LITTLE THINGS MATTER MUCH
Childist ideas for a pedagogy of philosophy in an overheated world

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for Aniket
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Abstract

In this overheated world, where children from the highest-scoring countries on the Human Development Index are on regular school strikes to cry for help - it is high time to ask what philosophy and education can learn from children and childhood. The scope of this work is - arriving at, asking and then attempting to answer the question: What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?

Through a hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation - by muddling through with Sungjae, Enaya, (Baby) Ole, Emma, Captain Duke, Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida, I found that there is a vast scope for adults to blossom philosophically with children as their primary philosophical guides. For this however, the adult view of what constitutes the form of philosophising must be surrendered. Childism proposes that we view philosophy as play and play as philosophy. By play, I mean something akin to the Norwegian verb å leke or the Portuguese verb brincar. In doing so - ignorance, incompleteness and immaturity of the embodied adult is unveiled, whereby the epistemological authority of the everyday adult philosopher simply dissolves. Subsequently, philosophising itself becomes a process of muddling through the mysterious.

When children play/philosophise - they perform embodied thought experiments in motion in a way that brings counter-factual spatio-temporalities into the horizons of the particular lived experience of the moment. Philosophising/Playing with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children requires us to slow down, scale down and cool down more often than one currently manages. In doing so, one can start nearing the possibility of - preparing for unpredictable futures and shouldering responsibilities in the face of the greatest challenges of the overheated world. For adults in highest-scoring nations on the Human Development Index, this is a more realistic possibility than those in the majority world. And it need not cost much.
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And last but not least, Emma Neumeyer.
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General Introduction

This dissertation constitutes a philosophical journey into the richness that children can offer adults, in order to overcome their own conceptual limitations and blossom philosophically. The core investigational process unfolded in the cosmopolitan Norwegian city of Trondheim with the generous companionship of some of its child-citizens. Without an intimate relating in those familial contexts, a work like this would not have been possible. But the pre-conditions, conditions and meandering trajectories of the specific routes that led to the realisation of this project have the vulnerable interdependent characteristic of my changing geographical and theoretical positionalities in relation to the worlds within which words make sense. The birth of the central research question arises out of the embodied mind that arrived at articulating it in oral and written language.

What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?

I did not simply wake up one day in Germany, go to my desk at the Department of Education at the University of Bayreuth and write down that question. I arrived at it as an embodied mind, pre-captivated by the pedagogy of philosophy in what anthropologist and public thinker Thomas Hylland Eriksen termed - an asymmetrically overheated world (Eriksen 2016). The pre-captivation occurred in India where I studied and taught philosophy. How come an embodied mind, pre-positioned in Asia, ends up at a desk in Europe writing a central question that unfolded in a cosmopolitan fjord city in Scandinavia? Why is a question concerning pedagogy directed towards the adult and not the child?

The theoretical turning towards childism (Wall 2012; 2019) through the meandering trajectories that influenced the directedness of questioning, was an organic part of this project. The childist perspective is both a result, as well as the condition for arriving at, asking and then attempting to answer this central question.

Childism is the effort to reimagine and practice child-inclusive social processes and structures (Wall 2012:136: 2019). Among else, it aims at treating children as scholarly and democratic subjects, insofar as this is possible (ibid.), and emerges from the interdisciplinary movement in social sciences called childhood studies (James, Jenks & Prout 1998; Spyrou et al 2018). Childhood has mostly been seen as a feature of parental (or solely
maternal) discourse, or the currency of educators or the sole property of developmental psychology (James, Jenks & Prout 1998; Tatlow-Golden & Montgomery 2020). Since its onset in the late 20th century, the discipline of childhood studies has been committed to seeking new possibilities in the face of dogmatic reassertions about the temporal other of adulthood (James, Jenks & Prout 1998; Spyrou 2018; in italics Beauvais 2018). Just as childhood has been seen as a feature of parental discourse or the currency of educators, the question ‘what is a child?’ as a foundational question for the philosophy of childhood, has been subsumed by the philosophy of education (Siegel 2009).

Particularly with reference to the pedagogy of philosophy, children are invariably positioned and conceived of as pupils of logo-centric philosophy education. The importance of philosophy education for global peace and preparing children to shoulder responsibilities in the face of the greatest ethical challenges of the contemporary world, has been repeatedly acknowledged since the 1946 Memorandum on the Philosophy Programme by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (here on UNESCO; Goucha 2007). The conviction voiced by UNESCO upholds the right to philosophy for all (ibid.). However, while the global community might have expressed the desirability of a right to philosophy for all, children remain philosophically constrained as default addressees of pedagogy, as they are categorically meant to be taught something by adults. In spite of the recognition of philosophical agency in even babies (Gopnik 2009) and the recognition of children’s consciousness as a positive phenomenon (Merleau-Ponty 2010: 131; Bahler on Merleau-Ponty 2015, 2016; Welsh on Merleau-Ponty 2013), somehow the philosophical agency of small children remains underestimated in terms of its philosophical worth for big adults. The value of philosophy education as a response to global crises, seems to be expressed in terms of adults teaching children how to philosophise and not themselves learning to philosophise with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children.

What are the contemporary global crises that philosophy education is responding to? I grasp this through the anthropological description of ‘overheating’ i.e. Anthropocene neoliberalism as a compounded term (Eriksen 2016). The description is not limited to the environmental crisis, but incorporates neoliberal economic activity and identity politics as well. Eriksen’s description further integrates awareness of the asymmetrical nature of overheating in so far as formerly colonised parts of the world pay higher existential costs in order to maintain standards of living elsewhere. The central double bind of this era is obtaining the balance between economic growth and ecological sustainability. The overheating metaphor
refers to an era that has no inbuilt ‘thermostat’ or to decide upper limits for growth-oriented runway processes e.g. energy use, urban expansion and population growth, tourism, migratory waves, waste production and waste colonialism, and the direct effects of such processes on local environments. Upscaling e.g. expanding of mining operations at the expense of local community and environmental interests is an integral part of overheating. Within the education sector phenomenon such as large-scale global testing of school children is an example. The testing is supposed to enable more internationally competitive human capital development; at the same time the pressure to perform and labour in schools increases for pupils and teachers across the globe, without their understanding and/or participation in the decision.

Eriksen (2016) explains that the three inextricably intertwined crises of overheating i.e. environment, economy and identity are individually experienced through cognitive oscillations between small and large clashing scales. The micro and the macro are seen as two sides of the same coin; yin and yang (ibid.). Eriksen further explains, that a clashing of scales occurs between the local and the global, in distinguishable ways i.e. in the social (reach of ones networks), physical (the compass of an infrastructural system), cognitive (the size of ones perceived world) and temporal sphere (the time horizon one imagines, forwards, backwards, when taking decisions and making plans) (ibid: 29).

To draw a loose analogy of clashing scales in the intergenerational light, the difference between social, physical, cognitive and temporal scales also applies to the child-adult continuum. Bigger scales however, do not guarantee more or better philosophical capacities. As Alberto Caeiro, one of Fernando Pessoa’s heteronyms illustrates (Pessoa 2006: 16: tr. Zenith) -

“From my village I see as much of the universe as can be seen from earth,  
And so my village is as large as any town,  
For I am the size of what I see  
And not the size of my height ...

In the cities life is smaller  
Than here in my house on top of this hill.  
The big buildings of cities lock up the view,  
They hide the horizon, pulling our gaze far away from the open sky.  
They make us small, for they take away all the vastness our eyes can see,  
And they make us poor, for our only wealth is seeing.”
Although the social, physical, cognitive and temporal scales of children are smaller, my investigation demonstrated their capacity to think counterfactually and expand the horizons of conscious experience to be even broader than that of my own graspable adult consciousness. Such capacities are indispensable to philosophical processes and yet the value of philosophical education as a response to global crisis, has been solely located in giving children philosophical education.

My hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation explores what doing philosophy with children could be like. The exploration pursues the value of asking what philosophy and education can learn from children and childhood (Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Storme, & Vlieghe 2011). The longitudinal inquiry is located in an overheated world (Eriksen 2016), where children from the highest-scoring countries on the Human Development Index are now on regular school strikes, crying for help (Thunberg 2019) and challenging their default positions as ‘pupils’ (Su & Su 2019; Straume 2019). In such a time, childism urges that we conceive of children beyond the developmental perspective (Wall 2012; 2019).

The text at hand is divided into five parts. Part 1 introduces an existential perspective on the overheated world of high-speed modernity i.e. Anthropocene Neoliberalism, within which the neoliberal global education sector houses nation-specific, institutionalised philosophy with/for children (PC) practices.

Part 2 gives a historical overview of how philosophy with children has become part of standardised global educational practices. Then, I discuss major critiques starting with the instrumentalisation of philosophy with the involvement of children and the questionability of the epistemology underlying the method itself, namely the ‘white reason-ability’ that characterizes it. Various critiques seem to be pointing at the necessity to take adult positionality more seriously. The critique raised in the Norwegian context is unique insofar as it recognises children as existentially equal truth seekers as their adult counterparts. None of the critics, however, seem keen on renouncing the spatio-temporality of schooling itself, where the pedagogical authority of adults is structurally protected and reinforced. Moreover, none of them seem to envisage the child as a philosophical guide.

Part 3 discusses how the child has invariably been seen as a pedagogical addressee i.e. someone to be taught and civilized by adults, what is said about modern childhood cultures and children’s cultures in literature. The text narrows into a discussion of children’s evolving role as researchers and democratic participants in high Human Development Index contexts (especially, following the introduction of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child). The changing scholarly and social positions of children in high Human Development Index contexts, as a corollary, implies that the scholarly and social positions of adults in relation to children are also changing. Finally, new research designs and new roles of adult researchers of childhood are discussed based on the childhood studies paradigm.

The lengthiest body of this work - part 4 begins with a description of the attributes of this particular study at hand, followed by the three phases of exploration or, as Gallacher and Gallagher (2018) propose to label it, the muddling through. The organic experimentation design engaged with children as interlocutors and co-explorers, drawing upon Continental and Indian phenomenological and logical traditions in order to enter into immersive play with co-explorers. Playing emerged as a form of philosophising enabling adults to unstiffen their conceptual muscles in a way that facilitates crossing the borders of one’s taken-for-granted world. I term these opportunities 'philosophical clearings with (hos/bei) children', whereby we can experience other fleeting, temporal, co-existing worlds regardless of their contradictory appearances.

Section 4.2 i.e. the embryological Phase 0 of the study features peculiar content, due to its seemingly autobiographical narrative style. The purpose of integrating this contextual section in the body of an academic dissertation is to make visible the invisible. Even welcoming the idea of a child as a philosophical guide for an adult in the first place requires some rigid borders to be transcended. These could literally be large scale national, bureaucratic, financial and disciplinary borders, as well as our small scale embodied conceptual child/adult borders. Chance has an equally significant role to play in how such borders get crossed - whether internal or external ones; this in turn has us delving deeper into the mysteries we tend to enframe as problems. Finally, interpersonal reciprocity and trust or the lack of it enables or disables any enquiry insofar as processes of fielding and access to any particular geographical or thematic field unfold.

Phase 0 can be especially confusing for readers who are acquainted with autoethnography. Resemblance is not identity. Well, not always. If one adheres to comparison as a primary way of knowing, then one risks mistaking the previously unknown for the known.

The resemblance between autoethnographic works and this particular section is valid, insofar as autoethnography can be taken as a phenomenological tool (Pitard 2019). As the word autoethnography itself suggests, autoethnography is the methodological coming together of the self and other (Jones, Adams & Ellis 2016). Autoethnography is methodologically
unafraid of intimacy (Smith 2005). One embraces vulnerability; pays attention to physical feelings, thoughts and emotions using systematic socio-logical introspection and emotional recall in order to grasp an experience one has lived through (Ellis 1999). Another resemblance which is also valid is that both methodologies are ‘queer’ in the etymological sense of the term i.e. being odd or non-conforming; and also because they bring forth commonly marginalised subjectivities. Queer methodologies are scavenger methodologies in so far as they use different methods to collect and produce knowledge about deliberately or accidentally excluded subjects from traditional studies of human behaviour (Halberstam 1998, in Jones & Harris 2018; Adams & Jones 2011). Moreover, such methodologies refuse academic compulsion towards disciplinary coherence (ibid.). This is especially noticeable in the diverse and experimental writing styles testing the limits of academic certainty (Johnson-Mardones 2015; Adams & Jones 2011; MacKinley 2019). Given its fundamentally critical and unorthodox character, autoethnography is appealing for decolonising the academy and making it a kinder place (Mackinlay 2019; Chawla & Ahmet 2018). For childist projects such as this one, re-imagining the academy in interdependent relationality to childhood and children’s experiences, necessarily implies a movement towards kindness as a virtue. Hence, resemblance is valid; Inferring an identity between the two based on that however, is not.

Despite its commitment to intersubjective reflexivity owing to the phenomenological and existential traditions, this project was not conceptualised as an autoethnographic endeavour rooted in the discipline of anthropology. The presence of ethnographic detail, including personal first person accounts and inclusion of written correspondences, in the embryological phase is to make explicit how and what influenced my philosophical process with regard to pedagogy of philosophy. The possibility of the arising of a question is itself contained within the standpoint of questioning. The limits of what and how something can be known is already demarcated by the directedness of a question. A central question doesn’t only open up epistemological horizons, it simultaneously closes others off.

My interest in the pedagogy of philosophy began from the adultist position of a philosophy tutor for a child, whom I solely regarded as a pupil. From an adultist position becoming concerned with the scope for the philosophical blossoming of the adult side was a non-existent sliver. The possibility of the primary overarching question could not have started opening up, had I not undergone the embryological processes in the first place. While the relevant knowledge and capital I was acquiring on the way and the children
I met facilitated my arrival at the leading question, internal and external borders have also often become hindrances on the way; often clashing, at previously unimaginable subtle and gross scales, and generating plenty scope for philosophical engagement.

Taking referential cues from participatory research methods in interdisciplinary childhood studies, during the systematic stages I embraced the methodological attitude of immaturity and muddled through (Gallacher & Gallagher 2018) with children as co-explorers whose influence I gradually and deliberately surrendered to. In doing so I stopped focusing on a logo-centric understanding of philosophising and instead grasped it as play. Overcoming the logo-centric understanding of philosophy implied a new directedness of questioning, motivation and thereof method of investigation, and a newfound critical approach towards the Continental phenomenological tradition as I had known and grown intellectually attached to. Through the methodological attitude proposed by Gallacher & Gallagher (ibid.) - the hybridic phenomenological method of entering immersive play with co-explorers came about. Every phase elaborately explained in part 4, shows how maintaining a methodological attitude made way for adapting methodical choices in order to investigate the philosophical richness of playing with children for adults. Thus, this is not an autoethnographic enterprise; it is a hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation into a pedagogy of philosophy and in turn a philosophy of pedagogy.

The progression of part 4 simultaneously traces the contextual emergence of the central question. The emergence owes itself to the ability to change the standpoint from where that question can be asked from. It cannot be asked, as long as the child remains a default addressee of pedagogy. The so-called ‘development’ of question in orthodox dissertations, in light of a work like this, is in the ‘development’ of the embodied mind that writes it. Can one even talk of ‘development’ in such a case? Not really. The question emerges through the influences traced in it. It emerges more or less towards the end of this work. Why didn’t I start this work from the point the central question was ‘finalised’? Because arrival at a question is as relevant, if not more, as asking and answering one. At least for a philosophical project concerning the pedagogy of philosophy, arrival at a central question depends on the pedagogical attitude that carries it. An elaboration of the mundane whys and hows of arriving at the central question may also be seen as a response to abstract philosophical works which clearly refer to childhood experiences and were most probably inspired by engagement with and observation of children. Such works seldom make explicit the contributions
and influences of children on the authors. I have tried as far as possible to offer readers transparency in terms of what influenced the questioning and its turn towards the childist standpoint. Here too, the diverse forms of ethnographic details, improvised and adapted to what various stages called for, are present in order to make influences transparent. 'Muddling through', in its literal sense, appeals to the ignorance of the one who muddles through. The principle researcher, who is invariably an adult. Acknowledging and embracing one's ignorance as an epistemological asset whilst investigating with children as an adult, is part of the methodological attitude underlying the methodical steps. Childism offers the valuable probability of finding strength in interdependence and vulnerability when a powerful adult position re-cognises its ignorance vis-a-vis a child.

Part 5 revisits the overall research question concluding this work, which at its core is about arriving at, asking and attempting to answer -

*What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?*

- in an overheated world.
Illustration 1: Childist ideas for a pedagogy of philosophy in an overheated world
1. The Existential Crisis of an Overheated Epoch

Anthropocene neoliberalism is the universal context within which this longitudinal exploration of what philosophising with children could be for adults has taken place. The essence of Anthropocene neoliberalism is overheating (Eriksen 2016) and the unresolvable dilemma of the epoch is obtaining between ecological sustainability and environmental growth (ibid.).

The compound term - Anthropocene neoliberalism - refers to the overheated zeitgeist of the early 21st century, uniquely characterised by the acceleration of acceleration (Eriksen 2016). In the last three decades alone, the growth rate of human population has accelerated exponentially, as the world inhabitants went from 4.8 to 7.7 billion. Consequently, this was paralleled by an acceleration in modern human activities. The first component of the compound term, i.e. Anthropocene, refers to the geological epoch where traces of human activity are found everywhere on the planet (Ehlers 2008; Steffen, Crutzen et al 2007). The second component of the term, i.e. neoliberalism, refers to the post-colonial modern era of the free market, whereby trade barriers between nations were reduced and capital flow increased. The era progressed through post-colonial practices such as outsourcing industries, exponential exploitation of nature and waste colonialism, especially in the majority world. And all the while, there seems to be no upper limit to neoliberal growth or the speed at which growth takes place.

Speed and heat being inextricably connected, the zeitgeist we find ourselves in can be said to be overheating (Eriksen 2016).

1.1. Modern Education and Anthropocene Neoliberalism

Modernity designates a period in human history whose ideological underpinning heavily relies on/is impregnated with Cartesian dualism, as well as the Cartesian idea of human beings as masters and possessors of nature, coupled with the technological prowess made possible by Newtonian natural science (conf. Faarlund, in Reed and Rothenburg 1993; Heidegger 1977). According to continental phenomenology - a response to modern scientism - what this particular modernity did is mathematise nature, certainly leading to perceived scientific progress, but also inaugurating a critical phase for humanity (Husserl 1970). Heidegger’s view on modern technological prowess was that it revealed nature, including human beings, as
a storehouse of resources ready for supply on demand which he termed Bestand (Heidegger 1977). In Heidegger’s words,

“Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged (German: Herausforderung/ Norwegian: Utfordring) to exploit the energies of nature can this ordering revealing happen. If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve? The current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this. The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather, is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderness of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand (ibid: 19; bracket insertion by author).”

In this passage, Heidegger was not particularly describing the exploitative colonial situation in the majority world. The description rather concerns the demanding modern human-nature relationship that was accepted as progress in the minority world, specifically continental Europe itself. Within the minority context, for example, Norway was still a developing country when it was invaded under Hitler’s stewardship. Following the technological might of the allies, Norway eventually set out to train its personnel and expand its national economy, increasingly turning into a modern industrial nation (Faarlund, in Reed and Rothenburg 1993:159).

Following Danish existentialist Kierkegaard, the Northern Norwegian existentialist Zapffe used the word biosophy to describe the depth of the philosophical predicament that emerges when the modern human learns enough about the world and our place in it to realize that the planet would be better off without us (Reed and Rothenburg 1993:3; Zapffe 1933, in Reed and Rothenburg 1993). Of course, by ‘us’ Zapffe was neither referring to the Sami minorities of Norway, nor peoples of the colonised continents who

1 The term continental Europe is employed in the vernacular sense expressed in the Norwegian term Kontinentet to refer to the geographical area of the European continent excluding the Scandinavian peninsula, Britain and Iceland.
were ‘not yet civilized’ through modern education to become comfortable enough with nature, including human beings as Bestand.

By the 70s, literal philosophical movements, largely informed by Naess’ explication of Gandhian non-violence (conf. Naess 1974) came forth to argue against the reigning modern philosophical commitment which reveals nature as a storehouse of resources ready for supply on demand (Reed and Rothenberg 1993).

A telling example of the deep philosophical efforts to performatively deconstruct modern commitments that the rapidly developing industrial Norwegian society had embraced (conf. Stugu 2012: 164–286) is the non-violent demonstration against the hydropower project in Mardøla Falls. Opponents of the premise, like Kvaløy and Naess, chained themselves to earth in order to prevent the machines from chewing their way up into the mountains (Kvaløy 1993, in Reed and Rothenberg 1993).

Seen as an escalated end of the spectrum that phenomenological philosophers such as Husserl and Heidegger pointed towards, and as confirmed in the latest international scientific report titled, Global Warming of 1.5°C, an IPCC special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Here on IPCC 2018), I believe that Anthropocene neoliberalism is an existential crisis in the individualistic and anthropocentric assumptions underlying global economic and social structures i.e. in the way we think (as in Stratford 2019). Consequently, radically new approaches in education science and philosophy through more interdisciplinary engagement are urgently called forth (ibid.).

In practice, neoliberalism is blatant in education too (Burbules and Torres 2000). Insofar as upscaled modern education is reduced to skills qualification and employability (conf. OECD 2015), the global education sector contributes to the problem and not the solution (Fitzsimons 2002; Biesta 2015; Clemens & Biswas 2019). Within the sector, philosophising in schools and kindergartens i.e. sitting and talking about philosophical topics through practices like P4C or PwC (here on PC) are globally implemented (Goucha 2007).

But as early 21st century global children, i.e. minor citizens, sense in their own capacities that something does not add up, they challenge the power of adult citizens who intentionally or unintentionally not only contribute to the acceleration of Anthropocene neoliberalism, but continue to pass on the
bad modern philosophical ideas that got us into this deplorable situation in the first place.

**1.1.1. Overheating and Childism**

The Thunberg Effect that fuels the #Fridaysforfuture movement is a compelling large-scale instance of a socio-political expression of childism. In August 2018, 15-year-old minor Swedish citizen Greta Thunberg exited The defining spatio-temporality for modern childhood, i.e. school, and took on a strike to argue for the premises of the Paris Agreement in Sweden be held onto (conf. Thunberg 2018; 2018a). Within a year, kindergarten, and school students -accompanied by adult guardians across continents- began striking school regularly to voice the accelerated existential crisis of our overheated epoch. After the global deep strike on March 15 2019, UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres admitted that his generation had failed to respond properly to the challenge of climate change (Guterres 2019). By March 2020, in face of the global COVID–19 pandemic and global lockdowns, protestors did not stop. They simply moved online embracing new forms of digital protesting.

The Thunberg Effect can be understood as a powerful relational impulse coming from the context of childhood that performatively deconstructs modern adult power at an upscaled level (Holmberg & Alvinius 2019). Already in 1992, Severn Cullis-Suzuki addressed adults regarding their (ir) responsibility in terms of considering children and future generations at the UN Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro (United Nations 2017). At the age of 9, Cullis-Suzuki founded the Environmental Children's Organization (ECO). Similarly, following the 2017 forest fires in Portugal, directly affected plaintiffs between ages 5 and 14, represented by British environmental lawyers, launched a crowdfunding campaign to sue European countries for global emissions (Bandeira 2017; Laville 2017).

The philosophical (here, ethical) challenge posed to adults by children reveals an intergenerational failure owing to the modern human-earth relationship and view of civilizational progress that conceives of nature were indeed a standing reserve².

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² A comparatively different paradigm for defining progress for example can be found in the Seventh Generation Principle of the indigenous philosophies of North America. Following the seventh-generation principle, any deliberation should take into consideration sustainable human-earth as well as community relationships over the next seven generations (Clarkson et al. 1992).
In Norway, modern adult stewardship of the planet and intergenerational (ir) responsibility are also challenged by minor citizens through school strikes. For example, during the early phases of global school strikes in September 2018, school students in Norwegian cities demanded more responsible handling of fossil fuels (Randøy 2018). As seen in the image below, banners used during the demonstration included illustrating current Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg setting planet Earth on fire.


Alas, as unexamined philosophical commitments rooted in so-called European Enlightenment occasion at accelerated pace on Earth - the colonization of Mars is on its way (Fairen & Parro et al 2017, Schulze-Makuch 2013; Zubrin 1995). Zubrin (1995) has predictably predicted that future motives as well as commerce systems will parallel the colonial patterns of Europeans followed by a specific developmental attitude. Mars will be to the pioneering nations of the coming centuries what the Mediterranean was to the Greeks or the New World to the Western Europeans (ibid.). The predicted interplanetary triangle trade, for example, will be analogous to the

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3 The thought bubble placed above the head reads: Responsibility? Whatever!
triangle trade of Britain, her North American colonies and the West Indies during the colonial period. The illustration below is a reproduction based on Zubrin’s diagram (1995: 410):

Illustration 3: Hypothetical interstellar colonial triangular trade based on Zubrin 1995, graphic by Emma Neumeyer

The philosophical unreasonablebless of modern human civilization consists in the possibility to engage in epistemological pursuits -science- as if there were no normative implications for the universal planetary lifeworld. For example, the problem of the Greenhouse Effect (Arrhenius 1896) has been known since colonial periods and its finder has been celebrated by an esteemed scientific community (conf. Arrhenius and Caldwell et al 2008). Lamentably and systematically, modern civilisation has pursued an ideal of limitless growth which by the early 21st century has brought humanity⁴ to a point where its home, the Earth, is on fire (Thunberg 2019; IPCC 2018; Eriksen 2016). Mortiferous consequences of Anthropocene neoliberalism as estimated by IPCC 2018 do not account for postcolonial global inequity.

As more and more children in the majority world (e.g. child monks in Ladakh, conf. Biswas 2013; 2016; Biswas & Sharma 2020 in press) are driven indoors to being competitively schooled to qualify for the neoliberal job market with the deceitful promise of a better future - their natural

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⁴ About 7,713,468,205 human beings as reported on 07.04.2020 to be approximately precise (conf. https://www.populationpyramid.net/). Approximately a third of the number are children.
resources and with it their relationships with nature are depleting and the fact remains: the future for all life on earth is on thin ice, and this does not even account for global inequity (IPCC 2018).

In practise, neoliberalism is self-evident in education too (Burbules and Torres 2000). Insofar as upscaled modern education is reduced to qualification and employability (conf. OECD 2015), the global education sector contributes to the problem and not the solution (Fitzsimons 2002; Biesta 2009; 2015; Clemens & Biswas 2019). Within the sector, philosophising in schools and kindergartens i.e. sitting and talking about philosophical topics through practices like P4C or PwC (here on PC) are globally implemented (Goucha 2007).

With 21st century global children -minor citizens-, sensing and voicing that something doesn’t add up, the power of adults -full citizens-, is placed under doubt (Straume 2019). Regardless of whether adult citizens contribute to accelerated acceleration in Anthropocene neoliberalism intentionally or unintentionally, the bad modern philosophical ideas that got humanity into this mess in the first place are called forth into radical rethinking. I am not referring here to particular philosophical ideas - but the cohort of taken-for-granted ideas that are gathered in together in a modernity that enabled the current fossil fuel generated civilization.

Oddly, Being (ontology), Doing (ethics) and Knowing (epistemology) i.e. the inseparable triangular scope of philosophical addressing has been segregated in this modernity. In fact, the history of modern Western philosophising, as Heidegger argued, is a history where the question of existence i.e. Being, itself has been systematically avoided (Heidegger 1972; 2010). To put it minimally: Cogito ergo sum was the philosophical conclusion of Descartes’ philosophising i.e. I think, therefore I am. Western philosophy progressed by working out the ‘Cogito’ and the ‘Ergo’ i.e. the rational, but the Sum i.e. existential basis was conveniently left out (Heidegger 2010: 23; Jaaware on Heidegger 2016). What was overlooked is that a human being doesn’t exist because she thinks; rather, thinking can happen because firstly one relationally exists.

It is beyond the scope of not only this dissertation, but my positioned lifespan in the early 21st century world, to attempt to explain how colonial modernity has enframed relational existence and what that implies in an era of Anthropocene neoliberalism, which is, needless to say, post-colonial. But, as a step towards the matter of philosophising with children in this era, I have shed some light on the enframing of childhood and education. This textual step is taken in order to narrow down the context within which the matter is embedded.
1.1.2. The Enframing of Childhood and Education

As I have explained elsewhere (Biswa 2014: 184-186), the term Enframing is a translation of the Heideggerian German term *Das Gestell*, used to describe the kind of modern technological challenging which reveals the phenomenon ‘nature’ as a standing reserve i.e. Bestand. The philosophical concept is derived from the root verb *stellen* meaning to place/ to set something or somebody/ to put/ to regulate/to supply, also found in verbs such as *herstellen* i.e. to make or *vorstellen* i.e. to represent. It is then combined with the prefix Ge- connoting a gathering-together as in the German nouns *Gebirge* i.e. mountain range or *Gedächtnis* i.e. memory or literally the gathering together of thoughts. Accordingly, *Ge-stell* is the essence of modern technology which gathers human perception in a challenging manner to order the self-revealing of beings as standing reserve i.e. Bestand. The prowess of modern technology thus affects our intelligibility and also results in forgetfulness and unawareness of non-calculable being. In other words, only that which can be measured can be.

Enframing is not something modern humans actively do. Nevertheless, they are affected by it in a way allowing them to discover nature itself in its measurable usefulness for themselves. For example,

“The forest is timber. The mountain a quarry of rock, the river is water power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’. As the ‘surrounding world’ is discovered, ‘nature’ thus discovered is encountered along with it... But in this kind of discovery of nature, nature as what ‘stirs and strives,’ what overcomes us, entrances as landscape, remains hidden. The botanists plants are not flowers of the hedgerow, the river’s source ascertained by the geographer, is not the ‘source in the ground’.” (Heidegger 2010:70)

Along similar lines, children come to represent for modern society - a stock of future human capital serving the economic growth of nations. For modern science, they become subjective objects of research (e.g. the overlapping common German and Norwegian term *Proband* which is etymologically rooted in the Latin term *probare* signifying ‘to test’). This subsequently affects the empirical foundations of reigning educational science theory, as well as practical implementations as found in the current overheated era.

The reigning global evidence-based evaluation paradigm has been identified as the age of measurement (Biesta 2009; 2015). Standardization (e.g. in curricula, testing etc.), segregation (e.g. of persons into classes
according to chronological age) and speed (e.g. amount of time to teach and learn specific content) appear to be features of this specific cultural form of education i.e. schooling (Biswa 2013). Large-scale global assessments such as PISA\textsuperscript{5} as well as ideas such as those of employability and human capital are grave symptoms of this era (Clemens & Biswa 2019).

Emphasis on technical aspects such as qualification or work-life relevance in schooling makes it possible to talk about a market which consists of service providers (school staff) delivering the product called ‘excellent education’ to its clients i.e. students and guardians (Biesta 2009; 2015). The assessment movement works to capture and evaluate the production of an industry that sets into standard order by enframing human beings and knowledges into standing reserves to be called upon to resort on demand.

Consequently, education becomes a technology for national economic development, and is as such assessed and valued according to its potential to proficiency in sustaining a predetermined goal of limitless growth. In such cases, the purpose of education is not called into question, but simply given. The stress on human resource development for the production of research and (calculable) scientific knowledge as found in the OECD and World Bank agenda is an evident example. Late 20th century OECD reports on education (1997a; 1997b) clearly specified that the aim of the technologisation of education was to prepare students for 21st century capitalism. Accordingly, the human being is challenged to participate in economic activity that contributes to the acceleration of 21st century overheating.

The human being thus becomes part of a structure which produces an industrially predetermined goal. Rendered into an industry, the student supplies the consumption, the state supplies capital and the teacher supplies the product. Since each part of the structure depends on the regulation of the other parts, it is the system and not the person that reveals (Fitzsimons 2002: 184).

The enframing of education conceals the state of beings from themselves. What is revealed is an educational framework for constituting and instituting One order. Such education demands, sets upon order, engages

\textsuperscript{5} PISA, The Programme for International Student Assessment (conf. http://www.oecd.org/pisa/) is a triennial global survey that evaluates national education systems by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students. PISA is an initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development which was founded and operates primarily to stimulate global economic progress. Non-participation of specific countries in PISA testing does not imply absence of a competitive human capital market for which children across the world are being disparately prepared for.
‘efficiently’, but does not entertain any other mode of revealing. In such an educational process, whatever threatens to elude established rules or whatever threatens the conventional order is in turn subsumed into the framework. Thus, education provides a framework that demands a constant supply of resources – whether that be knowledge, people, or financial capital assets (ibid.). The mathematisation of nature itself leads the movement from human beings to human capital in national contexts that can compete in the global market. Consequently, children and childhood get invariably reduced to investments for the future - whether they want to be part of that predetermined future or not.

Even the Norwegian society with its affluent, powerful and relatively stable status in the global context is not exempt from partaking in the human capital competition. An illustrative example of this national direction is the case of royal children: Princess Ingrid Alexandra and Prince Sverre Magnus, who in 2014 were moved from public to private school (Skrede et al 2014). Considering that this implied an annual investment of approximately 100,000 Norwegian Kroner (approximately 10,000 Euros) per child as opposed to free public schooling, the move was no doubt economically strategic. The decision of the royal family was controversial and critiqued by common Norwegians because it was a break from the long tradition of the national royalty participating in common collective life as equals. Furthermore, it indicated that free public educational institutions - in a nation with the highest Human Development Index - were no more sufficient in forming the kind of global human capital or teaching life-skills that the era demands (!).

With the competitive logic of the global era, it follows that being in this world as Princess Ingrid Alexandra and Prince Sverre Magnus demands an annual educational investment of 200,000 Norwegian Kroner. Their existence as royalty in an overheated world is challenged by an evidence-based, highly competitive global evaluation paradigm and is enframed by it.

Industrially-inclined, mass-schooling is primarily carried out by geographically separating the human from its environment. This includes inter-generational segregation based on strict division of humans according to chronological age. There is One order to be followed and anyone who does not fit into that specific order is either excluded or risks being medically diagnosed as problematic. Beder et al. (2009) demonstrate how contemporary psychiatry is now systematically employed to discipline naughtiness, inattention, excess spontaneity, and creativity, to blunt anger and aggression or to control mood variations in children (ibid: 206). Increasingly diagnostic criteria for childhood disorders are identified and medicated with reference to the
boundaries of social acceptance of adult thought, mood and behaviour (ibid: 207). Most dis-orders e.g. learning, communication or attention deficits are categorized in relation to the performance of their roles within the education system. Adult faith in the ordering itself remains relatively unstirred.

A blueprint of modern childhood lifespan according to this ordering can be minimally visualised as follows:

![Blueprint of a modern childhood lifespan](image)

Illustration 4: Blueprint of a modern childhood lifespan. Graphic by, Emma Neumeyer

The oddity of this kind of ordering is that at first glance, things seem to be in perfect order. It is however brought into and kept in place by causing disorder elsewhere. Or, as stated earlier, by reinstating into the framework whatever threatens to get out of that specific singular order (Fitzsimons 2002: 184).

Integration of philosophical practices with children (PC) within school curricula occurs within this enframed education system. Philosophy is also enframed in a manner that it becomes deployed as an instrument to work on children so that they can develop cognitive, thinking, moral, social and democratic skills and capacities (Biesta 2011:310). Here, neither is the adult pedagogue invited to be reflexive in terms of the horizons of her own aforementioned capacities, nor are the epistemological foundations of a singular understanding of philosophy itself reflected upon.
1.1.3. Philosophising with Children in an Overheated Epoch

PC practices are considered in line with the Memorandum of the Philosophy Programme of UNESCO written in 1946 (Conf. Droit 1995). As stated in the report by the director-general on an intersectoral strategy on philosophy (UNESCO 2005), the task of the programme was to “imbue the public mind with a certain number of philosophical and moral notions to be regarded as a minimum equipment, and which are calculated to reinforce respect for human personality, love of peace, hatred of narrow nationalism and the rule of brute force, solidarity, and devotion to the ideal of culture.”

The Paris Declaration for Philosophy accordingly acknowledges the role of philosophy education as indispensable to democratic participation (Paris Declaration for Philosophy, in Droit 1995: 15). The declaration reiterates that “philosophy education, by training independently-minded, thoughtful people, capable of resisting various forms of propaganda, prepares everyone to shoulder their responsibilities in regard to the great questions of the contemporary world, particularly in the field of ethics.” Nonetheless, PC practised within the walls of enframed education, nested in the universal overheating context of the Anthropocene neoliberalism, tends to reproduce the instrumental nature of the global education sector. Furthermore, the concern is finally being explicitly voiced that its epistemological basis of reference is rooted in white ignorance or racialised common sense (Chetty 2018).

At a time when minor citizens i.e. children are mobilising themselves on an unprecedented scale for school strikes to show resistance, great questions of the contemporary world are being explicitly posed to major citizens i.e. adults themselves are increasingly challenged by great questions shaking the foundations of the contemporary world. In turn, adults are called forth to question themselves on philosophical grounds. The overlap between philosophy and democracy here is that both continuously question themselves and believe in the fecundity of doubt (Mayor, in Droit 1995:12).

The initial vision of PC was a pedagogical practice stimulating democratic citizenship that emphasised reasonability, more than reason itself (Lipman 1991:64). Lipman justified the practice for its democratic i.e. social and political impact (Kennedy & Kohan 2016: 47). The epistemology of the PC approach itself however operates within what is termed ‘white ignorance’, in turn becoming an intimate part of a racialised common sense (Chetty 2018). PC practices, namely those based on the community of inquiry met-
hod, fail to fathom the fleshiness of reasonability⁶ that is embodied by the adult pedagogue. Chetty (ibid.) asserts that reasonability stemming from white ignorance in fact leads to a gated community of inquiry. Philosophical commitments of privileged adult pedagogues do in fact play out, because they remain protected in their embodied ignorance. Consequently, space for adult pedagogues to reflect on their positionalities i.e. one’s social location in relation to one’s existing economic, political, cultural and social network (Martín Alcoff 2008: 148, in Reed-Sandoval & Sykes 2017) has been questioned in the context of PC practices.

Theoretical literature further raises the question of what education and philosophy can learn from children and childhood, as opposed to what children and childhood can learn from education and philosophy (Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Kohan 2014; Kohan 2011).

