Marcus' claim. In his statement, he crossed this border by claiming social rights as a living being based on his body capacity to be a worker that can be included in a *useful way* later. Looking at it the other way around, being a potential worker represents the basis for claiming rights in terms of being granted social services in the camp. It involves, so to speak, self-positioning as a 'potentially to be skilled worker' based on which rights are demanded. Thus, one's own body as a potential economic resource and commodity is used by camp dwellers to claim rights and thus to position oneself as a political subject.

It is thus the 'bare to be skilled life' referred to as potential economic resource, that forms the building blocks for claim-making and for getting recognized by state institutions. According to Saba Mahmood, understanding agency in terms of practices of subjectification also takes into account "a capacity for action that specific relations of subordinations create and enable" (Mahmood 2001:209). The legal category does not only shape practices of self-making in the sense of an 'economically active subject', but this position is ultimately turned into an instrument of demanding rights. The legal definition is not only a "biopolitical mechanism, filtering migrants based on their ability to become skilled workers" (Suerbaum 2021:11). It is also appropriated as an enabling instrument for claiming rights. Marcus' analysis and Sina's practices point to the "complex and ambivalent acceptance of dominant categories and practices that are always changed at the very moment they are adopted" (Ortner 2008:144). For Sina, the legal category represents a central point of orientation. She aligns herself with its definition in her daily life, guided by the aim of getting a safer residency and evading the situation in the camp. The script thereby becomes a lived experience of citizenship (Kallio, Wood and Häkli 2020). Besides that, the definition is adopted as an instrument so that the script creates itself a site over which struggles for rights are carried out, even when only referred to in their potential performance.

To summarize, the performance of the formal category of a 'to be skilled worker' serves on the one hand, as a resource to access a more certain spatial right to reside, more certainty

in the future, and a possibility to leave the position in the camp. In this process, the position in the camp is coped with an “economic performance” (Ataç 2019:5) such as learning German and involvement with employers. Thereby the state citizenship project and its script appear deeply entangled with economic projects, which produce the ‘skilled working migrant’ as a position to be granted a right to reside. One could argue that the “gendered, classed and racialized borders within formal citizenship” (Anderson and Hughes 2015:2) unravel here in the sense that rejected asylum seekers are forced to position themselves in precarious sectors of work, thereby vulnerable to exploitation (Dwyer et al. 2016) in order to be recognized by state authorities. Former studies must be left behind to position oneself as an ‘apprentice’, as Sina’s practices illustrate. In this sense, the border work by the state lets the citizenship’s border bend outward or inward, produced in the rhythm of economic considerations. However, the practices of camp dwellers also point to the category’s potential for challenging the restricted access to rights and for navigating the camp situation, thereby expressing their own border work. The solemn potential to fulfill the legal position is formed into an instrument for claiming rights, and camp dwellers’ demands challenge the citizenship’s border by addressing the script’s definitions itself.

### 3.2 THE ‘CITIZEN’S PARENT’

*“It’s because of the system,” Gaby explained passionately one day on the Lockbridge. For a while now, we had been sitting side by side on one of the concrete benches, looking at the river and talking about his experiences in Germany. Gaby described, “One friend got a negative and was living illegally, and one time the police got a hold on him. And then the police told him, ‘Just find a girl and marry her. Then it’s fine. But next time we see you, we have to take you with us.’ So even the police say it!” He added, “People do it a lot who come from countries without warzones, not like Syria or Iran or Afghanistan, with no chance to get a residency just like that. It’s the system that forces people to do so. It’s about the system that is making us chase girls all the time like chasing, chasing, chasing.” As he told me earlier, Gaby himself has a son with a woman in Cologne, “I was kind of praying for a child that she gets one. I prayed for a child. And then she was pregnant.” He whispered, “She wanted a child, and I get a residency. So yeah, I mean... it’s a compromise.” When I asked him about having a relationship with her, he said very resolutely, “No, a child is enough.” He aspired to get a transfer close to his son and exhaled in relief when he stressed that he*

*was now not in the asylum process anymore but had sent the required documents and especially the ‘acknowledgment of paternity’ and the biological proof of paternity, to the Central immigration office and now his application for residency relied on his son. Normally, the “mother of his son,” as he referred to her, sent videos and pictures when he asked about his son’s wellbeing. He said, “My priority is to be close to my son”, and added smilingly in an emotional voice, “When I saw the first picture of him, I thought: Oh, he looks exactly like myself when I was a child. Also, my mother said that when I sent her a picture. I was very happy to become a father.” (Protocol 13\_06.09.2021)*

In my encounters with Gaby, he always seemed highly released from being in the asylum procedure in which Ghana is a declared “safe country of origin” (§ 29a (2) Asylum Act). Thus, he had little chances of getting recognized as ‘a refugee’ and being granted a permanent residence permit. In response of being positioned legally as a ‘non-citizen’ and being excluded from rights beyond the basic services in the camp, Gaby positioned himself through his practices as a to be recognized ‘father of a German citizen’. He stressed his differing position compared to the other camp dwellers in terms that he was no asylum seeker anymore but “only waits to be transferred to his son” and claimed rights through this relation. The self-positioning relied mainly on his self-made relationship with a woman in Cologne, where he first arrived in Germany. He got in contact with the mother of his son, and they shaped “a compromise”, insisting on a residency and a child. Thus, Gaby’s position in the camp provoked his involvement in social relations, in which his body signified a resource for creating officially recognized ties to the German state through his son.

Looking at this through the lens of *citizenship as status*, in this practice of forming bonds to German citizens, the position in the camp as a legally ‘rejected asylum seeker’ is transformed into a position of a “parent of a minor unmarried German to exercise care for the child” (§ 28 (1) nr. 3 Residency Act). Thus, becoming part of a German citizen and part of a German child serves as a base for claiming rights and navigating the campspace. Thereby, Gaby experienced the citizenship script as a “system that makes people chase girls”. According to his statement, the exclusion from rights forces people “from countries without warzones” to get involved in intimate, social relationships with German citizens. As a way out of being positioned as “illegal”, creating kinship ties by a marriage or in the

form of becoming a parent forms a common strategy, as he stated.<sup>15</sup> Gaby's reference that even state employees as the police recommended these practices can be interpreted in terms of the experienced omnipresence of the discourse about these practices. The state citizenship script recognizes relations between 'non-citizens' and 'citizens' which are reflected as a way to claim a spatial right to reside and to leave the camp. Operating on the legal requirement of the "custody for a child" (§ 28 (1) nr. 3 Residency Act) and otherwise of the "family unity" (ibid.) and its requirements, especially values of childcare and the responsibility for a child are legally highlighted and linked to an entitlement. This legal recognition produces practices of intense relationship-making that involves not only social engagement but also intimate bodily practices to produce the recognized ties.