Positionalities, essentially relational in nature, is where our reasonability dwells. Therein, the borders of our perception, acting and thinking are located i.e. the horizons of one’s consciousness. Within the spatio-temporal walls of instrumental schooling there are structural limitations as to how far embodied reason-abilities and positionalities can be negotiated.

By understanding philosophising as a set of processes that broaden the horizons of one’s consciousness, I doubt that one can philosophise within the literal walls of a class. One can teach philosophical acts such as dialogue, argumentation, critical thinking and rhetoric, essential for exercising democratic participation. But especially for those whose voices don’t count in democratic decisions regarding their lifespans anyway, the understanding of philosophising cannot be limited to such acts. Therefore, it could be worth exiting class-based philosophy where the adult pedagogue is the philosophical guide for the child and accept the child as a philosophical guide for a change. Consequently, the search of this exploration in the universal context of Anthropocene neoliberalism is lead by the question:

*What is the scope of philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds?*

The question is not about particular instances of philosophy as a noun or philosophy as an institutionalised discipline. In so far as Being, Doing and Knowing are fundamental recurring concerns throughout human lifespan, the question concerns the verb philosophising as a self-reflexive, inter-

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⁶ Chetty had used the term reasonableness, I use reasonability to express the same.
subjective process that human beings regardless of social status, including age, go through. Here, the human being, as the one who goes through a philosophical process, is affiliated to what Gullestad (1996) has called *hverdagsfilosof* or *everyday-philosopher*. Chetty’s elucidation of the problem of white ignorance in PC in this light refers specifically to everyday-philosophers who are major citizens of the highest Human Development Index nations of the early 21st century (conf. Human Development Report Office 2018).

Following the nation-specific legal status as globally defined by Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child, here a child is “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier” (conf. Cohen 1989; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner). However, given that the chronological category is socially constructed, a static definition for the term child (and, as a corollary, adult) especially based on chronological age is no longer reasonable (Aries 1962; James and Prout 1997; James, Jenks and Prout 1998; Qvortrup 1995, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009; Alanen 2005, Corsaro 1993, 1997; Sorin 2006; Wyness 2000; Bluebond-Langner 1978:5; Speier 1976; Gullestad 1997). Corpo-real, mental and social aspects related to chronological age can be relevant depending on the questioner’s interests, but for a philosophical project as presented in this text - the child is further understood as a *temporal other* of the adult being (Beauvais 2018). This notion comes from the continental existentialist tradition and is a recent addition to the childhood studies paradigm. Children can not access a past like adults can and adults can not access a future that children will be able to. Symbolically children have more time left than adults. At the same time they inherit the past baggage of their adult counterparts. The primary temporal tension refers to who is heard in the nowness of lived-experience. There is a considerable degree of fatalism in so far as children become agents of a project to which they are committed by others, before they arrive in the world. Furthermore, they might commit others to similar projects in the future. Children’s resistance to becoming agents of a fatalist project moving towards an unknowable future is also part of this temporal tensions (ibid.). One of the ways in which temporal otherness plays out is through chronological age insofar as it determines not only socio-political and economic positioning, but also the scope of philosophical negotiations. The lower one is on the chronological age rank, the higher the sense of futurity that is attached to what a child represents for an adult.

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7 Being (ontology), Doing (ethics) and Knowing (epistemology).
In an overheated epoch of economic growth and human capital, micro and macro level decisions made by adults in the best interests of the child are not only to provide the best possible children’s welfare. In fact, they are also to be understood in light of futurity as an investment towards future socio-political and economic capital (Qvortrup 2008). Structurally speaking, in spite of instruments like the child rights convention, their voices in negotiating what this futurity entails remain marginalised (ibid.)

As in the minimal diagram below - nationhood forms the default frame for mass schooling, which in turn enframes standardized modern childhood by default. By childhood, I refer to a category in the social structure which determines the place children are expected to occupy in a society (Qvortrup 2011).

![Illustration 5: Nation as the default enframing of standardized modern childhood](image)

So, although the internationally sanctioned declarations on philosophy education and consequent pedagogical practices, PC in schools across the globe, intend to teach skills based on specific notions of critical thinking and moral values, as indispensable to democratic participation, the scope for philosophising itself is enframed. As Chetty has finally pointed out especially with respect to PC - the epistemology of such practices is rooted in white ignorance or racialised common sense (Chetty 2018).

Chetty’s observation doesn’t come as a surprise given that the upscaled imagined community of nation (Anderson 2006), which houses schools and within them modern childhoods, is itself inextricably coloured with white reason-ability, especially in the highest Human Development Index contexts. In spite of the noblest intentions regarding teaching children how to philosophise, as declared by the Paris Declaration for Philosophy, what is unintentionally passed on then is a reason-ability that contributes to the
reproduction of the 19th-century European idea of nation that is neither tenable nor philosophically justifiable in the light of the existential planetary crisis humanity is faced with.

Through the case of Norway, it may become evident how separating sentiments accompanying shared imaginations of white nationhood and childhood can become a complex task.

### 1.1.4. The Irrational National

Historically, 19th-century European conceptualisations of nation tended to anthropomorphize the imaginary nation into a stable and strong adult (usually white female) figure. The painting by Honoré Daumier (1848), titled *The Republic*, vividly pictorialises the complex and intimate relationship between a developmental nation-state model and childhood as a state of dependency on adulthood (Lee 2001: 34). Similarly, the pictorialisation in the work titled *The Motherland and Her Dependent Colonial Offspring* by William-Adolphe Bouguereau (1883) extends the scope of the developmental nation-state model and childhood dependency to include colonies.

Modern European societies also constructed a range of imaginaries, attitudes, discourses and institutions as a result of what Aries (1962) termed *le sentiment de l’enfance*. Since childhood and adulthood are a conjunctive phenomenon - corresponding constructions of adulthood form part of the childhood sentiment. What has almost become part of our natural attitude (Husserl 1962) of understanding ourselves as individual adults today corresponds to a shared modern imaginary bound with the idea of the developed nation.

Generally, the Norwegian nation is referred to as fatherland. With feminist critiques of gender roles in society, especially in 1970s (Stugu 2012: 274-276), this imagination was challenged. In the influential political satire *Egalias Døtre* (Daughters of Egalia, Brantenberg 1977; conf. also Moberg 1985) one sees the powerful emergence of the idea of the nation as motherland. In either case, adulthood and nationhood remain knotted. Norway in particular is a unique context wherein children and childhood are highly visible in nationalism. In fact, children and childhood are at the very heart of contemporary theories about national identification (Gullestad 1997).

An example coming from the 19th century, discussed by Gullestad (ibid..) is the patriotic hymn called *Småguttenes Nasjonalsang* (The National Song of Small Boys - Wergeland 2008). The opening lines already express,
“We - the little two feet tall ones are a nation too”. Intersections of childhood and adult-nationhood becomes visible as the song goes on. The song is not written only for humans within the chronological age determined category called children (see for example the adult choir: UnikHum – Trondheim Humanistkor 2015), but as though one were always located in an imaginary context of childhood.

Another widely discussed example is the annual Barnetoget or the children’s parade on National Day 17th May. There is a general pride in Norway regarding the representation of children in national parades, and not adult soldiers. The tradition goes back to the 19th century and was initiated by school manager Peter Qvam and poet Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (Det Norske Kongehuset/ The Royal House of Norway 2016). To this day, celebrations are marked by the heavy presence of children participating through kindergartens and schools.

Ironically, tensions around changing imaginations of nationhood occur from within this tradition too. In the so-called Flag Debate - the central question has been whether or not ‘foreign’ or ‘non-Norwegian’ children should be allowed to bear other flags and costumes (Strøm & Henrik Klau- sen 2017; Lundesgaard 2013; Svarstad 2013)8. It is customary to celebrate childhood, but only as long as children represent a specific imagination of Norwegian nationhood. When that is stirred, from kindergarten playgrounds to homes and right upto the public sphere - heated debates on where to place the symbolic borders occur.

The inclusion of childhood in the knotted understanding of a developed adult-nation made way for transposing qualities of youthfulness and innocence into a developed sense of Norwegian nationhood. The adult-nation in this case is not only developed, stable, responsible, caring and so on, but also ever peaceful, pure, innocent and nature-loving - like a child. In turn, strong boundaries to protect itself from ‘foreign’ contamination become necessary, as observed in Norway’s resistance to the EU (Gullestad 1997). Gullestad (ibid.) identifies this as the Norwegian passion for boundaries.

Similarly, micro level child care is marked by the notion of ‘grensesetting (boundary-setting)’, which has replaced traditional authoritative notions of disciplining children. Children spend less time outside on their own and more time in pedagogic settings with adults (ibid: 34), being taught to pro-

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8 Debates expanded with the inclusion of ‘non-Norwegian’ children, but have already been present through the indigenous Sami population - which has for long struggled for visibility and recognition in Norway (Stugu 2012: 278 -282).
tect their own boundaries. At home, the phenomenon of ‘quality time’ with
children emerges (ibid.; Eriksen 2001:133) because parents have limited
time with children. Grensesetting consequently becomes an important psy-
chological and pedagogical notion which - it is argued by educationalists -
is done for the sake of the child, not the adults9. Firm and autonomous per-
sonal boundaries are deemed necessitous towards culturally correct social
involvement (Gullestad 1997: 34).

However, since the 1990s, traditional notions of childhood as well as
adulthood and nationhood have been steadily diminished and reshaped.
Moving effortlessly across macro and micro scales, Gullestad (1997:
39, footnote 18) summarises the change in the knotted adult-nation view
as follows,

“Not only is childhood at risk, but adulthood also. It seems no longer possi-
ble to keep the notion that responsible, rational adults can create and main-
tain the necessary conditions for ‘traditional’ childhood. In a similar way
it seems increasingly problematic to believe in and plan for the traditional
paternalistic Norwegian welfare state - rationally and consciously caring for
all the needs of its citizens. Rather, the new conditions for both individual
and national life seem to be, increasingly, global market forces - outside
anyone’s conscious, rational control. The best nation-states can try to do
is to steer, direct, influence these forces along ‘national’ and ‘international’
lines, just as parents no longer see themselves so much as setting the con-
ditions for life within the home, but as providing the necessary mediations
(money, transportation, etc.) that allow their children to move between dif-
ferent social arenas - from the music lesson to the sports club to friends’
houses, to school, etc. Adulthood is in many ways diminished - or at least
reshaped - as much as childhood.”

Gullestad here hints at two aspects:

a. the complex intersections of internal and external boundaries of
   adulthood, childhood and nationhood, and

b. the diminishing character of those boundaries in the current era.

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9 The psychological notion in education according to childhood researcher Anne Trine
Kjørholt (in Gullestad 1997: 39, footnote 19) was introduced to the general public in
Norway by psychologist Åse Gruda Skard (1976).
However, the power of nationhood and adulthood does not simply disappear. In fact, in light of recent phenomenological investigations, whiteness as institutionalised orientation (Ahmed 2007) and the fleshiness of racialised common sense in PC (Chetty 2018) deeply rooted in the imaginations of nationhood in high Human Development Index countries also become visible. The upsurging of some sort of white nostalgia in the feeling of loss in Norwegian society after the July 2011 massacre (Svendsen 2014) also illuminates the deep-rootedness of complex internalised borders of reason-ability.

Traditionally internalised intersecting borders of (white) nationhood and adulthood are no longer tenable. However, these imaginations continue to determine how children and childhood are perceived, or not, in an overheated era. Moreover, these internalised borders also determine how children are invested in and educated by adults to become future full democratic citizens of their respective high Human Development Index nations in a global context.

As it eventualises, through a phenomenon like the Thunberg Effect causing school strikes, children are simultaneously emerging as - to use Gullestad’s words - boundary breakers and bridge builders (Gullestad 1997) at a greater scale than they have traditionally understood to be. They might not be as large as the scales of powerful adult worlds and adulthood, but they are making their presence felt. In turn, the greatest questions of this era are already being posed to adults.

The articulated intention of philosophy education might in fact be to cultivate thoughtfulness and capability to resist propaganda and prepare for shouldering responsibilities in regard to the great questions of the contemporary world (The Paris Declaration for Philosophy, in Droit 1995: 15). But where enframed education across the globe fuels the great problems of the contemporary world, it doesn’t particularly help to invest in adults training children to sit and talk philosophically in an epoch which has driven children across the globe to strike school in the interest of a planetary future.

What could be the case is that adults give humble way to letting children play their simultaneous parts as boundary breakers and bridge builders in our era of Anthropocene neoliberalism. This would imply slowing down while surrendering to the daunting task of letting the stiff internal and external boundaries of our adult natural attitudes to dissolve. In turn, taking impulses for our philosophical blossoming from children, rather than teaching them what should/could/would/may, be done and be known.

However, such a process is easier to let happen outside the walls of instrumental mass-schooling.
1.2. Seeking outside the spatio-temporality of schooling

In order to arrive at a position where I as an adult researcher could comment on the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests, I let the scope of inquiry move farther and farther away from the walls of instrumental schooling.

The spatial ground of reflection is any place that is not school. Similarly, the temporal ground is not school time i.e. chronological time, either. Spatio-temporal suspension of schooling allowed this exploration to reflect upon the philosophical blossoming of the adult when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as a guest. In other words, the default addressee of pedagogy is not the chronological child, but the chronological adult.

Shifting from my own need for epistemological giving to epistemological receiving and arriving at the leading question itself has been part of the exploration. As a product of a modern institutionalised lifespan in an overheated world, I struggled with confronting my own internalized borders with respect to a chronological child as a pedagogical addressee through the empirical phases of this hybridic, nomadic and pluralistic exploration. It is not as though complex internalised borders have vanished, but the awareness that comes about as a result of trying enables me to suggest what philosophy and philosophising with children could also be. ‘With’ here is not to be directly translated in the sense of mit (German) or med (Norwegian), but rather grasped in the sense of bei or hos (Biswas 2017: 97).

This exploration culminated in a childist perspective, which can be seen as the conclusion of this work.

1.3. Summary

Our overheated zeitgeist of the early 21st-century world, uniquely characterised by the acceleration of acceleration (Eriksen 2016) or Anthropocene neoliberalism, is the universal context within which this longitudinal exploration has taken place. The era progressed through post-colonial practices such as outsourcing industries, exponential exploitation of nature and waste colonialism especially in the majority world. Obtaining a balance between economic growth vis-à-vis environmental sustainability is the central double bind of this paradoxical era (ibid.). Exploitative colonial patterns along with a specific developmental attitude preceding the
current era are predicted to become the model for hypothetical interplanetary relations in the future.

I grasp the historicity of the present era mainly through modernity, understood as based on Cartesian dualism, the Cartesian idea of human as master and possessor of nature, and technological prowess made possible by Newtonian natural science of continental Europe.

Following the Heideggerian German understanding of the essence of modern technology as Das Gestell and Bestand i.e. enframing of nature and corresponding self-revealing of beings as standing reserve where only that which can be measured can be - the enframed educational sector is recognised as a vital part of accelerating same old trends in newer forms and at larger scales.

Philosophical efforts to performatively deconstruct premises of modern commitments in high Human Development Index contexts can be seen in instances such as the non-violent demonstrations by opponents like Kvaløy and Næss against the hydropower project in Mardøla Falls in Norway.

As pupils across the planet today are themselves challenged by the demands of the global neoliberal market, the early 21st-century global school strikes as a consequence of the Thunberg Effect are understood as upscaled efforts on the part of children to resist the existential crisis of Anthropocene neoliberalism powered by the individualistic and anthropocentric assumptions underlying global economic and social structures.

Neoliberalism is blatant in the education sector in so far as upscaled modern education is reduced to skills, qualification and employability. Within the sector, philosophising in schools and kindergartens i.e. sitting and talking about philosophical topics through practices like PC are globally implemented in order to respond to the great questions of our time and form children into full democratic citizens of the future. Not surprisingly, philosophy is also enframed in a manner that it becomes deployed as an instrument to work on children so that they can develop cognitive, thinking, moral, social and democratic skills and capacities. Illustrated in the minimalist diagram below, one can see how PC is nested within the global education sector, which is nested in the early 21st century era of the Anthropocene neoliberalism:
Critiques of PC that go beyond its instrumental character, particularly of the community of inquiry method, point towards taking subjective positionalities of pedagogues into account. Within the high Human Development Index context attention is now being directed towards racialised commonsense inherent in its epistemological foundations itself.

In theory, as opposed to asking what children and childhood can learn from education and philosophy, it is now being asked what education and philosophy can learn from children and childhood. Taking philosophising as processes of broadening the horizons of one’s consciousness, I firmly doubt that one can philosophise within the literal walls of school. Consequently, I sought to understand what the adult everyday philosopher can learn from children and childhood by exiting the enframed spatio-temporal context of school altogether. Hence, this work is directed towards attempting to answer the question:

What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?
2. Philosophy with/for Children (PC)

The history of philosophical practices with children - specifically the question of its ‘origins’ - follows discourses oscillating between either North America or Europe (mainly Germany) as the pioneer land. This partly has to do with the cultural paradigm through which something as existentially fundamental as ‘philosophising’ is understood.

The UNESCO 2007 report - Philosophy, A School of Freedom: Teaching and Learning to Philosophize, Status and Prospects - states that the spirit of the report is universal and does not favour a particular cultural criteria (Goucha 2007: xix). It claims that the study enables readers to embrace a broad vision insofar as it does not restrict philosophy and its transmission through teaching to the Greek and Western context. Further, that the study is contextualised “completely within the context of the promotion of the universal, indefeasible values: those of human rights and the rights of children, and in particular the right to education (Goucha 2007: xix).”

The recommendations claim to be designed to be adapted to different cultural contexts and to diverse educational policies (Goucha 2007:16). At the same time it seems evident that PC as interpreted and re-presented in academic journals, international networks and above all the UNESCO 2007 report refers to and favours a very specific cultural criteria. Hence, the report ironically confesses the problem that it reinforces, “While the history of philosophical practices in relation to young people in the past remains to be written, there are examples of such practises being used in many parts of the world. In the West, Plato noted Socrates' dialogues with adolescents, including Lysias, and rhetorical and theological disputes were organized in schools during the Middle Ages. We might also mention the tradition of debates in Buddhist monasteries or the traditional African institution of 'palaver', a process of debate and consensus (ibid. :16).”

Traditional Buddhist debate practices (conf. Perdue 1992) endure, however, in Tibetan Buddhist monastic communities, for example in Ladakh. The image below, for instance, documents child monks practising debate in 2017. Hence, the Tibetan Buddhist Debate tradition belongs not just to historical representations of philosophical practices with children, but also to the descriptions of contemporary practices. This is especially pertinent within the purview of the way the genre of philosophical practices with children is represented in the early 21st century - somehow tracing its genesis to a specific form of philosophical activity in 1970s USA or at the most Europe. Within the minority world too, there have certainly been other
forms and cultural practices\textsuperscript{10} that as a result of high standardisation processes have been in some way - left out of the picture.

 Illustrated 8: Child monks practising Tibetan Buddhist debate a monastic school in Ladakh in 2017. Image by author

It is not only that a transnational history of philosophical practices in relation to children is missing, but also a history of philosophy which is not nation- or continent-centred.

In the broader realm of the history of education itself, Fuchs et al. (2014) demonstrate the need for transnational histories which, instead of putting nations in the centre, put cross-cultural transfers characterised by adaptation, re-contextualisation and hybridisation into perspective. The need further points to the way 'borders' are conceived of. The problem may not be tracing abstract roots of 'philosophy' to the European continent, but to broaden the horizons of our imaginations so that cultural transfers that are part of the evolution of thought may be rightfully accommodated. It is not surprising therefore, that the UNESCO 2007 report on PC worldwide is comprehensive and yet limited.

The trajectory of PC has also been described by Vansieleghem and Kennedy (2011:177) as a “method which has become a movement (ibid.)”. Based on Stephan Engelhart’s work (1997), the initial character of this genre is understood through the following three threads (ibid :172):

\textsuperscript{10} In the case of Scandinavia - the Sami and Inuit practices for example.
a. as focusing on developing critical thinking skills in an educational environment (e.g. Matthew Lipman) whereby analytical thinking skills are emphasised.

b. as a means of closing the gap between adult and the child (e.g. Gareth Matthews) in being critical of the validity of Piaget's developmentalism in terms of interpreting philosophical intelligence, since it is held that children are likely to ask more interesting questions than adults.

c. as a strategy to reconstruct power mechanisms and to communicate as well as reflect upon personal meanings (e.g. Ekkehard Martens) whereby the focus is on “letting children learn that there are different orientations and the practise of philosophical inquiry is necessary in order to learn to think beyond totality, dualism and exclusionary categories (Vansieleghem and Kennedy 176-177: 2011”).

With the second generation representatives of PC like Ann Margaret Sharp, David Kennedy, Philip Cam, Karin Murris, Marina Santi and Michel Tozzi et al., the instrumentalist structure of traditional mass schooling began to be understood as being at odds with the purposes of philosophy with children. Philosophy through this lens is not a certain skill, but a space wherein students can ascertain important questions for our time, and seek their own answers through the practice of thinking for themselves and with others (Vansieleghem and Kennedy 2011: 178). In other words, the focus of this trajectory is seen as moving from philosophy for towards philosophy with children (ibid.). This implies among other things that the experience of interacting philosophically with children gave way to a profound critique of the normative adult view of the child.

2.1. Continental Roots of Philosophical Praxis

In the early 1900s in Germany, mathematician and neo-kantian philosopher Leonard Nelson proposed a didactically re-oriented approach to Socratic discussions (Gespräche) as opposed to Socratic dialogues in order to guide youth and adults towards a process of critical revision of one’s convictions and knowledge. His student Gustav Heckmann developed Nelson’s ideas further and facilitated their travel beyond Germany to the Netherlands and Great Britain (Siliberti 2004:8).
Siliberti (2004:6) takes philosophical practice as the broader historical point of departure and credits its origins to Gerd Achenbach’s *Philosophische Praxis* - the first philosophical counselling practice - in 1980s Germany. Inspired by Achenbach’s work, Parisien philosopher Marc Sautet began the Café Philo movement in cafés, libraries, bars and pubs – open to all (adults) who wished to participate. Like Sautet’s Café Philo in Paris, potter-philosopher Evan Rutherford was invited to start the Café Philosophique meetings by family-friends and owners of the Scart-hin Books of Cromford in Derbyshire, hosting over 100 meetings in over a decade.

While practices initiated by Achenbach, Sautet and Rutherford were addressing adult talk-based philosophical communication, the parallel evolution of philosophical practices specifically with children with an explicit pedagogical intention was also gaining ground in the minority world. With Matthew Lipman’s publication *Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery* in 1974, a so-called official P4C curricula was implemented in North America. Subsequently, an instructional manual (Lipman, Sharp et al 1980) would also be published.

By 1986, in France, postmodern philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard had pedagogically addressed children and childhood through his work *Le Postmodern expliqué aux enfants* (1986). By the 90s, the work had been made accessible to readers of English (*The Postmodern explained to children*, 1992) and German (*Postmoderne für Kinder*, 1996). Deleuze and Guattari’s work *Duhamat dessine Deleuze: L’Oiseau Philosophie* (Duhem draws Deleuze: The Bird Philosophy) was published for a francophonic child audience in 1991. Though neither of these well-known European publications had the same kind of curricular intention as their American counterpart *Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery* and the consequent instructional manual, they were indeed addressing children with a pedagogical intention.

In the same year, that is 1991, *Sofiesverden* (Sophie’s World) by Jostein Gaarder was published in Norway, a book that went on to receive, in 1994, the highly esteemed *Deutscher Jugendliteraturpreis* (German Children’s Literature Award) in Germany, and just within a year was to be found on best-seller lists in Spain, Italy and Korea (Lyall 1995). Through Sophie’s World, Gaarder presented a history of Western philosophy and philosophical thinking in a story that addressed both children and adults. The story was retold by virtue of computer games and television shows across continents and by 2017 had been declared the biggest Norwegian
global literary success for children and youth by the Norsk faglitterær forfatter- og oversetterforening (Norwegian Non-Fiction Writers and Translators Association).

Gaarder went on to carve a niche in the literary realm of philosophical practices related to childhood with books like Hallo? - Er det noen her? (Hello? Is there anybody here? 1996) and a host of others which did not gain the same reception as Sophie’s World, but contributed to a new genre of philosophical literature addressing children and childhood. Sophie’s World for example became an inspiration for a German publication based on a letter correspondence between a philosopher and a child called Nora (Hösle 1996).

Through both curricular as well as extra-curricular media such as computer games and literature, children remain on the receiving end of the philosophical address. Even in nation-specific contexts such as Norway, where critiques of PC acknowledge children as existential equals of adults, the step towards re-postioning the adult pedagogue is not made.

2.2. PC in the Norwegian Context

Within the institutionalised pedagogical context, the Lipmanian community of inquiry model started to be widely accepted in global school curricula with nation-specific modifications. The founders of the pioneering organisation for PC in Norway - Schjelderup and Olsholt - held that important facets of Lipman’s ‘caring thinking’, i.e. to treat children with humility and respect, were already present in the Norwegian context. The reason, according to Schjelderup and Olsholt, was that since Scandinavian societies adhere strongly to democratic thinking led by ideals of justice and equality, it was natural for Norwegian teachers to meet children with a humble and respectful attitude.

At the same time, many educators in Norway viewed philosophy as an exclusive, esoteric art, placing limitations on practising the community of inquiry in Scandinavia. Having tried out various ways of initiating and facilitating philosophical dialogues with different age groups and children with different backgrounds, their main focus remained the spoken dialogue. As a consequence, they maintained some skepticism in terms of introducing too many pedagogical games and tools or to “let the orchestration of dialogue replace the dialogue itself (Goucha 2007: 37, Box 9)”.

Lipman’s curriculum has been a significant source of inspiration for
Schjelderup and Olsholt to create their own material, but they do not use Lipman’s materials because they found it “culturally foreign, bearing too much upon American culture and pragmatist worldview\textsuperscript{11}. Furthermore, they held that the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) adopted an instrumental approach towards philosophical thinking as a tool to arrive at certain external ends such as improved reading, writing and output in other subjects along with qualities such as openness, friendliness and democratic attitudes. That would in turn compromise the intrinsic value of philosophy (ibid; Osholt & Schjelderup 2002: 126).

Osholt & Schjelderup (2002: 124) held that believing in a method blindly leads to overlooking the ‘whole child’. Moreover, they held that there is no existential difference between children and adults insofar as they are both in search of the truth of life. It is the adults’ forgetfulness of their own ignorance that causes them to stop their search, but being with children as fellow co-explorers of truth, adults have much to learn. The ideal that adults mustn’t function merely as professional educators, but rather be catalysts in a pedagogical context and learn to become philosophers in their own lives, was part of Osholt and Schjelderup’s re-evaluation of the Lipmanian agenda (ibid: 126-127).

At the time of the UNESCO report in 2007, when philosophy with children was still in its initial stages in Norway, the activities of the Children and Youth Philosophers (CYP) received no general support or subsidies from the state, limiting their scope. Therefore, the focus of institutional philosophical practices with children turned towards spaces like art institutions, philosophy clubs and camps etc. Schjelderup and Olsholt had also expressed the need for academic research in the fields of pedagogy and philosophy, as well as for offering seminars at university levels.

As Schjelderup and Olsholt identified a need for bridgework between academia and child and youth institutions like schools and kindergartens, they made efforts at the University of Oslo. However, they were not very successful due to lack of finance and to institutional resistance. Schjelderup and Olsholt perceived a worry that the practise represented a threat to the theoretical work that was being done at philosophical institutes. Consequently, Schjelderup and Olsholt sought to collaborate on a governmental level as well as network with people and institutions that were receptive towards philosophy with children (Goucha 2007: 37).

\textsuperscript{11} The scepticism towards the Lipmanian model is also present in Jesperson’s approach conf: http://www.buf.no/nyheter/2011/?page=0315
Especially paralleling the growing emphasis on the third section of the National Kindergarten Framework (Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training 2017; already present in the 2006 version) devoted to the child’s right to be involved (Norwegian: medvirkning), philosophy, especially with kindergarten children, had found its spot in institutional pedagogy. By 2016, kindergarten teacher training courses in institutions like Dronningen Mauds Minne in Trondheim had included the Norwegian application of PC in the institutional curricula. The Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training had also begun to concretely consider philosophy with children in schools (conf: Breivik & Håvard 2007).

Alternative, ‘child-friendly’ methods outside the formal institutional contexts in Trondheim included events during festivals such as Olavsfestdagene. In 2016, for example, actress Kari-Ann Grønsund realised a puppet-theatre12 based on philosopher Arne Næss’ toy-companion Timotei (Mejlænder 2007). Children - in all cases, despite being recognised for being existentially on a par with adults and in spite of the ideal of engaging with them as philosophical co-explorers - remained addressed in a developmental context as default addressees of pedagogy.

2.3. Major critiques of PC

The desirability of PC as a pedagogical practice was justified on the grounds of its social and political impact (Kennedy & Kohan 2016: 47). Lipman’s community of inquiry model in particular intended to stimulate democratic citizenship with an emphasis on reasonability (Lipman 1991:64). In practice though, and not surprisingly, PC fell into the logic of measurement of the contemporary overheated era, the global education sector being no exception (e.g. Biesta 2011).

Chetty (2018) has thrown critical light on the epistemological grounds of the method itself, pointing to a racialised common sense or fleshiness of reason-ability embodied by those assuming the position of the pedagogue in the community of inquiry. The Lipmanian premises are challenged by Chetty, who highlights the white ignorance that contributes to a gated community of inquiry, rather than a community of inquiry. The problematic seems to be shared by critics who are invoking a poverty of self-reflexi-

vity insofar as philosophical commitments of privileged adult pedagogues remain protected in their embodied ignorance. Reed-Sandoval & Sykes (2017) appeal to adult pedagogues to reflect on their social location within existing economic, political, cultural and social network i.e. their positiona-
lities as part of pedagogical practices. Further novel questions emerging from critical philosophical considerations on the pedagogy of philosophy now start to be raised: what can education and philosophy learn from chil-

Although major critiques of PC models based on the community of inquiry (Biesta 2011; Kohan 2011; Jasinski & Lewis 2016; Reed-Sandoval & Sykes 2017; Chetty 2018) differ in focus, they all seem to be poin-
ting towards taking adult positionalities more seriously into account. At the same time, critiques of the dominant institutionalised practices also still seem to firmly believe that philosophy is possible in classrooms, but it is a matter of different approaches to make more spatio-temporal room for those positioned as default addressees of pedagogy e.g. a community of infancy (Jasinski & Lewis 2016). However, the institutional setting and commitment to spoken dialogue as The form of philosophising remains the same.

So, despite the theoretical critiques and nation-specific differences within the high Human Development Index context, PC forms part, in one way or another, of “a method which became a movement Vansielegehem and Kennedy (2001:177)”. The movement has to be further seen as part of the larger flow of the inclusion of children and childhood into democratic models as citizens. For societies like Norway, where a high “belief in social engineering based on social science research (Gullestad 2010:9)” is found - it is not surprising that children’s right to participation is extended to scientific activity too. At the same time, the inclusion of any group within a particular field (e.g. political, pedagogical or scientific) implies a shift in initial positioning and changes in horizons of the defining borders. In other words, the inclusion of children in definitions of democracy implies re-positioning the adult-self as a citizen or the concept of democracy itself. Consequently, the recognition of children as citizens and children’s cultures implies shifts in adult-centric cultural criteria of democracy (Wall 2011; Moosa-Mitha 2005)\(^\text{13}\). Similarly, the inclusion of children and childhood into specific cri-

\(^\text{13}\) In the case of including children in research, the re-positioning extends beyond adopt-
ting child-friendly tools of research, but implies re-thinking the researcher-self and the methodological attitude itself (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008).
teria of philosophising has given way for adults to engage pedagogically
with children on philosophical topics.

In the Norwegian context, Schjelderup & Olsholt (2002) recognise the
existential sameness of children and adults and propose the idea of con-
sidering children as philosophical co-explorers (ibid.). However, a strong
attachment to word-based dialogue (Gespräch) as The form of philosophi-
sing remains evident. The attachment to spoken word reinforces the epis-
temologically authoritative position of the adult whereby children are inva-
riably addressed in the developmental context.

Despite critiques in terms of the instrumentalisation of philosophy in PC,
the white reason-ability of the epistemology of the community of inquiry
or the recognition of taking adult positionality more seriously, the proposal
of including children as philosophical co-explorers due to their existential
sameness, children, not adults, remain the default addressees of pedagogy.
Additionally, the default entitlement of adults to be philosophical guides for
children remains insufficiently opened for questioning.

2.4. Summary

Within the curricular context, Matthew Lipman’s publication Harry Stottle-
meier’s Discovery in 1974 in North America may be seen as the first offi-
cial P4C curriculum. Mathematician and neo-Kantian philosopher Leo-
nard Nelson’s proposal for a didactically re-oriented approach to Socratic
discussions (Gespräche) in early 1900 Germany may also be considered a
forerunner for contemporary PC practices. Outside the curricular context,
continental philosophers such as Lyotard and Deleuze and Guttari made
their philosophical ideas accessible for children via literature by the early
1990s. In Scandinavia, the publication of Jostein Gaarder’s Sofiesverden
in 1991 especially was a pathbreaker in terms of the global reception of the
idea of addressing children pedagogically on philosophical themes.

Second generation representatives of PC like Ann Margaret Sharp, David
Kennedy, Philip Cam, Karin Murris, Marina Santi and Michel Tozzi et al. began
to recognize the instrumentalist structure of traditional mass schooling as
being at odds with the purposes of PC. Philosophy, they held, was a space
where students can ascertain the most important questions of our time. Phi-
losophy, according to the second generation, was not a mere skill. Especially
Biesta’s critique of the instrumentalisation of philosophy in PC is telling of how
PC became appropriated by a larger culture of measurement in the global
neoliberal education sector. Consequently, the trajectory of PC began moving from philosophy for towards philosophy with children. Experiences of adult pedagogues and philosophers interacting philosophically with children also began giving way for a critical review of the normative adult view of the child. The Lipmanian community of inquiry as well as other variations, however, did not pay attention to the corresponding position of the adult pedagogue.

Towards the end of the 20th century and early 21st century, PC had found channels through both curricular as well as extra-curricular media such as computer games and literature across the globe. In any case, children remained and remain on the receiving end of the philosophical address i.e. the default addressees of pedagogy.

In a wider high Human Development Index context too, major early 21st-century critiques of PC models based on the community of inquiry seem differ in focus e.g. instrumentalisation, white reason-ability or lack of self-reflexivity, but they all seem to orient theory and praxis towards taking adult positionalities into account more seriously. The desirability of asking the question - what can education and philosophy learn from children and childhood, not vice versa - has also found space in theoretical considerations. At the same time, critiques of the dominant institutionalised practices seem to maintain that philosophy is possible in the spatio-temporality of classrooms. Moreover, the institutional setting and commitment to spoken dialogue (Gespräch) as The form of philosophising remains the same. Even in nation-specific contexts such as Norway, where critiques of PC acknowledge children as existential equals of adults and as equal philosophical co-explorers, there is hesitation in taking the step towards re-positioning the adult pedagogue such that they can learn to become philosophers in their own lives through exploring with children.

The very display of the desirability of asking what education and philosophy can learn from children and childhood already seems to constitute a significant motion towards re-positioning of the adult pedagogue. In fact, the desirability of the question itself reflects that, somewhere in the intimate theory-praxis fibres of pedagogy of philosophy and philosophy of pedagogy, the will for re-positioning is breathing. Thus, the possibility to ask anew from different positions is there. The probability of asking anew from different positions, however, is stunted. The stunted probability of placing the pedagogical entitlement of the adult for being the philosophical guide into question owes largely to the way children and childhood are in fact positioned in pedagogical contexts i.e. as pupils or learners. In other words - as the default addressees of pedagogy.
It seems as though this default positioning in both theory and praxis is one of the strongest borders across disciplines and nations. The border, due to its embodied materiality, is not something that can simply be deconstructed away.

At the same time, with the ever growing school-strikes, voices of children from both private and public spheres are calling for attention in posing the ‘great questions of our time’ to adults. Therefore, the border cannot be ignored either and beckons engagement.

With this, I proceed to take a closer look at the temporal others of adult beings who are posing the greatest questions of our era back at us; rightfully calling for our attention, disrupting big plans, pulling us up and slowing us down in an overheated world with a bleak future. In doing so, I will proceed to present some challenges and responses around children’s right to participation in research, as well as a larger democratic society within which research happens.
3. On Theoretical and Methodological Approaches

For the purpose of this project, I have assumed that the inseparable triangular scope of philosophical addressing i.e. Being (ontology), Doing (ethics) and Knowing (epistemology) is recurring rudimentarily throughout human life-span, regardless of social status in terms of chronological age. Accordingly, all human beings are everyday-philosophers (Gullestad 1996a; 1996b) in their lifeworlds. What post-Husserl philosophers call the lifeworld (German: Lebenswelt) or anthropologists generally call culture spans the unquestioned repertoire of beliefs, values, ideas, habits, dispositions, assumptions and practices of everyday-philosophers in a society (Gullestad 1996: 23).

Following a Goffmanian understanding of team-based role performances as defining ‘real’ situations (Goffman 1990), it becomes possible to observe how those positioned as children are kept at bay in order to maintain the ‘reality’ of situations. Goffman uses the term performance team to refer to “any set of individuals who cooperate in staging a single routine” (ibid.: 85). Even though both children as well as adults may be recognised as everyday philosophers at par, the scope for children to performatively negotiate taken-for-granted meanings is limited in mundane life. As Goffman explains, “It is apparent that if performers are concerned with maintaining a line they will select as team-mates those who can be trusted to perform properly. Thus children of the house are often excluded from performances given for guests of a domestic establishment because often children cannot be trusted to ‘behave’ themselves, i.e. to refrain from acting in a way inconsistent with the impression that is being fostered” (ibid.). In the respective footnote, Goffman further explains: “In so far as children are defined as ‘non-persons’ they have some licence to commit gauche acts without requiring the audience to take the expressive implications of these acts too seriously. However, whether treated as non-persons or not, children are in a position to disclose crucial secrets” (ibid: 96, footnote 20).