Based on Gaby's practices, the situation in the camp is navigated by performances of legal definitions, in which kinship images are entwined with the state citizenship project. New kinship studies have placed particular emphasis on the social production of kinship ties, in terms of „doing kinship" (McKinnon 2017) and have detached them from naturalizing assumptions. Thereby, the law is understood as one dimension of how kinship is produced (Howell 2007). In migration studies, kinship is analyzed as "a uniquely dynamic reservoir of resources to creatively imagine and put into practice ideas and visions that enable moving to and living in new worlds" (Carsten 2020:319). Hence, kinship is situated as a central aspect of navigating new spaces and following ideas and imaginations by translating them into practices around kinship. Others have paid more attention to the relationship between kinship and state politics (Andrikopoulos and Duyvendak 2020; Thelen and Alber 2018) and have stressed "some of the ways state politics and kinship get entangled" (Andrikopoulos and Duyvendak 2020:307). Andrikopoloulos and Duyvendak demonstrate in their article that citizenship and kinship are deeply entwined as they compare the membership of a nation-state to a family and stress the ambiguities of criteria on which this membership relies (ibid.:308). Interesting for my analysis is their argument that the state definitions of family and kinship matter in the sense that "migrants often adjust their family lives to fit state definitions and requirements" (ibid.:309). The authors attribute the intense struggle around family norms and family reunification laws around migration to the situation that

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<sup>15</sup> In the following, I will refer mainly to practices of becoming a parent and not to marriages due to their higher relevance in my research.

“(f)amily, and marriage specifically, remain one of the last few open routes of legal migration for those who do not meet the criteria of the privileged categories of mobility” (ibid.). Hence, kinship definitions play a significant role in struggles around citizenship and are especially around migration movements central resources to claim membership and navigate daily life.

Gaby’s situation shows one aspect of how legal categories of citizenship, kinship images, and practices of claiming rights become entangled. In difference to practices of transforming already existing ties, he adjusted to state definitions of family images or speaks in the recognized “kin language” (Suerbaum and Richter-Devroe 2022:736) to claim rights, such as a residence permit and to leave the campspace. In this regard, the control of family images by the nation-state represents not only an intensified side of migration control but also a resourceful instrument for excluded asylum seekers to claim membership and to navigate the campspace by adjusting to the recognized kinship ties. Gaby’s practices of self-positioning as ‘a father of a German citizen’ were guided by the requirements he had to meet in order to be recognized, organizing the necessary documents and proving his positioning through these papers as “truths” (ibid.:735). It emphasizes in which way kinship images and norms within the state citizenship project are made an effective resource and reveals “kinship in terms of its inclusionary tendencies” (Carsten 2020:326). His legal membership of the Ghanaian state led to the denial of membership in Germany. Navigating his position as only ‘temporarily authorized rejected asylum seeker’, he developed his own strategies and practices that addressed these dynamics that have caused his exclusion. He drew on the ideological bond between membership, blood, and birth and referred to these connections as resources that can be practiced and actively created. The experienced exclusion is transformed into the point of departure to getting included. Thereby he reflected within his practices on the seemingly clear border articulated in citizenship statuses and addressed its porosity in crossing that border by forming the recognized ties. His practices highlight the *doingness* of the bond between nation, blood, and soil and, thus, the *doingness* of citizenship. Hence, Gaby reflected his exclusion in terms of making its insistent logic itself the instrument of inclusion.

However, the entanglement between kinship and citizenship unravels itself as a site of struggle, through which legal categories and regulations institutionalize certain kinship

images, and people are subjected to their changing definitions (Suerbaum and Richter-Devroe 2022:736). One day, Gaby came to the café with another woman, Mina, also from Ghana,

*The café was still empty when Gaby arrived with a woman carrying a tiny baby, which rested calmly on her left shoulder. By that time, I had never seen her before in the camp. Her daughter, Linda, was half a year old, and the father was a German who lived in Cologne, as she explained to me later. She waited for a transfer close to him. On her ears, she wore headphones all the time and seemed tired. She approached me and asked for advice while showing me a document from the 'BAMF'. In the letter, she was asked to pay 550 euros for the purpose of verifying her documents and especially the acknowledgment of paternity due to a "suspicion of abuse". She told me lethargically, laying back on one of the sofas in the café, that she did not know what she must pay for again, that everything had been submitted, and that she could not afford that amount of money. She seemed frustrated and baffled, resigned by the new issues that she had to face. (Protocol 9\_25.08.2021)*

Like Gaby, Mina applied for residency through her daughter, whose father is a German citizen. Whereas she organized the official certificate to prove the paternity and thus officially validate the relation between her daughter and the father, the documents were not accepted as proof so far, and the *BAMF* called for another process of verifying the already submitted verification. In the letter, it was not further mentioned in which way this check would unfold, and she was just asked for the necessary amount of money. Reaching a more permanent right to reside through officially proven ties to a German citizen was not an automatic mechanism but formed a network of new emerging regulations and procedures that had to be adjusted to. In this sense, new borders were created that regulated what forms of relations were recognized by the state. Mina did not seem too surprised. Moreover, she seemed tired of facing a new requirement that just emerged as a response to her performance of finally submitting all the required documents. Her position was questioned again, which she could only prove by paying the required amount of money. Whereas the fulfillment of this requirement was mainly a temporal question, as Mina tried to accumulate the money over time, it also shows in which way these legal definitions are frequently reshaped by state practices. Officiality and verification of



documents are the building blocks on which these borders are set up. Even when paternity is officially acknowledged, “suspicion of abuse” is articulated, leading to another checking process. It points to the role of documents (Borrelli and Andretta 2019) within the state citizenship project, especially in terms of the interplay between state membership and kinship. Carsten argues that documents signify “new forms of inequality currently being generated by state institutions” (Carsten 2020:326). The application for residency is based on the birth of a child, legally a citizen through the acknowledgment of paternity of the father who is a citizen or automatically through a mother regarded as citizen (§§ 3, 4 German Civil Code). The other parent gains a residency until the child is 18 years old in the case of a recognized acknowledgment. The “suspected abuse” that Mina experienced draws on the law of “abusive recognition of paternity” according to § 1597a German Civil Code. It is suspected in the case one parent has a negative decision on an asylum application and is a member of a *safe country of origin*. The check is conducted through separate hearings of the two parents. In the case of biological paternity and its proof through an official test, an abuse of acknowledgment of paternity is defined as impossible (§ 1597a (5) German Civil Code). Thus, whereas the official documented social relation between Mina and her daughter’s father was still subjected to doubt, the officially proofed blood relation of the father to the child would lead to an unquestionable recognition of the relation between Mina, her daughter, and the daughter’s father.