Certain ways of seeing become habitual to performance teams of everyday philosophers as we co-universalize our own little lifeworlds in order to keep up with the normalized temporality of life. One takes for granted or simply surrenders to that which is already taken for granted. For adult performance teams, it becomes necessary to ensure that children maintain the desired epistemological balance of knowing and concealing.

Think for example of the disruptive child in Anderson’s (1837) 

_Kejserens nye Klæder_ (Emperor’s New Clothes), who literally spills the naked truth.
Professor Robert Kelly’s BBC live-telecasted Skype interview (BBC News 2017) was interrupted by the unsupervised entry of his children, followed by his wife who desperately tried to pull them out of the visible scene. Similarly, as a result of COVID-19 lockdowns which imposed new temporary norms of home-office and video conferencing, ‘disruptions’ of professional adult performative acts became a wide-spread phenomenon (Schmidt 2020). Business as usual requires keeping game-changing actors at bay. What makes sense in one’s worldview instantly vanishes as tiny de(con)structive performances reveal the mythical pictures that adults are philosophically committed to. The capacity of child beings of the human species to deconstruct our taken-for-granted worlds with the tiniest acts doesn’t require sophisticated argumentation. By simply being in the ‘wrong’ place at the ‘wrong’ time, the co-constructed realities of adult teams can be put into profound question. Such states of being-put-into-question concern the mundane e.g. how mundane routines and subjective states should be experienced, but also concern deeper levels of philosophical commitments e.g. what and how life from prenatal to postmortem states is/should be.

In contemporary modern European and Scandinavian worldviews, it seems as though the existential telos of upbringing is individual autonomy and self-determination. Highly institutionalised and standardized human life-spans starting with prenatal stages is one of the general social operations through which this value (among others) is realised. Childhood is characterised by early years of total dependence, security, innocence, extended play and compulsory schooling (Honeyman 2013: 167).

Furthermore, being schooled is a default way of childhood and there are no structurally supported lifestyle choices possible for children as in the case of child monks in Ladakh (Biswas 2013; 2016). An individual or a ‘person’ in a modern, Western view is understood as egocentric as opposed to sociocentric, and starts with birth and ends with death (Smith 2012; Eriksen 2004: 20). Further, there is no agreement on what happens afterwards (Eriksen 2004) or realms beyond objective, secular, material reality where human consciousness could come from and so on. Other causal understandings regarding where life comes from, however, do exist (e.g. Gottlieb 2015). Not in every worldview does the egocentric individual life begin at birth and end with death; the Buddhist causal view of life and death for example is cyclical (conf. Chatterjee and Datta 2016). Modern egocentric individual lives, however, are interconnected through processes of production and reproduction - in every sense of the term.

Reproduction of humans i.e. a precondition for social reproduction of
any sort - is an indispensable factor in keeping human societies going on earth. A lot depends on children and childhood, but even more so on how and from where adults view children and childhood. In fact, the dimensions through which children and childhood are viewed influence theorizations on the matter. Frønes (1994: 148-149) charts four dimensions of studying children and childhood:\footnote{Mouritsen (2002) uses the term 'child culture' to lay out a similar analysis to Frønes' dimensions of studying children and childhood analysis (1994).}

\begin{itemize}
\item a. analysis of socio-cultural relations among generations,
\item b. relationships among children,
\item c. institutional arrangements of childhood and
\item d. childhood as an age-group akin to social class.
\end{itemize}

As a structural component of modern societies, I consider childhood within the triangular constellation of the state, family and the child. It is within this constellation that children can be identified as separate objects of social administration and control, whereby identifying children as 'individuals' means formally separating them from their social background in order to bureaucratically individuate them (Näsman 1994). While \textit{individuation} is the systematic tendency to treat individual humans as the basic units of bureaucratic handling, \textit{individualization} refers to individuals as a psychological personality (Frønes 1994: 147). Individuation is possible through a refined system of classification and differentiation for the bureaucratic insurance that justice is done by treating each member of the category equally. It is not intended to accentuate the uniqueness of each member of a particular category (ibid.). Chronological age is a central reference point in demarcating modern childhood globally; as done by the United Nations Child Rights Convention by defining individuals under the specific chronological age of 18 as children.\footnote{Chronological age as per UNESCO convention is a pragmatic point of reference for determining who is identified and positioned as a child. The phenomenological understanding I follow is that of 'a temporal other' (also conf. section 1.1.3).}

Age-group consequently becomes the primary factor through which life-phases are institutionally organised. Based primarily on such social
facts, one can talk about childhood (and thereof the identity of a ‘child’) as socially constructed. It is not just a matter of social meaning, as Schrag (2006:427) critically remarks, but also of the highly individuated, individualised and institutionalised framework which demarcates the existential horizons of how a modern lifespan (as becoming in time) may be experienced. This includes:

1. the spatial positioning within a particular economic way of production, insofar as children’s obligatory tasks are system-immanent, i.e. they always correspond to the prevailing forms of production (Qvortrup 2001:97).

2. the temporal positioning, i.e. a. the way the experience of time is shaped as well as claimed by society, and b. the extent to which one has claim to society’s resources (Qvortrup 2008).

It is not by chance that modern children’s school work is dominant in quantitative terms; the new economy could not survive and prosper otherwise (Qvortrup 2001:97). This type of highly socially engineered, existential, spatio-temporal positioning of human life is peculiar to modernity and especially correlates to contemporary high Human Development Index contexts.

In other words, high Human Development Index contexts re-produce human capital and culture primarily through highly individuated, individualised and institutionalised age-based segregation systems. Of course, as these contexts do exert considerable influence on how lifecourse experiences should be globally standardized e.g. through human and child rights conventions, it becomes possible to talk about ‘designed childhoods’ globally (Gutman and Coninck-Smith 2008). The mass-scale operation of age-based segregation gives rise to forms of cultural islanding (Gillis 2008) which are specific to age-groups.

On the one hand then, adults can individuate ‘our’ children and ‘their’ children based on nation-specific demarcations such as ‘Norwegian’ or ‘non-Norwegian’ children. On the other hand, the adult members of the human species live on mythical islands whereby new members called children are systematically assimilated into their own mythical, but onto-epistemologically superior worlds. As Gillis (2008: 317) explains,

“Modern life is full of child-centred moments - Christmases, birthdays, summer holidays - elaborate rituals created by adults both to connect
with children and gain reassuring access to memories of their own childhoods. [...] The islanding of children must be considered a creation of adults, a response to their own needs rather than those of children. [...] Adults have not only islanded children physically, but have also constructed mythical landscapes that sustain childhood in its idealized forms, even when it is no longer sustainable in a real world. [...] Mythical geography consists of the mental maps that orient us in the world where physical landmarks and signposts are often obscure or absent. The mythical landscapes of childhood constitute a kind of parallel universe, one that bears a similarity to physical geography but has the virtue of being invulnerable to both temporal and spatial changes that are constantly transforming the real world."

Consequently, new geographical imaginations and philosophical borders come forth. Borders that have to be passed on, in order to sustain the highly ‘developed’ ways of life which the ‘naive native’ does not yet know. The assumption seems to be: developed ones develop the developing ones. Further, that the developing ones are dependent, needy receivers of aid, care, knowledge and most importantly: principles of reason. Furthermore: the developed ones are independent, non-needy, rational givers.

For some indescribable reason these borders also position the developed one as philosophically higher - whereby the adult, primarily by virtue of being adult, already qualifies to teach the child something philosophical. A Gregorian calendar-determined identity ends up creating an islanded life-phase, invariably rendering the child into a default addressee of pedagogy. As a child, constantly being positioned as the pupil leaves little room to negotiate existential matters of becoming and time. One has to learn how not to put the ‘larger’ adult-determined realities into profound question. Processes of interpretive reproduction i.e. socialisation (Corsaro 1993; 1997) are limited in so far as they cannot negotiate the philosophical premises of what is given by the adult-determined reality. Consequently, one can move from the little developing islands of childhoods to the large developed countries of adulthoods. Primarily due to my increasing awareness of this little room to negotiate existential matters of being and becoming as a child with and within larger adult-determined realities - I began doubting the PC practices in classrooms. It seems as though this particular cultural practice belongs to a long tradition of civilizing human beings who are not there yet due to their temporal otherness - what amounts to invariably placing the child on the learning end of the pedagogical relationship.
3.1 The Child as a Default Addressee of Pedagogy

According to Duane (2013:3), the concept child has a long history of being metaphorically deployed in Western scholarship as the model for human progress, for example from savagery to civilization, from murky past to a fully realized present and so on. In opposition to Hume’s claims of white racial superiority, and in order to make the point that one has to allow time for a process of civilisation to take place, Beattie (1805: 309) writes, “The inhabitants of Great Britain and France were as savage two thousand years ago, as those of Africa and America are at this day. Civilisation is the work of time. And one may as well say of an infant, that he can never become a man as of a nation now barbarous, that it never can be civilised.”

A similar analogy occurs in Jefferson’s letter to Bancroft whereby Jefferson (1789, in ed. Boyd 1958: 492) asserts: “[...] as far as I can judge from the experiments which have been made, to give liberty to, or rather, to abandon persons whose habits have been formed in slavery is like abandoning children.” The conceptualisation here is of something i.e. a person, place or time that is primitive, uncivilized and foreign, yet having the potential for a rationally autonomous future. This is to affirm, at the least, that child members of the human species are in the most basic and broadest sense addressed within the context of development. However, in all cases a crude not-yet-ness has to undergo some sort of training. The one that is entitled to train belongs to the developed context and is epistemologically higher in the hierarchy.

For instance, the popular etiquette writer Mrs. Manners in 1853 North America echoed a widely shared view describing young boys as wild, careless, primitive savages commonly compared to Indians and African tribesmen (Rotundo 1998: 337). Kant, who is held to have been highly influenced by Rousseau’s Emile (Kant 1904. ed Buchner: 25), advised that “children should be educated, not with reference to their present condition, but rather with regard to a possibly improved future state of the human race, that is, according to the idea of humanity and its entire destiny” (ibid.: 116).

For Kant, reason and duty were to triumph over both instinct and inclination (Buchner on Kant 1904: 27; Schapiro 2003:577). In the introduction to his Lecture-Notes on Pedagogy, Kant (1904:101) opens with a clear reference to the child as a default pedagogical addressee, “Man is the only creature that must be educated. By education we mean care (maintenance), discipline (training), and instruction, including culture. Man is thus babe, pupil, and scholar.” Kant held that “man can become man
through education only” and that “man could be educated only by those who are educated themselves” (ibid:107). One of his chief classifications of the telos of education was the development of humanity in so far as man had to be disciplined, cultured, civilized, moralized through education (Kant 1904: 121-123).

In section 30, Kant lays down the guidelines for what should be observed in educating a child towards freedom through constraint. Section 30c is particularly noteworthy as a developmental context which is also primitive and foreign is explicitly evoked: “It must also be shown to the child that he is under such constraint as will lead him to the use of his own freedom; that he is cultivated, so that one day he may be free, - that is, not dependent upon the foresight of others. This is the child’s latest acquisition. For the consideration that each must rely upon himself for his own sustenance comes to the child very late. They fancy it will always be as it is in the parental home; that food and drink will come without any thought on their part. Without such treatment, children, and especially those of rich parents and princes, become like the inhabitants of Tahiti, who remain children their whole life long.” (ibid: 132; emphasis by author)

One sees here a conceptual synthesis of childhood and the non-white peoples’ context conceived of as in need of development. On these lines, Bøyum (2002: 100) raises the question - what was it about Tahitians that got Kant to evoke this comparison with children? The answer he provides is the following: “First and foremost the natural. The childlike is not yet cultivated, and so locates itself closer to the original natural state. Next, the emotional. The childlike17 follows its emotional hunches instead of reason. To be childlike is therefore also to be instantaneous. One follows one’s instincts “without thinking over it”, not taking a step back in order to reflect. Therefore, we think of children as irresponsible. However, we can also perceive that as freedom because it is not determined by social conventions and self-consciousness. These features also apply to the childlike mentality. To think in a childlike manner is to be subjective. One considers things for the meaning they bear/have for oneself instead of taking a general perspective. This also

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16 According to Buchner, Kant’s conception of culture here is Bildung and is to be understood in the sense of moral culture. In some cases e.g. in section 6 of Lecture-Notes on Pedagogy Buchner has translated the term as ‘education’. The term ‘culture’ has been broadly used by Kant and alongside ‘morality’ central to his conception of education.

17 Since the term childish carries derogatory connotations, Barnlige is translated as childlike instead.
inbears a self-orientation towards the *concrete* and *particular* instead of the abstract and general. One can also say that the childlike mindset is *organic*: it does not draw distinctions and treat different things for themselves such as an analytic approach requires. Lastly, the childlike is characterised by letting the *fantasy* govern, not logic. Consequently the childlike is associated with *play*, as opposed to the serious work of reason. One therefore gladly perceives art as childlike and science as the opposite. The question then is: Where does philosophy place itself?” (ibid.: 100-101; translation from Norwegian by author, emphasis original).

On similar lines, Speier (1976: 168 - 186) describes the view that positions the child as a default addressee of pedagogy as the adult ideological viewpoint. The traditional interest in studying childhood orients itself towards regarding children as a raw material for cultural learning. Moreover, apart from their physical growth, they have also been looked upon as entrants in a society who have to learn to adapt to that social context (Speier 1976: 168). A magnitude of the focus of so-called Western scholarship has been on the process through which a child becomes an adult in her society i.e. development.\(^{19}\)

The normative framework of conceiving development has been based on an adult view of social life in terms of the rules for navigating properly in their lifeworld. The adult ideological viewpoint perceives development as a historical and biographical process. It is also through this viewpoint that the adult members of the society with whom a child interacts are referred to as ‘agents’ of socialisation and it is argued that they become models for her own behaviour (ibid: 169). What in turn occurs is a compromise in terms of cognizing the interactional characteristics of processes of socialisation and the possibility of grasping the child members of a society as inter-actants (ibid: 171).

Analogously, child members of a society also remain invariably addressed in this developmental light when considered in their role of philosophical beings.

\(^{18}\) And as a corollary: philosophical.

\(^{19}\) A noteworthy parallel with the integration and migration debates is that key questions about multiculturalism or assimilation are about the immigrant becoming a ‘citizen’ of the host society (e.g. Kivisto and Wahlbeck 2013).
3.1.1 The Child as a Default Addressee of Philosophical Development

In the realm of philosophical education for children, pedagogue Jespersen has been a central figure in Scandinavia (Breivik & Løkke 2007: 4). In his work on childhood and philosophy, for instance, one remarks a tendency towards understanding childhood as a primitive, developmental context which is also foreign/extraneous. As part of the conviction as to why philosophy should be included in schools, Jespersen (1993:10; translation from Danish by author) argues: “From nativity to adult life they go through in their spiritual and intellectual development, reflecting all of philosophy’s development from ancient Greece to the present. Therefore, it can be argued that children think pre-philosophically. Therefore, philosophy can reach them in the world they live in. Therefore, we need to have philosophy in the school.” Here, there is an analogous developmental discourse in describing a generalized history of philosophy beginning in Greece and a child’s life course. Childhood as a stage is likened with a pre-philosophical stage in ancient Greece.

In other words, the analogy conceptually presents childhood as something in the past with a potential for philosophical development. It implies a corollary that adulthood is the present space-time towards which the child has to be led. Jespersen further concludes that, due to the similarity between children’s development and the history of philosophy, it is possible for philosophy to be brought into the world where children live in. Hence, philosophy should be introduced in schools. The child here is recognized as having her own world, but also as in need of being helped to move from a universal pre-philosophical stage (as in ancient Greece) to a more contemporary stage through adult intervention.

Therein, while the philosophical attributes of children receive positive validity, one concludes that the next step is to infiltrate their world in order to teach them something. In this particular strain of understanding, where childhood appears to be a (foreign) country in the past and adulthood is a country in the present; the present is also epistemologically more advanced and thus entitled - and perhaps also obligated - to support the movement from the pre-stage to a post-stage. The intervention is usually supposed to take place in a particular social space allocated to childhood: the school.

Especially in high Human Development Index countries, it is next to impossible to think about the child independently of a pedagogical institution to which she ‘belongs’. This is not surprising, given that obligatory
institutionalization is the dominant way of life for children, especially in high Human Development Index contexts.

Structurally speaking, then, children can be legally obliged to spend a sizeable amount of their time in schools i.e. “a spatial positioning which provides a singular possibility for the focused and highly considered management and control of an extensive group within the population” (James, Jenks & Prout 1998:41). Accordingly, these spatial positionings “provide an ordered temporal passage from child to adult status; at the same time, on a daily basis, they restrict the ways in which children can spend their time” (ibid.). Important rites of passage from one life stage to another also become intimately knotted with institutionalised spatial positionings, for example the high-school graduation ritual Russ, which almost every Norwegian child citizen participates in (Corsaro and Johannessen 2013).

The individualising effect that modern schooling has on children not only progresses through the school system e.g. primary to secondary or rites like Russ, but daily time-slotting such as lessons, break-time etc. too (Oswell 2013: 121). Furthermore, curricula are more than content-description, because of the non-accidental theories of cognitive and bodily development containing world-views embedded in their constructions. Among other things, this involves philosophies of human nature and potential, apart from selections related to questions of power and identity specifically addressing children and childhood. Curricula, especially the time-table as its central organizing principle, “instances human-kind’s selection from and control of its world; its replication and repetition in paradigmatic style instances the control of others through the constitution of the child’s body and consciousness into the form of an educational identity” (James, Jenks & Prout 1998:42). It is not surprising that the raison d’etre of PC in curricula is often expected to be justified on grounds of its efficacy in promoting argumentation and reasoning skills (e.g. Reznitskaya and Anderson 2006).

The matter of education is invariably interlaced with processes of socialization and one’s knowledge of the social order. One’s tendency towards grasping concepts like ‘child’ and ‘childhood’ consists in viewing them as universal recipients of rearing, care, education and guidance through adult members of the human species in the particular societies where its child members are situated. Such an approach, however, re-emphasises, re-plays and re-produces the epistemologically powerful, independent and developed ‘adult’ who is invariably positioned at the giving end of any child-adult dynamic. Moreover, it systematically neglects vital areas of childhood
e.g. peer-relations, care-giving, social negotiations, children’s epistemological manipulation of adults and so on.

I describe this as the **pedagogical gaze** i.e. an instrumentalising gaze whereby even scientific attention is directed to the areas of behaviour that parents focus on (Bluebond-Langner 1978:5). Hence, such gaze follows from an adult-ideological (Speier 1976) or what Flascher has termed the adultist position (Flascher 1978). In other words, one focuses on bringing children up by negating that children are also involved in literally and figuratively bringing adults down i.e. grounding them back to earth in the process.

As actors in their own right, children are not one-sided recipients of processes of socialisation; on the contrary, they interpretively reproduce the social orders and codes that they grasp through their being in the world (Corsaro 1993; 1997). The pedagogical gaze is oriented towards all that is necessary for performing as competent adults according to a rather idolized and complete picture of adulthood. In turn, this implies viewing children in terms of what they will become and viewing childhood through its bearing on future activities and status (Bluebond-Langner 1978:5). Child-rearing is however only one aspect of interaction with children and socialization processes (ibid.).

Similarly, teaching (German: **beibringen**) children something is one aspect of child-adult interaction which is possible by first and foremost viewing the child as a pedagogical addressee. If the rearing and teaching must in fact take place, the addressee of rearing and teaching is however still supposed to simultaneously interpret the address and act along. “Possessing a self\(^{20}\) children can interpret the behaviour of others and act on the basis of their own interpretations (cf. Mead 1970 and Blumer 1969) [...] in the course of inter-action” (Bluebond-Langner 1978:7-8). In other words, the process of meaning-making in coordination with the objects and others around the self is in motion. It may not happen through spoken or written words and sentences, and may not be articulated or could be interpreted as inarticulated. Nevertheless, the lifelong continuum of interpretation and meaning making IS in motion.

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\(^{20}\) **Self** here in an existential sense i.e. the sense of existing in the world. Not in a psychological sense of experiencing oneself as a separate entity. The latter can be ‘tested’ through tools like the famous mirror tests performed on animals and children. The former can only be inferred.
3.1.2. Bluebond-Langner’s Axioms

In cases where children can communicate in languages that their adult counterparts recognize and understand as ‘language’, a play of showing and concealing knowledge becomes evident as in Bluebond-Langner’s study with dying children shows (Bluebond-Langner 1978). The study is especially relevant here, as it deals with the lived-experiences of a highly philosophical subject namely: death. At the same time, it is not in abstraction that such a subject lives - it is a subject that comes into the existential play of life the moment a human is born.

The emphasis here is that the terminally-ill participants of Bluebond-Langner’s study-participants had mechanisms to find out that they were dying when no one told them. Furthermore, they concealed their own knowledge from their parents and medical staff. Both the knowing and concealing of the knowledge that they would die are examples of how the children actively acquired the knowledge that was existentially important to them and at the same time decided not to reveal it - reflecting the social order to which they were socialised and the place that death had in their society.

The mutual pretence in the interplay of knowledge and concealment was part of preserving a certain social order of those particular, interrelated, institutional settings e.g. family and medical facilities (Bluebond-Langner 1978: 198). In other words: why they play along. Mutual pretense is like a ‘delicately balanced drama’, with a superfluity of (adult-determined) rules to be followed, and it inevitably breaks down (Glaser and Strauss 1965b:74f, in ibid: 200). An open awareness then becomes the new context for interaction (ibid.).

While the parents had their questions e.g. What am I going to do? What does it all mean? Will he die? What am I going to tell him? (Bluebond-Langner 1978:3) - obviously there were questions on the other side too e.g. What can I do? What is happening to me? What is going on? Why are my parents behaving like this? Regardless of how one categorizes the nature of these questions from the outside, what is important to mark here is the relationality of the questions. That is to say that questions and co(r)responding motions arise in a highly interrelated context. Not all questions may be as directly corresponding to each other - but there is a form of implicit dialogue flowing here and children are actively participating. The following axioms about children are presented as a result of Bluebond-Langner’s work (ibid : 12):
1. They are willful, purposeful creatures who possess selves.

2. They interpret their behaviour and act on the basis of their interpretations.

3. They interpret their own self-images.

4. They interpret the behaviour of others to obtain a view of themselves, others, and objects.

5. They are capable of initiating behaviour so as to affect the view others have of them and that they have of themselves.

6. They are capable of initiating behaviour to affect the behaviour of others toward them.

7. Any meaning that children attach to themselves, other, and objects varies with respect to the physical, social, and temporal settings in which they find themselves.

8. Children can move from one social world to another and act appropriately in each world.

Re-positioning the way one sees children as the other based on the aforementioned axioms has significant implications for scientific understanding of the nature of consciousness which is highly significant for the discussion on philosophising in general and in children in particular.

For the pedagogical gaze in philosophy some immediate, unanswered questions emerge, namely: What role does consciousness play in philosophising? Is there a difference in child and adult consciousness? (If so, then) Should and can it be hierarchically categorized in terms of higher and lower or better or worse consciousness? In the case that one is higher or better, which one is it and can pedagogical authority towards the other be justified on those grounds?
3.1.3. Childhood Beyond the Developmental State Model

The axioms that Bluebond-Lagner’s work outlines belong to the purview of childhood studies whereby children are seen as active social participants (James, Jenks and Prout 1998, Qvortrup 1994; Alanen 2005; Corsaro 1993; 1997) and at the same time relate to the sociological critique of the adult/child distinction as a product of history and changing social relations (Lee 2001:37). This has also led some to doubt the assumption that adulthood itself can no longer be understood as axiomatically stable, complete, independent and developed; in turn calling for a fairer conceptualisation which can see all humans as fundamentally dependent and incomplete (ibid.). The equation of childhood as a state of dependency itself, it has been argued, lies in the history of nation-states and in the widespread adoption of the developmental state model (ibid: 34). However, the imaginary concept of nation, (Anderson 2006) too, is in a flux.

Nationhood - which has been understood as part of the ‘inner self’ and hence linked with individual identities - is also being understood as flexible. In the light of increased migration, national boundaries are gradually being conceptually divorced from ‘physical boundaries’ (Kjørholt 2008:33), while powerful discourses on children as citizens entertain the question whether children are being constructed as a new global nation (ibid.). The idea of a travelling nation has also been suggested (e.g. Hultquist & Dahlberg 2001). In the Norwegian context one can affirm the presence of a hegemonic element in the interdiscursive relationship between discourses on democracy and nationality on the one hand, and children and childhood on the other (Kjørholt 2008:37; also see Gullestad 1997).

To break it down further - the underlying matters here refer to:

1. participation

2. that in which one participates.

Increasingly, seeing children as active social participants leads to forms of social construction whereby “to an increasing degree, childhood is constructed as a symbolic value related to democracy, national identity, autonomy and authenticity” (Kjørholt 2008: 31). In the early 1990s, in the Norwegian project Prøv Selv (Try Yourself) children were constructed as an imagined community that is supposed to inhabit its own authentic cul-
ture. The imagined community, however, is not anchored in any particular geographical area, as a notion of childhood is constructed within particular historical and cultural circumstances.

Some of the participants constituted an imagined community of friends, united in a shared interest in singing, making music and travelling around, raising money for a charitable organisation. Their imagined travelling community was spatially dispersed in the public space, depicting the blurred boundaries between the local and the national (ibid.). Although Kjørholt acknowledges the view of childhood as a symbolic space where notions of democracy, nationality identity, autonomy and authenticity are both represented and reproduced, she herself is equally hesitant to regard the notion of children’s culture as separate from the surrounding adult cultural context, because it can contribute to concealing the dynamic interrelatedness and embeddedness of children’s cultures in larger, adult-constituted cultural and political structures (ibid.).

However, given that structural individuation and individualization along with institutional segregation based on age are basic operations of social engineering through which high Human Development Index contexts subsist, it seems unlikely that the recognition of the islanding of childhood is avoidable. Such recognition, however, need not entail an exclusion of the structure-immanent or interdependent nature of childhood with respect to adulthood. In other words, the childhood-adulthood continuum in itself is not negated, but the affirmation of cultural worlds on the smaller side of the continuum is magnified for the pedagogical gaze.

In order to magnify the smaller side of the childhood-adulthood continuum, in what follows, I will now present a consideration of islanded modern children’s cultures as part of system-immanent childhood cultures from micro- and macro-level dimensions. The consideration is taken on in order to come closer to identifying where and how children’s interpretive philosophical agency subsists in constraint.

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21 Especially if plurality is integrated into the logical foundations of studying children and childhoods. In other words, one needs something that goes beyond traditional two-valued logic.
3.2. Children’s Cultures in System
Immanent Childhood Cultures

The biological fact of differences between adult and child bodies - including the brain - cannot alone justify the entitlement of the philosophical authority of the adult in relation to the child. It may also amount to an analytical fallacy to (con)fuse the senses of ‘developmental context’ to refer to both childhood as well as specific geographical localisations.

Nevertheless, as I have written in the earlier sections, there has been a historical tendency in Western traditions, including philosophy, to draw an analogy between children and peoples who were perceived as ‘foreign’. The former and latter have also been considered as ‘lacking’ culture which the ‘educated’, ‘developed’ or ‘civilised’ one has. Hence, I remark:

1. The having seems to give way to a sense of entitlement and even duty to ‘aid’ and ‘raise’ the ones who do not-yet have. This in turn comes to negate what the one addressed in the developing context has and the so-called ‘educated’, ‘developed’ or ‘civilized’ one does not.

2. The individuating, individualising and institutionalising nature of modern and especially high Human Development Index contexts gives way to islanding of childhoods, that remains structurally addressed in the developmental context.

The former remark refers to the non-recognition and negation of the epistemological surplus of the other with reference to a self that is centrally-positioned as having culture. The latter refers instead to how modernity itself structurally constructs islanded cultures based on age-segregation. Consequently, recognizing and studying children’s life-worlds has multiple overlapping dimensions.

Corresponding to the micro and macro level dimensions of studying chil-

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22 As I have argued elsewhere (Biswas 2017: 91), if philosophising is primarily defined through articulated language-bound acts such as argumentation, a bigger adult brain as opposed to a smaller child brain can claim philosophical authority. However, the mind plays a role in philosophising and there is no scientific certainty about what is meant by the term ‘mind’. The tendency in Western (Cartesian) traditions is to treat the mind as body and attribute a psychical localisation to it in the brain. Here, it is assumed that the mind is in the brain and that is where ‘thinking’ happens. Consequently, it is derived that a more developed brain automatically implies a more developed mind. It is however ridiculous to suggest that the mind is located solely in the brain!
dren and childhood (Frønes 1994: 148-149) i.e. child-adult, child-child, institutional and structural as in social class - conceiving childhoods as cultures and children’s cultures also has multiple, intertwined dimensions. As I mentioned before, especially in modern societies in general, and in high Human Development Index contexts in particular - childhood must be considered within the triangular constellation of the state, family and the child.

Within this constellation, general child-adult relations or rather the childhood-adulthood relationship is not solely of cultural and natural reproduction, but also of production (Oldman 1994: 56). To put it simply: it costs money to raise children. To put it crudely: it costs money to produce highly developed human capital. Childhood activities are for example structured in order to serve the economic interests of adulthood i.e. family as well as state and market. Supervised curricular and extracurricular activities outside the family create childwork, whereby the child is the psychological or pedagogical object of adult labour - one that is in the process of becoming, not being (ibid: 46).

Only a small amount of childwork is done by parents and without financial reward (ibid: 45) and takes place outside the nuclear family due to the increasing incorporation of mothers into the labour force (ibid: 51). On the other hand, unsupervised new media technology-assisted activities make children at once independent and dependent (Lee 2002: 87) and free parents from child care (Oldman 1994:55). Parent-child time in the broadest sense becomes a one-parent-at-a-time thing with the other parent ‘freed’ for work (ibid:52).

Children’s domestic labour in high Human Development Index contexts too is primarily linked with self-maintenance; not that of other family members. Therein lies the contemporary value of children’s domestic labour for adults (ibid.), in turn reproducing specific constructed cultural understandings of the ‘autonomous’ child. The value of scholastic labour is also linked with the childwork it represents e.g. teaching, ancillary, administrative staff in schools etc. Consequently, one sees the connection

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23 Institutionalised philosophical training too, as I have discussed, belongs to the same adultist tendency.

24 In high Human Development Index contexts in welfare states like Norway, provisions for parental leave from work, as well as financial support in this period exists. Financial support to cover children’s living and educational costs are also generously covered by the state. Parental leave is however only in a limited amount of time in early years and one is not paid for childwork as such.
between educational expenditures expressed for example in salaries and educational output expressed through ‘achievements’ of children (ibid: 53).

Similarly, with extra-curricular activities like swimming, dancing, skating, skiing, listening to music and so on comes at a price which goes into child-work wages and profits of leisure industries. Although many adults do ‘voluntary’ work, often this is a stepping stone into part-time paid work or entry into the professionalized labour-market as a child worker (ibid: 54). Here, the vulnerable child’s desire for play and leisure is systematically capitalized upon. The notion of play here is also very specific as firstly opposed to work, secondly as belonging to childhood, thirdly as good for ‘development’, and lastly - as one sees in Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child - as a right (Shackel 2015).

Contemporary high Human Development Index notions strongly link play and childhood (Kline 1998: 96). In contrast to the feudal European worldview where the community shared work and leisure as well as games, macro- and micro-level concerns with children’s rights, leisure and pleasure manifest themselves in an extravagance of toys and objects specially designed for children filling up children’s own rooms (ibid: 97; emphasis by author). The nineteenth century in particular gave way to a specific view of child development, whereby children are innocent and in need of formation, learning and protection from harsh realities of industrial society (Kline 1998). Here the early seeds of a new self-conscious conception of children’s culture are noted.

Through systematic and structural social exclusion - the idea of childhood as a life phase (Närvänen & Näsmann 2004) or generation (Qvortrup 2009) or even class (Oldman 1994) and children as the chronologically determined age-based categorised group was compensated by granting them specific rights, separate institutional spaces with a new training agenda.

Within this agenda literacy and ‘knowledge’ became objectives of socialisation and the state began to assert its own interest in communication with children (Kline 1998: 98). According to historian DeMause (in ibid.), “the very idea of the family and schools as [...] agents of conscious attempts to shape and mould children into civilized beings by orchestrating their learning and social experiences - gains its full force precisely during this intense period of upheaval. [...] In literature and popular writing of the period, childhood became both a way of understanding the changes of industrialization and a fitting metaphor for growth and development”.

60
In structurally excluding this certain life phase and its members, childhood and children are also in a way made visible in a specific way. For example, they are much more easily recognisable in twentieth-century art and photography for the very reason that special spaces and products were created for them (ibid: 104; emphasis by author). The commercialisation of childhood and corresponding child-rearing products tips and directives through catalogues began to address the educational interest in child development and welfare (ibid. 103), of course according to identifiable stages. New items of furniture to make children sit more erect at the table are also among design innovations of the nineteenth century (ibid.)25.

A distinct work/play divide (in this case the divide between school and play) starts to be integrated into individual and collective worldviews. ‘Toys’ become a distinct cultural signifier which changes the experience of being in the world in relation to objects (Barthes 1975: 53). For Barthes ‘toys’ are perfect illustrations of how the child is viewed as another self vis-à-vis adult. “ [...] Faced with the world of faithful and complicated objects, the child can only identify himself as owner, as user, never as creator; he does not invent the world, he uses it: there are prepared for him actions without adventure, without wonder, without joy. He is turned into a little stay-at-home householder who does not even have to invent the mainsprings of adult causality; they are supplied to him ready-made: he has only to help himself, he is never allowed to discover anything start to finish. [...] French toys are usually based on imitation, they are meant to produce children who are users not creators” (ibid: 54).

Similarly, the construction of a consumer child in the Norwegian context can be seen through the example of the firm A/S Riktig Leker (Proper Toys), established in 1946 by the national preschool teachers union in order to provide kindergartens and parents with pedagogically ‘correct’ toys. Influenced by the developmental psychology trends, the firm conceptualizes ‘proper’ (toys) through its material quality, pedagogical value, creating individuality by enabling the child to ‘master the toy’, representing ‘reality’ and nostalgia-generating by referring to parents’ own romanticized memories of childhood (Bomann 2007).

Contemporary childhood in Norway is no exception to the market-enhanced, post-war, consumer society, in so far as money is spent on buying and organising spare time - also noticeable in the bedrooms of Norwegian

25 One sees here how objects are designed to physically produce specific positionalities and consequently shaping physicalities- here as ‘postures’ - based on age.
children (Blom 2004:133). In the beginning of the twenty-first century, Norway distinguished itself from other high Human Development Index context economies for addressing the inexperienced vulnerability of children through special market and marketing regulations in order to protect its minor citizens. Nevertheless, Norwegian child citizens (as its adult citizens) remain part of a high consumer culture context (Blom 2004; bracket insertion by author).

Mass consumer culture also provides children, both nationally and globally, with the possibility to have distinct tastes and preferences for objects, media and activities which set them apart from adults. In turn this induces a sense of power: “something they know, but of which adults are ridiculously ignorant” (Seiter 1998: 298). At the same time, mass cultural goods and practices created specifically for children can be studied as “complex manifestations of adult culture which are engaged with in various and contradictory ways by different children under different circumstances” (ibid.:299). Similarly, in the realm of children’s fiction literature it has been argued that it is the adult world that comes first as author, maker and giver (Rose 1998: 58) and through language, which has an institutional history (ibid:63).

Consequently, there are dimensions of children’s culture that are system immanent. In other words, they form part of the macro level institutional and structural aspects, as well as the micro-level adult-child aspect. Childhood culture refers to that which is for and in order to re-produce specific childhood constructions. Children’s culture refers to how children engage creatively within constraining facticity of the childhood culture they are born in. This is what is meant by the system immanent nature of children’s culture. Children’s interpretive philosophical agency is understood through this fabric.

3.2.1. Interpretive philosophical agency of children-in-the-world

Unlike Barthes’ description, whereby child-specific objects do not allow children to invent the world, only to use it, children do in fact invent their own worlds and innovatively challenge the network of meanings within which they find themselves. This occurs in the micro-level child-child dimension that Frønes has marked out.

The movements, dynamics and comparatively evident temporality of the nature of invention of worlds in the child-child (or just child) dimen-
sion point out to an interpretive philosophical agency in children. There is without doubt always an existential facticity within which every human finds herself, for example a time and place, a language, environment, previous choices and prospect of death (Sartre 1992). But there is an agency in terms of the possible meanings of the given facticity that could be created and dissolved.

For example, within institutionalised spaces such as Norwegian kindergartens (Norwegian: barnehage) children construct social relationships through a sense of we-ness (Nilsen 2005) by sharing knowledge, interests, objects, engaging in joint play using their bodies and voices to communicate by sitting closely, emphasizing sameness and breaking adult-initiated rules (ibid: 123). Or the way child-addressed objects such as ‘toys’ are actually used by children in combination with ‘non-child addressed’ spaces such as kitchens or dining rooms also entails innovation of new worlds (e.g. the case of Captain Duke in Biswas 2017).

It is through this micro dimension that this inquiry questions the understanding of what constitutes philosophising with reference to institutionalized PC practices. It was through this particular dimension of children’s playfully co-constructed worlds that I briefly entered as a guest through the course of this study.

This was possible firstly by somehow arriving at a position where I made conscious efforts NOT to view the child as a default addressee of pedagogy, who is inevitably (and especially philosophically) addressed in the developmental context. The micro level, playfully constructed worlds of the child participants of this study was the context where I could ask: what is the scope of philosophical blossoming of adults when they play in children’s playfully constructed worlds? The question itself emerged as a result of firstly recognizing my participants as citizens26, and secondly by opening up my investigation to including them as co-explorers who influenced the methodological course of my study - including changing the focus of my research question.

In other words, nearing the playfully constructed worlds of my co-explorers by taking conscious distance from my own instrumental pedagogical gaze implied engaging with notions of children’s participation and inclusion in lay society as well as academic communities from a more liberal position than I could previously imagine.

26 As in high Human Development Index contexts like Norway where children are individuated right bearers i.e. beyond their belonging to the family institution.
3.3 Children as Citizens and Co-explorers

Traditionally, children are not seen as social actors in their own right. In research contexts too, they have conventionally been denied rights of participation and their voices have remained considerably unheard (James and Prout 1997; Alderson 1995). Childhood and children’s lives have been explored through the understanding and concerns of their adult caretakers, by excluding them from the research process itself (Christensen and James 2008:2; Bluebond-Langner 1978:5).

In 1989, the Treaty on Children’s Rights was accepted by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Consequently, the convention gave way to further progression of standardizing childhoods globally and allowed children to present themselves as individuals with their own rights (Jans 2004). The UNCRC has been seen as a milestone for new ways of thought and actions concerning children (Verhellen 1994). Ensuing participation and inclusion discourses not only began to re-position children (especially high Human Development Index contexts) as citizens, but also uplifted their status in the scientific contexts (Powell & Smith 2009: Ennew et al. 2009).

Thereupon, researchers within the childhood studies paradigm respond by engaging in a re-examination of conceptual frameworks that influence children’s representation and participation in research (ibid.:3). The convention on children’s rights had a direct influence on childhood related research, whereby participatory methods are favoured and new ethical considerations such as empowerment have become an integral part of research with children (e.g. Ennew et al. 2009; Cheney 2011). Methodological designs themselves reflect innovations by finding ways to make space for children’s voices (e.g. the Mosaic approach by Clark 2017). Similarly, global PC culture has also been aimed at democratic citizenship (Lipman 2003, in Jasinski & Lewis 2016: 2; Echeverria & Hannam 2017) i.e. intended to support children’s participation and inclusion in society through critical thinking.

Articles in the UNCRC such as Article 13 (conf. Cohen 1989; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner) link children’s participation and inclusion with the right to freedom of expression; accordingly, they bear implications for research with children (Ennew et al. 2009). As stated in Article 13, “The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s choice.” For research, among other things, this implies that methods need to be discovered to promote children’s capacity for free expression (ibid: 1.18). The discoveries need not be limited to methods i.e. research tools only, but could also involve methodological shifts such as the possibility to ask questions, that in turn makes it possible to include children at various stages of research. Here, the role of the adult researcher too becomes susceptible to redefinition.

In a nutshell - recognition of children as citizens with rights implies that children are citizens just as their adult counterparts, and therefore calls for a re-positioning of the adult-self as a citizen. Hence, the ways in which one’s own adult citizenship plays out as a result of making space for child citizens change. Similarly, including children in research implies methodological shifts as well as the re-conceptualising of the adult researcher-self.

### 3.3.1. Re-conceiving the Adult Researcher-Self

One of the basic concerns for childhood research is whether research with children is differs from research involving adults (Punch 2002; Norozi & Moen 2016). In my work, I proceed to apply the epistemological standpoint that what is known is determined through how it is known (Biswa 2017: 90) to scientific engagements with children and childhood among else. The how-ness is a methodological matter that includes the way one sees not only children, but also oneself in relation to children. The reason is that, in encountering a human other as a child, one also simultaneously encounters oneself as an adult (Biswa 2017:94). Similarly, the way one sees children influences the choice of methods and the way one listens to them (Punch 2002). Insofar as one addresses children as actors in a social world (Waksler 1991: 62), as any other group, somehow research with children does not have to be considered different at a methodological level. In any case, the methods need to be tailored according to the groups and the possibilities that the researcher has. This is a matter of contextualisation which would hold true for working with any group of human beings. Furthermore, ethical considerations such as positionality, reciprocity, consent and confidentiality also need to be taken into account depending on the group.

There has been a tendency in childhood studies to view children as entirely the same or different from adults (Punch 2002). Treating children as indistinguishable from adults (e.g. James et al. 1998, in Punch 2002) would
entail using the same methods with children that are used with adults. The responsibility of the adult researcher, then, is to treat them as mature, competent people as one would do with adults (Alderson 1995, in ibid.). However, such an approach to treating children as ‘equals’ of adults can leave the power imbalance between adult researchers and child subjects inadequately addressed (ibid.; Morrow 1999).

Taking ‘different’ group-specific considerations into account while contextualising research with children can be regarded as a step that is necessary in order to arrive at a way to appreciate them as actors in a social world. Taking the step of course implies that the positions of the researcher has to be re-conceived.

3.3.2. Instances of Research Designs with Children

Opening up to methodological and methodical inclusion of children’s participation on these lines is based on the guiding principle that research with, not on children, cannot not take age-based child-adult distinction for granted. Consequently, a significant emphasis in most innovative research designs is placed on how not to reinforce the child-adult power imbalance (cf. especially, Punch 2002: 326-327). Interpretations and applications of the guiding principles differ widely, although they form a common reference for experimental attempts to overcome the border of chronological age in research with children.

Solberg, for instance, deliberately ignored chronological age as a significant marker in her research on child work in order to explore doing rather than being (Solberg 1996). Although one may make such a strategic move, the modern islanded nature of childhood does not simply disappear. Children, especially those living in high Human Development Index contexts, remain individuated and institutionalised individuals just like other members of high Human Development Index societies. Co-creating spaces whereby the deliberate ignoring of age is realisable constitutes a major challenge for actively including children in research processes.

However, fundamental conceptual differences (Carey 1988), as well as material and perceptual differences in child and adult spatiality (Holloway & Valentine 2000), also exist. Consequently, power imbalances arising especially due to the research settings themselves - e.g. institutional time and spaces allocated to them based on chronological age - deserve distinct attention. School as a research setting, as Morrow describes/remarks/
points out (1999), particularly poses obstacles that implicitly and explicitly refer to children’s chronological age-determined position in society. Issues related to curriculum, adult-gatekeepers, school routines or working in the presence of teachers - whereby the children might see the researcher as a teacher too - are problems that require methodological attention (Morrow 1999: 206).

New research designs keep emerging as a result of acknowledging children as participants and the need to include them in knowledge production, especially as this affects their lifeworlds in relation to adult lifeworlds. All emerging approaches are experimental in their own way and no specific method is being suggested, but rather methodological strategies which tend to lean towards the qualitative, ethnographic side of the human research spectrum. A significant emphasis in most innovative research designs is placed on how not to reinforce the child-adult power imbalance.

Larger social and structural inequalities do of course play out in intergenerational research encounters (Nairn et al. 2007: 2), but it is precisely to respond to those power imbalances that child and youth researchers attempt involving their child-counterparts in order to work with them and not on them (Christensen & James 2008). Nairn et al. adapted their methodology to include the sub-cultural capital (Nairn et al. 2007:4) of youth in New Zealand in what is termed peer-research.

It is in the same vein that the project Deconstructing the Canon with Elementary School Students: Participatory Research in Practice unfolded: the project by Deszcz-Tryhubczak et al. (2018 accepted) involved extending the methodological scope of their research and working with children as co-researchers in the field of children’s literature studies in order to contribute to children’s participation in Poland. Their work is, in their own words, “purposely confrontational” as it is “directed against the adultism prevailing in children’s literature studies” (ibid: 1 of accepted version).

Deszcz-Tryhubczak’s intergenerational research team was comprised of ten minor child researchers from grade five and six, all of whom were also avid readers and members of the Educational Discussion Club at Primary School No. 28 in Wrocław, and three adults including two children’s literature scholars and a teacher of Polish language. The team had three strategic meetings in a classroom where the setting of the desks was reorganised into a circular constellation and during the first two meetings the child members learnt about different forms of qualitative and quantitative methods. After that, the child members divided themselves into three groups, selected their preferred research tools and agreed upon the course of action.
Some months later, the teams had procured 124 survey respondents from primary school, staged a focus group discussion with 4 pupils from grade 4 and conducted observation in school corridors and libraries to know how many peers read during breaks. The child researchers were also consequently involved in the dissemination of their findings to the school community and policymakers. Here, one observes more evident manifestations of overlaps between new forms of citizenship and research that emerge as a result of children’s status as right-bearers.

While the project *Deconstructing the Canon with Elementary School Students: Participatory Research in Practice* can be considered as a strategic inclusion of school children in organised peer-research activities, Warming’s ethnographic work in a Danish Day-Care centre (Warming 2011) may be seen as a strategic inclusion of the *researcher-self* in children’s life-worlds. All in all, Nairn, Warming and Deszcz-Tryhubczak’s works are examples that belong to a body of scholarship based on research with children as opposed to on children. Such a variety of scholarship is also oriented towards children’s empowerment in acknowledging the asymmetrical power relations between children and adults that are played out in both scientific as well as social and pedagogical realms.

As in Warming’s ethnographic work (2011), my study also entailed a conscious and strategic inclusion of the researcher-self in children’s life-worlds. Further, as in Nairn’s work, I tried to draw upon children’s subcultural capital in every phase, except towards the conclusion – as I re-turned to my question and sought support in literature that resonated with the directions my research consultants and co-explorers had pointed towards.

### 3.3.3. Ontological Reconsiderations of Pre-positionality

Apart from the obvious differences in participant constellations, research questions and agendas, what distinguishes my approach in this study from the aforementioned exemplary works, as well as my own former work with child monks (Biswas 2013; 2016), is that it does not directly address children’s worlds in order to improve them. Instead what I address here is the adult and adultist position after following engagement with and inclusion of children, and after due reflection on the nature of childhood. In this sense, its contribution to discussions in methodology as well as pedagogy is related to discussions regarding self-reflection and self-positioning. In abstract
terms, this work has been about re-turning afresh to where one started, after having been somewhere else.

The work may also be seen as participatory research, although children were not co-researchers as in Deszcz-Tryhubczak’s case, but co-explorers - accompanying me into a journey, trying to understand other ontological dimensions of their mundane realities. It also did not hold onto an agenda of empowering children through research. There is a value in such projects, but empowerment concerns both sides. In this sense, discussing ways for adults to shift their pre-positionalities - after having ontologically and epistemologically validated their child counterparts - could compliment research directly intended towards children’s empowerment.

The question of empowerment concerns the side that is recognised as in need of empowerment as well as the side which empowers. The latter is concerned insofar as it requires conscious shifts in the pre-positionality in both the material as well as the ontological sense of the term. By ontological sense I mean first and foremost the acknowledgement that something exists on the other side regardless of whether or not one can grasp it. In other words, I mean an ontological validation that is indispensable to the how-ness of knowing.

In his work on the secret lives of trees, Wohlleben (2015) presents a perspective that recognizes thinking, feeling and communication networks in the lifeworld of trees27. While this could be recognised as a form of anthropomorphistic understanding, it is at the same time an ontological validation of historically silenced cultures28 that ‘speak’ different ‘languages’. It is only through an ontological validation that the horizons of an epistemological engagement with a particular lifeworld could come forth.

An ontological validation and the epistemological gains that spring forth (from it) necessarily imply shifts in the pre-positionality. In practical terms, it implies that a new relationship between oneself and the other emerges. It is something that simply happens as a result of a new-found awareness. One may continue taking regular trips into the forest while on holiday, but the experience of being in a forest of trees will play out differently. The changes may well be highly subtle, for example in the way the feet now start touching the ground during the act of walking, or a slightly deeper breath or longer gaze at the greenery one is surrounded by. Thus, this undertaking

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27 I digress here by bringing in this example in order to show that positionality and ontological validation calls for alterations in methodological considerations and broadens epistemological horizons in natural sciences too.

28 The word culture here signifies both - its biological as well as social sense.
gives way to knowing (appreciating) new things within that which one takes for granted (as already known).

A simultaneous process of how I sense\textsuperscript{29} and make sense of the other side transforms. For a scientist concerned with forests, the shift in pre-positionality will lead to methodological shifts as well. This includes, for instance, new ethical considerations in scientific processes. It is not only the epistemological stance that is transformed as a result of an ontological validation, but along with it the ethical positions too. In this manner one can see that one can in fact observe the unfolding of a holistic philosophical foundation (ontological, epistemological and ethical) that transforms itself\textsuperscript{30}.

For childhood research, the ontological validation of children’s lifeworlds on its own terms called for a paradigm shift that emphasized research with rather than on children (Christensen and James 2008). As a result, qualitative approaches that were primarily ethnographic and co-exploratory in nature began emerging. New self-positionings, redefining the researcher such as the ‘least adult role’, came forth into empirical research (Mandell 1988; Corsaro 1985). Corsaro (ibid.) suggested that participating in children’s life worlds by among other things playing with them included letting them define and shape the role of the ethnographer.

The significance of bodily experience in taking on the least adult researcher role, as discussed by Warming (2011), further opens up possibilities of access to children’s experiences in order to come back and reflect from positions of adulthood.

\subsection*{3.3.4. Warming and The Significance of Bodily Experience in Least Adult Researcher Roles}

Warming (2011) argues that taking on the least adult role gave her access and allowed her to acquire a familiarity and identification with children’s perspectives, which wouldn’t have been possible by assuming a detached observer- or other adult positions. “Despite the impossibility of dissolving power relations in the ongoing negotiations to gain access, the ‘least adult

\textsuperscript{29} Through sense experience i.e. through touch, smell, sight, sound and such.

\textsuperscript{30} These ‘branches’ of what constitutes the philosophical tree need not be as strictly distinct as Western academia has traditionally categorized them. Classical schools of Indian philosophy are an example of how such categorizations may not always apply (conf: Chatterjee & Datta 2016).
role’ constitutes a mis-reiterating performance which enables the researcher to gain access to areas of children’s worlds which would otherwise not be accessible through the ‘contextual constructed natural adult role’” (ibid: 44).

The how-ness of knowing includes the position one assumes with respect to that which one seeks to know something about. Warming (2011) illustrates this through her discussion on the epistemological implications in light of the "positioned nature of experience". During her ethnographic undertaking in a Danish day-care centre, Warming as a ‘least adult’ was seated around a long oval table to sort out Lego bricks by colour. The task was given by one of the teachers who provided the objects required in order to complete the task. Several children could not reach boxes placed in the middle of the table without leaving their chairs. Some of the children did nothing, some called attention to the problem without receiving a response and some began to play with the bricks instead. One of the children began looking into a book, but was retold to sort the Lego bricks out. The boredom was becoming evident to Warming as the children began messing about, fighting, trying to sneak away or playing farting games and singing about who farted. Warming experienced the boredom too and instinctively started playing a magic game with some of the children.

The game constituted using an imaginary wand and coming up with as bizarre a wish as possible, which would then be rendered true by the magic wand. While it felt nice to respond to the experience of senselessness and boredom with an imaginary magic wand, it was equally an experience of doing something dangerous. This was mainly because Warming was afraid that the teacher would realize that she was taking part in sabotaging the Lego-sorting project. As a result of the positioned production of experience, participation in the children’s sabotage of the teacher’s pedagogical agenda just happened.

The experience of being unable to comply with the demands and rules of the situation was a result of the physical and social position i.e. sitting on a small chair from where she could not reach the boxes. Moreover, in performing a child-like position, Warming was not actually allowed to do so either, in the first place. From this position, the situation did produce a senseless and absurd experience. From the position of a detached observer, the situation would have been perceived differently. "The point is that experience is positioned, so that my experience as a participant positioned in a child-like position was different to that of performing a more normal adult role. I do not claim that this experience was identical to the children’s (multiple) experiences; however it does constitute a very good starting point
for reflecting on and asking about what it means to be a child, or rather to perform a child's position. Thus, bodily experience gained through performance of the least adult role opens up access to children's perspectives” (Warming 2011:45).

The positioned nature of bodily experience through role-performance and the epistemological accesses it allows for - necessarily occur in inter-dependent role-constellations in a setting. The role constellations in Warming’s case included, according to the description, the day-care teacher, the day-care children, and the researcher in a day-care center setting. One of the reasons that the least-adult researcher role allows for greater phenomenological access is due to the context-specific fluidity it implies.

One is methodologically allowed to cross taken-for-granted borders and engage as if one were a child in a day care among other children in relation to the teacher. The experience cannot be identical as it occurs within the confines of separate physical bodies, but it is the closest one can come to simulating experiences which can broaden epistemological horizons. In other words: to know approximately what is from another perspective. The basic question being asked by the adult-researcher is -: what role to take in relation to the settings and roles I find myself in?

As a researcher, who is herself regulated by adult-determined processes of democratic knowledge production, performing this question in practice can augment ambiguity and start unconcealing one’s own ignorance and immaturity. Here, the dominant position of both the adult and the researcher as expert and research becomes a process of muddling through.

3.3.5. Childhood Research through Ignorance

Gallacher & Gallagher (2008: 504) point out that encouraging children to participate in knowledge creation about themselves paradoxically implies encouraging them to participate in processes used to regulate them. Therefore, children’s participation in both democracy and research cannot simply mean that children start replicating what adults do. The inclusion of children implies re-conceptualisations of democracy, research and participation itself.

For example, recognising children’s participation through play and learning, whereby they give/are challenged to bestow active meanings upon their environment, implies recognising playful and ambivalent forms of citizenships (Jans 2004). Furthermore, adult-centred ideas of democracy
based on clear-cut rights themselves fall into question. Consequently, the horizons of cultural criteria of democracy need to be altered to include representation and participation regardless of age (Wall 2011; Moosa-Mitha 2005).

Consequently, the recognition of children as citizens and children’s cultures implies shifts in adult-centric cultural criteria of democracy (Wall 2011; Moosa-Mitha 2005). In the case of research methodology, the repositioning extends beyond adopting child-friendly tools of research, but implies re-thinking the researcher-self and the methodological attitude itself (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008). Similarly, the inclusion of children and childhood into specific criteria of philosophising has given way for adults to pedagogically engage with children on philosophical topics. Nonetheless, despite recognising their existential sameness to adults (Schjelde-rup & Olsholt 2002) and the idea of considering children as philosophical co-explorers (ibid.), a strong attachment to word-based dialogue as The form of philosophising is evident. Moreover, this attachment reinforces the pedagogical gaze whereby children are invariably addressed in the developmental context.

Including children in any field of study implies a structural realignment of that field (Duane 2013:1). To include any silenced group in the broadest sense in any field of study is to realign the very structure of that field. The methodological and theoretical realignments apply first and foremost to the institutionally-nested individuals who perform a study. The realignment is possible through questioning, asking what it means to be a researcher and simultaneously what is asked of a researcher in that field. It is a shift in the how of that which is to be known, as it emerges as an ontologically reflexive, back-and-forth relationship between the knowledges and the knowers.

For childhood research, the inclusion of children has meant a shift from various discussions regarding child-friendly methods and strategies to include children (Barker and Weller 2005; Weller 2006; O’Kane 2000; Punch 2002; Clark 2017; Clark & Moss 2001; Burke 2005; Greenfield 2004; Hart 1997; Lancaster and Broadbent 2003; Kellett 2004; 2005; 2010) to giving attention to the methodological attitude itself (Gallacher and Gallagher 2008). Following Lee (2001) and Horton (2001), Gallacher and Gallagher (2008) emphasize the aspects of interdependence, incompetence, incompleteness and vulnerability.

The emphasis is not on these attributes in children and childhood; these attributes are rather located within the adult researcher and researcher community as a result of having encountered such properties outside
themselves and the community. In other words, it is about coming back to the self after having acknowledged something about the other. “Like ‘becoming’, ‘immaturity’ has been largely sidelined in ‘new paradigm’ childhood research, viewed as an unhelpful product of the hierarchisation of the adult–child binary. Yet, within the ontological framework suggested earlier, the distinction between maturity and immaturity becomes as irrelevant as that between being and becoming. If all being is becoming, then ‘we’ are all constitutionally immature – and this is not to be seen negatively, as something lacking, but rather in terms of potential” (ibid: 511). Consequently, a position of methodological incompleteness and immaturity comes forth, whereby the dominant status of the researcher as an expert dissolves and research fundamentally becomes a process of muddling through.

3.4. Summary

Keeping in mind that major critiques of PC recommend taking adult positionality more seriously along with the desirability of asking what education and philosophy can learn from children and childhood, I have presented some theoretical and methodological considerations that bring about a re-conceptualisation of adult positions in childhood research as well as larger democratic state constellations within which modern islanded childhoods are system-immanent.

In contemporary high Human Development Index contexts, children and childhood are invariably addressed in a developmental context and thereof positioned as default addressees of pedagogy. The address comes from a position of entitlement to teach; I have expressed this as the pedagogical gaze which is evident when it comes to philosophically intended engagements with children and childhood too.

Recognising both children and adults as everyday-philosophers at par doesn’t alone seem to simply nihilate the existential power imbalance of the child-adult dynamic. Insofar as those who have the status of adults in a given society team up to perform and maintain normalized realities, the scope for interpretive philosophical agencies of children get systematically constrained. Consequently, taken-for-granted ways of seeing become universalized partly by keeping game changing actors like children at bay.

Broadly speaking, the entitlement to teach and cultivate a ‘not-yet-developed’ subject can be observed with regard to children as well as non-white people as in the case of Kant’s comparison of children to inhabitants
of Tahiti. It appears as though qualities such as being natural and emotional, which can also be perceived as freedom, facilitated such comparisons from a pedagogically entitled point of view. Additionally subjective, non-analytical and organic orientations where fantasy, i.e. the realm of counterfactuals, precedes a particular kind of logic, contributed to empowering the pedagogical authority of those having the status of developed adults. Bluebond-Langner’s axioms, however, reveal that the interpretive agency of children is in profound motion since the earliest ages, especially in so far as an epistemological balancing between knowing and concealing i.e. mutual pretense is concerned.

Within larger democratic contexts, especially after the ratification of the UNCRC, the position of children in society, education as well as research beckons reconceptualisations on matters of participation and what one participates in. Moreover, re-positioning children invariably implies re-positioning adults in society, education as well as research. Therefrom, not only new ways of knowledge reproduction are manifested, but also the possibility of asking new questions. The scope of asking consequently need not be limited to improving modern islanded lifeworlds of children, but can also be directed towards what adults can learn from them. In practice, matters of child-adult power imbalance across philosophical, academic and educational realms still continue to receive focused considerations.

In childhood studies, the least-adult role has conventionally been widely discussed and strategically assumed in order to respond to questions of power. Proponents of the least-adult role have generally emphasised letting the researcher be influenced by her participants. Especially Warming’s work sheds further light upon the positioned nature of bodily experience in terms of including children in research dynamics, as well as coming closer to understanding what it could be like to be in a child’s position. Here, one can observe a methodological and epistemological movement that brings the gaze of the adult researcher back to herself. By way of explanation, this broadly refers to coming back to the self after having acknowledged something about the other.

As Gallacher and Gallagher (2008) have pointed out, the aim of including children as co-explorers in research processes is not to make them act like adults. Accordingly, an emphasis on ignorance as a point of departure

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31 The same can be said about doing philosophy with children, insofar as the aim of such projects cannot be to teach children how to act in a way that constitutes philosophical from adult perspectives.
is made, whereby interdependence, incompetence, incompleteness and vulnerability are validated as belonging to doing research with children.

Correspondingly, viewing children as beings illuminates the becomingness of adults, who are traditionally understood as complete and developed. Therefore, an emphasis on interdependence, incompetence, incompleteness and vulnerability does not mean focusing on these attributes in children, but rather recognising these attributes within the adult researcher and research community. In this manner, a position of methodological incompleteness and immaturity comes forth, dissolving the dominant status of the researcher as an expert. Research with children as co-explorers then becomes a process of muddling through the mysterious.

Hereinafter, I move forward to present the phases of exploration at the intersection of philosophy and childhood. The exploration has taken place through both pre-systematic and systematic phases. All along, the endeavour has consisted in exiting class-based philosophising with children i.e. a context in which the child is positioned as the default pedagogical addressee. Simply desiring a more equal pedagogical child-adult relationship turned out to be, however, insufficient. External and internal borders intersecting at multiple levels deter the desirability of inquiry itself. External borders included literal borders such as national borders, as well as with bureaucratic and financial borders of inquiry. Scientific artefacts i.e. disciplinary borders formed part of the cohort of intersecting external borders. Internalised borders of chronological age, my embodied child/adult binary and especially the way it played out in trying to exit class-based philosophical relationships with children were also determinant factors). Chance, as I will recount in the following, has played a significant role in how every frontier could be crossed in the course of muddling through this inquiry.

Before presenting an account of the trajectory of the exploration starting at the embryological Phase 0, I will provide a description of the attributes of the study in order to make the theoretical fibre (of the nature of) this exploration visible. Thereafter, I will give an account of the phases that firstly led to the possibility of asking what the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults is when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds, and secondly allowed me to in fact briefly enter those playfully constructed worlds in order to answer the question I had raised.
4. Phases of Exploration

Conventional positivistic attitudes and expectations towards qualitative research might tend to articulate a problem that is defined and articulated through a research question, followed by an application of tools gathered in for data collection, which is analysed in order to produce results or solutions for the problem that was posited. However, especially for exploratory projects that have a philosophical interest in a particular phenomenon, in this case child-adult pedagogical relationships in the light of philosophising, one is not actually dealing with a problem. Rather, one is invited to participate in the mysterious. According to Marcel (1949), “A problem is something which I meet, which I find completely before me, but which I can therefore lay siege to. But a mystery is something in which I am myself involved, and it can therefore only be thought of as a sphere where the distinction between what is in me and what is before me loses its initial validity” (ibid: 117).

In the same vein, Gallacher and Gallagher’s (2008) approach of muddling through research with ignorance as the point of departure in order to include children as co-explorers requires a sustained ambiguity tolerance towards something as mysterious as assisting self-reflexivity. Data, in such a vein of approach, need not constitute some sort of building block for research, but is a “a potential dialogue partner, a source of questioning, doubt, and a problematisation of existing/dominant expectations and frameworks” (Alvesson and Kärreman 2011: 120). Therewith, the nature of this self-reflexive exploration can be grasped through the following attributes.

4. 1. Attributes of the study at hand

The attributes of this study are essentially nomadic, hybridic and pluralistic, wherein the primary means of knowing has been the adult researcher-self (set) in a dynamic relation to children who were gradually and deliberately allowed to influence the course of this work and my positions.

The consistent interest has been in the subject of philosophy and childhood in the early 21st-century global context. Particularly, it as directed at exiting forms of class-based philosophy with children usually found in the spatio-temporality of institutionalised schooling. I started ignorantly, with a relatively unproblematic view of children as default pedagogical addresses and the conception of doing philosophy as bound with spoken language.

The exploration went through systematic phases over a period of four
years travelling back and forth between Germany and Norway. These systematic phases were preceded by a non-systematic stage over a period of approximately ten years going back and forth between India and Italy, culminating in Norway. All along, I was in contact with children and childhoods directly or indirectly concerning this particular exploration. Here, the term children is not limited to a static age-group. It refers to the temporal others whom I first encountered as children and in reference to whom the self-reflexive exploration could travel.

4.1.1. On Nomadicity

Nomadicity, in the context of this study, refers not only to the geographical localisations and multiple language-scenes that I travelled with curiosities and doubts. The reference is also to the academic disciplines that have contributed to this study, namely:

philosophy as was taught at university in Pune
childhood studies as was taught at university in Trondheim\textsuperscript{32}
general pedagogy as approached at university in Bayreuth.

While my first two academic roles put me in a position of being a student whereby I was taught, the third role as a junior researcher in Bayreuth enabled me to align my work with a peculiar approach to pedagogy. The approach was primarily to view educational science as a cultural science (Clemens 2015) that is not restricted to specific institutions. Moreover, an emphasis was placed on the need for global perspectives in educational sciences (Clemens 2008). And lastly, my experience pivoted on a recognition of the dysfunctionality of specific educational models due to the limited singular, Western logic that underlies it (Clemens & Biswas 2019).

Clemens’ work opened the way to realising that educational institutions like schools and universities are in fact culture-specific practices of knowing and learning. This resonated with the social construction approach of childhood studies. Further, it also promoted a more contextualised understanding of the individuated, individualised and institutionalised nature of

\textsuperscript{32} By the time I concluded this project, however, the new paradigm of childhood studies had become old and discussions regarding new directions had come to the fore. Conf: Spyrou 2018; Spyrou et al. 2018
education in high Human Development Index societies within which the child citizens of my study were nested.

Geographical localisations with reference to the academic fields have added to the specific complexity of my task. Had I studied philosophy, childhood studies and researched for general pedagogy all in the same university, this would have been a very different work. Academic approaches differ from continent to continent, country to country, county to county, city to city and university to university – this much has surely become evident to me in this journey.

Studying philosophy from high school until master level in Pune (India) firstly meant seven formatory years of systematically studying Western and Indian approaches side by side. One did not just study metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, logic, aesthetics and so on. All these themes were systematically and equally delivered from the perspectives of both Western and Indian schools. This implied that one was constantly made aware that highly diverse Western worlds of ideas are not the only ones available – there are diversities. In European institutions however, it is unlikely or rare to find such an approach to studying philosophy. Usually the non-Western Schools of Thought are something extra or otherly departmentalised like Indology and Tibetology, or included as part of religion.

Childhood Studies, which is interdisciplinary in itself, presents significant international variation, with overlapping strains from North America to England (Wall 2012) and also from Norway to Germany, as I noticed. Until then, it had not been obvious to me that theorisations themselves happen within particular languagescapes and networks. So while in the Norwegian context English and Norwegian were languages for developing Childhood Studies, in Germany most work remained within the horizons of the German language. Traditionally speaking, the (former) Norwegian Center for Child Research tended to take its point of departure from the new paradigm of childhood studies (e.g. James, Jenks and Prout 1998; Qvortrup 1994; the Childhood Journal of Global Child Research), as a strong reaction to the developmental psychologisation of children.

But Germany had its own specific tradition of childhood research coming from the early 1900s (e.g. Die Kinderfehler: Zeitschrift für Kinderforschung/The Child-Errors: Journal for Child Research) and oriented towards the psychologically corrective handling of children in pedagogical contexts. Contemporary childhood research seemed largely influenced by the work of Manfred Liebel (e.g. 2009; 2017), which is rights-oriented and concerned more with applications of children’s rights in the global South. The emphasis at the (former) Norwegian Center for Child Research was on a strong rejec-
tion of Piaget’s developmental approach to childhood, which I wouldn’t have possibly inherited had I done my degree in Germany.

So, while childhood studies borrows from fields like sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, geography, literature, political science, and economics – the way this interdisciplinarity itself played out in Norway and Germany showed remarkable differences.

In terms of General Pedagogy too, there has been a geographical and disciplinary specificity. My exposure to educational theories prior to Bayreuth was solely through philosophy of education and childhood studies, mainly with reference to Article 28 of the UNCRC: the right to education (as schooling) (conf. Cohen 1989; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner). The term Allgemeine Pädagogik, translated as General Pedagogy, was a categorisation that I was not aware of because I had neither encountered it in India nor in Norway. Within this specificity, the University of Bayreuth clubbed Psychology, School Pedagogy and General Pedagogy under the rubric of Educational Sciences under one faculty unit which fell under the Faculty of Culture Sciences.

It took me a while to grasp exactly what it was that I was being academically relocated to and to orient myself accordingly. Understanding education science as a cultural science wherein constructions of pedagogical addressees had a history and played a pivotal role in educational projects (Clemens 2015) was a result of coming in contact with General Pedagogy as a field specifically in Bayreuth.

The oscillations in my mindset were not only between the intersections of geographical and academic localisations with respective language-determined scientific activities, but the differences of language use in every field itself, too. This constituted one of the main intellectual challenges in the research process. At the same time, it offered me, first, extremely rich and diverse resources to draw upon. Secondly, I was not directly limited by the borders of specific academic ‘fields’. Lastly, it paved the way for an organically emergent hybridity that could make an innovative contribution to discussions pertaining to philosophy and childhood in the broader context of education as a cultural science.

4.1.2. On Hybridity

One of the main areas that the hybridity of this work directly influenced was both methodology and choice of methods, as well as the nature of analysis.
Another area where the influence is evident is in the choice of literature. This particularly slowed down the writing process, as it was impossible to know beforehand what kind of academic readers of education philosophies and sciences this work would address. In addition to this, it took time to engage with questions regarding an appropriate format and language-use that could communicate the complex and complicated trajectories of this project in the simplest, graspable, yet academic manner across disciplines. As I did not always manage finding timely creative responses to such challenges, the shortcomings resulting from them are an integral part of this text. In terms of methodology and methods, this work draws and builds upon mainly, but not only, philosophy and childhood studies.

Among philosophical methods – the method of doubt was present with respect to the dominant institutionalised practises of PC. It doubts the very possibility of doing philosophy in a classroom (Hinman 1975) and it doubts the epistemological entitlement of the adult to be philosophical guides for children. Within a classroom context, argumentation, specific systems of logic and performative acts such as formulating questions, debating, discussion and dialogue can certainly be taught. Further, an adult does have something to teach a child in this regard, due to their experience and capacity to articulate (it) through language.

However, as I have discussed elsewhere (Biswas 2017), argumentation, applying specific logical principles and sitting and talking belong to the realm of communicating philosophical ideas to others. In turn, they alone cannot be used to define what it means to philosophise.

Furthermore, I have drawn upon philosophical methods especially in the third phase of the research i.e. immersive playing. Namely, that entails the performing of phenomenological bracketing (Husserl 1962) with the help of an observation technique based on Vipassana meditation as taught by S.N. Goenka (Hart 2011). This approach brought co-existing worlds into being that called for an ontological validation i.e. a confirmation that they exist. Two-valued, either-or logical principles could not meaningfully support such a validation. Therefore, I switched to pluralistic principles of the Jaina school of Indian logic (conf. Shastri 1990; Chatterjee & Datta 2016; Shah 2000; Ganeri 2001; Ganeri 2002) when needed.

Childhood Studies has been the primary field informing the qualitative approach to research with children that I engaged with for this work. Firstly, because it is state of the art in terms of:
a. addressing the power imbalances between children and adults, b. its emphasis in doing research with and not on children, and c. the methodological openness of the field to innovation of methods.

And secondly, because of the minimum contextual gap between where the theories come from and where I was applying them. The phenomena of childhood studies are something that comes from the high Human Development Index context. Particularly, the (former) Norwegian Center for Child Research, Trondheim has been an important factor in the development of the field in Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon academic traditions. Ideas of children’s participation in society as citizens or in scientific projects as researchers are relatively common for these contexts.

Children in the Norwegian context are viewed as equal rights bearers and adults are obliged to take their voices into account even in institutionalised, pedagogical contexts. For example, the third section of the National Kindergarten Framework (Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training 2017) is devoted to the child’s right to be involved (Norwegian: medvirkning). Political commitment to institutionalised child-centeredness in the Norwegian context is also evident through the establishment of a Children’s Ombudsman in 1981 (Nilsen 2008:40). Therefore, the question for society is not whether children can and should have a say regarding their own lives, but how such a directive should best be realised (e.g. Bae 2009).

Not surprisingly, my experimental approach and questioning of the adultist position was encouraged by parents, fellow academics and the city municipality. Moreover, there was friction-free room for communicating the development of the project to the local community (e.g. Biswas 2016 b; discussions with the Child and Youth Research Seminar in 2017, 2018). Contextualisation in this light was not only in terms of theory, but also a reflexive engagement with the larger lay and academic community wherein the empirical parts of this project were primarily realised. Moreover, it provided a balancing element to the inherent hybridity of the project.

4.1.3. Ontological validation through Pluralism

The immersive experience of entering children’s playfully constructed world as a guest was performed through a phenomenological bracketing of my own world as a network of meanings. In addition to the suspension, I had to ontologically validate the worlds that were being constructed. It
is not that ‘my world’ in fact completely ceased to exist as a result of me suspending it. This was simply a strategy to let the other world be more evident as real in my experience. How can play, however, be as real as the real world? And yet, how can play be as real as the real world? Something can either be real, or not real. It certainly cannot be both. Such an expectation of ontological and epistemological singularity would have been an obstacle in taking those playfully constructed worlds seriously.

Consequently, I adopted the many-sidedness position to reality based on Jaina logic\(^{33}\). This particular approach allowed me to ontologically validate the ‘play’ worlds without negating the existence of the ‘real’ world. There are no absolute truths according to Jaina logicians and hence propositions are qualified by the term *somehow*. Somehow, the playfully constructed worlds and the ‘real’ world both exist as well as do not exist. They are also somehow indescribable. What the Jainas propose in the face of perceived inconsistency, is that there is an internal consistency in each standpoint (Ganeri 2002:274).

Qualitative research seeks to understand the inner logic from the standpoint of the parties involved. Such inner logics may often be in contradiction to the standpoint of what constitutes logic for the standpoint that conducts the research. For this, as I have emphasised - an ontological validation of the other side is indispensable. Precisely due to this need - qualitative research cannot adhere to a taken-for-granted position on logic. Two-valued logic promises researchers a limited form of consistency that is possible only by negating the aspects that produce an experience of epistemological ‘inconsistency’. The either-or thinking is successful only in so far as it conceals the pluralistic nature of social reality itself. Distinctions like real worlds and play worlds also belong to this kind of social reality.

Especially if children are to be involved in philosophical negotiations in child-adult interactions - a philosophical commitment to pluralism seems necessary. Otherwise, the exclusion of children in order to reaffirm adult-team based performances of ‘reality’ as Reality (Goffman 1990:96) continues to be reproduced. Here, philosophical negotiations are not taken to be

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\(^{33}\) Jaina logic is not the only school of thought that can support an engagement with pluralism. I chose it as it was available to me through my academic resources. Ganeri (2002) also discusses an example of pluralism from Western philosophy. There are limitations to my application of the Jaina view in this project. Notwithstanding this, it is primarily engaged as part of a larger recognition for the need for an epistemologically grounded pluralism in research, as well as educational practices such as philosophy with children.
just talk-based or argument-bound, but rather as done with the whole body. So, the entry of the child in Professor Robert Kelly’s BBC live-telecasted Skype interview (BBC News 2017) is an example of a tiny act that disrupts the flow of an adult-team based performance of ‘reality’. It can be interpreted as a ‘disruption’ or a result of ‘ignorance’ and the naive child-other ‘not-yet knowing’ how the world works. Somehow.

At the same time, it is also a de-construction of one of the many realities that exist. Furthermore, it is an invitation for the adult to further reflect on their performed roles as roles (Goffman 1990). Perhaps, it amounts to considering that the ‘developed’ self is often mistaken with developed roles at the base of which lies the identity of being an adult. In this sense too, the little things that children do matter much more, especially in light of de-constructing adult philosophical commitments. Consequently, an attempt to confront the many-sided nature of reality is called for – even though it means not knowing what to do with it.