Mina’s experience of state practices draws into the earlier argument that family migration laws are an intense field of increased state control. In the end, blood relations are the form of relatedness unquestionably recognized by the state. Whereas Gaby has already submitted the biological verification of his fatherhood, the lack of doing so by the father of Mina’s daughter points to the entanglement between norms of family and citizenship. The creation of social ties and the official statement of caretaking is not sufficient. Moreover, the decisive argument is the connection through the blood that justifies the relation and leads to the state’s recognition and the granting of rights.

Relatedness in form of being socially a parent thus leads to the right of residency only if the social relation can be proven as *real*, while biological relations are defined as indisputable. It also connects the experienced exclusion based on the national membership of Gaby to inclusion based on the national membership of a child. Nationhood as blood relation thus

unravels as one determining ground on which state citizenship operates. To speak in terms of the concepts around citizenship developed in the Roman times: The exclusion through the principle of membership of *ius soli*, the birth in a certain territory, is confronted with the doing of *ius sanguinis*, the birth from citizen parents (Agamben 1998:142) through a citizen child. The self-making as ‘a biological parent’ thus produces these blood ties that one is otherwise lacking. It makes apparent that also blood ties to a nation can be performed through which citizenship rights are claimed.

While these legal definitions are practiced, they are themselves sites of struggles, and the borders between ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’ are frequently reshaped and negotiated. In this process, performing the state citizenship project can also result in another experience of exclusion. The position of a ‘temporarily authorized non-citizen’ is faced with practices of self-positionings as a ‘citizen’s parent’, more precisely, a ‘citizen’s biological parent’. “Requisites of belonging” (Yuval-Davis 2006:209) consist not only in social performances and intimate relationships but also in acquiring documents as “truths” (Suerbaum and Richter-Devroe 2022:735) to get recognized by state authorities. Fundamental is ultimately the relationship through blood, which is recognized as an indiscernible basis for being granted a right to reside.

Thereby, performances of the legal category of a ‘citizen’s parent’ and practices of self-making associated with the definition are ambivalent. Gaby emphasized this by describing the relief he felt due to his detachment from the asylum procedure and to the possibility of moving out of the camp to be close to his son, but also by highlighting the burdensome constraints of the “system”, as he calls it, that calls for such practices. Moreover, Mina’s experience illustrates that the legal categorizations and necessary requisites are frequently reshaped and are themselves a *locus* of the *politics of belonging*. Suerbaum and Richter-Devroe mention in their work about the relation between migration and kinship that “struggles of ‘doing family’ take place within and against legal and bureaucratic constraints” (ibid.:728). The authors argue that “migrants’ kinning and de-kinning practices, as well as their tactics for being in relations with significant others, should be read as political acts” (ibid.:739). Migrants are understood as political actors who take part in transforming relations. Political subjectivities are formed “by and through the relations and intimate ties they forge, maintain or break with significant others” (ibid.:740). To follow

their argument, Gaby and Mina take part in these *struggles of 'doing family'* and in the *politics of belonging* to the nation-state within legal definitions and through position themselves not only as 'the citizen's parent' but furthermore in doing so as claimants of rights. They claim rights and recognition through their practices of forming social ties, biological ties, and lastly paper ties in documents.

### 3.3 ADOPTING THE LEGAL SCRIPT: A SITES OF STRUGGLE

According to these practices related to kinship and economic considerations, claiming rights and navigating the *campspace* is closely linked to legal definitions, state authorities, and the nation-state. These performances speak to Hannah Arendt's assumption that having rights is connected to the ability of a nation-state to enforce them (Arendt 2017 [1951]:388). Camp residents navigate the situation in camp with minimal rights and uncertainty about the permission to reside by ingratiating themselves to legal categories and thus the state citizenship script. The recognition as a 'parent of a citizen' or a 'to be skilled worker' is thereby linked to a more permanent *suspension of deportation* and potentially to an unrestricted status. Self-makings are addressed at state institutions and are negotiated through documents and bureaucratic procedures. The position as "rightless" (ibid.:387) or "human being in general" (ibid.:385) in the camp is thereby faced with performances of the state script.

These practices around legal categories point to the fusion of citizenship, economic objectives, and images around kinship. They show that citizenship is a state project strongly merged with economic and social layers. It relates to the "gendered, classed and racialized borders within formal citizenship" (Anderson and Hughes 2015:2), through which 'non-citizens' and 'citizens' are produced. Anderson and Hughes argue against an understanding of citizenship that can be fully achieved or denied. The authors consider the "complexities of citizenship" (ibid.) in, for instance, the appearance of "zones of toleration" (ibid.:3). Going further, Anderson explains in her article that "non-citizenship is highly differentiated" (Anderson 2015:43). She argues that the nation as a political community is not clearly defined by being outside or inside. The emphasis is on the production of 'insider' and 'outsider', 'excluded and included', 'non-citizen' and 'citizen' in a multilayered and partial way, which unfolds through layers of hierarchy. Camp dwellers are positioned partially legally excluded in "liminal legality" (Menjívar 2006) and experience exclusion

from rights in their daily life in the camp, as shown above. However, they are temporarily included in the territory as they dispose of a temporal right to reside. Intending to be granted a more durable right to stay and to move out of the camp, they attach themselves to legal categories and shape themselves in orientation to legal definitions to get recognized by state authorities. These performances are not necessarily accompanied by a legal citizenship title, but the positioning directs to a movement in the “zone of toleration” (Anderson and Hughes 2015:3). Aspired rights to work, decide over one’s housing, and the spatial right to reside within the territorial borders of Germany, even when still temporary, are voiced in performances of the state script. The exclusionary experience of citizenship is thereby attempted to be transcended through fulfilling recognized kinship images or in one’s self-makings as an economically trainable workforce. In these dynamics, the intersection of citizenship as status and performance emphasizes “who qualifies for citizenship” (Isin 2012:109f.), while camp dwellers’ affirmative practices point to the ways in which layers of formal citizenship can actively be performed.

Although these state definitions in which people must “flat” to fit are fraught with recurring difficulties, as is evident in Mina’s experience, they are nonetheless crucial in the struggle for rights and central objects of aspiration. Their fulfillments form familiar strategies linked to specific knowledge, how to perform them, and to requisites, such as language skills or social contact with German citizens. Although citizenship shows its exclusionary face in the camp, the legal script’s definitions shape central “weapons” with which state recognition can be achieved and rights are claimed. These processes point to the camp dwellers’ political life, even when excluded from state membership, and call for a broad understanding of political practices in the camp. Camp dwellers’ navigation can be understood in Bayat’s sense (2015) as “quiet encroachment” (ibid.:34), even if Bayat does not refer to the specific situation in refugee camps. He argues for a more complex understanding of protest and contentious politics concerning movements in the Middle East. Bayat describes the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” (ibid.) as an emerging strategy of the urban poor to change their living situation, which can result in a transformation of rights. He develops the concept as follows,

*“Quiet encroachment represents an instance of a broader category of “social nonmovements,” or the collective action of noncollective actors, where a discreet but*

*persistent process of claim making in daily life establishes alternative (if extralegal) norms that often come to be articulated in terms of “rights.”*” (ibid.)