4.1.4. Thematic and Geographical Routes

Here i.e. section 4.1, I have explained the theoretical fibre of the nature of this study, namely: nomadicity, hybridity and ontological validation through pluralism. The following sections aim at presenting the empirical phases of this longitudinal study.

The purpose of the empirical account is not to produce an accurate chronological timeline, but to illustrate overlapping aspects of qualitative research processes such as:

a. Motivation
b. Access to thematic and geographical fields
c. Ethics e.g. rights, reciprocity, consent
d. Data collection
e. Analysis (here, self-reflexive and interpretive)

Moreover, the account also accounts for the challenges that I met with in the process of recognising and traversing class-based philosophy with children who have generously accompanied me through the ambiguities inherent to a nomadic approach to qualitative research in an overheated world. While the written voice is mine, I cannot claim that the subjectivity behind it solely belongs to my individuated individual researcher self. The reason for this is
that my reflections and insights would not have been possible without the active and passive interactions that led to a shift in my perspective at the end of this endeavour. In this sense, this is an intersubjective, interpretive account based on the geographical and thematic routes cartographically represented as below:

Illustration 8: Geographical routes, Graphic by Emma Neumeyer

Illustration 8: Thematic routes, Graphic by Emma Neumeyer

In what now follows, I offer an account of relevant experiences and phases that contributed to my arriving at a childist perspective on philosophising with children after muddling through the aforementioned thematic and geographical fields.
4.2. Phase 0: Embryological Stages

*Impara l'arte e mettila da parte* (Learn the art and put it aside)

- Italian proverb

Phase 0 presents the course of experiences, encounters, relationships and positionalities that constituted the pre-conditions for this exploration to evolve. Not only can the originary motivation for this project be located in this phase, but also its progression. Conventionally, such accounts may be silenced or considered irrelevant to the textual presentation of academic research. In other words, the embryological context i.e. who, when, where, why and how of the unfolding of a particular questioning typically remains unaccounted for.

Insofar as it accounts for access to the thematic and geographical fields, the embryological context of the text is vital because it appertains to the relational field that made rationalising possible in the first place. During the unfolding of this particular questioning, the embryological Phase 0 is where momentums of fielding, reciprocity, consent and ‘data collection’ began. Phase 0 took place over approximately 10 years, starting from Pune (India) to Trondheim (Norway) via Arco (Italy) and culminating in Bayreuth (Germany), where the project found institutional support enabling me to keep returning to Trondheim to meet my co-explorers Ole, Enaya, Emma, Captain Duke, Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida. At the same time Sungjae, with whom I entered into a pedagogical relationship in Pune, may be seen as the first co-explorer in my nomadic course of inquiry.

4.2.1. From Mi Kyong’s Child to Sungjae Kim: Alternative class-based philosophising

To mark the pre-conception of my empirical explorations on the intersections between childhood and philosophy in the light of pedagogy, I have taken as a starting point the moment when I met Mi Kyong Kim - a school pedagogue from South Korea. The following recollection intends to introduce:

34 Other than Sungjae Kim and Enaya Mubasher, whose names are mentioned in original with their informed consent, names of other participants have been changed.
1. The first experiment in practising a child-friendly curriculum for doing philosophy outside the formal school context.

2. Initial experiences of myself in the role of a philosophy teacher in relation to a child as a pupil.

3. The first consciously experienced performative deconstruction of my pedagogical adult perspective by a child.

Mi Kyong Kim had recently moved to the city from South Korea with her nuclear family. We first met as classmates in the Bachelors of Arts, Philosophy programme of Fergusson College, Pune. It was mid-2000s and I learned with time that the decision of her family was partly due to an economically fluctuating situation in South Korea and partly to the fact that India would offer her the opportunity to have her child enrolled at a private English medium school within the family’s financial capacity.

Mi Kyong, however, was aware of the general limitations of modern schooling models and wished to offer her child an exposure to creative thinking based on a philosophical approach. That is why I was invited to be a private philosophy tutor for her child. At that time, Sungjae worked as a primary school pupil in Pune. In exchange for my service, Mi Kyong offered me meals with the family and introduced me to Korean food culture. This included participating in Korean tea ceremony rituals and learning about philosophical aspects of this practise.

My participation in the Korean tea ceremonies was mainly out of respect for what Mi Kyong’s family wanted to share with me and born from my curiosity towards understanding diverse forms of philosophising. The greater incentive, however, was the unique opportunity to eat delicious and healthy food once or twice a week. As a single university student, living alone on a small budget, I often tended to ignore eating properly. So I was more than delighted that, twice a week, I would be relieved of having to think about what to eat. Apart from the fact that I would save spending money on food, in my view, being served delicious food which was home-cooked with care made Mi Kyong’s offer very attractive.

The task itself that I was being assigned with gave me a sense of self-confidence and motivation. Having chosen to study philosophy full-time at university often implied being looked down upon by peers and challenged by family, elder acquaintances and even strangers. Natural and formal sciences were more respected than social sciences and humanities in
Pune. In my understanding, this was linked to their future professional value on the promising job market for IT, medicine, engineering etc.

Among social sciences, students of economics and psychology were usually (the ones that were) taken seriously. Philosophy students were generally perceived as wasting their time hanging around on kattas (parapets), drinking chai (Indian milk tea), talking for hours, reading useless stuff or coming up with absurd arguments and critically doubting social norms for no good reason. As a philosophy student, one rarely had a concrete answer to the question, “What are you going to do in the future?” Furthermore, what we did - was not perceived as doing. All in all - philosophy students were perceived as people with no real future opportunities or anything worthwhile to contribute to others. Being on the receptive end of such perceptions often affected my confidence and motivation. Therefore, Mi Kyong’s unique invitation came as much needed support as well as a unique opportunity to evolve a special curriculum for doing philosophy with children.

MiKyong gave me the freedom, time and trust to plan lessons for Sungjae. We talked beforehand about the kind of content and formats that would be part of Sungjae’s philosophy curriculum. Our agreement was that the main pedagogical direction was meant to strive for free thinking, with space for imagination. As a result, we initially labelled it ‘creative thinking’. The main components of Sungjae’s open-ended curriculum were:

1. Free, playful and imaginative thinking
2. Exposure to Western philosophical approaches
3. Exposure to Eastern philosophical approaches
4. Debating and argumentation

My focus during the first year was on building our rapport, letting Sungjae find his comfort with me and tuning into his personality. The first component was comprised of methods associated with the term child-friendly, such as drawing, colouring and playing, and improvised as well as arranged games. Although philosophical themes were allowed to emerge and I tried to pay attention to Sungjae’s inclinations, I had a very clear idea what the first philosophical theme would be, namely, the Self. The theme was introduced through the intertwined questions: Who am I? ↔ Who are you?. I dealt with these intertwined questions through a game. We would both sit face
to face with closed eyes. One person would open their eyes and ask, “Who are you?”. The other would think up any thing that came to mind, open one’s eyes and answer, “I am ______.” Then both would close their eyes again. In the next round the previous respondent would ask the question, and the previous questioner would answer. We kept repeating the sketch until we got bored or it was time for dinner. Sometimes we switched the question to “Who am I?” and the partner had to say any thing that came to their mind e.g. “You are ______.”. The goal was to imagine different versions of the idea of one’s self.

The idea of making the Self our first philosophical subject came from my early experimentation with polyglottism. Growing up in a multilingual environment, I had knowledge of some regional Indian languages. As is common in Indian curricula - learning languages had been a regular part of my formal schooling and university education too. When I met Sungjae, I was learning French and was noticing that formal language studies usually began with personal pronouns and the verbs: to be and to have. Further, one usually began with describing one’s self and gradually the scope of description was extended to other people and objects. Language teachers spent a lot of time on understanding meanings of nouns and verbs - but what pronouns such as I, you, us, them etc. and basic verbs such as to be and to have meant were usually treated as self-explanatory. So I applied formal insights from my linguistic education and transferred it to Sungjae’s philosophy curriculum, but emphasised aspects that were treated as self-explanatory by my language teachers.

As time progressed, I started to introduce philosophers and philosophical perspectives under labels of Western and Eastern traditions. My choices were influenced by my own tastes and university education as well as resources that were available on the market. I discovered a book series in a popular book store that offered introductions to Western philosophers in comic forms. And I began giving them to Sungjae to read at his own pace. They included some classical names like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, but we quickly moved to existentialists such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. Whenever Sungjae felt prepared, I would visit him and we talked about what he had read. For Eastern traditions, I could not find any analogous reading materials he could use. So, I showed him pictures of monks meditating or in yoga postures and facilitated talks on what Sungjae thought they were doing.

The following is the first section of a short two-part memoir that Sungjae (now a university student) wrote on my request, for the purpose of this
dissertation. My request to Sungjae was for him to share his side of the experience of those years as he now remembered. Three reasons for my request were:

a. To not depend solely on my personal memory as there was no accessible material evidence of that time e.g. learning materials, notes, diary entries, photographs, videos, recordings etc.

b. To include the ‘other’ perspective and co-construct the past (memory) for a more credible intersubjective account.

c. To broaden the scope for reflexivity in the reflective analysis.

The memoir describes the evolution of our dynamic as a teacher-pupil relation to a sort of a pedagogical friendship:

“I was first introduced to Tanu as a friend of my mother in my primary school years. I was supposed to embark on years of indeterminate classes without much description of what the class was going to be on. According to my recollection, it was going to be about philosophy but also about getting to meet a friend who wanted to philosophise with me. In the first class to my best recollection, Tanu spoke about the openness of the class not simply in terms of content the we shall embark on, but moreover, it became clear to me at the time that it was going to anything but a class. I remember that although I hadn’t been to a lot many ‘classes’ as such, but knew from my school experiences, classes always had a sense of direction but more importantly a sense of tutor-pupil dynamic. But already as Tanu and I began to simply discuss, it was becoming apparent that I felt neither like a pupil nor Tanu a tutor. She didn’t sit with me for half an hour (probably) trying to teach me or establish the one way student-teacher dynamic. Instead it felt like she wanted me to share my thoughts and experiences about topics and have a conversation of some type. Even the activities that we ended up doing, it was more of her outlining a rule of a game and us playing along with it. One of such activities that I remember for instance was about a word game where we tried to associate certain words (not clear of which kind) into a bubble. And it was as though she had no such intervention or regulations but improvisation as we would do playing a game with just the mutual understanding of the rules. After each session we would have a meal together with my family and then generally continue into dinner conversa-
tions. Thus, that was another element of our interactions — there wasn’t a sense of duty. Furthermore, these sessions never had a set schedule as far as I remember and by the end it was less regular and felt more like friends meeting up to talk about certain philosophical topics. Later on through our connections, she also began lending me some comic books about philosophical thinkers and I remember we used to talk about these thinkers. These sessions felt a bit more like classes as she was better aware of the contents of these books and obviously I was on the receiving end having never heard of these before. [...] “

Sungjae’s account highlights aspects I was unaware of during that phase. I believed then, that our pedagogical relationship was equal and free. Furthermore, since I used child-friendly methods, simplified things and was playful - I masked my interventions cleverly. In other words, I was playful in order to mask my pedagogical gaze and lead him towards the next planned components i.e.

a. exposure to Western and Eastern philosophical ideas, and

b. debating and argumentation.

The lessons were not framed in the logistical context of a ‘class’ as in the process of formal schooling. So it was a comparatively freer alternative. Nevertheless, I brought the class mentality with me insofar as the pedagogical vision was mine (formed in dialogue with Mi Kyong’s vision). The teacher-pupil roles were hierarchical, even though I managed to create a space where the pupil was protected from a sense of our hierarchy or duty.

The logistical freedom in terms of clock time and space was more fluid than school or after-school classes. As Sungjae points out - the family meals, meant to be my incentive for teaching, also became an extended and unintended context for the lessons. Nevertheless, as Sungjae’s account confirms: we moved in the planned direction of class-like activities aimed at teaching Sungjae about Western and Eastern philosophical traditions.

Somehow, this curriculum could be seen as an alternative to class-based philosophy. In hindsight though, I see that I viewed Sungjae as someone’s child whom I had to educate. I brought with me the principles of the classroom, although I concealed them cleverly. Sungjae by default remained a pedagogical addressee for me. In this sense, what was going on was simply: an alternative class-based philosophy.
After the first year or so, as part of giving exposure to Eastern philosophical traditions, I organised an excursion to an ashram (a spiritual hermitage center) near Pune. The community practised systematic silence following their master Meher Baba. The intention was to introduce Sungjae to an example of philosophical engagement that did not use words. Forms of language-based philosophising i.e. thinking, reading, writing and talking are no doubt found in Eastern traditions. At the same time the role of internal and external silence has also been emphasised in long term philosophical engagements through various practises. So both Mi Kyong and I agreed that this trip could be a fruitful experience for Sungjae.

According to the planned curriculum, in this phase Sungjae was only supposed to learn about Western and Eastern philosophical approaches. Systematic debating and argumentation were going to be the next step. But when we reached the ashram, within the first few hours of our arrival - Sungjae not only broke my pedagogical agenda, but also revealed my own philosophical commitments to me by deeply challenging both Mi Kyong and me together. It was our first philosophical debate and for me - the first philosophical debate as an adult with a child. I was not prepared and had Mi Kyong not been on my side - I don’t think I could have defended my position. It became very clear to me that Sungjae knew how to argue. So my plan of introducing argumentation and debates seemed unnecessary. All he needed was space to argue and debate, but I was hesitant to be challenged regularly by someone I was supposed to teach.

The difference between introducing debates and argumentation as part of the curriculum and debating organically as it occurred would be:

In the first case, I would represent opposing positions for the sake of practice and occasionally put Sungjae on the spot in order to improve his debating skills. In the second case, Sungjae would have identified and pulled me up on my own philosophical commitments - in turn putting me in the defence. At that time, I resisted the experience of being personally challenged by someone I believed was still lacking maturity.

Our first debate was a series of connected subjects which began with Sungjae questioning the possibility of internal silence i.e. absence of thought. It moved into questions of body-mind relation and whether the body is identical to the self. In the second half of his memoir Sungjae describes his perspective:

“[...] Beyond these in the category of the continuation of such interactions, I remember going on a retreat to an ashram with Tanu and my mother. I was
probably in my middle school years, and during this trip, probably because of the philosophical connections she and I had or the contextual situations of being in an ashram, we organically embarked on a philosophising discussion. But this interaction felt less like the interactions we’ve had previously. Furthermore, it did not feel like an activity nor in the nature of a personal conversation. What picked this interaction apart from previous instances were, primarily to do with the fact that we were conversing with different opinions and ideas — we were debating (the topic does not recall to me in clarity but it was roughly about the nature of being able to have a conscious state without ‘thinking’. I was in the position that one cannot be conscious while not thinking, and Tanu and my mother in the contrary position). Secondly, the nature of activity was definitely a lot more sophisticated than the previous instances of interactions with rules that we were abiding by. Although it was still a play of a kind, strictly in terms of philosophising for the sake of philosophising and vocational element of the interaction, it was still much more broadened in scope and organic. Thirdly, tutor-pupil dynamic of argumentation had mostly if not completely dissipated within this interaction. It was more of an interaction of dialectics than anything.”

What Sungjae remembers as an ‘activity’ was not in fact planned for him as other activities - where Sungjae believed something spontaneous was happening. It was triggered largely by his highly emotional disagreement with what was put forth to him.

The high degree of dissipation of our teacher-pupil dynamic was also, in my reflective view, a result of him taking a bold argumentative plunge. In turn, the event lead to the performative deconstruction of my imagination of him as Mi Kyong’s child and my pupil.

From that point onwards, my view of Sungjae and our relationship also started to change. An immediate consequence for my planned curriculum was that I simply continued sharing information about philosophers once in a while. The last component i.e. debate and argumentation was never implemented and the frequency of the meetings decreased.

My contact with Mi Kyong and her family continued. Sungjae and I also continued to interact and stay in touch with new projects in each other’s lives. The focus of my engagement with children started turning more towards performance-based activities as I had come into contact with a street theatre artist and pedagogue from Italy who regularly visited India to travel and train in Vipassana meditation.

To encapsulate the above, my first experiment of practising a child-friendly
curriculum for doing philosophy outside the formal school context made way for initial experiences of myself in the role of a philosophy teacher in relation to a child as a pupil. Within the frame of this experiment itself, I was confronted with a strong performative deconstruction of my pedagogical adult perspective by a child pupil. The practical consequence was that I did not continue pursuing Sungjae’s planned curriculum. Moreover, I guarded my view of children as immature vis-à-vis adults.

4.2.2. Playing by Chance: Early recognitions of positionality and power

Around the same period in mid-2000s that I met Mi Kyong, I had also gotten to know Erica Vicenzi, the co-founder and director of a street theatre company called ‘Teatro per Caso’ in the Trentino region of Northern Italy. Erica and I met in a Vipassana meditation centre near Pune where we were both students in a ten-day course.

On the last day of the course, we talked about each other’s lives and interests. Erica was going to transit through Pune before her next destination. So I suggested that, instead of a cheap hotel, she stayed at my place. Erica accepted my invitation. There was no explicit intention of welcoming her except that this person was very interesting, due to her knowledge and experience regarding children. Further, we were students training in the same school and she educed trust in me.

Erica and I spent a day in various conversations, shared meals, practised Vipassana and visited a park in the city. She also met my mother, who was visiting at that time. So the sense of familiarity and trust grew even more.

Erica was, for some unintelligible reason, convinced that I had to go to Arco - the town in northern Italy where she was based. As a citizen and resident of India, the bureaucratic steps required to cross continents alone were sufficient to keep me from even entertaining the idea of travelling to Italy. Dealing with the financial aspects i.e. thinking through the stronger Euro currency from a comparatively weaker Indian Rupee position was unthinkable. Erica, from her position as a citizen of Italy, understood the situation in India and did not pressure me further.

Instead, she returned to Italy, worked more, saved money and assumed the role of an official sponsor, taking care of the bureaucratic steps such as preparing an invitation for a visa application, giving an official guarantee for
the temporary nature of my visits. All that was required on my part was to trust further and take a leap of faith. So I accepted my new friend Erica in her new roles as official sponsor, informal guardian and mentor who would be responsible for me in Italy. From this point on, for about four chronological years, I spent between one to three chronological months every summer in Italy.

Under Erica’s mentorship and with her logistical support, I was given access to the opportunity to discover ‘real’ European lifeworlds and childhoods. On many levels, it was as though I was starting afresh, while at the same time previous knowledges served as building blocks. An example of this simultaneous movement of starting new and building on old is relating to the world around me through sounds generically termed as Italian and Basso Sarca dialects. I could refer to my knowledge of French, but at the same time I had to adapt to a new set of rhythms, tones and sound patterns simply paying attention to what sounds cause what sort of behaviours. Initially I could make sense of this new system of sounds, then gradually I repeated the sound-patterns myself and found myself ‘talking’ and ‘communicating’. My capacities grew to fit my tasks which did not require much reading and writing. For all practical purposes for the first two years I was somehow ‘illiterate’ in Italian.

In formal terms, my new linguistic capacities would not be easily re-cognisable or tested through the standardized order put forth by the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (abbreviated as CEFR; Trim 1997).

Somehow, this opened up new experiences of relating to childhood and children. In terms of relating to childhood, the experience of entering a new lifeworld and learning to communicate and navigate in it through new systems of sounds - among other aspects - somehow put me in a child-like position associated with something primitively natural, emotional, free, subjective and organic (Bøyum 2002). Having someone from this life-world as guardian, mentor and official sponsor attributed a renewed sense of interdependency to my child-like position.

Further, I had to allow a re-ordering of my bodily senses and cognitive sensibilities to start performing new roles in new teams addressing children. The new roles I assumed included modifications of conventional characters from Italian street theatre e.g. a noble court jester named Fiorellino, a nameless bubble-fairy, a majestic lady on stilts and a clown, illustratively summarised in the following caricature:
These new roles enabled unusual positions and consequent relationally contextualised powers. As an example, I highlight one episode, namely the time I performed the Majestic Lady on Stilts in a street festival near Lake Garda for public entertainment, including children, as seen on the right hand side in the image below.

*Illustration 10:* Experimenting with new roles and positions in relation to children, Graphic by Mihir Ranganathan

*Illustration 11:* Supra-adult, Majestic Lady on Stilts. To the left, Erica Vicenzi, co-founder of Teatro per Caso. Image by Paola Marcello
Learning to carry my embodied self on stilts required going through the micro-scale ambulatory process of learning to walk again. Gaining new ambulationary capacities began with discovering that extended 'parts' attached to 'my' physical structure move in balancing relationality to other parts named head, shoulders, arms, stomach and so on. The balancing relationality was not limited to the conjoining parts of 'my' bodily entirety. It involved the maintenance of constant awareness of direct contact to material surfaces e.g. the sole of my extended foot (base of the stilts) and the ground and well as an environment which regardless of direct contact permitted basic ambulation. The curious will to stand tall and move like Erica, to be able to touch and see things from a new level, was a primordial impulse for the process of discovering the complex internal and external material relationalities that made basic ambulation possible. This synesthetic primordial impulse was coupled with repeated oscillations between subjective states of fear of falling and the courage to stand up in responsiveness to the enthusiasm and encouragement of others that I could recognize through gestures coupled with facial expressions and tonalities of the sounds they were making.

Literally step by step, ambulatory efforts became 'walking' and opened way to further sequential movements termed - dancing. The scales of my positioned mobility became larger. Consequently, the world around me looked smaller. Even the tallest persons appeared like little child-like humans. Further, I could now play new roles. While this brought an increased sense of power, freedom and self-determination, it required that I remained in a teamed-up constellation of new roles that could also protect the larger scales of vulnerability and fragility. The more the scales of my physical being and performatory possibilities grew, the larger my dependence on social and material resources and risk of falling became. In turn, that contributed to unveiling new scales of vulnerability and fragility that made the relational power possible.

Basic material aspects like clothing the body demanded more resources to performatively sustain the powerful role of the big Majestic Lady. Additionally, other smaller roles without stilts were performed to facilitate, enable and protect the performatory navigation e.g. the characters of a little clown and a hybrid ribbon-fairy. These smaller roles contributed to the total impression management of the team (Goffman 1990) aimed at entertaining the team called ‘public’. The smaller roles carried out logistical func-

35 Although Erica and few friends could communicate in English, others communicated only in Italian. Such contexts also constituted spaces where I grasped linguistic expressions.
tions like moving around an amplifying sound-box for music. There was an even more primary contribution to sustaining the bigger roles. The smaller roles freed the crowded way in ensuring that our territorial space to walk was obstacle-free and mediated my contact with those passively performing common public roles in order to be entertained. In the absence of the smaller roles, the bigger roles would be exposed to an upscaled vulnerability and fragility of simply walking tall - where the positioned nature of bodily experience of power (Warming 2011) was coming from in the first place.

In stark contrast to the least-adult role (Warming 2011; Mandell 1988; Corsaro 1985), I was in a supra-adult role which was experientially revealing an upscaled vulnerability and fragility on the bigger side of the role-spectrum. In fact, the interconnectedness of vulnerability and fragility was also upscaled. If I fell, the consequences would very likely not be limited to the borders of my individual embodiedness. There was a larger chance that the vulnerability and fragility of the 'little humans’ and things contributing to my position would also be triggered. The entire constellation was a highly delicate web of interconnectedness between the small and the big. What was apparent on the surface however, was the powerful and entertaining energy of the situation it was the doing of individual larger-than-life units e.g. the Majestic Lady on Stilts. Rather, the power occurred and was relationally sustained through the form and not specific individual content (Jaa-ware on Foucault 2011).

To summarise, the mentorship of Erica Vicenzi and collaboration with Teatro per Caso gave me the possibility to cross continental borders and gain access to a direct sense experience of ‘real’ Europe for the first time. Entering a new lifeworld was a highly synesthetic experience. Especially coming into a new languagescape as an almost illiterate person, and being dependent on others, brought me closer to a child-like position.

New roles that I began performing for children and adults included the role of a supra-adult on stilts, which put me in the position of having to learn how to walk again, in turn making me aware of the relational power that could come with the ability to perform basic postures such as standing tall and walking. Further, the positioned nature of experience (Warming 2011) and the relationally constituted knotted experience of power and vulnerability, revealed themselves itself to me at macro- and micro-scales i.e.

1. The influential role of geographical and socio-cultural position of birth on my navigation possibilities in a globalised era.
2. The actually situated bodily positioning and navigation in relation to other bodies e.g. in a particular room, on a street etc.

These two positional scales invariably relate to each other insofar as the geographical and socio-cultural place of birth pre-determines access to rooms or streets where one can be in the first place. In other words, approved bureaucratic and structural individuation common for modern societies (Näsman 1994; Frønes 1994) - forms a prerequisite for gaining access to navigation within particular rooms or on roads within the context of interrelated national borders. Thereafter, as demonstrated with the example of the Majestic Lady on Stilts, the actually situated bodily position occurs in an interconnected web in relation to other bodily positions. Consequently, oscillating experiences of power and vulnerability are experienced.

Such interrelated scales of positionalities also come together with regard to a lifeworld turning into a research field, certain people getting positioned as research participants, inner landscapes of curiosity turning towards academic disciplines and a messy web of resulting questions conjoining into a singular research question. In turn, the self starts being positioned as a researcher.

Inter-personal mentorship, encouragement and material support from individuals like Erica Vicenzi or Mi Kyong Kim in phase 0 is indispensable to attaining relational positions that induce processes of exploring, learning and studying something one is interested in. However, for it to become something scientific, structural provisions and institutional networks across national borders must be in place that offer support to access spaces where modern science conventionally takes place.

The Norwegian Quota Scheme for Capacity Building (now discontinued) is an example of such a provision. The Quota scheme, as I will describe in the following, made it possible for me to navigate further in a high Human Development Index context - both as a space for institutional scientific activity as well as a field of research.

### 4.2.3. Hjerneflukt: Fielding by chance

Hjerneflukt is the Norwegian term for the global phenomenon of human capital flight, also known as ‘brain drain’. Although brain drain has been used to describe migration of qualified human capital from low development contexts to high development contexts, the term itself was coined
in the 1960s by the Royal Society of Britain to describe post-war emigration of qualified British citizens to North America (Brandi 2006; 2004). In theory, the term is contested because it treats the embodied human brain as a commodity (ibid.; Rizvi 2005). Post-colonial perspectives suggest taking deterritorialisations of cultures and subjective dilemmas arising from the global labour market into account while thinking about transnational mobility (Rizvi 2005). In practise though, as in the case of the Norwegian Quota Scheme, contributing to capacity building and NOT brain drain in low development contexts was strategically integrated into the funding contract.

My interrelated scales of positionalities had enabled me to be a member of a Norwegian partner university from the low Human Development Index context. Consequently, I qualified to apply for funding for the international research-oriented Mphil Childhood Studies programme hosted by the former Norwegian Center for Child Research, Trondheim. The funding contract formally required repaying 60% of the loan in case one resided outside one’s country of citizenship after completing the study programme. The debt-contract applies to all Norwegian citizens upon entry into the work market, on completion of higher education. Furthermore, the debt perishes with the individuated individual i.e. it is nullified when a person dies and is not transferred to any other related person. Formally, the same contract applied to quota students. A special provision permitted full cancellation of the education loan, in case the receiver returned to their country of citizenship and resided there for a minimum of 10 years. Residence in any other country, regardless of its position on the Human Development Index, implied debt.

Informally, quota students were obliged to conduct research in home countries and maintain focus on childhood and children-related problems in their own countries. Norwegian students had freedom to choose fieldwork locations in both high as well as low Human Development Index contexts. A long Western tradition of fieldwork abroad or in far off, foreign locations put Norwegian students in a better position to choose.

The Quota Scheme was a unique, generous and considerate provision to contribute to global equity. However, the focus on capacity-building and resistance to brain drain ironically contributed to maintaining inequity in science. Traditionally, the so-called ‘developed’ ones researched the so-called ‘developing’ contexts, while the ones from the ‘developing’ contexts

36 Often referred to as home country.
are expected and encouraged to do indigenous research\textsuperscript{37}. With the acceleration in the growth of the global tourism industry (Eriksen 2016:61), the one-way scientific traffic increases as access to ‘fields’ in cheaper locations also expands for those with appropriate documents and currencies, in turn reproducing the inequity in terms of who gets to play the ‘objective’ researcher and where. The first couple of images that show up on a Google search for \textit{<anthropologist in the field>} can illustrate this asymmetrical tendency of one-way scientific traffic and access. Access in the etymological sense nearing, coming closer, approaching, a passage or an ingressing is related to the word \textit{accede} which means to give consent and belongs with what I term \textit{fielding}.

Fielding is the process through which a thematic or geographical area becomes a field for a researcher. Entering Norway as a quota student gave me access to reading in a highly technologically advanced, state-of-the-art university context. Since the Quota Scheme made it possible for students from various continents to be in one room and exchange worldviews, it also gave me access to a (class)room with a high global demographic diversity. Moreover, I could be in rooms where established names in the field of childhood studies lectured and could access state-of-the-art literature through the library. This access could be possible over a period of two years because the university had consented to giving me a funded place as a Quota student, followed by the Embassy of Norway consenting to my departure from India and finally getting a Norwegian national identity number in Trondheim. With this number especially, navigation and participation in day-to-day life was possible. The number also gave me access to public and private language courses which gradually helped me navigate the languagescapes of the new lifeworld I was permitted to be in (Larsen 2013). Consequently, two fielding processes began in this new lifeworld i.e.

a. Thematic and intentional: Children and Childhood

b. Geographic and unintentional: Norway, particularly the city of Trondheim.

\textsuperscript{37} The developmentalist tendency in childhood research operate along similar lines. Children are included in academic research, but their voices are usually restricted to their own worlds. Nevertheless, in the public sphere, and especially in high Human Development Index contexts, one finds growing occurrences of child citizens coming to the fore and commenting on adult structures e.g. the Greta Thunberg-inspired #Fridaysforfuture movement that was mentioned in Part 1.
The first initiation into fielding children and childhood began with an auto-reflective memoir exercise with Anne Trine Kjørholt. Our class members were requested to write a memoir and reflect on their own contextualised childhoods wherever they grew up. With a demographic of participants from nearly fourteen different countries from five different continents - our discussions very soon revealed that childhood is a social construct and it is untenable to blindly accept age as a universal category for grouping human beings (e.g. Aries 1962; James and Prout 1997; James, Jenks and Prout 1998; Qvortrup 1995, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009; Alanen 2005, Corsaro 1993, 1997; Sorin 2006; Wyness 2000).

The primacy of such an exercise in fielding children and childhood goes beyond overcoming the natural attitude (Husserl 1962: 95) towards the temporal category of age as a ‘scientific’ fact. As adults, we tend to relate to children through our own conscious and subconscious memories of our respective childhoods. Our epistemological authority partly stems from a been-there-done-that attitude. Furthermore, our own unexamined past baggage is superimposed on our perceptions of children. Thus, training to be a researcher of children and childhood necessitates going through auto-reflective processes of re-visiting their childhoods as remembering adults (Briod 1989; Lippitz 1986). An actively undertaken, self-consensual access to one’s own childhood by means of travelling through one’s own consciousness i.e. memory, is the closest one can get to a lived experience of the temporal otherness (Beauvais 2018) of childhood. The consequently gained self-awareness not only facilitates nearing human beings termed children - it also decreases the probability that the temporal other before our temporal self evokes either a nostalgic sentiment of childhood (Aries 1962; Gullestad 1997), or the epistemological authority we tend to derive by default due to our ‘years of experience’ of existing and navigating as human beings on Earth.

Upon recognising the importance of Kjørholt’s auto-reflective memoir exercise for fielding children and childhood - I decided to extend it beyond the class. I did this by creating a passport-picture timeline of myself and I also gradually integrated it into my experimentation with polyglottism over the years that followed. As mentioned in section 4.2.1 - the Self is an important curricular component, especially in institutionalised Western language learning methods. Invariably, one is usually asked to write about where one comes from or an essay on one’s childhood. Apart from

38 Including the broader philosophical authority.
the passport-picture timeline of the self and the memoir in English that I wrote for Kjørholt’s exercise - I kept revising the exercise in every new language I would learn. The reason for such an exercise is to be able to access consciousness (in this case memory) through different languagescapes. Since as humans we dwell in Language (Heidegger 1990: 193), we tend to start mistaking word for world. Playing with our multilingual capacities to think about the world through diverse words, helps a little to not take our worded adult worlds too seriously. In turn, to overcome a singular sense of our personal historicities which mediate intergenerational relating.

Phrasing it another way, singularising limitations of worded language as a medium of accessing consciousness can be overcome to some extent by pluralising language itself. The collage below provides a partially summarised representation of the extended version of Kjørholt’s auto-reflexive exercise I carried out39:

39 Components include English texts written for Kjørholt’s exercise and texts in Danish and Portuguese as part of language courses in Bayreuth. Due to unavailability of documentation - the collage neither includes the exercise as performed in Norwegian, nor the Tibetic language Ladakhi (Bhoti) with the guidance of philologist Bettina Zeisler, University of Tübingen. However, the attempt in Ladakhi deserves a special mention because - unlike the mentioned languages - Ladakhi uses special evidential markers i.e. the verb ’to be’ has five different forms that depend on the kind of knowledge one is expressing e.g. description on the basis of 1. feeling and sensation (rak) 2. one’s self and own things (in) 3. general facts about the world around (inok) 4. what one has seen or heard (duk) 5. what one has authoritative knowledge about (yot) (Norman 1994: 31–32). I cannot then claim to have authoritative knowledge about my place of birth like my mother or father can because they know directly, while I know it indirectly because it was told to me. Consequently, for the first time I could perceive an onto-epistemological deconstruction of my own sense of childhood history. In turn, revealing modes of our own existence that we take for granted as remembering adults (Briod 1989; Lippitz 1986).
The second process of fielding in terms of geographic locality i.e. Norway happened unintentionally, but also largely during the course of learning Norwegian and other languages. Without a national identity number that rendered me the temporary entitlement of an individuated individual personhood in a particular local community welfare system - I would not have received access to rooms where native general knowledge about society is imparted.

The unintentionality of formalising the process resulted from the fact that I did not actually intend to take language lessons in order to turn Trond-
heim into a research field. Travelling in languagescapes had become habitual to me and the philosophical paradoxes of the ‘Norwegian’ society that were gazing at me pushed me further into wanting to understand the particular lifeworld where and from where I was allowed to be positioned.

Norway, as I had learnt in India, was the place where the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded and where Deep Ecology was philosophised to extreme lengths. I learnt about Norway’s highest Human Development Index status only after I got permission to arrive there in 2011.

The first philosophical paradox of Norway already captured me during the visa application process in India. In July 2011, the Norway massacre took place in Oslo. How could it be that one of the world’s worst mass murderers was raised in the same lifeworld where peace is given the world’s highest honour? The mass-scale deconstruction of philosophical values that the mass murderer single-handedly performed exposed a philosophical paradox not just of the Norwegian society, but Christian societies across national borders.

The second philosophical paradox of Norway showed itself in a comparatively gentler and subtle manner within the first week of my arrival in Trondheim. The nature in and around the city appeared pristine and clean. There were not the slightest, immediately visible signs of poverty. The fjord and river waters had a piece or two of plastic, if one happened to spot them. Even the roads had no garbage, which showed a high degree of ‘educated’ civic sense in inhabitants as well as almost perfect municipality management. Something did not add up though, when I would see random spots of garbage or tiny overflowing city garbage containers on the banks of the city river or in the city forest. Garbage items were peculiar and included: aluminium trays filled with coal, varieties of packaging waste, beer cans and bottles, disposable plates and cutlery. The Engangsgrill barbecue-picnic culture in the city was a faster, more convenient, but more garbage and garbage management generating way of doing barbecue in summer. It didn’t add up mainly because it didn’t appear ecological, especially in a context where deep ecological philosophising (in my former view) was happening.

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41 Arne Naess, the philosopher who coined the term Deep ecology, reportedly chained himself to a rock to the Mardalsfossen waterfall area (Mardøla-aksjonen 1970; Seed et al 1988) in order to argue in favour of land and water, in opposition to the construction of a dam (Seed et al 1988). His theory was a curricular part of the Environmental Philosophy component at University in Pune and applied in the universal township Auroville on the Eastern coast of the Indian peninsular.
A third philosophical paradox showed itself as a comedy evoking laughter in my body - the tragedy of which I began grasping as I spent time learning to dwell in the languagescapes of that lifeworld.

In the flight to Trondheim in August 2011, I was surrounded by people who demonstrated a high ‘educated’ civic sense. They appeared very calm, content, polite and peaceful. The children on the flight whom I observed since boarding in Copenhagen appeared incredibly ‘well-behaved’ and ‘tantrum-less’. As soon as we alighted the flight and walked towards baggage claim, I sensed a nervous excitement rising in the people around me. Within a few more steps - the speed of the crowd accelerated, so my speed was accelerating too. Within a flash of a moment, the majority of the crowd ran to the duty-free section. One lady uttered a series of sounds pointing a direction to her child. The series of sounds ending in something like ‘gotterreee’\textsuperscript{42}. Then, big bodies moved in frenzy to the alcohol section and the small bodies moved in frenzy to the candy section.

In December 2011, another tragic comedy occurred, driving many citizens around me, including children, into desperate states, oscillating between what I perceived as deprivation and panic. The Norwegian Butter Crisis occurred when the state-subsidised Norwegian dairy sector was acutely short on butter, causing not only high inflation, but also making way for butter smugglers to start illegal cross-border operations from neighbouring countries. An acquaintance in Trondheim drove to the Swedish border to line-up before a secret truck. Approximately 250 g of smuggled butter could cost between 1000—1500 Norwegian Kroner (ca. 100—150 €). If that meant there could be Christmas bakes in the house, people were willing to go to the clandestine market. I had seen people in India and on Indian television lining up for water and staple diet products. The idea of a butter crisis couldn’t be real - although I was in fact witnessing it. It induced laughter in me, but eventually the lifeworld context causing such uniquely desperate reactions became a little graspable.