Hence, the concept of *social nonmovements* stresses everyday practices as contentious politics that play a significant role in changing existing living situations and can also fuel the emergence of larger political struggles (ibid.:35). Daily writing of German texts, getting into contact with people outside the camp while communicating about compromises, and developing knowledge about the requirements of certain legal categories are some of the practices that form the *quiet encroachment* of camp residents, transforming the legal script of citizenship into a site of struggle for rights.

The position of camp dwellers as “abjects” (Isin and Rygiel 2007:170) produced in the camp is challenged by practices of forming and position oneself as a recognizable subject. *By thinking the camp ‘from below’* these self-makings become visible as central components and strategies of camp residents. In doing so, legal categories become instruments and sites of struggles for rights. They represent domains through which nation-state practices meet camp dwellers’ claims. In this way, “status and practices of citizenship presuppose each other and also call each other into question” (Isin 2009:370). The ambiguity of the categories becomes tangible in the reflection of the camp residents themselves. They are enabling and a way to more certainty and independence from the experienced state control in the camp. Furthermore, they lead to belonging and shape affective relations to children and people outside the camp. At the same time, they are painful and demand adaptation to narrow legal definitions. Hence, it is the ambiguity of practices involved which accompanies the struggle around rights and points to “practices of classification, which can be both enabling and hurtful” (Schramm, Krause and Valley 2018:245). Performances of the state script precisely illustrate this tension. The position of a ‘rejected asylum seeker’ in the camp implies painful processes of adaptation to the legal categories that are acknowledged in the struggle for rights. At the same time, legal definitions are shaped as sites through which exclusion is renegotiated, and rights are demanded regarding the potential filling of the positions. Furthermore, these practices question the assumption of the camp as a space of exception. They illuminate the camp as a space in which political participation is demanded through affirmative practices of self-making within the citizenship’s definitions and categories.

## 4 ENACTING COUNTER PROJECTS OF CITIZENSHIP

Besides practices of addressing legal positions by performing the citizenship script and claiming rights in this way, camp dwellers experienced belonging and claimed rights beyond the relation to the nation-state. In this sense, counter proposals of citizenship were acted out beyond the recognized positions within the nation-state script. In the following, I will approach *citizenship as acts*, “(I)f we approach citizenship as acts, we are interested in how those whose status is not citizenship may act as if they are and claim rights that they may not have” (Isin 2012:110f.). Drawing on Isin’s proposal to examine citizenship, I will focus on how camp dwellers cross borders of the state-made citizenship project and its script by enacting rights they are not legally granted. Isin explains that subjects become “activist citizen(s)” who “engage writing scripts and creating scenes” (Isin 2009:381). He draws on the claims of *sans-papiers* in France and argues that practices of enacting citizenship “must call the law into question and they may, sometimes, break it” (ibid.:382). He states, “By theorizing acts, or attempting to constitute acts as an object of analysis, we must focus on rupture rather than order but a rupture that enables the actor (that the act creates)” (ibid.:379). Thus, in difference to performances of citizenship, *enacting* means here challenging the legal script and can signify moving beyond its legal borders. Through these acts, people become enabled as actors and as creators, designing their own scripts apart from the state project. Isin’s approach to understanding citizenship as “the right to claim rights” (Isin 2012:109) is crucial here. It allows to direct the focus to camp dwellers’ practices of claim-making and enacting rights beyond the direct recognition of state authorities. Alternative forms of belonging and the camp dwellers’ self-making as writers of scripts can be traced, entwined with claims for rights. Hence, I will shift my focus on practices through which camp dwellers enact rights beyond attempts for legal recognition and will contribute to the question in which way these political self-positionings challenge the state script and the camp script while proposing subversive counter projects, thereby living scripts apart from the nation-state.

### 4.1 MAKING BUSINESS

*Another afternoon on the ‘Lockbridge’. Gaby and I met at the central bus station and walked to the bridge to have coffee on one of the benches. While having a casual conversation, a middle-aged man came along. His right arm was fixed by a splint and tied*

*with a sling around his neck. He and Gaby greeted each other, also greeting me. The man spoke only very broken English and no German. Gaby explained to me that he also lived in the camp. He asked him in English what had happened to his arm. The man mumbled something to himself, looking at the ground in front of him. Gaby commented, "You like fighting, huh?" The man responded something quietly. He seemed not interested in explaining his injury. After some seconds of quietness, a cheeky smile slid across his face, and he pointed to Gaby's beer bottle, standing next to him. "Haram," he said with a sarcastic tone in his voice. Gaby grinned. He told the man that I am sometimes in the café in the camp. I suggested he could come by for a coffee one day. He laughed and responded, "Coffee is not for me! No, no, no." Now he turned to Gaby again and asked quietly, "Marijuana?" A few minutes ago, I had noticed a police car passing the bridge and now asked surprised, "Here? Is it not dangerous here because of the Police?" Gaby said, "They know how to do it. You can't smoke it here, that's for sure. But at a quieter place." "You can smoke in the camp?" He laughed, "Sure, you can smoke there everywhere; nobody cares." "And the securities?" He was visibly amused by my questions, grinned, and did not address my inquiry further.*

*Meanwhile, in a whispering voice, the man offered us some other substances. When we did not respond to his offer, he started looking around impatiently and said after a while, "I go, make business." He gave each of us a fist check and walked away, looking for some customers. We glanced after him, and I turned to Gaby again, "Is selling drugs a common practice?" He explained, "A lot of people do it. For a small piece of marijuana, you get five euros. So, with the less money you get, it's good money." (Protocol 13\_06.09.2021)*

On the one side, this encounter points to various questions about practices of drug selling as a work domain of migrants (Bucerius 2007) and the use of drugs in the camp, regularly highlighted in talks with camp dwellers, volunteers, and state employees. Besides this topic, it also connects to the question of how people in the camp "make business", even when legally excluded from the right to work and thematizes the relations between camp dwellers. Due to the legal exclusion from work, residents developed multiple other ways to gain access to economic capital and practice economic inclusion by creating alternative work relations apart from authorized work. In terms of their navigation in the camp, the practice of selling drugs in the city or in the camp was a frequently applied option to gain

additional money. As the camp dweller on the bridge referred to it, “making business” is not bound to the state’s authorization and its citizenship project, which excludes asylum seekers from participating in the labor market and positions them legally as ‘non-workers’. Thus, other options to work are created, and economic inclusion is acted out in alternative relations. Selling drugs is one of the practices to cross this legal border that excludes camp dwellers from gaining money by getting engaged in *illegalized labor domains*<sup>16</sup>. Thus, while authorized work is attributed to ‘citizens’, other domains apart from the state’s documentation shape options for ‘non-citizens’ to access economic capital. In studies focusing on these economic practices of migrants, crossing the border of being excluded from economic activities and acting out the right to work beyond authorization is related to the lack of social rights in terms of precarious working conditions. Payment insecurity and low wages, the possibility of getting controlled and penalized in terms of paying a fine, and the lack of health protection are only some of the issues stressed by studies on illegalized labor sectors (Shelley 2007). Other researchers argue that practices of migration control produce the position of a “precarious worker” (Anderson 2015), situated in precarious labor domains. The potential of control and the subsequent documentation of a criminal practice could be experienced as especially restrictive by camp dwellers due to their legal situation, as it can impact their already uncertain legal status. However, the reflections of camp dwellers drew a broader picture. As Handren’s practices exemplify, risks were reflected as less important than the possibility of getting economically involved,

*One afternoon in the café, I met Handren, and he told me about his work activities. He stopped working as a translator for the camp management and started moving into alternative labor domains and “the black market”. When I inquired about his reasons, he explained, „You get 80 Cents per hour. 80 Cents! For one can that you collect in the city, you get 25 Cents in the supermarket. So, you get money much faster than with the work in the camp. Also, I sometimes work in the black market to do some construction.” I asked him if he was not worried to get controlled by the police and get a file: „You know, I am really not a criminal. But they push us in that direction when they only give us 100 Euro a month.*

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<sup>16</sup> See Nicholas P. De Genova’s work on the production of illegalities in terms of migration (De Genova 2002).



*There is not really a choice. And you only get a money file if they get you. So, it's fine."*  
(Protocol 22\_20.09.2021)

According to Handren's narrative, the potential of control was a necessary risk that camp dwellers took to gain money beyond the cash payment or the job in the camp. The position of a 'criminal' when working in undocumented labor domains was reflected as a consequence of the system itself that creates this position by prohibiting access to legal work and offering little benefits in cash. These relations were considered part of the system, and the inevitable consequence was proclaimed that people also enact them. The risk of getting a file was thereby preferred in comparison to the authorized but low-waged work in the camp. Handren ascribed his activity to the camp regulation and his position that "pushes him in that direction". In that way, he distanced himself from being "a criminal" while attributing his practices to his position in the camp and "the system" itself.

*During our second coffee, he added, "I also do some programming. So, if your phone is locked and you have forgotten your password, I can open it. I don't do it for criminal things or stealing money, only if people have forgotten their passwords. "How do people know you can do that," I inquired. He explained, "You have one customer, and then he tells friends and so on." I referred to other jobs I heard about in the camp, "A man sells seven cigarettes for one euro." He commented, "Ah yeah, the small businesses. The man is a genius." With obvious respect for the man's idea in his voice, he explained, "He is a nonsmoker, and he gets Tabak from the city, rolls the cigarettes, and gets money for that." (Protocol 22\_20.09.2021)*

Hence, people in the camp developed different ways of applying their knowledge by creating "businesses" to earn money. These businesses were well known among camp residents and created relations based on the different services residents provided to each other. Handren applied his technical knowledge to offer services to other camp dwellers while others developed models of transporting goods from the city to the camp, preparing and selling them in the campspace. Connections to the city were established as the city became a place of economic engagement, such as the *Lockbridge* or construction sites, but also by social relations that were enabled through economic capital. Handren, for instance, spent his time in the city center, regularly visiting a bar, meeting people living in Bamberg,

and forming relationships, especially through the common Kurdish language. Thus, work relationships were strongly related to other social practices that created connections beyond the camp. Economic capital was also invested in moving out of the city area to other known people and friends. Furthermore, practices of undocumented work and gaining money beyond authorization were, in some cases, preferred over efforts to find a place to undergo an apprenticeship. Even if working is not legally recognized as a reason to gain a legal residency, working for money was reflected as more important than the possibility of being granted a more protected status due to an apprenticeship. Whereas some camp dwellers indeed tried to find a place for a training, others rejected this orientation towards legal entitlement and the relation to the nation-state within their practices. By stressing the importance of money, they distanced themselves from the legal script of citizenship and drew on other methods to create relations through which resources were able to be obtained. Even if not legally recognized by the state, camp dwellers recognized each other's creativity in earning money and thereby formed distinct communities of their own.

Similarly, other studies on working activities of migrants in unauthorized domains stress their transformative moment. Holger Wilcke describes the field of tension between politics as practices of getting visible and recognized and politics of migrants that proceed unseen in undocumented labor domains (Wilcke 2018). With reference to Papadopoulos' and Tsianos' *non-politics*, he describes the latter as "imperceptible politics" (ibid.) which have the potential to challenge the excluded position of migrants. *Working as politics* can thus be understood as a practice of political positioning even when excluded from working in a legal and recognized way regarding state authorities. Various possibilities were creatively developed to earn money and access material resources while acting out other formally denied rights. Imaginative ways to navigate the camp situation created not only self-made labor relations and labor domains but also social inclusion and engagement in the city. Hence, these economic acts were, besides that, also spatial and social acts and confronted the state dependency and the "project of legibility" (Scott 1999:80) within the campspace. The position of the 'non-working non-citizen' was thus countered by the creation of own work opportunities, which led to the development of social relationships and inclusion, also beyond the economic activity. In this sense, camp dwellers did not only

confront economic exclusion, but transgressed the social and spatial distance between camp and city and challenged the dependency on state payment and authorizations in the camp.

Claims for rights and recognition were thus enacted through relations beyond the state's acknowledgment. Denied rights were claimed by enacting them and the script of state citizenship was broken. Camp dwellers positioned themselves as the writer of their own scripts while creating "a multiplicity of informal economies" (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013:191). Although one could argue that these illegalized workspaces are also part of the citizenship project, in which "the precarious worker" (Anderson 2010) is produced, the practices of residents in the camp speak to a more far-reaching picture. Relations transcended further, and they shaped own domains based on knowledge and creativity. The borders that separate the camp from the city and distinguish residents from citizens were transgressed economically, spatially, and socially within these everyday practices. These acts detach access to rights from a state-centered perspective and confront the position of a produced *bare life* or *object* in the camp. Moreover, these self-positionings demonstrate the political self-making of camp dwellers as writers of scripts in the struggle for rights, even when not legally included.