Specifically – during the course of my structured Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR; Trim 1997) level B and C education in the Norwegian language in Trondheim - I was able to access some inner logics of the lifeworld. Owing to its minimalistic grammar, relative absence of linguistic hierarchy and high social tolerance and

\textsuperscript{42} The very commonly used word in Norwegian lifeworlds - \textit{Godteri}, refers to cheap candy or similar sugar-based products. The word is constructed by adding a suffix ‘eri’ to the noun ‘godt’ meaning good.
Having gained knowledge more or less comparable to at least that of a Norwegian teenage citizen, I could start nearing some philosophical paradoxes of this particular high Human Development Index context. As part of a common formal university exercise called Semesteroppgave, we were instruc-

**Illustration 13: Notes on Norway**

Norwegian languagescapes were historically standardized for written purposes. Therein too diversity was maintained in so far as two standard forms are officially accepted. Speaking in dialects is normalized even in public sphere and state educational institutions. In this sense it appears to be a multilingual languagescape. As a consequence, Norwegians are able to grasp sense of spoken words even when the pronunciations are ‘wrong’ i.e. not standard. At NTNU level B comprised reflective learning of general knowledge about society that is imparted to teenage citizens in schools. Level C was dedicated largely to dialects with a focus on the regional varieties of Trondersk. Other CEFR-based applications for imparting social and linguistic knowledge such as the cases like French, German or Portuguese give peripheral or no attention to inner linguistic diversities of their respective lifeworlds.
ted to read a book and write an essay about it. The aforementioned philosophical paradoxes that I had sensed in the prior two years lead me to a book addressing teenagers after the 2011 Norwegian massacre. Unlike philosophical addresses to younger generations that focused either on imparting a particular history of philosophy, abstract themes through stories or rhetorical training etc. *Det som står på spill* (That which is at stake; Eriksen 2012) was different. The address was not intended to teach philosophy or critical thinking, rather it contextualised the locally experienced philosophical paradoxes of the overheated Anthropocene neoliberal world (Eriksen 2016) for new positionally scaled Norwegian generations. It presented the philosophical dilemmas that anyone born in a high Human Development Index is unfortunately bound to inherit and sense on a daily basis throughout their lifespan. Further, it contextualised those dilemmas to the lifeworld of its new generations without educating guilt in readers. By undertaking a brief reflective textual dialogue with this intergenerational communication, I met the questions I was wording from outside - from an insider point of view. The image below shows the abstract of my task. The sentence underlined in red represents the primary collectively shared philosophical dilemma of the Norwegian society arising from the 2011 massacre:

*Underlined in red: How is it possible that a society which is so proud of its morals and values produced one of the worst mass murderers in the world?*

Subsequently, Eriksen (2012) reflects on possibilities of maintaining the valuable in the face of an undesirable global future which Norwegians are partly responsible for. Themes include: community of disagreement, fairness, poverty, freedom of expression, sense/reasonability, differences between humans and ideas and so on.

*Illustration 14: Early reflections on Eriksen’s address to youth after the 2011 Massacre*
With this, I could make sense of Norway as a field in a global context - within which particular macro and micro dimensions of children and childhood (Frønes 1994: 148-149) could be contextually accessed. Further, I could get a firmer grasp of the particularly fielded triangular constellation i.e. state, family and the child within which the child citizens I met needed to be understood. Lastly, due to the case of Norway, I began grasping some philosophical paradoxes that are specific to high Human Development Index contexts. With especially the work Det som står på spill (That which is at stake; Eriksen 2012) - it became evident that there is a need for honest intergenerational dialogues regarding responsibly responding to those paradoxes.

To recapitulate, I have briefly presented how, as a consequence of my interrelated scales of positionalities, I was permitted to access two fields, namely:

a. Children and Childhood

b. Norway, particularly Trondheim.

Subsequently, I gave examples to describe two fielding processes that began intentionally and unintentionally. Through these processes the thematic area of children and childhood and the geographic area of Norway started turning into fields. In the course of doing exercises as part of the CEFR (Trimm 1997) determined level B and C application of language learning at NTNU, I was able to better grasp the philosophical paradoxes of Norway as a high human development context. Along with that, the need for honest intergenerational dialogue regarding those paradoxes became evident.

Just as a subject of curiosity became a thematic field and a lifeworld became a geographic field - there were persons I accidentally got to know who eventually became what is broadly categorised as research participants in my project. The preliminary contacts with each respective person was either through their primary caregivers, who were friends, colleagues or acquaintances. My part-time job as a kindergarten substitute, occasional work as a babysitter44, voluntary engagements with community projects or supporting friends with care-giving also made space for regular contact.

44 The right to work for 20 hours per week for Non-EU members is integrated into the study residence permit on acquisition of a national identification number in Norway.
Being an amateur polyglot, I tended to come into contact with persons who were themselves dwelling in multilingual micro-lifeworlds. Norwegian was a language they all had in common, but the additional language combinations differed according to specific backgrounds.

The time I spent with and around these persons made me aware of attributes such as interdependence, incompetence, incompleteness and vulnerability (Lee 2001; Horton 2001; Gallacher and Gallagher 2008) within my institutional researcher-self which is first and foremost a product of the hierarchization of the child-adult binary. Additionally, it gave me experientially lived insights beyond what I had pluralistically accessed as a remembering adult (Briod 1989; Lippitz 1986) or through research including children (e.g. Barker and Weller 2005; Weller 2006, O’Kane 2000; Punch 2002; Clark 2017; Clark & Moss 2001; Burke 2005; Greenfield 2004; Hart 1997; Lancaster and Broadbent 2003; Kellett 2004; 2005; 2010) that I had done in Ladakh (Biswas 2013; 2016) as part of the Quota Scheme determined Mphil Childhood Studies requirements.

In the following two sections, I will introduce some of the experientially lived insights. Starting from birth, as something that took me back to synesthetic and temporal basics of existing as human, I will proceed to a preliminary rediscovery of the ludic ontological structure of human existence i.e. play.

4.2.4. Babies, Toddlers and Playing with Time

Ole started his lifespan in this world in the municipality of Trondheim in the Gregorian-calendar year 2012. He became the first child member of a local household established by a couple born and raised in France, residing in Norway. I had gotten to know his biological parents, who were also his legal primary guardians, through a common friend-circle of persons who were interested in Italian language and culture. We met regularly to cook, to discuss culture and politics, play music or go for hikes in local and regional forests. Our gatherings also paved the way to become closer parts of each other’s mundane lives in the city. As a consequence, we began relating to each other beyond our shared interest in Italian.

Since Baby Ole’s family migrated from France, we also spoke French and I could be included in French/Norwegian gatherings. After Baby Ole’s arrival (birth), our common activities changed as we had to adapt to a new temporality and respond to a new sensibility that Baby Ole came with.
Already in the prenatal phase, children and childhood had become a subject of conversation in the circle. Particularly, Baby Ole’s mother and I shared our views on the matter. Philosophical themes in relation to childhood became part of our conversations due to my engagement with child monks in Ladakh that time. With Baby Ole’s arrival, I began helping his guardians in care-giving. As both guardians were employed researchers at university and their respective families were far away, close friends helped out whenever possible.

Baby Ole’s guardians were well aware and supportive of my curiosity in understanding childhood. I would often have my handycam with me and had begun actively experimenting with anthropological filming. I had no particular research agenda with neonate Baby Ole, except that I had the urge to understand his neonatal and post-neonatal being-in-the-world as closely as possible. Filming served as documentation for reflecting on what I was experiencing and observing with him. Sometimes I also wrote entries in my private diary after having spent time with Baby Ole. In this regard Baby Ole was the first person whom I could closely observe in the social life-phase called infancy with active attention.

Although it prompted some of the conversations I had with other adults around Baby Ole, the focus of my interest was not really the topic of ‘child development milestones’ (e.g. Behrman et al. 1996; Kohlberg 1966, in: Lewis 2011). Rather, I was drawn to the ways in which Baby Ole showed signs of sensing the world around him. Further, during times I took care of him I was becoming aware of aspects of my human condition which I took for granted in my mundane life e.g. breathing, sleeping, waking, sensing and experiencing spatio-temporality through my body. The most striking experience, however, was coming closer to a completely different temporality. Was there even a sense of temporality in Baby Ole? Certainly, there was no sense of a socially constructed clock and calendar time that human beings begin to experience as real time as they are socialized into being ‘grown up’ (Ennew 1994; Wall 2010). The rational adult, singular, universal ordering of temporality i.e. clock time is only possible because there is temporality in the first place (Lippitz 1983).

Time, derived from temporality, did not tick the way clocks do, in the presence of Baby Ole. Clocks had to be respected, because our adult team (Goffman 1990) co-navigated in a specific timely world according to it.

45 Terms borrowed from osteological categorizations (Lewis 2011: 1; Table 1) and referring solely to the physiological age, not social categories.
Baby Ole’s time-less, temporal scale often conflicted with our timely, temporal scale. Erratic temporal flows of sleeping and waking were turning into timely cycles mediated by synesthetic sight, sound, touch and movement. Entering his perceived spatial field, making melodic sounds, touching gently or moving around holding him firm and close to the body helped tuning his cycles into our time. Such ‘rituals’ gradually initiated him to start being in time with us. Placing a little piece of red wool in his palm, or keeping it close to his convenient reach had also become part of Baby Ole’s timely sleeping and waking initiation.

In terms of visual attention or making and maintaining eye contact, Baby Ole showed an impressive capacity to maintain a large attention span. By the time he could be placed in an eating-chair, it often seemed like he was distracted from the food. But then he would hold my gaze and smile playfully. If my attention moved to something else in the room, his gaze would follow mine. There were occasions where I noticed that Baby Ole’s capacity to hold mutual gaze was in fact greater than that of most adults, who would easily look away or not look into my eyes. Especially his capacity to look was really considerable. I made efforts to let myself be guided by him by looking where he looked, empathising with the immense joy he took in the smallest things, listening more carefully to ‘meaningless’ sounds. When I sometimes allowed my attention to be captured by seemingly banal objects like a spoon and engaged in an activity invented by him e.g. him throwing the spoon and me fetching it - Ole used eye contact and babbling to maintain connection with me. Unlike Piaget’s egocentric approach to infancy, as Scaife and Bruner (1975) have argued - babies are not as egocentric as especially developmental psychology traditionally believed. Infants, according to Scaife and Bruner, have some knowledge of the other’s perspective in so far as they can follow the gaze of the adult caregivers. “In so far as mutual orientation implies a degree of knowledge in some form about another person’s perspective then the child in its first year may be considered as less than completely egocentric. The source of such abilities (for example, imitation) remains to be investigated but utilisation of another’s gaze direction may be a very basic process. [...] Such observations need careful investigation but it may not be entirely unex-

46 The same holds true for my own capacity to make and maintain eye contact with other adults. However, with children, especially in the absence of adult interference or presence of adult ignorance - making and maintaining eye contact with babies and small children across specific geographical contexts e.g. Ladakh or mainland India, Italy, Germany or Norway, is much easier than with adults.
pected that human infants should also have greater abilities than has been supposed (ibid.: 266).”

Early 21st-century investigations, being relatively distant from traditional developmental and evolutionary narratives of infancy, confirm that infants do in fact have greater abilities than adults suppose (e.g. Gopnik 2009). These abilities go beyond having knowledge of other perspectives and the capacity to look or maintain visual attention. According to Gopnik’s study with infants and infant brains, the scales of neuroplasticity are far higher in babies than in adults (ibid.). Further, infants perform active processes of changing their mind and are not simply changing passively (ibid.). The difference in physical, social and temporal scales between adults and children (including babies) is vast, but it doesn’t therefore follow that childhood is a primitive state of adulthood. Children and adults are different forms of *homo sapiens*, who have different, yet equally complex and powerful minds, brains, and forms of consciousness serving diverse evolutionary functions. Accordingly, unlike in the traditional understanding of development as simple growth, development is better grasped as consisting of processes of metamorphosis e.g. caterpillars becoming butterflies. In the case of humans it seems more as though we were “the vibrant, wandering butterflies who transform into caterpillars inching along the grown-up path (Gopnik 2009: 9).”

The temporal scales of both these forms of being human differ and often clash, although they are interdependent. Tuning into moments of harmonious intergenerational temporality with Baby Ole required disempowering my own clock-time temporality and opening up to a fair negotiation of temporalities. In other words, getting the timing right. Consider the following example of our interaction around sleeping and playing:

Baby Ole and I were spending time in a room for children and their caregivers at the student village of the university while his primary caregivers were busy attending to other responsibilities. According to the clock, that time should have been allocated to ‘playing’ and socialising with other children within his age-group. But Baby Ole did not seem to want to join the activities. He crawled away every time I encouragingly placed him among other children or tried to direct his attention towards other ‘toys’. Initially he maintained eye contact with me, made sounds or showed notorious smi-

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47 The capacity of the brain to change throughout the lifespan.

48 Assuming in accordance with Western scientific models that the mind is ‘located’ in the physical body part identified as brain.
les when he crawled away or resisted me carrying him to spaces that he resisted. Gradually, he stopped making eye contact or addressing me with sounds and got cranky. My restlessness and irritation began co-responding to his resistance. Of course, he couldn’t ‘understand’ my imposed importance of socialising with other children in the clock hour when it was planned. Eventually, I let him crawl in the direction where he wanted i.e. away from the designated play area. I sat on a reclining chair in the same area and waited, clueless about what to do as the clock ticked. Baby Ole explored ‘nothing’ in the corner and crawled towards me and reached out for my knee. I lifted him onto my lap, facing his body towards me and we stared at each other. He then neared my chest and I could feel the difference in the tempo of our respective breathing. Baby Ole’s breath was far gentler and subtler compared to mine. I then deliberately changed the tempo of my breath to tune into his and stopped focusing on the clock-time which I was emphasising in my mind. As our breathing tempos came closer, Baby Ole’s eyes began closing and he fell asleep. I remained tuned into his breathing tempo which in turn was transforming my temporal sense. I remained in the stillness, my eyes open and aware of my surrounding world, yet removed. My body was like a breathing mattress with palms on Baby Ole’s head and back.

Supporting Baby Ole’s temporality to tune into the precise mathematised time of the adult world, i.e. the mathematisation of nature itself, was often a very conflicting process. The first negotiation between child and adult, it seems, starts with the embodied negotiation of time itself. Who plays along with whose sense of ‘real’ time seems to be the beginning of an embodied philosophical tension between two temporal kinds of beings called child and adult. It was in such tensions that the temporal otherness of childhood (Beauvais 2018) began to reveal itself to my adult self. Ambiguous child time and temporality in a contemporary overheated world is particularly hyper-regulated. Historically too the speeds, rhythms, and durations of childhood have been fixed and modulated by adults (e.g. Foucault 1975; Ball et al. 1984; Adam 1995; Symes 2012; Duncheon and Tierney 2013, in ibid.).

It wasn’t and is not possible to access what went on in Baby Ole’s mind. What is known through work that has somehow managed to step out of a strict developmentalist paradigm is that the realm of internal consciousness i.e. the realm of thoughts, feelings and plans is in motion since even before ‘nonsensical’ babbling begins. This internal consciousness is also where our subjective temporalities are mediating our relationships with external consciousness of the ‘real’ world. Subjective temporalities are to a large
extent mediated through counterfactuals expressed in articulated language through words like might, should, could, would and if. Unlike traditional developmentalists, who were convinced that little children are limited to the here and now, cognitive scientists seem to be discovering that even very young children already consider possibilities, distinguish them from reality and use this knowledge to change the world around them. Sophisticated counterfactual thinking which lies at the heart of philosophising is not just part of ‘grown-up’ consciousness. Even babies can sense that there are rules in the external world, but that they can be negotiated and changed (Gopnik 2009).

While I continued meeting Baby Ole once in a while, I started working regularly as a substitute in a barnehage (Norwegian kindergarten). Among other things, this was a hotspot of counterfactuals and alternative realities that I could hear in languages I could follow as an adult. It was there that I first met Enaya, who accompanied me until the fourth phase of this study. The barnehage was without doubt a space where I re-learned to play like a child, in the conventional sense of the term. Furthermore, it was also a space where I found myself in philosophical conversations with children similar to Matthews’ philosophical dialogues (1984).

In the following section, I will focus on presenting a reflective account of some child-adult tensions that I observed during my time in the barnehage. In my analysis, the complex power struggles emerged from and circled around conflicting temporal senses, at least to a large extent. My principal insight in the barnehage was a shattered myth that women are ‘naturally’ more inclined to love children and act in their interest. With the example of Ms. X, I began asking what love in a pedagogical child-adult relation was in the first place.

4.2.5. Playing more by chance: Barnehage with Enaya & Co.

Visiting the barnehage for a year in the position of an on-call substitute was also primarily possible because of my interrelated scales of positionalities that gave me access to a Quota student status in Norway, permitting me in turn to be individuated as a temporary resident with a national identification number. The particular barnehage I was accepted into was mostly visited by multilingual children from diverse backgrounds. There were children from ‘pure’ Norwegian families with USA-return-migration backgrounds (conf. Stugu 2012) or ‘half’ Norwegian backgrounds with either a
parent or ancestor who was not born in present day Norway. ‘Non-Norwegian’ children belonging to skilled-labour families which had migrated from the European Union, Africa and Asia also attended the kindergarten. With the exception of one child who had just arrived in Norway from China, all children understood and spoke Norwegian and English, with most having at least one additional language.

Regardless of their origins, they formed a highly cosmopolitan team of Norwegian child citizens. Since I shared language clusters with most children, many seemed to feel comfortable approaching me and I was often invited into their playfully constructed worlds. However, I could not always accept invitations as I was a formal member of the adult team (Goffmann 1990), hired to perform roles of watching and counting children as well as helping them or other adults with daily tasks.

Child-adult temporal tensions often arose from the child not understanding the precisely mathematised long and short time-bound future visions of the adults around them. As for the children, they didn’t seem to reserve specific time-slots and spaces for an activity called play (as also observed by Bae 2009:15). Instead, they brought in playful aspects into all activities and situations (ibid.). They played with and in time, which provoked the need to bring in order, control the situation or reinforce defined spatio-temporal borders49 in the adults.

The ideal of autonomy in children seemed to be realised through specific behavioural markers that the children were expected to achieve within adult-determined projections of time. For example, within the first calendar-year and a half of being in the institution, children were expected to demonstrate autonomy by dressing or eating on their own. While the justification on this emphasis was usually that this is something children need to learn for their futures, it was never acknowledged that children eating and dressing themselves saved adult caregivers a lot of clock-time. The sooner it happened, the more convenient it was for the adults who could go about their business. The behavioural markers on part of the children firstly freed the adults from the interdependent dynamic. There was no doubt that the source of urgency was in the adult experience. The children seemed to have no problem ‘whiling away’, a little bit more ‘toying around’ with their attires, rolling on the ground, running around or using the spatio-temporality of those moments in ways that did not fit into the temporal ordering scripts of the adult-world.

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49 Conf. discussion on grensesetting (boundary-setting) in section 1.1.4.
Despite highly egalitarian practices and participation of men in sharing responsibility towards children in the Norwegian private spheres, most childcare positions in the kindergarten seemed to still be occupied by women. Consequently, the clashing temporal child-adult scales usually manifested between children and adult women. Invariably, the smaller side surrendered to the bigger side, that claimed to know what is ‘true’, ‘right’ or ‘good for’ the smaller side. With the following example, I present a reflection on the probable power dynamics underlying the ‘loving’ disciplinary approach of a kindergarten teacher Ms. X, whom I observed.

The kindergarten was comprised of three internally connected rooms and a dressing area leading to an outdoor play area. Each room was designated to specific age groups and had one adult teacher and assistant in charge of it. Substitutes like me either filled in for absent teachers and assistants or were called in for extra support in respective rooms. The substitute position was the only one that moved between rooms, while teacher and children positions were fixed. For the children, moving from one room to another signified a temporal change in terms of growing up or becoming small again. Some either felt an anticipation of going to the next room or took pride in having friends in the ‘older’ rooms who occasionally invited them over. Others were either attached to their spatiality or simply didn’t focus on this theme. Going from an ‘older’ to ‘younger’ room was possible only in terms of visiting. ‘Older’ children seemed to take relatively more liberty to walk into ‘younger’ rooms spontaneously. The spatio-temporal borders seemed to be explicitly reinforced from the adult side. The method of spatio-temporal border reinforcement used by Ms. X was noteworthy due to its juxtapositioning of fear and love.

In cases where a child would not obey Ms. X’s daily plan for the members of her room, Ms. X would never show signs of anger or force. Instead she turned to emotional appeal. For example, Ms. X had started an afternoon ritual of reading to members of her room during nap time. The younger room did not have this ritual, but instead its members were allowed to do ‘quiet activities’ after lunch. An assistant usually read to those who wis-

50 It might be assumed that what is good for women is good for children, or that women are ‘naturally’ inclined to act in the best interest of children. However, modern women gaining equal rights to participate in the labour market and political life doesn’t automatically lead to empowerment of children and childhood. It is noteworthy that children and childhood have not been sufficiently theorized on their own right in feminist theories (conf. Burman & Stacey 2010). The relationship between孩童 and feminism has only recently begun to receive attention in theoretical discussions (Rosen & Twamley 2018).
hed to join. Eden was a member of Ms. X’s room and was obliged to stay in the room during nap time. Instead, one day Eden crossed over into the ‘younger’ room to play and ended up sitting with a reading circle there.

On having realised that Eden was missing in the room, Ms. X came to the ‘younger’ room looking for her. As she saw Eden, she went to her and approached her in an affirmative, but highly anxious tone. Ms. X told Eden that she has to stay in her room during nap time for stories, otherwise Ms. X gets worried that something could happen to Eden. Ms. X asserted that she cared about Eden’s well-being and Eden should think about this too before she decides to go somewhere else during nap time. Eden started showing signs of guilt and began crying. Then, Ms. X took Eden into her arms. She started soothing Eden’s back assuring Eden that she was not angry because she saw that Eden had understood.

Eden exiting the defined spatio-temporality, i.e. the room where nap time for her group took place, did not represent a particular threat to her well-being. However, it was probably a source of anxiety and loss of power for Ms. X, whose sense of ‘truth’ was performatively deconstructed by Eden fearlessly navigating the spatio-temporality following her own terms. Ms. X’s sense of real time was a precondition for her project of spatio-temporal positioning in the kindergarten for the well-being of the children as she understood. She was philosophically committed to that particular spatio-temporal reality derived from the natural attitude that clock-time is real time. Her philosophical commitment further made it possible to be in an empowered position to define truth and thereof influence how Eden’s right to self-determination could play out in the room she was in-charge of.

As my early recognitions of power and positionality51 had already revealed to me, “power occurred and was relationally sustained through the form and not specific individual content (Jaaware on Foucault 2011)”. It follows that Ms. X’s use of ‘love’ to educe guilt in Eden so she understood how to cooperate with Ms. X’s definition of mathematised time as The truth cannot be credited to the individual Ms. X. Foucault (1980) explains that exercising power is bound together with the production of truth as well as the possibility to exercise rights. The sides that represent truth, in this case clock time as real time, are also the ones who get to control where and when what should be done. Loss of control, especially over clock time-determined activity, can often lead to high levels of fear and anxiety in adult women like Ms. X working closely with children. Regard-

51 As presented in section 4.2.2.
less of their conviction in ‘love’ as a motivation to act in the interest of children, from the perspective of power dynamic it becomes evident that fear and anxiety facilitate interventions aimed at teaching children about ‘borders’.

In so far as modern childhoods, especially high Human Development Index ones, must be considered within the triangular constellation of the state, family and the child – the philosophical project of truth production, e.g. clock time as real time, amplifies the temporal tensions. The first philosophical negotiation between child and adult is temporal. One of the ways one can create fairer spaces for philosophical negotiations is by tuning-into children’s temporalities, something that in early 21st-century times of overheated acceleration becomes more and more challenging for adulthood and childhood.

Ms. X’s anxious attachment to protecting children, determining plans and activities that were best for them, and teaching them about cooperating with her border-setting agenda lead to some turbulent situations in the barnehage. Power conflicts often took place among adult caregivers themselves. They were however focused on different adult interpretations of how children’s spatio-temporal navigations in the barnehage should ideally be. Ms. X’s room and ‘loving’ approach were particularly questioned. Assistants and substitutes on temporary contracts usually played along because they did not want to lose their jobs. Whenever differences were voiced, usually the assistants and substitutes were either transferred or asked to leave in the best interest of the barnehage management and children’s well-being. That is to say that the power constellations were maintained by keeping the central authority figures in place and simply moving out smaller figures that were not playing along as the adult team required.

My reason for departure from the barnehage too was due to questioning the peculiar ‘loving’ approach of Ms. X and her defenders. Prior to that, her permanent assistant had also been pressured to leave. Other on-call substitutes disagreed with Ms. X too, but preferred staying silent to protect their jobs. Getting the secure hours of paid work was part of the silenced temporal negotiations among adults in the barnehage. Additionally, there were, as I have described, child-adult power struggles revolving around performing certain activities or reaching specific developmental milestones within a given period of clock or calendar time. All of us, not just Ms. X, claimed their motivation was ‘love’ for the children. Still, tuning into their temporalities, which could have created more room for a fairer child-adult co-operation (Norwegian: medvirkning; conf. Bae 2009), didn’t come easy within
the power constellations we (mainly adult women) found ourselves in. The barnehage was a space that brought these difficulties to the fore of my awareness. However, my own pedagogical gaze towards children and childhood didn’t simply disappear.

Some children and their families expressed interest in maintaining contact beyond the barnehage. Enaya’s family was one of them. However, within a few months of my departure, life-circumstances put me in a position where I had a Norwegian degree, but no job in Norway enabling me to continue research on the intersections of philosophy and childhood in high Human Development Index contexts. Applying for childhood-related jobs outside academia, mostly via online job portals, brought no success either. No job contract, in my case, meant I would have to leave Trondheim and exit the country altogether.

Although the Norwegian academic context was a promising place to continue research drawing upon the new childhood studies paradigm, my social as well as legal contract as a Quota student was putting pressure on me to ‘go back’. Further, the coming of Solberg’s Norwegian cabinet in autumn 2013 coincided with reduced job-seeking time for non-EU degree holders from Norwegian universities. A representative of the government did come to assure international students of NTNU that the new government welcomed qualified foreign job-seekers like ‘us’. The assuring and welcoming address was primarily directed towards scientists who could contribute to technological and industrial progress e.g. the oil and energy sector. It seemed as though ‘foreign’ researchers in humanities and social sciences, both according to the academic as well as political expectations, were supposed to go back and contribute to fixing ‘real’ social problems found in their own countries.

Going back to India to do research with high Human Development Index context childhoods, as based on the new childhood studies paradigm, was an unrealistic option. The paradigm itself would also be way too progressive in a context where even philosophical concepts of adult rights and empowerment are seriously malnourished in practice. Critical, democratic, rational thinking associated with scientific temper itself had entered into a new violent era of unfreedom which accelerated as the Modi ministry assumed majority political power in spring 2014 (Biswas 2014).

A stroke of luck again opened up an appropriate skilled-labour passage to Germany within academia. The newly tenured professor of the department of General Pedagogy in Bayreuth and I had gotten to know each other at a summer school on Philosophy for Social Sciences in India before I
moved to Norway. The professor gave me a contract that would make it possible for me to start formalising my explorations into a doctoral study. With this contract, I could go to the German Embassy in Oslo to ask for permission to move to Germany.

In the last segment of this section, I will present how this move could further support me to sustain the access I had gotten to Norway, as representative of a high Human Development Index context society. Further, the new contract I entered made it possible to start thinking again about philosophising with children. My thematic return to the subject was influenced by Sungjae, who had in the meantime moved to South Korea and was sharing his observations and reflections on being in this overheated world through letters. Sungjae had decided to temporarily exit institutional learning and was experimenting with autodidact learning in order to prepare for writing high-school exams as a location-independent candidate. I will conclude the next segment with a reflection on one of Sungjae’s letters which made me further reconsider the role of children in philosophising.

4.2.6. Die Talentabwanderung: This is not America

The Norwegian Quota Scheme no doubt created opportunities, but also curbed freedom of self-determination and movement insofar as it reproduced the tendency to commodify the ‘brain’ within national borders, in both theory and practice (Basford and Van Riemsdjik 2017). My application for an extension to the Utlendingsdirektoratet (UDI; Norwegian Directorate for Immigration) had officially put me in a position of waiting. The status was visible on a computer screen and the suffering caused by ambiguous waiting only increased every time I called.

Phone lines were always busy as there were probably many others in similar positions for different reasons. Waiting on the phone was accompanied by music - a soft hotel lounge cover of David Bowie’s This is not America. It was a dark tragic comedy, not perhaps as dark as it was for many other cases. The tune had become an ohrwurm (a catchy tune) in my mind and the only way to get rid of it was to stop calling. Police headquarters of Trondheim informed waiting candidates like me that the UDI was overworked and issued a special document assuring the legality of our stay. The document gave one restricted access to residence i.e. cros-

52 Introduced in section 4.2.1
sing the Norwegian border meant being denied the possibility to reenter the country.

What next? was a pragmatic question I was overwhelmed with; to the extent that working theoretically on intersections of philosophy and childhood in this overheated world just could not flow. However, correspondence with Sungjae sustained the questions on those intersections.

The following letter is representative of our correspondence in that phase. Sungjae’s actions, observations and reflections arising from being-in-this-world usually faced me with questions of positionality and power. With this particular letter, though, he began articulately poking at:

a. the arbitrariness of demarcating the child-adult positions based on legal age.

b. the limitations of the adult pedagogical gaze when it comes to teaching children philosophy, particularly ethics.

c. the consideration of intergenerational interconnectedness in light of justice.

d. the distinction between logical and real in the light of power.

e. diversity of temporal experiences of ‘Time’ in this world.

What stood out the most however, was that Sungjae - still a child to me - was philosophising on justice drawing upon his observation of a child. Simply watching a child had set off a series of philosophical reflections in adult Sungjae. They were of course questions that were usually important to him, but that such profound reflection could be triggered simply by watching a child was a crucial input for me.
Dear Tanu,

25th Oct 2013

[...]

My ‘Time’ here in Korea so far (as Michael would refer…) flew by. I really had to do lot of things but the main thing being ‘adapting’. Adapting to my new somewhat independent life. As you already know I’m in Korea just months before serving the army. [...]

Anyway, so the answer to the question you asked might be very much temporary. Apart from the question – What next? What next? Which I ask myself almost on hourly basis, I also am stuck on the question of what is Justice. [...]

A child who barely knows how to count could prove all the latter. A week ago I was at a market, then there I saw a small boy with his mother. I’m sure the boy might not have been above four years old. The mother was pretty much occupied with her own grocery shopping and I was busy observing the toddler walk around the marketplace. (Of course I also had my own grocery shopping to do.)

Now that I visualize that moment from the child’s point of view as I write this letter I can develop some kind of empathy for the boy. A market place full of colorful and new things, with his own mother busy enough not to restrict his free will to do what he wants in this attractive exotic foreign surrounding. Then there it was a small red cherry tomato glowing if not dazzling. His hand reaches out for it, grabs it and the next moment it’s inside his right jacket pocket (which barely even lets the small tomato unnoticed). Now I’m not sure if he had planned this or if it was that amazing moment of coincidence that helped him escape everyone’s eyes, even the eagle eyes of the shop owner. It might well have been a perfect piece of crime if he could have escaped my eyes too. It would probably be too harsh to call it a crime but then I thought of highly hypothetical possibilities. Firstly, what if the boy had carried out similar activities in the past or would be carrying out in the future too.

Due to his lack of understanding of moralistic value and the concept of boundaries he might be susceptible of getting used to the idea of stea-
ling and feel nothing wrong about it. Now what if the mother of this boy actually noticed the scene but chose to ignore it with her own various valid reasons. What if she fails to notice similar situations in future or fails to introduce the term of right and wrong to the child, or what if she herself don’t know what’s wrong and right. As a matter of fact I myself cannot be sure what is actually right or wrong. All I try is just escape situations where my act of my interest creates problems to others, as much as possible.

[...]

Do we just blame the child for being too mentally weak to find moralistic values all the while his childhood passed by, all the while time flew by...

Even though I see most of the legal adults by age including myself are no different from this clueless boy. It’s just that the situation rose that the boy committed a crime and was caught red handed. If laws, corrupted and honest lawyers or corrupted and upright politicians, teach us anything about Justice, it would be only measures and knowledge that Just is maintained and controlled. More of like a post-measure. Advices from parents, childhood education or gut feelings that rise include our self to act ‘moral’ are more of pre-measures to remain Just.

If the boy who stole a tomato at the market was scolded by his mother or was taught correctly he might as well turn more legally clean even though he probably still doesn’t know the meaning of Justice. It would be his habit that would judge him after all not the fact he knows the meaning of Justice and moralistic values. Just like habits of stealing or like the habits of not stealing. I’m not ‘just’ talking about this boy nor this case, but collectively. These are happy stories where good parenting and educations lead to cleaner societies there are also hopeful stories where the law and government actually manage to bring logical or satisfying judgements. But there are still a lot of unfortunate cases, cases lot enough to appear in news or books and to worry about.

[...]

Warm Regards,
From ‘excited and thrilled’ Sungjae                          Seoul, Korea
Sungjae and I had come a long way beyond our experiment in practising a ‘child-friendly’ curriculum for doing philosophy outside the formal classroom context. My initial experience of seeing myself in the role of a philosophy teacher in relation to a child had also evolved as Sungjae started acting like a thinker. Already with his early performative deconstructions of my pedagogical adult perspective, he challenged me to re-think. My responses were usually resistances to the challenges that he would throw at me. Moreover, I reserved my view of children as default addressee of pedagogy vis-à-vis adults.

With this letter especially, Sungjae gave me access to seeing a child in this world through the eyes of someone whom I considered a child-in-relation-to-me. From this distance, he pointed my attention towards the epistemological play of knowing and concealing that happens between children and adults. Furthermore, he pointed out to the fluid boundaries of moral principles that humans in adult positions systematically play with themselves. Sungjae also pointed out to me the vulnerability that came with powerful positions i.e. the fear of losing power.

Drawing upon what the child in the Korean market had triggered in him, Sungjae was philosophising on macro-level corruption and injustice. Adult power games could occur in relatively innocent spaces like Norwegian kindergartens too, as I was seeing with the case of Ms. X, who managed to negotiate her powerful position through a discourse of love for children. In spite of disagreement, most adults in smaller positions played along in order to secure their paid working hours. The adult truth of clock-time as ‘real’ time, it seemed to me, was the philosophical spring of conflicting temporal scales of childhood and adulthood. Temporal power was invariably in the adult hand that held the calendar and the clock.

These insights did not immediately enter my project of doing philosophy with children. That is to say that, when I finally had my papers in place to move to a new academic home in Germany, I still maintained that children could and should be taught philosophy. Lastly, I believed that spoken and written word with occasional silent pauses in between was the only form of philosophising there was. The only shift that I had arrived at through my time as a student of childhood studies was sensing a need for more equitable ways of having philosophical conversations with children.

53 As presented in section 4.2.5.
4.3. Phase 1: Muddling through the Mystery

Following the aforementioned, the point of departure of the systematic stages of this exploration was critical towards both class-based philosophising with children i.e. the community of inquiry model, as well as the traditional developmental attitude. However, as I will show in the following, it could not overcome its own critical attitude, primarily because the question that I was intending to formulate was in itself attached to the pedagogical gaze which, as I explained through the experiences with Sungjae, was an internalised border that I was ignorant of. What was it about both the community of inquiry model, as well as Sungjae’s alternative class-based philosophy, that seemed to stand in the way?

Firstly, both models were based upon spoken language, which follows a pre-determined blueprint of logical argumentation. Further, in both cases the philosophical thematic i.e. question itself came from the adult facilitator. Consider the following two models, the first is a simplified illustration of the community of inquiry and the second of Sungjae’s alternative class-based philosophy:

Illustration 15: Simplified illustration of the PC community of inquiry
As explained, the limitation seemed to be that the philosophical control - mainly through the projected vision, the themes and questions - is housed in the adult position. This in turn limits the scope for philosophical negotiation. Particularly, the method of the standard community of inquiry model coming from the high Human Development Index context, as I explained in part 2, entailed an epistemology rooted in white ignorance. An open conversational interview with the critical cultural and education scientist from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Stine Helene Bang Svendsen, based specifically upon her work on historically silenced matters such as race, gender and sexuality in Norwegian classrooms (conf. Svendsen 2014), further confirmed the generic need for the suspension of the epistemological sovereignty of the adult teacher in order to respond to, in Svendsen’s words (personal communication), “the white Norwegian hereditary perspective” and make way for a more “plural concept of knowledge that understands that two things can be a case at the same time.”

According to Svendsen (ibid.), diversity in the Norwegian society and thereof educational institutions is not viewed as a resource, but a problem that needs to be handled. Svendsen describes her culture as a culture where “people had the privilege to presume that their language, cultural way of life is best. And, because of that, they normally do not need to learn from other people.” The entire institution and culture, according to Svendsen, supports this embodied truth and hence especially if educating for democracy is desired it requires that “your own position and your knowledge and
your authority is tested by students. And, eh, and that you allow the process of, you allow yourself to be included in the process of becoming, you know, that you actually, you know, let your, your own, eh, view on the world change in the classroom (ibid.)."

As the experience with Sungjae had shown me, even outside the spatio-temporality of the classroom, risking authority was not easy, let alone letting one's view on the world change. Nevertheless, in the light of the bigger picture where it is finally being asked what education and philosophy can learn from children and childhood as opposed to the conventional contrary (Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Kohan 2014; Kohan 2011), it seemed important to try to find spaces where a more philosophically equitable pedagogical child-adult dynamic could unfold.

4.3.1. Muddling through with Interlocutors and Co-explorers

The systematic stages of the inquiry began with a definition of philosophising with children as questioning and talking about philosophical subjects such as being, knowing, doing within the contemporary overheated high Human Development Index context in consideration i.e. Norway. The spatio-temporality of instrumental schooling, as explained in section 1.2., was exited relinquished. Svendsen’s input was however necessary to understand important aspects of the philosophical shortcomings of the singular white hereditary perspective, which was immanent in the society wherein the educational context is nested.

Having further acknowledged the need to take adult positionalisties in PC more seriously (Biesta 2011; Kohan 2011; Jasinski & Lewis 2016; Reed-Sandoval & Sykes 2017; Chetty 2018), I sought a space and medium that would allow child participants more room to negotiate philosophical questioning and meanings with adult participants as well as more room to exercise their interpretive philosophical agency. In order to do so, I needed to chalk out a research plan that included children.