#### 4.2 IN-GROUPS

*One day in the café, Baran, a camp resident from Iraq, came by just before closing time. We sat on the sofa for a short conversation, and he told me that he had received a letter from the 'BAMF': He was required to move to Aschaffenburg next week and was informed that he would stay in another camp there. He seemed depressed, sorrowful. He commented, "I don't like the 'AnKER', but I have my friends here." I have hardly ever seen Baran walking alone in the camp or the city. Usually, he was accompanied by his two roommates or other camp residents. He told me about his worries about the new camp but he seemed like being in a hurry. He left after a short while, quickly putting on his shoes and commenting with a sparkle in his eyes, "Hassan is cooking dinner for all of us today. So, I have to go." Later that evening, back in my apartment, my mobile phone buzzed. A message*



FIGURE 5: „IT WAS SO DELICIOUS“ (PHOTOGRAPHED BY BARAN)

from Baran, a photo of their meal with the short text, “It was so delicious.” (Protocol 23\_22.09.2021)

Cooking and eating together was a common practice within communities of camp dwellers, which came into being through everyday practices in the camp. Sharing of food signified one of the central practices to experience relatedness and expressed a distancing from the regulations in the camp. Self-selected food and the choice of time and place of eating were experienced as soothing distance to the structured routines in the camp. Because of its costs and the often-experienced lack of economic resources, these occasions of self-made community cooking and eating were referred to as special get-togethers with a fixed beginning and a planned meal. Purchased food from the city, lemons, raw meat, and rice, brought to the camp in plastic bags, became opportunities to experience an *in-place* and to participate in a community. Relatedness was practiced through hands cutting lemons, chopping the meat, and trickling the rice into a pot on the self-organized electric hotplates. In the holistic sensory experience of eating and cooking, food became a social event that created feelings of belonging. The apartments in the camp were no longer just shelter buildings or blocks, but the camp thereby became a space of the feeling of “home” (see Hammond 2004), a space of closeness between camp residents.

Friendships and mutual support in the camp were significant ways to navigate the camp situation, experience forms of belonging and enacting rights. These groups relied on shared experiences in the camp and were reflected as significant relations linked to emotional attachment. In contrast to relations of blood and birth, which the state citizenship script links with membership, other forms of being related were shaped in alternative projects of belonging. As stated above, new kinship studies have argued for the detachment of kinship relations from a merely genealogic ground and have stressed an understanding of kinship as a product of social practices (Carsten 2000; Howell 2007). Janet Carsten, for instance,

has dealt with practices of creating “relatedness” (Carsten 2000) in terms of the social production of kinship ties and argues for an approach to these relations as “optative rather than given” (ibid.:2). Carsten understands relatedness as „the ways in which people create similarity or difference between themselves and others“ (Carsten 2004:82) and thus opens up a broad understanding of how relatedness is shaped actively through producing commonalities and differences. Howell has referred to kinship practices not only as processes that can be made through the law, as referred to above, but also through nature and nurture (Howell 2007). While the section on the position of the ‘citizen’s parent’ (see chapter 3.2) has shown how the law and the citizenship project are entangled with kinship images, practices of camp dwellers challenge this legally recognized biological conception of relatedness as the crucial base for getting related. Suerbaum and Richter-Devroe stress in their analysis of practices in camps that “migrants engage in kinning practices through friendship, companionship, support, care, co-living and other forms of proximity. Kin, as a mode of social belonging, thus is continuously and actively chosen, made, and maintained beyond blood and affinal ties” (Suerbaum and Richter-Devroe 2022:737). Following this description, kinship is created by actively shaping relations of mutual support and commonalities apart from an understanding of kinship as blood relations but rather as self-selected and actively chosen. Baran’s concern about his forced movement to another camp points to the close bonds between camp residents. The shared dinner demonstrates that they organized special dinner occasions and recognized each other for these invitations. Through the photo Baran sent me, he illustrated that he appreciated the dinner as a special event and an affective experience. Their relationship was based on support, and they created distance from the camp script that would have directed them to eat in the cafeteria. These practices show how camp dwellers transcended the camp script into their distinct community and created an inner space for themselves, thereby experiencing belonging in relationships with each other. *Requisites of belonging* did not consist in blood connections but, for instance, in the common experience of the camp, the closeness of living together, and a common language.

Continuing, these communities also formed ways of mutual information exchange. Forms of knowledge flew through these connections, as Marcus’ explanation reveals. He advised

other camp residents frequently of how to navigate the camp situation, drawing on his former experiences in other camps he lived in,

*“In Greece (...) after a few months, I found a little bit of experience. A friend told me, ‘I am sick. I go to the Info every day; they don’t care about me.’ I told her, ‘If you are sick (...), tell your brothers to take you on a bare, and they will take you inside.’ She laughed. After four days, she came to me and said, ‘Really, you live here. I told my brothers to do it as you said. After one day, they took me (inside) as you said. I went inside the clinic in the camp, and the doctor visited me and gave me another appointment to come to see him. But how did you find this way?’ I said, ‘You should be a little bit of an expert.’”* (Interview 16\_05.09.2021)

Marcus’ narrative illustrates how information on access to medical treatment was spread through relations between camp dwellers. Besides, his experience demonstrates how the “suffering body” (Fassin 2005:371; Ticktin 2006:39) is a crucial resource in accessing rights and getting recognized by authorities. It points to the discourse around humanitarianism, to the shift of governance “from right to favor” (Fassin 2012), and the depoliticization of rights associated with humanitarian practices (ibid.). But the way Marcus related to these experiences of getting recognized also illustrates in which way “humanitarianism as a politics of life” (Fassin 2007) is drawn on and shared as knowledge in relations between camp dwellers. Marcus drew on the knowledge that he had gained by incorporating various borderspaces. He connected his former experiences to the situation in Bamberg and stated that it is harder for people in the *AnKER Center* who “haven’t seen any camp” (Interview 16\_05.09.2021) and that “you should be a little bit thinking” (Interview 16\_05.09.2021). Knowledge is gained through the experiences of multiple camps and borderspaces to cope with the situation in the best possible way. Marcus had experienced diverse forms of camps in various countries and explained that he had learned how to handle the regulations and in which way he could access services easier. He did not keep this information to himself but shared them with other camp dwellers and recommended practices. In their work on *non-politics*, Papadopoulos and Tsianos refer to networks between migrants as spaces for sharing the “invisible *knowledge of mobility*” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013:191) that flows through these relations. They state that migrants develop a “world of knowledge, of information, of tricks for survival, of mutual care, of social relations, of services exchange,

of solidarity and sociability that can be shared, used and where people contribute to sustain and expand it (ibid.:190). This form of sharing knowledge extended beyond camp borders and established a web between people navigating various camps. Camp dwellers told me about their contact with other migrants they got to know in camps and were spread in different European countries. Through their relationships, they exchanged where rights can be claimed and exercised most effectively. Hassan, for instance, thought about leaving Germany to join his friend in Great Britain to “try his luck there” (Interview 22\_02.11.2021). He explained,

*“My friend told me to come to his place to try the asylum there. It is maybe easier, and I have more chances. Also, I have nothing to do here, and he is a very good friend. So, why not? On the other side, I don’t know if it makes sense to always move or start something new all over again. But he wants me to come.”* (Interview 22\_02.11.2021)

While Hassan expressed his wish to be close to his friends and had “nothing to do” in Germany, he was also not sure if the frequent change of places would lead to a better situation. Hassan had been in Europe for five years and had moved from country to country, hoping to achieve a residency status. In Germany, he felt extremely depressed about the “wasted time” (Interview 22\_02.11.2021) during his stay in Europe and stated that he had “achieved nothing” (Interview 22\_02.11.2021). In this time of being frustrated about his life situation, contact with his long-known friend, who has experienced asylum procedures, campspaces, and exclusions in a comparable way, represented a way of getting support. Thus, his relation to his friend was not only a relation of mutual information exchange but also the relatedness he sustained daily in his practices, having regular phone calls. While he could talk about his situation and worries with his friend, he explained that he felt exhausted by talking with his family due to the need to keep his anxieties to himself and pretend to be in a good mood. “They would not understand” (Interview 22\_02.11.2021) was a frequently used phrase to describe the contact with his family. Hence, he did not emphasize the biological connection to his family in Iraq but highlighted the support he experienced from his friend. Their relation represented a point of orientation on navigating daily life and a source of mutual understanding and information exchange.

Overall, relatedness was produced between camp dwellers through their shared daily life and beyond the campspace maintained with other previously met migrants who experience similar forms of borderspaces and exclusion. In difference to the state project of membership, belonging is based on shared similar living conditions and struggles for rights. Belonging is acted out through mutual invitations to dinners, or services are exchanged as the spreading of information. Bonds rely on commonalities and question therefore assumptions of a genealogical model of relatedness, stressing it as “optative rather than given” (Carsten 2000:2). Rights are made practicable that are not granted or not realizable to camp residents through the relation to state authorities. The autonomous preparation of food is one example. Alternative layers, on which these forms of connectedness rely, challenge in this way the exclusionary form of national membership based on relations of blood and birth. The common daily experiences in the camp, the challenges faced by the multiple dynamics of exclusion, and the struggle for rights unravel as the building blocks of these groups. At the same time, information is spread on how to claim rights effectively from authorities. Hence, these projects do not unfold independently or isolated from the state citizenship project or the camp script. Rather, they are strongly connected to its angles. These relations must be seen as entangled with the state project, even if they challenge its assumptions.

#### 4.3 LIVING ALTERNATIVE SCRIPTS: PROJECTS OF CONTESTATION

The practices described above point to a variety of relationships that residents created during their navigation of daily life in the camp and through which they exercised rights they are not granted with. Camp dwellers transgressed the camp script and habitus as they prepared their own food, shared information about leaving for another European country, or worked in the city. In Isin’s terms, camp residents “engage writing scripts and creating scenes” (Isin 2009:381) through these practices, designing them in their everyday lives. They positioned themselves as ‘working actors’, ‘moving actors’, and ‘self-determined actors’ through their acts. Aspired rights were not claimed from the nation-state but were exercised and negotiated through other relations apart from state authorities. Alternative forms of belonging were experienced in communities besides belonging to the state. The situation in the camp with limited rights led to their enactment in everyday practices, even if residents were not granted them. In which way rights were able to be practiced without



having them was shared as crucial knowledge. This specific knowledge about how to navigate spilled from camp to camp, was expanded, adapted, and traveled. In these demands for rights, residents became political actors. They moved beyond the script of the camp and the position as a 'state-dependent legible non-citizen'. In this sense, they forged alternative paths on which belonging was negotiated. *Requisites of belonging* tied to the membership to the nation-state, such as blood, birth, or aspirations to form oneself in a state-recognized way, were challenged. Camp dwellers practiced alternative projects of belonging and detached relatedness, membership, and recognition from essentialist assumptions and lastly from the focus on the nation-state.

At the same time, practices were closely entangled with the state citizenship project and did not proceed in isolation. In alternative relations, it was negotiated how the relation to the state could be shaped most effectively and how it could be formed into a resource. Knowledge was spread about how to encounter authorities and get recognized through specific practices of self-making. In short, the relation to the nation-state became an object of knowledge itself. Yet acts of residents emphasized that the state relation is not the only relation that self-making practices followed for the purpose of accessing rights. Instead, these practices speak to a multi-layered understanding of residents' positioning practices.

Continuing, these self-making practices challenged the position of camp residents as excluded from being political in the sense of being positioned as *human beings in general* or as *rightless*. They cannot be captured with Arendt's assumption of a "fundamental situation of rightlessness" (Arendt 2017 [1951]:387) in refugee camps, resulting in a loss of political life. By focusing on acts of citizenship, practices of self-making as political, social, and economic subject took on visibility. Alternative communities and relations emerged in which residents did not only think but had an opinion recognized by others. Residents positioned themselves as subjects through the enactment of rights they did not legally have, thus shaping themselves from *objects* (Isin and Rygiel 2007) excluded from the demand for rights to "actor(s) (that the act creates)" (Isin 2009:379). *Bare life* (Agamben 1998) evolved as part of knowledge about navigating borderspaces and making claims. In other words, *bare life* itself became a surface of negotiation to demand and exercise rights. In this way, *bare life* was not only politicized by the fact that government technologies were directed towards it but by the fact that camp residents themselves formed the centrality

of their *bare life* into an instrument of navigating and demanding rights. Exercises of rights are thus not only related to the state in contexts where they are denied. Residents' subjectification within the camp was not incorporated in a rigid form. Life in the camp as a state-made form was transformed by the practices of self-making by residents who aligned themselves with its restrictions and regulations. Common meals, cooking, conversations, support services, and shared information are some examples. These practices illuminate that the *rightless* do not stay *rightless*, *abjects* do not stay *abjects*, and *bare life* is never just *bare*.

In this way, acts of citizenship propose alternatives of how authorities *could* think about individuals as potential citizens and how they *could* act upon them. These communities and relations demonstrate a crucial way of proposing differing *requisites of belonging* on which the state citizenship project and ultimately membership *could* rely on. Understanding these forms of belongings as proposals for an alternative citizenship project highlights that they are not experienced as less relevant in the struggle for rights, recognition, and resources; these connections are not merely a *softer alternative* to state membership but serve as a ground for claiming rights and exercise them effectively beyond the state's authorization and its project. Politics become practices of positioning even beyond its acknowledgment by state authorities. *Non-politics* of camp residents or *the quiet encroachment of the ordinary* in terms of rights claiming and citizenship establishes in this context an understanding of politics beyond the stage of the nation-state and beyond the recognized positions within its project.