Following the shared concern regarding ‘participatory’ approaches in research with children voiced by Gallacher & Gallagher (2008), I opted for a methodologically immature direction creating the possibility to allow being influenced by children, but not at the cost of turning them into adult-like researchers. So, children like Ole (formerly Baby Ole in the
embryological phase 0, here on Ole), whom I had watched over, as well as Enaya & Co., whom I had gotten to know through my time in kindergarten were requested to help me in my project with the informed consent of their parents.

At this stage, I refrained from even articulating a research question and determining particulars such as where and what should be explored. The motivation was not simply to include children in order to “report a world that was out there (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008: 512), but rather to continue an exploration towards finding a more equitable room for children to negotiate philosophical questioning and meanings with adults. Thus, research was deliberately conceived of as experimentation (ibid.) and I first approached children as interlocutors whom I consulted in order to determine what the central question would be and the consequent research design.

The goal at this stage was simply to understand how children and adults could talk together about philosophical subjects on more equitable terms such that children could have more room to negotiate the questions and themes. As far as possible, I documented exchanges with interlocutions using either audio or video recorders. The role of such ‘data’ however, has been to support my memory in the reflective processes that followed. I still strongly adhered to the talk-based (Gespräch) view of what constitutes doing philosophy. Hence, my questioning was directed towards the content of discussion and not the form of doing philosophy itself.

I also avoided using the word philosophy or suggesting ideas, but since my co-explorers were often present when I talked to their guardians, that was not entirely avoidable. Interlocutors often pretended to be occupied doing something else, while sitting around in the same room as I engaged with the adult-teams (Goffman 1990). However, I would later discover how intently we had been observed, for example by being sketched as seen below in the work of one of my interlocutors and co-explorers:
Such sketches sometimes served as a tool for interlocutors to invite me to further engage and I rarely turned down playful invitations. Through one such invitation I was invited for a tea-party by Emma in her room, who was aware that I researched with children and it was something with the word philosophy. Initially I saw it as an opportunity to sit for an informal interview with Emma in her habitual lifeworld, as with other interlocutors too.

Despite trying to avoid starting off our conversations with terms like ‘philosophy’ or ‘research’, I had to invariably do so because either the observant interlocutor would ask, and/or, as in this case, the guardian would already introduce the interlocutor to what we were going to do. In the following, one can see Emma and me in the tea party, followed by parts of the conversation\textsuperscript{54} which contributed to the emergence of an idea that streamlined the consequent direction of the exploration.

\textit{Illustration 17:} Adult-teams intently observed. Illustration by Interlocutor

\textsuperscript{54} Transcribed in Norwegian by Mira Myhr; Translation by author.
Illustration 18: Emergence of an Idea
Emma: We didn’t start with the potato chips!

Tanu: No, I mean potato sticks too and ..

Emma: But we also have to eat it up

Tanu: But you’re very fond of lentils, right?

Emma: Mhm (affirmative)

Tanu: Yes. Here (gives milk). Okay. Can you, uh, can you say, do you have any questions in your life Emma which you have no answer to...

Emma: Many thousands

Tanu: Yeah? Can you give an example? Or two examples or three examples?

Emma: That eh, here’s the first example, question 1, it’s ... what should we talk about again?

Tanu: What?

Emma: Oh yeah, if anyone asks, how many cupcakes do you want? Or, how many, how many, how much, how many slices do you want with tomato soup, then have no answer as I even don’t listen to her ..

Tanu: Mhm (affirmative). Is there more ... answer? No, questions. For example.

Emma: Yes.

Tanu: And can you just tell me, you can think of all the questions that you have that don’t have an answer, a right, one right answer.
Emma: You, I have no answer to a thousand questions I ..

[...] [72x690]

Emma: Also point, and you say you can get a (*inaudible*) first. Then they do it. And then it can give you an exam-
ple also choose the next one. And the same on each.

Tanu: Already asking a child „do you have any idea“, you
mean? That I say, „Hey, you, do you have any idea or
topic you are going to discuss,“ do you mean that?

Emma: I mean.

Tanu: And then ask the others „ok do you have one …“

Emma: If they say no then you can go to the next. And if they
have, they can tell you and... Yes.

Tanu: So you just ask?

Emma: Mhm (affirmative). It is the simplest.

Tanu: One problem here is that, um, do you mean to say that
now we are going to discuss a philosophical theme, then I
must explain what I mean? With the philosophical theme,
not true, it does not van .. it is not easy to explain.

Emma: Mmmm (thinks). Oh don't really know but, uh, don’t
really know. Oh don’t really know it all.

Tanu: eh...

Emma: Oh, just want a little milk l.

Tanu: What? Yes..

Emma: But, it’s best to have a tea party during the day, that’s a
long time ago I did that.
Tanu: Yes, (laughs a little). Yes, it’s been a long time since I did too.

Emma: There I put water in all things.

Tanu: Can I just take some tea?

Emma: Just take it.

Tanu: Ehm, do you think maybe tea party is a good idea to have?

Emma: You must have milk in it (takes the milk mug)

Tanu: Yes. Do you think a tea party is a good idea to have philosophical conversations?

Emma: eh?

Tanu: Yes.

Emma: For conversation? Makes you think of tea and it is good when you have a conversation. So always think about it nicely with a tea party.

Tanu: Yeah?

Emma: Because then one has to eat and drink, and yes. It’s that and it is fun.

Tanu: Yes it’s fun. It actually is (laughs). And me, think about it, that, children, and adults can have a tea party together.

Emma: Mhm (affirmative).

Tanu: Yeah? Ehm.
Emma: You can ask what they want, whether they want a tea party or whether they should look in a book while you talk or, or you can say what they can do. But I am going to do a tea party anyway.

Tanu: Yeah, anyway? So whether you have a discussion or not, you want a tea party?

Emma: Mhm (affirmative). This is a good idea. .. oh put them in here (puts something on a plate). When this one is empty we put that up in that way.

Tanu: Yes.

(pause, puts candy and potato chips in bowls and eats a little about 30 sec)

Tanu: It actually might be a good idea.

Emma: What then a good idea?

Tanu: Yes, with a tea party. And do you think that maybe, that is, who will organize tea parties, then, who will, or?

Emma: Just ask what they want.

Tanu: mhm

Emma: For example, what they can do and what you think what they can do and what suits them. What they can do and what suits them as they hear what you say and how.

Tanu: But, okay, eh, it’s a good idea and I think maybe tea party might be a good idea for having philosophical conversation, okay?

Emma: Oh I give you some milk up here again

[...]

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Taking the cue from there, I began looking into the possibility of including interlocutors in experimenting with a tea party format, where children and adults could sit with each other and talk without a predetermined thematic agenda. The Trondheim municipality, with whom I had been in touch regarding the project, offered to support the experiment by offering us space within the frame of a children’s festival where we would get a room and logistical support. I met with interlocutors either in small groups or individually depending on their availability to think of how the tea party would be realised.

Interlocutors had the possibility to talk about how the tea parties would be organised, communicate via email or to draw their ideas as seen in the example below:

![Illustration 19: Planning the Tea Party Experiment. Illustration by Interlocutor](image)

Interlocutors had their own preferences and distinct opinions on how the tea party should play out. At the same time, there were identifiable influences from children’s literature such as Alice in Wonderland, the Norwegian children’s market where tea party sets are sold or as specifically in Trondheim during that phase - a niche culture of practising oriental tea ceremo-
cies akin to what I had learnt with Mi Kyong. In addition, the anti-racist Tea-
Time campaign, which had been enthusiastically embraced by the royal
family mainly in the Oslo region (Det Norske Kongehuset/ The Royal House
of Norway 2013; 2011) and was also celebrated by some of the internatio-
nal family circles in Trondheim, was also mentioned.

The actualisation of the child-adult tea parties were also limited by the
budget and logistical framework laid out by the Trondheim Kommune itself.
Eventually, as we had the tea parties, few moments of child-adult tea time
in fact occurred, leaving barely any realistic prospect for exploring the tea
party as a possible space for children and adults to philosophise together.

4.3.2. Failure of The Tea Party Experiment

The Tea Party Experiment failed due to several factors at child-child, child-
adult and structural levels. At the level of child-child interaction, gender dif-
fferences affected the tea party in so far as the male participants could not
satisfactorily realise their ideas. One of the male participants, who insisted
on having footballs in the room, could not successfully challenge the con-
victions of the female participants - who outnumbered him - as to the aest-
hetics of tea parties. He managed to negotiate football motives to be part of
decoration and wore a T-shirt from his favourite team. However, the nego-
tiation itself brought him to tears. Distressed, he asked to be accompanied
out of the area by his father.

At the child-adult level, adult participants had either communicated
their interest in participation beforehand or spoken to volunteers position-
ed as gatekeepers to the area on the day of the Tea Party. The eagerness
of adult participants to experience and learn something by participating in
a tea party arranged by children turned out to be counter-productive. Most
adult participants seemed to be waiting for something special to happen
and such moments did not occur in their experience. Some adult partici-
pants were moved by the charm of the experience or a nostalgia about their
childhood play experiences. Others seemed to have experienced somet-
thing trivial or rather boring. On the other side, some child participants were
either not particularly impressed with their adult playmates, or felt that the
adults came more to look at, than to play with them.

At a logistical level, the context of the children’s festival helped to get
the support of the community to experiment in a new direction. However,
it also became a hindrance because other organisational considerations had to be taken into account and not all ideas that came up spontaneously could be realised. For example, Emma and Enaya, who met for the first time during the festival, wanted to go for a little tour as part of their tea party. Due to security reasons however, they had to stay inside the room. Their irritation grew as their spontaneity had to be repeatedly curbed. They found a solution by using curtains in the room to go ‘in and out of two worlds’ - one where one could be like funny peacocks and the other where one had to be like immovable statues. As it eventualised, they preferred to stay in-between the two worlds they had co-created and did not show further interest in entertaining adult guests in their tea party.

Nevertheless, the particular failure of the Tea Party Experiment became the next turning point for the direction of the exploration. My adherence to a view of doing philosophy in terms of sitting and talking (Gespräch) became evident to me. The tea party initially seemed like a good idea to me because it reflected a practice from the child-child dimension of children’s culture (Frønes 1994: 148-149). Furthermore, it still preserved the form of doing philosophy, i.e. sitting and talking, that I took for granted as The form of doing philosophy.

However, after the failure of the experiment, the scope of my attention began to expand beyond the tea party, towards something even more fundamental i.e. play. Interlocutors like Emma, Enaya and Ole usually made an effort to sit and talk to me because they wanted to help me. At the same time, the invitations I received were invitations to play within which my project was generously accommodated. Furthermore, the way interlocutors were negotiating definitions while planning or re-inventing the direction of their play e.g. Emma and Enaya’s peacock world, when they could not go on a tour’ during their tea party, was in itself a way of negotiating the definition of what could or could not be done. If the initial project was to seek a more equitable room for children to negotiate philosophical questioning and meanings with adults, then reducing the definition of doing philosophy as sitting and talking was already limiting the scope giving the adult counterpart an upper hand, since adults are used to sitting and talking for comparatively longer periods. Ultimately, I was still conceiving the child as the default addressee of pedagogy who had to perform on adult grounds when it came to philosophising.

Thus, I re-considered the very outset of my inquiry once again. Consequently, I turned to muddling through the mystery (Marcel 1949: 117) called play.
4.3.3. Fielding Play with Childism

The English language, like its continental counterparts German, French, and Italian, employs a single word to describe the phenomenon called play. The verbs spielen, jouer or giocare, with their own variations in how they are used in their respective lifeworlds, come closest to the English expression play. The Norwegian language has two verbs to describe what in English would translate as play - å leke and å spille. A similar distinction can be found in the continental counterpart Portuguese - brincar and jogar. The former is usually employed to describe something children do, whereby no ‘structures’ or ‘rules’ are observed - it is usually something ‘just for fun’ or in other words, å ha det gøy. Connotations of å spille include acts steered by rules and structure - a more ‘grown up’ play. An instrument, a theatrical performance or a game of chess would be played in the sense of å spille.

The pervasive influence and significance of play in human life was comprehensively laid out by Huizinga, who described human as Homo Ludens (Huizinga 1955, in Duflo 1997: 35). According to Feezell (2013) various standpoints of studying play are broadly categorized as follows:

a. A behaviour or activity

b. A motive, attitude or state of mind

c. A form or structure

d. A meaningful experience

e. An ontologically distinct phenomenon

Within the Western tradition three broader philosophical approaches to studying play, regardless of the standpoint, have been further laid out (Wall 2013: 48-50, 2011):

a. The top-down approach, which views human nature’s childhood and thereof play as a starting point of an animal-like unruliness, passion and disorder, requiring an ordered rationality to be imposed from above. Kant’s last publication on education reflects this approach in so far as it holds that children’s lively imagination “does not need to be expanded or made more intense ... [but] needs rather to be cur-
bed and brought under rule”; and “playing and caressing with the child ... makes him self-willed and deceitful” (Kant 1960: 78, 50, 52-53, in Wall 2013: 49).

b. The bottom-up approach, which views childhood and thereof play as an expression of humanity’s basic goodness and wisdom and its natural spontaneity and simplicity. Children and their playfulness, according to this view, must be nurtured from the ground up as a way of resisting the corrupting habits of the world. Rousseau’s idea of the ‘noble savage’ reflects this approach; Rousseau writes, “Cultivate and water the young plant before it dies [...] its fruits will one day be your delights, [...] and all of childhood is or ought to be only games and frolicsome play (Rousseau 1979: 38, 125, 153, in Wall 2013:49).

c. The developmental approach, which views play as a neutral instrument to be used for humanity’s gradual development or as a means for individuals, societies and history to make progress. Locke’s work on education reflects this approach; Locke writes that children start out life “as white Paper, or Wax, to be moulded and fashioned as one pleases [so that] all the Plays and Diversions of Children should be directed toward good and useful Habits, or else they will introduce ill will (Locke 1989: 265 and 192, in Wall 2013:50). Locke further argued that children’s development is the foundation of empirical science and democracy, since both rely on the human potential to play with new experiences over time (ibid.).

While all three approaches share a developmental tendency, especially the instrumental variety based on Locke’s tabula rasa thesis is compatible with approaches of developmental psychologists who, following Piaget (1972, in Wall 2013: 50), tend to understand children’s play as important to becoming cognitively and morally adult. A similar tendency is found in Sutton-Smith’s instrumental interpretation of children’s play as a basis for evolutionary development, in which play’s “function is to reinforce the organism’s variability in the face of rigidifications of successful adaptation (Sutton-Smith 1997: 231, in ibid.).”

The standpoint of questioning, perspectives and approaches to studying play within play theory and related fields are primarily from an adult point of view (e.g. Factor 2004; Schwartzman 1976; Singh and Gupta 2012, in
Glenn et al 2012). For example regarding play as the ‘work’ of children (e.g. Piaget 2007, in Glenn et al 2012) or as a particular activity preparing children for adult life (e.g. Elbers 1996). The childhood studies tradition on the other hand has studied play as an activity from children’s point of view (e.g. Øksnes, M. 2008; Glenn 2012; Lindqvist 2001:7; Evaldsson & Corsaro 1998). As opposed to adult-centric conclusions, such studies enable grasping children’s interpretive agency in response to adult life (Evaldsson & Corsaro 1998) or as pointed out in Section 3.2.2 – the system within which their interpretive cultures are immanent. Children are not captivated by objects themselves, but the stories which give the objects and actions their meaning (Lindqvist 2001:7). They partake actively in creating those meanings. Such studies include children’s perspectives i.e. children themselves contribute to the knowledge production process of the researcher’s investigation (Hallden 2003:14). Taking children’s perspectives into account however, would not alone guarantee that the theoretical grounding of the concept does not remain adult-centric. Play, had to be approached from a perspective such that it could not be understood as either free child-like ‘lek’ or adult-like structured ‘spill’, but as a more nuanced continuum of what was in between the two terms, namely so that the creative realm could be grasped, rendering play as belonging to the ontological structure of who we, regardless of age, are.

To illustrate this with a counter-intuitive example, I quote Wall’s telling illustration of the case of Ying Ying Fry who was adopted by an American family from an orphanage in China:

“Fry herself tells this story of her infancy when she is eight years old in her book for children and adults titled Kids Like Me in China, which she wrote shortly after revisiting her old orphanage with her adoptive parents. While Fry does not directly remember her infancy, she describes what it must have been like in powerful ways: ‘To get people to have small families, the [Chinese] government made some rules, and they’re really strict about them. But the babies didn’t do anything wrong! Why do they have to lose their first families? I don’t think those rules are fair to babies’ (Fry 2001: 2-3). As both a newborn and an eight-year old, Fry must constantly ‘play’ with her own experiences and meaning in the world. As her infancy shows, she is shaped by untold layers of relationships, communities, policies, and histories. She is partly who she is because of her birth parents, her biological ancestors, the Chinese government, global economic systems, international adoption agencies, her adoptive parents in the United States, their
own ancestors, their larger cultures and societies, and so on beyond any conclusive reckoning. At the same time, however, none of these conditions merely shape Fry passively. She also actively creates senses of meaning out of them for herself. As both a baby and an eight-year-old, she invests her complex and powerful surroundings with her own responses, ideas, and aspirations. She is both ‘played by’ and ‘plays with’ her worlds of meaning. She exists, in short, within an endless hermeneutical ellipse: a world that shapes the meaning of her experiences even as she in turn reshapes this meaning in new ways for herself” (Wall 2013: 51).

The kind of aforementioned ontological experience that starts in childhood cannot be understood through the traditional bottom-up, top-down or developmental approaches to childhood and play. The continental tradition that emerged as a rejection of the dualistic modern Cartesian view of human being as divided into subjective inner reason and objective outer nature - phenomenology - fleshes out a more complex sense of play. However, following Wall’s analysis of the three most influential phenomenologies of play, one finds that they not only entirely ignore the play of children, but in doing so assume a rather narrow play perspective of adulthood itself (Wall 2013; 2011). Therefore, I was convinced that, for muddling forward in the direction that my interlocutors had shown, not only the three traditional approaches, but also the promising continental phenomenological tradition itself would have to be carefully imploded.

To give a brief presentation based on Wall’s analysis of the phenomenological conceptualisations of play,

a. A top-down ontology can be found in Heidegger and Gadamer insofar as play is churned into the dynamic existential belonging of humans to history. Heidegger writes about how Being (Sein) “toys with man” and the role of man is to “play along with” the play; that man is caught up in that play (Heidegger 1957:206, quoted in Caputo 1970: 34, in Wall 2013: 51). Gadamer presents play as a movement of “historical consciousness” that in a somewhat “tragic” way is less “something a person does” than something that, “absorbs a player into itself” (Gadamer 1989: 104-105 and 110, in ibid.)

b. A bottom-up ontology of play can be found in Derrida, who presents the human being as a historical being subjected to constant deconstruction. Providing a more comic view, Derrida posits that the human being finds meaning only in the “play of differences,” the
presence of absences, the mischievous and disruptive “movement of play that “produces” ... differences’ of meaning in the first place (Derrida 1996: 441, 449, and 459, in ibid.)

c. A somewhat developmental perspective can be identified in Kearney’s suggestion that play is the endless imagination of life’s unfolding “possibilities”; and that to be human is to play with continually new possibilities for meaning and thereby constructing over time a “narrative identity woven from one’s own histories and those of others (Kearney 2003: 188, in ibid.).”

Consequently, muddling forward with my interlocutors compelled me to consider Wall’s proposal to open up to the unfinished project of nearing play as the in-between of lek and spill, or for that matter brincar and jogar, from a childist standpoint. Childism includes children and childhood in a phenomenological conception of play by grasping the poetics of play i.e. world-creativity as the meaning of being human. This perspective understands play as the capacity for decentering one’s historically given horizons of meaning in tune with one’s own particular and dynamic lived experiences. From the mundane life of everyday philosophers such as sleeping, waking, eating, talking and so on to powerful works of art and science, human beings play with the meaning of their own being by continuously deconstructing and reconstructing it afresh (Wall 2010, 2011, 2013).

Accordingly, childism understands play not only as a legitimate object for philosophical study, but as what it means to philosophise in the first place. “Philosophy is not just a professional occupation but also an activity of being human. And from this point of view, it is practised by all human beings from birth to death. To think philosophically is to ‘play with’ the most basic meaning of being human (Wall 2013: 56).”

Ergo, sitting and talking is a form of philosophising, at the same time it is playing. Which in turn is philosophising.

In the phase that followed, I decided to approach former interlocutors like Emma, Enaya, Ole and others as co-explorers who could further lead me into a form of philosophising I had pretty much forgotten as a remembering adult (Briod 1989; Lippitz 1986). This was a different effort/attitude compared with the time Emma had invited me to her tea party, which I had seen as an opportunity to ‘interview her in her habitual lifeworld’. However, the new intention of playing whatever co-explorers decided was no longer to seek their opinions on any specific matter, but to philosophise with them,
in the sense of the Norwegian preposition *hos* or the German preposition *bei*. The desire of seeking a room where a more philosophically equitable pedagogical child-adult dynamic could unfold had subsided. The room was *play* itself. Since my prospective co-explorers were by far better than me in this form of philosophising, it wasn’t any longer reasonable for them to be positioned as default addressees of pedagogy. In turn, I, as the adult in our child-adult dynamic, would have to be positioned on the receiving end of the dynamic. Thereupon, the central question came to the fore and I finally could and therefore asked:

*What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds as guests?*

### 4.4 Phase 2: Immersive Play

In order to explore the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds, I now decided to approach children as co-explorers. Although I drew upon the least-adult role (Mandell 1988; Corsaro 1985; Warming 2011), the conscious decision was to assume the role of a guest. In doing so, I could emphasise my ignorance of the temporally distinct worlds I would enter and consequently explore what it is that I could perceive. This new stage also involved conversations with co-explorers who could talk and my own notes and, if the situation allowed, play sessions were filmed so as to not depend completely on memory.

In the following, I will account for the theoretical considerations and consequent pragmatic choices I made in order to prepare myself for immersive play with co-explorers. After that, I will present some representative illustrations of selected moments captured through a camera, in order to proceed to cerebrations on having played which led to the core insights.

#### 4.4.1. Preparing for Immersive Play

Preparing for immersive play as a least-adult who is an ignorant guest called for going back to play itself in the phenomenological sense of the phrase, and starting with suspending the graspable natural attitude as far as possible. The continental phenomenological tradition, despite its promising
methodological tools, would be insufficient for such a purpose, because I was not about to enter a thought experiment in my mind, but an embodied thought experiment in dynamic and unpredictable motion lead by co-explorers. Hence in the embryological stages of the experiment, following Irigary’s critique of the forgotten breath in phenomenology, and inspired by the experience with Baby Ole, I drew upon the phenomenological technique of Vipassana meditation - which I had also began practising in the embryological stages with Erica. Since maintaining the stillness of the conscious mind in a dynamic state was predicted to be an obstacle, I further drew upon Jaina pluralism as an analytical fall-back. These considerations contributed to a systematic preparation for immersive play.

4.4.1.1. Suspending the graspable Natural Attitude

In the continental phenomenological tradition, suspending the natural attitude has been the methodological point of departure for the investigation of phenomena. In a pure, theoretical philosophical project such as the fundamental reflection on the world as a phenomenon, performed by Husserl (1962), the world is reduced to a phenomenon for experiencing subjectivity. The natural attitude, in this case, is the consciousness standpoint that posits - *The world is* (ibid; also see Luft on Husserl 2002). Instead of simply positing the existence of the world, positing itself is conceived of as ‘taking being for granted’ i.e. taking it as it is or presupposing it as something independent of us. Here, the interdependent nature of experience is recognised in so far as experience is always experience of something (Husserl 1962; Luft on Husserl 2002; Jaaware on Heidegger 2016). In terms of muddling through (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008), suspending the natural attitude is then understood as a sense of embracing ignorance as a point of departure.

Identifying a natural adult attitude specifically, as described by Waxsler (1986; 1991; 1996), would imply initially tuning into what children can do and adults cannot or will not do. Secondly, it entails an awareness that, at the level of social being, the role of a child is a role, and correspondingly becoming aware of the adult role vis-à-vis a child role. Phenomenological recognition of child and adult roles called forth a suspension in the assumption that childhood has some absolute existence beyond the social - an assumption that embodies the very topic that it could endeavour to study (Waxsler 1986: 80).
Given the embodied positioned nature of experience itself (Warming 2011), an intellectual suspension could then not suffice for overcoming the embodied natural attitude as an adult. The ‘child-friendly’ experiment, in trying to exit class-based philosophising in the embryological stages with Sungjae, as well as the failed Tea Party Experiment, had already shown me my limitations. Clearly, a purely intellectual suspension of the natural adult attitude would not be enough, if it was possible for me at all to perform in accordance with the continental phenomenological tradition as far as I had grasped. Something more would be needed if I had to enter into immersive play with my co-explorers.

4.4.1.2. Remembering the Breath

A major limitation of the Western tradition and especially continental phenomenology, as Irigary has pointed out, is the forgetting of a fundamental aspect of existence, namely the breath (Irigary 1999). Baby Ole had already pointed me towards the significance of being in touch with my own breath in order to tune into the temporal otherness of a child.

In order to systematically integrate the breath as a tool into the phenomenological approach, it was necessary to look for an approach that did not have primarily intellectual goals. Within the Eastern traditions, Buddhist mindfulness practices bear an affinity with the phenomenological because of the centrality given to the role of consciousness as well as presupposition-less investigations of the consciousness through the body (Gokhale 2018). Therefore, I decided to actively draw upon my practice in the Vipassana technique of the Buddhist tradition as taught by S.N. Goenka, which I had begun practising during the embryological phase with Erica Vicenzi. The Vipassana mindfulness practice entails performing cycles of persistent observation of the internal and external body in order to gain insight into the impermanent nature of consciousness. The first step to get into the phenomenological self-investigation is to begin with observing the breath. As one proceeds with the practise, the breath serves as a point of return and renewed departure every time the analytical mind wanders away.

While at a material level of my embodied participation in immersive play I had deliberately chosen breathing as the phenomenological point of return, years of training with the school of Vipassana meditation helped me predict the default tendencies of the mind to go into analytical mode. I could by no reasonable means anticipate that I would manage to hold the silence of the
mind through meditative breathing. Such states of complete mental silence had only been possible for some minutes after intensive periods of sitting meditation during Vipassana courses. Since immersive playing would entail bodily movements including sounds as well as my attention towards including the video camera in the process, I had to be prepared with an analytical tool that I could fall upon.

Consequently, in addition to the intellectual phenomenological suspension of the natural adult attitude following Waksler (1986), and integration of material breath into my preparations for immersive play, I sought analytical support from Jaina pluralism.

4.4.1.3. Jaina pluralism as analytical fall back

My co-explorers and children I had spent time with especially during the embryological phase in the kindergarten in Trondheim often used the conditional Norwegian term på en måte (in a way), especially while planning their play. Although I learnt of Jaina pluralism earlier in the embryological phase, it came to the fore of my attention only in kindergarten.

Following the methodological attribute of ontological validation through pluralism, I drew upon Jaina logic to counter my own judgements which were bound to arise in my mind during immersive play. Specifically, the Jaina theory of judgement holds that every judgement about reality can only be partially true (Shastri 1990; Chatterjee & Datta 2016; Shah 2000; Ganeri 2001; Ganeri 2002). In other words, our judgements hold only for the particular aspect of the judged object and with reference to the standpoint occupied from where the judgement is being made. Therefore, the term somehow is used in the beginning of every proposition in order to make the conditionality of judgements transparent (Chatterjee & Datta 2016: 79). The approach systematically adheres to a seven-fold propositional model, as opposed to a two-fold propositional model of affirmative and negative propositions as commonly found in Western logic.

To elaborate further, in addition to systematic conditional qualification of propositions, the seven-fold model of judgement goes beyond the default two-fold affirmative and negative template of description through an ontological epistemological validation of incapacity of a human observer to describe reality. Hence, a third conditionally qualified proposition is added in order to make the descriptive incapacity transparent. Consequently, indescribability is onto-epistemologically legitimised. In other words, Jaina plura-
lism entails an epistemological humility which two-valued epistemologies regardless of geographical origins fail to offer.

It follows that the primary conditional propositions through this approach are:

1) Somehow, X is
2) Somehow, X is not
3) Somehow, X is indescribable

Furthermore, the consequent three conditional propositions are derived by compounding the primary conditional propositions as follows:

4) Somehow, X is and is not
5) Somehow, X is and is indescribable
6) Somehow, X is not and is indescribable

Finally, the following last conditional proposition comes forth as a trinity of all three conditional propositions:

7) Somehow, X is, is not and is indescribable.

So while the forgotten breath (Irigary 1999), based on the Vipassana tradition of the Buddhist school of Indian philosophy, would serve as an embodied point of return, the anticipated activity of the analytical mind would be curbed through falling back upon the conditional seven-fold judgement criteria from the Jaina School of Indian Philosophy.

4.4.2. Playing

Having prepared myself mentally to enter into a phenomenologically immersive experience as a least-adult guest in the playfully constructed worlds of my co-explorers, I began meeting Enaya, Emma, Captain Duke, Ole, Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida, to play on their terms.

The play encounters had a temporality of their own and did not always meet the schedules that the adult-team of guardians and caregivers agreed upon with me. Sometimes when I arrived, co-explorers were eagerly waiting with a plan e.g. a story or objects that would be used to realise what they had in mind. On other occasions, either they were already absorbed in
playing, or simply in an aloof mood. Or at other times, they were either participating in what was going on in the household e.g. waiting for dinner or spending time with other people. Even during such occasions, there were fleeting moments of playfulness that happened which were captured on one of the recording devices I had i.e. A Blackview rugged outdoor smartphone and a Sony handycam.

In order to tune-into the specific temporalities that my co-explorers dwelt in, beyond the pre-determined schedule of my visits, the first suspension was the suspension of external clock-time.

The second suspension was a spatial suspension of my taken-for-granted world i.e. the network of meanings around me, through which I usually make sense of everyday life.

In the following section, I will begin with the example of approximately 6 clock-time minutes of an intense play encounter in Lava Land with Captain Duke (Biswas 2017), the total of which lasted about 7 clock-time hours over a period of three days in Spring 2016. Nevertheless, these 6 clock-time minutes didn’t feel like 6 clock-time minutes, but indescribably longer.

4.4.3. Cerebrations on Having Played

Taking my experience as the focal unit of analysis, I describe the encounter with Captain Duke in a place which was:

- Somehow, a kitchen. (+)
- Somehow, not a kitchen. (-)
- Somehow, indescribable. (0)
- Somehow, a kitchen and not a kitchen. (+ -)
- Somehow, a kitchen and indescribable. (+ 0)
- Somehow, not a kitchen and indescribable. (- 0)
- Somehow, a kitchen, not a kitchen and indescribable. (+ - 0)

In this place, Captain Duke endlessly flew a toy car, as though it were a plane, that he was holding in his hand. At first, these repetitive cycles were boring for me and did not make sense. But I returned to my breath and intellectu-

55 Since co-explorers tended to playfully incorporate the recording devices themselves, I used a rugged outdoor smartphone in order to preclude my adult anxiety of equipment being damaged during play.
ally allowed the other meanings he was bringing to life, through his dynamic embodied movement, to enter the horizons of my perception. Gradually, it did not feel as boring and senseless, rather exciting and abundantly meaningful.

Captain Duke flew the car over the kitchen counters and landed it on the dining table. He generated onomatopoeic sounds accompanying the motions. He cautioned me that there was lava on the floor and that all the cars were in the lava. Therefore, we had to fly the cars and land them on the dining table. He then flew the cars on the same route and I surrendered to his lead. Captain Duke’s primary care-giver was present in the room, but supported my investigation by staying in the periphery, only responding when Captain Duke asked for attention. The presence of the other adult caregiver made me conscious of my own adulthood, but I stayed with Captain Duke’s lead and played along. This meant that somehow I was observing and immersing in the play at the same time. I accomplished this by surrendering to Captain Duke’s lead as much as possible until at one point our body movements became highly synchronised. In superficial words, I copied Captain Duke’s moves. When I couldn’t, Captain Duke repeatedly explained to me what I should change or do better until I got into a flow.

Eventually, my prior conceptual understanding of the network of meanings i.e. the world around me remained and at the same time ceased to exist. Material objects such as the ‘dining table’, ‘kitchen counter’, ‘play-kitchen’ and so on revealed themselves as co-determinants of our movements, as opposed to the usual sense within which I encountered them. Subsequently, my prior conceptual understanding relaxed and a parallel world presented itself to me.

Captain Duke had led me through an embodied thought experiment in motion and shown me what else a particular spatio-temporality could be. As proposed by Gopnik (2009), sophisticated counterfactual thinking i.e. all that is expressed in spoken language through terms like might, should, could, would and if etc. is not just part of adult consciousness. Ultimately, counterfactual thinking lies at the heart of philosophising or playing. From a childist perspective, they both refer to the one and the same (Wall 2013). Somehow.

To attempt a visual illustration\textsuperscript{56} of what came to pass in my conscious experience, I present the following four static frames of a dynamic GIF image:

\textsuperscript{56} Partly inspired by some of the art works produced by my co-explorers.
Frame 1: the immediate world

Frame 2: my prior, non-exhaustive, conceptual understanding (PCU) of the immediate world
Frame 3: my PCU appears to have ceased to exist

Frame 4: a parallel world presented itself to me

*Illustration 20:* GIF frames of Lava-land. Graphic by author; GIF by Emma Neumeyer
4.4.3.1. Philosophical Clearings with (hos/bei)Children

Playing with co-explorers opened up the horizons for me to unstiffen my conceptual muscles. I could receive invitations to temporarily be part of an immersive lived-experience in co-existing worlds, which my co-explorers offered me. As in the case of Captain Duke (Biswas 2017), I experienced somehow being and not being in the kitchen at the same time. The experience is further attributed with indescribability to acknowledge that my linguistic repertoire cannot capture experience completely. Of course, since I am not aware of everything, not all concepts through which I make sense of my world as a network of meanings can be exhausted. But within the scope of my awareness and self-reflection there were plenty opportunities that were easily lit up in presence with my co-explorers. These opportunities illuminated the perceived spatio-temporal relationship between my self and the surrounding objects. I name these opportunities: philosophical clearings.

Philosophical clearings with (hos/bei) children call for relaxing mental muscles in a way that can facilitate crossing the borders of one’s taken for granted world; subsequently, for experiencing other fleeting, temporal, co-existing worlds regardless of their contradictory appearances (ibid.). In everyday life, objects within the scope of one’s awareness make sense within a network of meanings that one experiences as given - in other words, that which one takes to be true. For example, the dining table is a piece of furniture to sit at, not sit on. The kitchen counter is a place to prepare food which in turn is placed on the dining table. Utensils, appliances and so on as well as the space in between the kitchen counter and the dining table - all assume meaning in functional relation to each other. This network of meanings can be extended to macro and physically absent aspects of one’s world (Heidegger 1977; 1972; 2010). For example, the dining table probably came from an IKEA store, where it was bought. It was brought there from a factory in a distant nation, which in turn procured raw materials such as wood from trees in a forest from another nation. Further, there are ‘professions’ and codes of transaction of resources in my world where the acts necessary to maintain dining table production are systematically carried out by human beings and other species, and so on. This is one possible way which contributes to maintaining the kitchenness of a kitchen one takes for granted. While playing, one’s natural attitude of taking the kitchenness of a kitchen for granted is put into question. One finds herself in a land of lava, where I fly cars in order to rescue them. As a consequence - within
the frame of that other spatio-temporality - the distinction between cars as play-world things or toys and the kitchen as a real-world thing become bleak. The kitchen remains a kitchen and at the same time becomes a play-world thing, just as the play-world things remain play-world things and at the same time become a real-world thing. In so far as one flies planes with her body making accompanying onomatopoeic sounds - one’s body is not only a doer of kitchen-world acts, instead it is also the doer of for e.g. lava-land acts (Biswas 2017).

As with Captain Duke, the playfully-constructed worlds I was invited into by co-explorers Enaya, Emma, Ole, Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida, opened up the opportunity for me to see the arbitrariness of what I usually perceived as a kitchen or a playground or bathroom or bedroom and so on. In other words, they were possibilities for me to participate in other conceptions of concepts which are an integral part of the way I interact with the world, i.e. network of meanings, that I find myself in everyday. I describe this as: ‘embodied thought experiments in motion’. During such temporary, embodied thought experiments in motion, tools of thinking are toys that enable one to toy with taken for granted meanings.

4.4.3.2. Toys are Tools for Toying with Meaning

Philosophising entails fantasy. Fantasy here does not refer to a specific genre of fantasising as in tales about fairies, mermaids and unicorns, although from the perspective ofchildism it does include them. Simply keeping a normalised everyday life going, requires embodied participation in collective fantasies such as the idea of Time, which remains an eternal mystery for philosophers. A collective fantasy of time according to specific clocks and calendars makes daily functioning possible globally. Practices such as Daylight Saving Time (DST) in the Continent and Scandinavia make it possible simply to turn the clock an hour here and there, and entire nations and economic sectors, including the education sector, from one day to the next, simply go on with mundane, seasonal lives, believing that Time has been ‘gained’ or ‘saved’(!).

Questioning also requires fantasy insofar as one has to be able to transcend a given realm of taken-for-granted answers in order to simply ask “Why not?” or to overcome fortifying questions that block the possibility of new questions like “Can one even ask such a question?”
During the immersive play encounters, it became evident to me that co-explorers used toys as extended tools for thinking. Conventionally recognised philosophy uses words and symbols (as in symbolic logic) to develop ideas. These words and symbols could be understood as abstract tools of thinking. In the context of children’s playfully constructed worlds, the ‘tools’ are in fact material objects which take on different meanings in order to construct fleeting, temporal worlds that one can enter and exit. The English word *toy* is akin to the Norwegian *tøy* - which can be compounded with other concepts to denote specific kinds of tools e.g. *verktøy* (work tools) or *leketøy* (toys). The Online Etymology Dictionary also presents a similar etymological link with an older form of contemporary Norwegian i.e. the Danish word *tøj*[^57]. Perhaps it is not just a coincidence that these concepts are intertwined across these languagescapes.