## 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS: CREATING NEW SCENES

The consideration of these practices ultimately leads back to the initial discussion of this thesis. How are citizenship, political life, and rights linked to a specific project of the nation-state but also negotiated through other projects shaped by communities within the borderspace of the *AnKER Center*?

Through this journey of illuminating practices, experiences, and narratives around the camp, I outlined an insight into how authorities shape people and in which ways they shape themselves and thus also reshape the space, the question of belonging and membership. Different layers of claiming rights became visible by looking at practices of navigating the

borderspace of the camp, adapting to legal positions, certain requisites, proposing alternative relations, and creating communities apart from state authorities. The camp is not only a politicized space, a locus of the state project to position unauthorized border crossers as ‘legible non-citizens’, but also forms a site of struggle for rights and of overlapping and contesting projects lived by camp residents. Citizenship shows its exclusionary face in the camp script, through which camp dwellers are spatially, economically, socially, and politically formed as *outsiders*. The borders’ potential of separating and the camp’s otherness unravel in practices of positioning residents as ‘temporarily authorized non-citizens’. However, residents do not stay in this position, excluded from shaping their own everyday life. They respond to their position by navigating and making sense of daily life by narrating and criticizing it, thereby developing their own daily script. They claim rights by performing the state script and by enacting rights, thereby moving beyond the script’s borders. They make the border shine in its porosity, show how it opens and closes, moves. They let the border bend: spatially, socially, economically, and politically under their own rhythm and in deep entanglement with borderwork from state authorities. Hence, the camp is not only a space of the visible gap between nation and birth, but practices and relations detach the requisites to belong to the nation-state from its naturalized assumption. *Border work from below* unravels differentiations inclined in citizenship by acquiring requisites and thus crossing its borders. State citizenship appears in this process as deeply entangled with multiple projects around economic discourses and kinship images and gets evident in its *doability*. In this sense, the state citizenship project and its insisting requisites are rendered *bare*.

Furthermore, by leaving the frame of national citizenship and proposing counter-projects, camp dwellers loosen rights from their relation to the state, which enter the stage of interpersonal relations and communities through which they are enacted. In this way, the camp is not only a politicized space in terms that daily practices are tied to state contact, but it is also a *locus* of negotiating the essential questions of belonging, membership, rights, and politics. Rights are thereby practiced quietly beyond visibility when looking through the state’s eyes. By shifting the gaze to the tension between borderwork as *bordermaking* to processes of *unworking the border*, the camp appears as a complex site of struggle and *in-place* of political negotiations. Camp dwellers challenge their positioning as ‘state-

dependent, legible subject' through their practices of navigating. They reshape their position and form themselves as recognizable subjects towards authorities, but also position themselves as members of alternative communities. Camp dwellers draw thereby on their position of being *bare* in the camp to get recognized and express themselves as political actors through everyday practices. Their *non-politics* could be described better as holistic *life-politics* as they pose the essential question of how to navigate and claim rights by making use of a repertoire of practices, investigating future plans, their own body, and their everyday life. Citizenship as a relation to the state is one resource, painful and enabling. It is one relation out of a repertoire of relations and practices that involves recognized membership and access to rights. Alternatives are enacted, not detached from the "national order of things" (Malkki 1992), not detached or "autonomous" (Genova 2017; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013) but in deep entwinement. The state script becomes *one order of things*, one project in the camp, one part of the script camp dwellers live daily, transformed, and reshaped when appropriated. Thereby residents shape their own projects and reveal a way of thinking differently about claiming rights and questioning the nation-state as the solemn actor who turns rights tangible. Their practices make alternatives of membership and citizenship but, moreover, of political practices imaginable. The *quiet encroachment* of camp dwellers and the multi-dimensionality and multi-layeredness of practices to acquire rights that overlap and influence each other demand an understanding of politics beyond dichotomies between the nation-state as the guarantor of rights and the significance of other communities, between exclusion and inclusion, between bare and political life. Residents cross these borders daily, entwine them in their practices, and let them bend under their rhythm of everyday life. It is by their practices as *life-politics* that they create their own scenes shaping in this way also a camp script a meaning of the space, flowed through by practices of claiming rights and exercising them.

For further research, a focus on these *life-politics* is interesting especially concerning the increasing decline of social rights granted by states. How do these decreases provoke even more intense practices of navigation? What knowledge is produced within practices of these *life-politics* and how is it transferred over time in interrelation to nation-state politics? These questions can serve as important guidelines for further investment in the topic.

*Now I am sitting here myself, “at the desk, creating scenes on a page” (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 2011:45), writing a script about a borderspace. From a project to a script. It is a created script, formed by what I experienced about everyday life around the camp. It is a proposal of a script that was narrated, performed, enacted there. It is a “partial truth” (Clifford and Marcus 1986), a “positioned truth” (Abu-Lughod 1991:469), selected, self-made. My script ends here. Nevertheless, camp residents’ practices of writing their lived script every day do not. A few months after my research, almost every research participant who lived in the camp was transferred to another camp. Handren got a transfer to the south of Bavaria and began to work temporarily in Frankfurt, where he lives in a room with other migrants and works in a restaurant, still without a work permit. Maybe someday, he will get one, he says. Now he tries to save more money to “make things work”. He still has contact with his former roommates, who now live in another camp in the north of Bavaria. Sina moved to a facility close to Munich, still learning German eagerly and trying to start an apprenticeship as an optician. She feels more secure in that smaller camp where she lives in a lockable room. Rich disappeared from our WhatsApp relationship. Maybe he has changed his number or has lost his phone. The last time we met in the camp, we were sitting on a sofa with a document lying on the table in front of us consisting of tiny squares to be filled with information. Rich wanted to apply for a transfer to another camp. We were discussing if the application would cause the immigration office’s attention to his legal case and could result in deportation. In the end, he decided to apply because he had “nothing to wait for” in the camp, as he stated. Sometimes, when I walk along a river and see the water flowing next to me, it takes me back to the gloomy afternoon with him and Gaby in Bamberg. I then wonder where he is right now. In a new camp? Collecting a new border experience? Figuring out what to do next? It is one of the crucial aspects that camp dwellers illuminated through their experiences, practices, and narratives, which they shared with me: Claims for rights, getting recognized as a member of a community, and aims to access fundamental resources are not just one part of their life. Life itself is invested in these struggles. It is life as such that is at stake. As naked but moreover as political life, which flows through tiny legal categories, through movement over bridges, and through hands eagerly rolling cigarettes to sell them. (Protocol 29\_16.11.2022)*

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