The following pages illustrate some fleeting moments where co-explorers used toys as tools to toy with meanings:

Illustration 21: Baking in the Kitchen

Illustration 22: Our City Kingdom
Illustration 23: Tiger Snail

Illustration 24: Flying to Norway Land
Illustration 25:  Poor Woman Cooking

Illustration 26:  The World Drowns in Lava
4.4.3.3. Relationality: Thinking and letting think from and for both sides

Thinking is literally and figuratively bound to taking certain positions. It is happening both within and with the body.

In many ways the fundamental existential question of being (and simultaneously being-with) in the world is inseparably connected to and boils down to questions of doing, for example:

What shall I/we do?
Why shall I/we do it?
How shall I/we do it?
Where shall I/we do it?
What shall I/we not do?
Why shall I/we not do it?
How shall I/we not do it?
Where shall I/we not do it?

... and so on, in relationality with others who are experiencing similar questioning.

Further variations of questions of doing can also be grasped in different formulations expressed in a variety of tenses and moods e.g. past and future tenses, conditional variations or subjunctive moods. This is not to say that every act performed requires explicit articulation of these questions. It is to suggest that questions of doing in various forms are relationally alive throughout one’s life course.

Moreover, while not every act performed through basic bodily postures such as sitting, standing and laying down is always done consciously\(^\text{58}\) - these basic bodily postures and their variations are steered and formed in and over time by one’s philosophical pre-understandings whether or not, it seems, one is aware of them. The natural attitude or that which one takes for granted applies not only to concepts at an intellectual level, but also to how the concepts become embodied and are repeatedly performed manifesting one’s mundane every-day self and the roles one performs. If one has to do something with somebody, it implies co-negotiating embodied

\(^{58}\) Although in principle the possibility exists.
meanings as well. Something as basic as sitting still - whether in order to have a ‘philosophical’ dialogue as in PC practices or to eat at a table – is up for negotiation in a child-adult dynamic. The posture refers to a picture one has of what it means to be human in a particular society and also as an extension how new citizens in a particular society ought to be-have.

An illustrative example was the repeated conflicting interactions of adult caregivers struggling to get co-explorers to sit and eat at a table instead of running around while intermittently eating. In some cases, they would negotiate why they could not sit on or under the table and eat. Hypothetically speaking, while one question arising on part of the adult could be: why doesn’t she just sit at the table on a chair and eat? A corresponding possible question on the other side was: why do I always have to sit at the table on a chair and eat?

The comparatively stiff adult mind-body doesn’t easily surrender to the latter question and holds onto the particular psycho-physical position. While there may of course be biological limitations to arriving at the kind of agility and flexibility the child counterparts can perform, the possibility to put oneself in different positions for different activities adheres rather to what it means for a particular person to be an adult in a particular lifeworld. Playing with children can be demanding but, as my hosts, co-explorers were taking my limitations into account so I could play along on their terms.

In playing with the co-explorers I often sensed that they took me into consideration as they improvised further\(^59\). While being a guest in the child’s playfully constructed world was a deliberate undertaking, this implied for the exploration that my co-explorers were actively and empathetically hosting me so as to include me.

Here too, an aspect of relationality in thinking together came to the fore. By ‘thinking’ I mean the embodied processes of thinking, which include bodily motions. The pluralistic relationality in thinking that occurred by putting myself in a guest position and allowing myself to be hosted by my co-explorers manifested a spatio-temporality wherein both sides were simultaneously thinking and letting think from and for the other side. I had of course deliberately given room for co-explorers to negotiate what should be done with the body at what point in order to continue playing.

On my side, a large part of it was facilitated by imitating bodily movements of the smaller embodied host side and being put into positions both figuratively and literally that did not make sense or felt ‘awkward’, ‘absurd’

\(^{59}\) Enaya’s response in the following section confirmed this aspect in my view.
and ‘boring’ in my ‘bigger’ picture. While for me this contributed to the experience of unstiffening conceptual muscles, it also entailed that my physical muscles were also relaxing. The experience was akin to when I learned to ‘walk for the first time’ as the supra-adult Majestic Lady on Stilts in Italy during the embryological phases.

There were moments where a very symmetrical physical coordination in my bodily movements with co-explorers was also externally visible, as for example while playing Escaping the Tower, in Fieldnotes from Trondheim (Biswa 2017a):

Illustration 27: Symmetrical bodily movements during immersive play

In lieu of a conventional single-authored discussion section, in what follows i.e. Phase 3 of this study, I present selected parts of the retrospective discussion that took place in the post-empirical phase with Enaya Mubasher in the Child and Youth Seminar at the Department of Education and Lifelong Learning at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim in March 201760.

60 Conf. https://www.ntnu.edu/ipl/sipp/child-and-youth
4.5. Phase 3: Retrospections with Enaya

When I was past the stages of immersive playing, I assumed that that would be the end of muddling through with my interlocutors and co-explorers. Usually, at this point one should go back to a room and look at ‘data’ and carry out analysis taking a distance from the lifeworld and the beings in it. However, in Summer 2016, Enaya with the help of her mother contacted me via Skype and expressed an interest in wanting to remain involved in my project. “Is there something more I can still do?” she had asked me. As a researcher of childhood, who aligned with the childhood studies position, following the UNCRC, that children have the right to participate in knowledge production about their lives, I couldn’t simply say “No, it doesn’t work like that.” I could muddle forward a little bit more.

Enaya and I continued meeting on Skype and I began sharing with her mainly the difficulties that I was facing in writing ‘what I had learnt from our ‘projects’. Apart from the aspect that academic dissemination of work involving children remains a challenge, the question was “How shall I write in words what cannot be written about so my teachers and adult peers can understand?”

“Use pictures to show them, maybe you can draw something,” Enaya advised me. This particular input became a deciding factor in the presentation of the work in a text format. I also began looking into possibilities of co-authoring an article with Enaya, who had started sharing her memories of what we did via email, which she had by this time began to use actively. As a former interlocutor and co-explorer, she had something to say and wanted to. Enaya was eager to go to places where I go to talk about our projects. So we attempted a joint application for an international conference on new directions in PC that took place in the Continent, but our application failed to secure a funded place in the main programme. We were given the possibility to be part of the non-funded after-programme, but I could not manage to procure travel funds for both Enaya and me. This left Enaya disappointed, and she was shocked that our project had not made it. On this particular aspect of muddling through, I regret having put Enaya in that position. However, the Child and Youth Seminar at the Department of Education and Lifelong Learning, where I was a regular affiliated guest researcher, expressed an interest in the project and offered us a date in their schedule.

The Child and Youth Seminar is a regular interdisciplinary research forum for researchers interested in child and youth related work. In our presenta-
tion, we opened with me giving a brief introduction of PC practices, followed by co-presenting what we had done, me presenting some insights that emerged, and followed by Enaya leading a playshop for the adult researchers in the room. In simple words, we all played in the research forum. After this, we opened the floor for questions, selected parts of which are presented below.

In reading the following transcript sections, the status of the transcript is not that of data to be analysed, but rather to be read as a multi-authored, as opposed to a single-authored, community of inquiry, where crucial aspects of doing research with children and resulting issues are raised. The concerns are raised in reference to the particular muddling through of this project, but in our common understanding applied to research with children in general.

Illustration 28: Child and Youth Seminar 2017, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Researcher 2: Hello, uhm, I was just wondering what it feels like to have these play research encounters with Tanu, uh, like what you were thinking when she comes, if you want to teach her something or do you want to just, like what are you thinking when ...

Enaya: Like, I’m thinking like from both sides like I want to help Miss Tanu with her studies also and I also want to, uhm, play with, like, get better at playing and see how it is to play with grown-ups because grown-ups don’t usually play like my mum and dad they don’t play. But like my little brother he wants to play, yeah ... Anyone?

Researcher 3: You say, uhm, Miss Tanu just disappeared\(^61\), right? From, uh, the kindergarten and, uhm, nobody gave you the notice.

Enaya: Mhm (affirmative). Yeah, it was like I was also like very little because I usually didn’t know when people disappeared, so then I couldn’t understand anything then. (Video break, confidential discussion ) ... Yes?

Researcher 4: I know that Tanu comes to you and you discussed different things, so are there things .. that is boring or maybe it’s not, you should be thinking of that or it’s something you know that you don’t like?

Enaya: Uhm, I sometimes think like wonder like those science thing because I’m not like used to science so when I, uhm, just think it’s boring so when I . I like (inaudible) but I think it’s a bit boring that they start doing that things so I don’t get bored while I’m listening, so I do like really many things at one time.

Researcher 4: I can see you put lots of efforts, it’s a good work, uh, but is there something that you want to tell Tanu, you know you should be doing this rather than doing this boring stuff?

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\(^61\) Conf section 4.2.5 of the embryological phase. Enaya is till date not aware of the reasons for my or the unexplained departures of others who were then in similar positions like me.
Enaya: Uhm no, but because that is like studying, like for example if I don’t like school so much but if I like go because I want to play and if I learn at home I get better at school so studies are important even if they are really boring.

Listener 4: (laughing) Very boring.

Enaya: (looking at another listener) Yes?

Researcher 5: It’s so interesting listening to you. Now I was just wondering about the playing thing is it, because you said that grown-ups don’t usually play but you play with Miss Tanu. Does it differ after you played with her when you play with other kids? Is it different like, do you play differently now you think?

Enaya: Uhm not like connected with Miss Tanu, uhm, like, uhm, because I’m getting bigger then we play like not so, like with toys, we climb trees, run around and jump off big stones and we do like a bit, hard things but with Miss Tanu we do like the old stuff that I used to do.

(Tanu and the Listeners start laughing)

Researcher 5: (To Tanu) So Miss Tanu should start jumping off rocks and do hard play as well maybe?

Tanu: (laughing) I try.

Researcher 6: Sometimes we take it just so for granted you know it’s a, I mean they really do the hard things like they climb trees or ... 

Tanu: No, it’s like, for me I am aware that we do the old things (laughs) like I can’t catch up with you (towards Enaya), you know all the time and it’s a, during the research I saw and I feel the difference of course, uhm, myself so then I try to see if I can fit into the game, in my way, you know? Which is also comfortable for me because I, we were in the park this, the, we were in this park and we were playing escaping the like this, tower, I mean we had to do a lot of (makes wave motion with her hands) which was much easier for you, but this, getting caught in
like spider webs and stuff my body hurt the next day it was like, it was a bit like going to a yoga or gymnastics or something and all happening because there is an idea in the mind and the body is following.

**Enaya:** Because like, when I’m getting older like if I see like when I was in kindergarten I saw like other big children like climbing trees up to the top and, like last year at school this happened that uhm there was a boy who climbed up all the way up the tree I was just staring at him when can I do that, when can I do that? (crowd laughs) But then afterward I saw that he was, he wa- he couldn’t even come down the tree so then the teacher went up to carry him (crowd goes ‘ooh’) and he was like in tenth grade or so (crowd laughs). And he would say like, mum help me and he was almost like falling down so some things are too hard for me and some things I’m getting better. Like my friends uhm who had broken their bone or something like that once in their life they, uhm, were yesterday we had like a big stone in our school and there was really much ice and then they would go and do gymnastics off that steep stone so that was really a hard game. And then we called that game survival course. And we must try to survive..

**Researcher 5:** Can I ask another question? (Enaya nods) When you play with Miss Tanu is it also with like the philosophizing like, I mean do you talk while you’re playing or is it just the playing?

**Enaya:** It’s playing and like a quarter or tenth that we are talking. But we are mostly playing.

**Researcher 5:** And what are you talking about?

**Enaya:** Uhmm we talk about like a game or so and sometimes well we have like a break when we’re playing and then we talk a bit about what’s going to happen. Like yesterday we were playing a lot and then afterwards we stopped playing and then we went to practice for this (drinks from a cup).

**Researcher 3:** Tanu, are there also other children that you play with besides Enaya?
Tanu: Uh yeah, yeah. There are other, there are uh one is around Enaya’s age and she has a younger sister as well so I played with them together and the sister was in kindergarten and school here. Then there is another child pair again it’s two brothers. So I started playing with the brother before and he’s about five uh yeah in kindergarten but the, while I, this is also a child I know for a long time and in the course of when I knew the child the baby brother came as well and then just started like joining and so this pair, I just look at it as one pair now, and uh there’s another boy who’s four uh, yeah that’s, and one more girl, I played with.

Researcher 5: Can I just ask one more question? When you were interviewing each other you told us that it’s very important to have other people’s perspective and there are different sights to stories. Is that something you’ve talked about or is that something you just sort of know or talked about with your parents or..

Enaya: Uhm that I actually learned in first grade because our school has like units and there are difficult words and then we learn their meanings but sometimes I can’t keep the meanings but some words only when I practice them they (makes downward hand motion) stay..

Tanu: I would like to add something to the word perspective because it was actually the first time that you used it yesterday and I was like, what is she, yeah like we were practicing that we can do this part like an interview and then Enaya just said, yeah now we’re going to this and we can get the other perspective, and I was like, what did you just say there? uh and then I asked her where she learned the word and she said it was in school and uh what you (towards Enaya) actually just pointed out was you know that, if you don’t practice it you lose the meaning and like, so for me in a way I’m lucky that she got the word in school so we can practice the meaning like it gets easier because uh I was telling Enaya this morning that it’s a very, very important word for social science. well any science like perspective is ,uhm, and so it’s great that you know how to use the word.
Researcher 4: Yeah you know in science it’s very much like this adult thinking that is, uh, is it really uh I, I think that is it really children thinking that they should have others perspective because it is what they’re learning or we teach children actually because she learned it from school, she learned it from elders, grown-ups that you should learn other’s perspective, so you know if you, uh, where is child’s own thinking they, because they learn it from school, they learn it maybe at home but you know sometimes if you don’t teach them than that mean, for example I have experience with my children the, my second year old she say that, I know better than you, because she for some of things then she, it’s, then I think it’s maybe now, it’s purely her thing it’s yeah because you know this is very much your, our education which really teach children, so I don’t know really where is this child’s own perspective, the perspective of child.

Tanu: (towards Enaya) You understand the question?

Enaya: (nods)

Researcher 4: Uuh

Tanu: You want me to answer because I... /Researcher 4: No./

Tanu: (towards Enaya) Do you wanna say something about that?

Enaya: Mmh. Yeah I think it’s also like if you do this perspective it’s like if the grown-ups teach the smaller ones, like if they tell like, something like, if I, someone just told me a weird perspective then I should, like sometimes the child finds, like if my mum says find, the teacher said to find the table so my mum said uh you do the nine times table and then I found a pattern that my mum and parents didn’t, know, even if they taught me it, (Listener laughs) Children find out things themselves.

Researcher 4: Yeah this is very good that you know. Children should, children’s own thinking, their own thoughts should, they, i—it’s just equally important not that I, yeah,
**Researcher 5:** I sort of, tend to disagree a bit because what is an own thinking because we’re all part of, you know you have your parents and a brother and I have my people around me as well you’re never, that’s something that just doesn’t come from just inside and I mean, to say that, well I mean how else are you going to sort of, be in the world if you’re not influenced by these people around you. And I don’t think that necessarily has anything to do with age or where it comes from, It’s just we’re all part of something and you can’t..

**Tanu:** Yeah (looks at Enaya)

**Researcher 5:** Do you understand?

**Tanu:** (to Enaya) Is there anything, like do you think there is like your own thinking or is there something like one’s own thinking?

**Enaya:** Like it’s actually I’m thin- , I’m like thinking of both things because sometimes there is, with other people and sometimes there are only your person- , it’s only like one person and sometimes there are like really many people.

**Researcher 4:** I agree with these things you know, this children’s agency thing, where do you border that, because everywhere you go, you are in a system, where do you border that you know? So how much influence or how much maybe fortune you take from others or how much freedom they have to express their own thinking or maybe whatever they want to. So this, you know this border thing is, it’s uh important.

**Researcher 5:** I suggest that there is no such thing as your own thinking.

**Tanu:** I mean it, I’m having, this uh this, like I have this question a lot also with Enaya. Like I don’t know in, like of course in the end I will submit this as my doctoral research you know but it’s actually really difficult for me to, show clearly the points because I don’t know if it’s my thinking, like of course I’m making something of the theories I know, but what has emerged like it’s very difficult to say, was it like
Enaya or me or also the other children that I played with because there’s so much coming from the other side and it’s not just like I’m the rea-
, you know so, I don’t know if it is my thinking either, you know? So I
don’t, I mean I, one question is for the child participants but the other is also for me because I’m doubting this a lot. And it’s feeling really weird that I’m going to submit this as my thinking or my work whereas it’s like you know (uh), like I mean also you (looking at Enaya) you’ve like con-
tributed so much to it and...

**Researcher 3:** This opens up a whole range of issues to do with also like in methodology, in who owns what is produced from, from the search but I, we, we have, I’m not sure if we have opened up for that discussion right here and now but, but one thing that I really found interesting from what Enaya said is uhm, her mum and the teachers teach them something but she finds a pattern that they have no clue about. That she is part and parcel of, she has her own thoughts but at the same time she also identifies her own recognizing of things in the world that is how, unique, And I think that this is the core of what we call a child’s perspective, that there is a perspective. That a human being, a person, holds. That I think is a very central thing, that you should develop further. Really, serious!

**Tanu:** Yeah, we should develop that further (looking at Enaya)

**Enaya:** Yeah and , like if, uh, because grownups just don’t like usually do like, children if they want to have their own language like making up strange words than uhm maybe if they find a word and then if they put it on Google search than maybe there comes a meaning of it, So the child has found something out and without even noticing it. Then maybe that like, I learned about like Vincent Van Gogh he like, or Leonardo DaVinci he did like, he put a mark on this as my thing and you can’t use this thing as your own thing. So maybe that would be your special thing that you find it and you get better at your work.

**Researcher 5:** What you were saying about your doctor like, and-and you were talking about the network of meanings and how networks of meanings change and I don’t understand this as a problem like is it
me or is it her or the kids. It’s a co-production /Tanu: Yeah, Yeah./ of knowledge and that’s not, I mean I think that’s a good thing because like for my perspective and how I view, you know, truth in the world is that, no man is an island and we’re not, I don’t have my own perspec-
tive that’s just mine because I have been influenced with my culture, my history, my family, my friends, what I read online, everything! It’s nothing that’s just individually just by myself, All parts of me are a co-
production of, and this is sort of where I come from the actor-network theory as well is the co-production of meanings and so. I don’t think that would be a problem.

Tanu: No it’s not / Researcher 5: Because where did it come from?/
Tanu: But then in the end like there would, there’s a product / Resear-
cher 5: Yeah / Tanu: so when that book is printed it has like, uh, my name on it and then it looks like it’s, you know me but it’s actually not and, you know this, that’s how / Researcher 5: But it never is / it never is of course but then like we, I mean at the end it’s like I will, also you know like I will defend my thesis but actually like we’ve done the work together and the thing is because Enaya doesn’t have an institutional affiliation like, I do and she is too, (simulates quotation marks with fingers) she can’t sign up for a doctoral trial right now but I would feel like, I mean that she is ...

(Enaya has been raising her hand for some seconds)

(Tanu signalizes that she can talk now)

Enaya: Yeah and I mean, but what if you, if you feel like that way we should do this thing that you feel? You should, maybe you could write other people’s name also, and you wouldn’t, because if it’s your stu-
dies then you choose it but they can’t like choose if there you’re sup-
posed to have your name not others.

Tanu: Well sometimes they can. I have to listen to them too you know? Because they will give me the certificate so there are some things I can try to do different but some things I must, if I want that certificate (uh) I just have to ...

Enaya: (nods) Ok.
The discussion with the community of the Child and Youth Seminar 2017 marked the end of the project, insofar as it opened up questions that came to the fore\(^{62}\), after having muddled through by ontologically validating the other temporal sides through pluralism.

Having done that, it was the moment to return afresh to where I started, after having been somewhere else. Communities like the Child and Youth Seminar 2017, essentially adult communities of inquiry on matters of children and childhood, are where further dialogues on the plenitude of new questions are being taken up. Such discussions may not yet be prepared to include child participation to the extent that is desired. But that the desirability of including children’s voices in adult epistemological quests is present is a promising sign for future directions of broadening the scope of including children in knowledge production concerning their lifeworlds.

In the case of the work at hand, I will now proceed to return to where I started and attempt, in light of an overheating world, to answer the central question:

*What is the scope for the philosophical blossoming of adults when they enter children’s playfully constructed worlds?*

But, before moving to concluding section, I present a brief summary of the phases of exploration.

**4.6. Summary**

Initially, I was looking for something that would give child participants more room to exercise their interpretive philosophical agency and negotiate philosophical questioning with adult counterparts. Major critiques of adult-positionality in PC, especially the critique of white reason-ability, resonated with what Svendsen had to tell me about the contemporary problem of the white hereditary perspective in the Norwegian educational context and the

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\(^{62}\) For similar ongoing discussions regarding children’s participation in the childhood studies paradigm also conf. Barker and Weller 2005; Weller 2006, O’Kane 2000; Punch 2002; Clark 2017; Clark & Moss 2001; Christensen & James 2008; Burke 2005; Greenfield 2004; Hart 1997; Lancaster and Broadbent 2003; Kellett 2004; 2005; 2010; Gallacher and Gallagher 2008; Warming 2011; Nairn et al. 2007; Deszcz-Tryhubczak et al 2018, accepted draft version; Ennew Judith et al.
consequent need for a plural understanding of knowledge. The privilege to
presume that one does not need to learn from other people is not simply
a matter of colour but is, at a more fundamentally existential level, a privi-
lege that comes with age. The stiff adult position was what both Sungjae’s
alternative class-based philosophy curriculum as well as PC community of
inquiry practices shared in common.

In the light of philosophy with children in an overheated global context,
and as Kennedy and Kohan (Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Kohan 2014; Kohan
2011) had pointed out, it was time to ask what philosophy and education
can learn from children and childhood.

Muddling through with children as interlocutors, I treated the research
as experimentation (Gallacher & Gallagher 2008), to the extent that, alt-
ough I had a research interest, I hesitated to fix a question which was not
influenced by my interlocutors. One would not call this a systematic enga-
gement with a problem, but rather delving into a mystery (Marcel 1949:
117). And that, after the failure of the tea party experiment, became an
immersion in the mystery of play. Until the failure of the tea party, I had not
questioned sitting and talking as The form of philosophising with children.

The purposeful methodologically immature direction (Gallacher &
Gallagher 2008) created the possibility to allow being influenced by inter-
locutors, who in phase two took on the role of co-explorers. In the process
of getting to know my own ignorance, I also discovered that the promising
continental phenomenological tradition I placed faith in, had itself system-
atically ignored the play of children (Wall 2013; 2011). Traces of tra-
ditional Western approaches in philosophy of education, i.e. Kant’s top-
down approach, Rousseau’s bottom up approach or Lock’s developmental
approach, could be found in phenomenologists of play like Heidegger,
Gadamer, Derrida and Kearney (ibid.)

Childism, which builds upon the phenomenological tradition, unders-
tands philosophy as play. The moment one accepts this, the authority of
the adult dissolves since children are better than adults at playing. Con-
sequently, it is not the child, but the adult who is the default addressee
of pedagogy.

Subsequently, I chose to enter into immersive play with children as co-
explorers who would lead the way in what they were best at - playing. That
would in turn lead to philosophising. But not as I believed I knew it.

Especially following the realisation of the importance of breathing in
tuning with children that I had found with Baby Ole, and Irigary’s critique
of the forgotten breath of phenomenology (Irigary 1999), I drew upon the
Eastern kin of continental phenomenology i.e. Buddhist mindfulness techniques (Gokhale 2018). Specifically, I drew upon the Vipassana tradition in order to maintain the breath as a constant point of return. In addition, I used Jaina pluralism as an analytical fall back for the moments where I could not maintain the spatio-temporal bracketing of the graspable natural world that I was going to carry out while immersively playing.

Playing with co-explorers opened up the horizons for me to unstiffen my conceptual muscles. The role of fantasy, not just in terms of counterfactual thinking, but also in terms of what questions may be asked and by whom, came to the fore.

I discovered that, in the context of children’s playfully constructed worlds, tools are all material objects which take on diverse meaning in order to construct fleeting, temporal worlds that one can enter and exit. In other words, playing is embodied thought experiment in motion.

Philosophical clearings with (hos/bei) children call for the unstiffening of conceptual muscles in a way that facilitates crossing the borders of one’s taken for granted world; subsequently, they urge one to experience other fleeting, temporal, co-existing worlds regardless of their contradictory appearances.

Lastly, having positioned myself as an ignorant guest, an element of relationality became obvious, since in letting my co-explorers think for me, they also thought from my side in order to accommodate me.

The concluding retrospective discussion with researchers of the Child and Youth Seminar 2017 with Enaya Mubasher was a form of collective retrospection on the process. Enaya was someone who had agreed to muddle through with me even before I began muddling through systematically. Entering a particular community of inquiry of adult researchers of childhood and youth with Enaya helped me to return to where I started, having been somewhere else.

Going back to Svendsen’s observation (2014; personal communication) that the white hereditary perspective of the Norwegian educational context needs a plural concept of knowledge, which appreciates that two things can be the case at the same time. Furthermore, adult teachers have to risk their own position and authority and surrender to a process of becoming in a way that one let’s one’s worldview change in the classroom (ibid.). I respond by saying that such processes can well happen outside the spatio-temporality of schooling in most mundane spaces like kitchens, bathroom, and playgrounds too, because in taking something as mundane as the kitchen-ness of a kitchen for granted, one has already moved away from plurality.
Philosophising with (hos/bei) children can thus be a way towards a lived-experience of plurality. As the old Portuguese proverb summarises:

*Mais descobre huma hora de jogo, que hum anno de conversação.*
*(An hour of play discovers more than a year of conversation).*
(Bohn 281:1857; translation by author)

From a childist perspective, however, play would have to be grasped in the sense of *brincar* or *å leke.*
5. Outro

On an overheated planet (Eriksen 2016), where children from the highest-scoring countries on the Human Development Index challenge their default positions as ‘pupils’ (Thunberg 2019; Su & Su 2019; Straume 2019) - it is time that everyday adult philosophers ask what they can learn from children and childhood. In theory, the question has already been raised in the overlapping fields of philosophy and education (Kennedy & Kohan 2016; Storme & Vlieghe 2011). Nevertheless, in the practical realm of pedagogy of philosophy, owing to rigid adult positionalities (Reed-Sand-oval & Sykes 2017) embedded in white reason-ability (Chetty 2018), this remains a challenge. Adopting a childist understanding of philosophy as play (Wall 2013) offers a possibility to overcome rigid adult positionalities. The childist understanding understands philosophy/play as belonging to the ontological structure of being human, not as a particular kind of activity or disposition.

Philosophy/play, as belonging to the ontological structure of being human, refers to our interpretive agency i.e. how we co-construct networks of meanings wherein we dwell. Our interpretive agency has a significant role in how, why and when we inter-act with objects around us. From the moment of waking to the minute we fall asleep, the way we exist in the world as a result of our choices and movements is to a large extent determined by our interpretations. Rigid adult positionalities occur as a result of taking for granted that our interpretive co-constructions are singularly real. By rigidity, I do not refer solely to intellectual rigidity. I instead emphasise the accompanying embodied rigidity of the body and as a corollary - what we habitually do with it. Similarly, grasping philosophy as play implies simultaneously grasping that philosophical processes cannot be reduced to logo-centric intellectual capacities. Playing with networks of meanings around us and the creative capacity to transform the world one dwells in constitutes philosophical processes. Hence, performing embodied thought experiments in motion is understood as a philosophical activity that can support adults to unstiffen their conceptual muscles. Performing embodied thought experiments in motion e.g. using a ‘kitchen’ as a ‘lavaland’, opens up the possibility of temporarily suspending one’s natural attitudes and living counter-factualities. Suspension unbars the possibility for counterfactual experiences not just interpretations of what one encounters, but most importantly one’s self-understanding and what follows. Who one believes one is; how one actualises all that one believes
she is; what one claims to know with certainty; what and how one values; the mundane bodily ways through which one actualises their self-interprettative beliefs - are just a few abstract extrapolations of what constitutes our natural attitudes. Along with these extrapolations, there are also the accompanying logical justifications i.e. the ‘whys’ that one integrates into her self-interpretations and their embodied actualisations. Furthermore, there are emotional states that accompany the actualisations. Momentary suspension of the caregiver role in a ‘kitchen’ in order to fly cars in a ‘lavaland’ also implies a momentary suspension of all the mundane embodied actualisations that accompany it. For most adults it is challenging to momentarily suspend their taken-for-granted network of meanings. However, it is precisely in children’s seemingly effortless capacity for momentary suspension in order to construct fleeting counterfactual realities, that the transformative philosophical wealth for adults can be found.

We, the everyday philosophers who have achieved the legal and social status of adulthood in the post-colonial overheated world, with our deeply embodied adultism (Speier, in Stolnick 1976; Flascher 1978), are confronted with our own rigid natural adult attitudes (Waksler 1986; 1991; 1996). In turn the possibilities of our own philosophical blossoming, which could eventualise in a free relationship with our temporal others (Beauvais 2018), are inhibited. By freedom I mean freedom from the internalised adultist barriers which impede us from opening up to the subtle, yet powerful philosophical complexities of children and childhood.

The everyday adult philosopher seems to have become a bit too comfortably numbed with their epistemological privilege, regardless of racialised skin colour and gendered genitalia bestowed upon us. An epistemological privilege which gives us the freedom to teach the default addressees of pedagogy; the freedom to objectively observe and train our temporal others as scholarly and social objects. Moreover, an epistemological privilege that gives the freedom to ontologically invalidate the pluralistic fleeting worlds that not only exist, but have something valuable to contribute to the philosophical blossoming of the contemporary everyday adult philosophers.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation has systematically acknowledged the vital role of philosophical education for world peace and to prepare everyone to shoulder responsibilities in the face of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world, especially in the ethical realm (Goucha 2007). The educational agendas, policies and
implementations that followed thereof - have categorically focused on training adults to teach children how to philosophise, often simulating ‘sit-n-talk’ adult democratic parliamentary models, for instance, the Lipmanian community of inquiry.

Furthermore, the international organisation categorically upholds the right to philosophy for all (Goucha 2017). Despite the voiced ethical desirability of a right to philosophy for all, children remain philosophically constrained as default addressees of pedagogy in general, and pedagogy of philosophy in particular. Contemporary research such as that of Gopnik (2009) is able to re-cognise the philosophical agency in even babies. Moreover, the continental phenomenological tradition, which is a promising alternative to deficit-fixated, developmental approach of psychology, is able to re-cognise children’s consciousness as a positive phenomenon (Merleau-Ponty 2010: 131; Bahler on Merleau-Ponty 2015; Welsh on Merleau-Ponty 2013). Unfortunately, the philosophical agency of small children remains neglected in terms of its philosophical worth for big adults. As observable in the UNESCO report on the pedagogy of philosophy (Goucha 2007), the value of philosophising as a pedagogical response to accelerating times of Anthropocene Neoliberalism (Eriksen 2016) is expressed in terms of adults teaching how to philosophise and not themselves learning to philosophise with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children.

Having been through this hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation into what doing philosophy with children could be like, I think that the crux of the problem is the identification of sitting and talking as The form of philosophising. Needless to say, as soon as linguistic competence is identified with The form of philosophising, adults have the upper hand. However, if, as childism proposes, we view philosophy as play and play as philosophy (Wall 2011; 2013) - ignorance, incompleteness and immaturity of the embodied adult is unveiled, whereby the epistemological authority of the everyday adult philosopher simply dissolves. Subsequently, philosophising/playing itself becomes a process of muddling through (Gallacher and Gallagher 2018). By play, I mean something akin to the Norwegian verb å leke or the Portuguese verb brincar.

Play/Philosophy as belonging to the ontological structure of what it means to be human (Wall 2011; 2013) is then not about solving problems that are objectively present before us to analyse and solve, rather a mystery to be lived (Marcel 1949) throughout one’s lifespan. By playing with the possibilities of what is presented to us in our immediately experienced life-worlds, we, regardless of age, make sense of our realities. As processes of
broadening the horizons of one’s consciousness, when children play/philosophise - they seem to perform embodied thought experiments in motion in a way that brings counter-factual spatio-temporalities into the horizons of the particular lived experience of that moment.

Whilst playing/philosophising with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children as guests invited into those fleeting micro-worlds which arise and pass away in the rigid macro-worlds of adulthood - the adult may experience various forms of discomfort owing to their own embodied rigidity. To extend Eriksen’s anthropological metaphor of clashing scales (Eriksen 2016), the scales that clash here are philosophical, primarily because what the adult is being invited to do by their child counterpart may at first not make sense in the horizons of their immediately perceived, taken-for-granted lifeworld. To avoid this discomfort - phenomenological bracketing performed with breathing as the point of departure and return, coupled with Jaina pluralism as an analytical fall back, can help.

Conventional scholarly and social focus tends to ask - what is it that children do? In this case though, the answer is: it is not important what they do. Rather, one is invited to broaden the horizons of one’s consciousness to accommodate the pluralistic ontological experiences by focusing awareness on what happens in one’s conscious lived-experience when one plays along on their terms. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “In the home into which a child is born, all objects change their significance; they begin to await some as yet indeterminate treatment at his hands; another and different person is there, a new personal history, short or long, has just been initiated, another account has been opened.” (Merleau-Ponty in Welsh 2013: 21).

In case the adult curiosity for grasping what it is that children do remains unsatiated, the following words by Welsh illuminate an answer:

“Merleau-Ponty’s view is that children are natural phenomenologists in that they remain connected to experience and do not require a resolution in theory. Such a perspective is limiting when one is considering ideal and not natural objects, but is less likely to sacrifice experience on the altar of consistency. Children explore the world rather than analyse the world. Unlike adults, children do not tend to take objects out of their context, or take themselves out of context. I can imagine myself somewhere else than where I sit at this moment. I’m driving to my house; I’m sitting with my friend on the porch. Moreover, I can with a bit more effort imagine that I had an entirely
different life. I can speculate on what it would be like, for instance, to grow up at the turn of the century on a farm. Yet, it is difficult to really “erase” myself, my context, my knowledge, my affections, and my desires and imagine being this other person in an entirely different situation. But telling a tale to a child: “Imagine you were born on a farm before electricity!” can almost make the child imagine being in a farmhouse but remaining, otherwise, the same. The child’s reality has a solidity that while not static, can appear to be rigid to adults who are indoctrinated in certain philosophical and scientific interpretations.” (Welsh on Merleau-Ponty 2013: 110).

The scope of philosophical blossoming for adults when they play/philosophise with (Norwegian: hos/ German: bei) children is vast. One cannot provide a standard manual of what this entails, because every playful encounter is intersubjectively unique. However, after having been through this hybridic, nomadic phenomenological investigation - to a large extent by muddling through with Sungjae, Enaya, (Baby) Ole, Emma, Captain Duke, Finn, Thor, Amelie, Gullveig and Aida, what I can say with certainty is that: there is a vast scope for adults to blossom philosophically with children as their primary philosophical guides. In other words, the scope of philosophical blossoming for adults is demarcated by the ontological validation one is able to allow.

From the way it looks, this overheated world of acceleration of acceleration where one has to constantly scale up, down and sideways between the macro and micro scales of one’s lifeworld (Eriksen 2016: 146) is unpredictable. It could be that all of us, who are in the same boat divided by the same destiny (ibid: 156), might have to be well prepared for unimaginable scenarios. Who knows, perhaps as a result of overheating, fish might fly and birds might swim, iff they survive. Consequences of overheating are unpredictable.

Playing/Philosophising with children will require us to slow down, scale down and cool down more often than we currently manage. The regular practise of temporarily suspending the natural attitude by performing embodied thought experiments in motion with child counterparts enable the kind of resilience required to broaden the horizons of adult consciousness. In other words, blossom philosophically. Philosophical capacities needed to ‘shoulder responsibilities in the face of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world (Goucha 2007)’ need not be restricted to a logo-centric understanding of philosophising. Unpredictable futures will require philosophical resilience beyond rational skills, which is best trained in the presence of children. For adults in highest-scoring nations
on the Human Development Index, this is a more realistic possibility than those in the majority world. And it need not cost much. To conclude, in case I have not managed to show with words, I follow Enaya’s directive and attempt an illustration with a picture, to answer what philosophising with children could be for adults:

Illustration 29: Azulejo i Lisboa, co-crafted by author in Eglantine&Caroline’s Azulejo Workshop, Lisbon 2018
Glossary of Terms

**Adult ideological viewpoint**

The common-sensical scholarly standpoint of seeing childhood as an adult-in-society. Questions raised from this standpoint tend to follow patterns of what adults in a given society recognise as worthwhile problems for study. The adult ideological viewpoint especially in studies of childhood tends to ignore children as interactants and is akin to the developmental attitude found in Piaget’s deficit conception of childhood. (Speier 1976)

**Adultism**

Implicit biases and behaviours of adults towards children which resemble those exhibited by adults towards other adults of lesser power, that is referred to as pseudospeciation, racism, sexism or elitism (Flascher 1978).

**Class-based philosophy**

Curricularised ways of doing philosophy, based on age-specific, class(room) segregated thinking. Class-based philosophy need not necessarily take place within the spatio-temporality of schools. Rather it refers to a template attitude towards teaching children something philosophical through a curriculum designed solely by adults.

**Childism**

Childism emerges from the interdisciplinary movement in social sciences called childhood studies. It is the effort to reimagine and practice child-inclusive social processes and structures. It aims at treating children as scholarly and democratic subjects, insofar as this is possible (conf. Wall 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2019).
**Childwork**

Work done by adults on the organisation and control of child activities (conf. Oldman 1994).

**Child Work**

Work done by children.

**Education Sector**

All parts of global and local, and public and private economies comprising educational institutions e.g. kindergartens, schools, universities, hobby classes and learning centres, including human resources employed to keep the institutions running. Markets manufacturing scholastic lifestyle products including toys intended to educate learners also form part of the education sector. Furthermore, related industries such as the health sector working to ‘fix problematic learners’ to assimilate into the standardised educational sector may also be counted as part of it.

**Fielding**

The process through which a thematic or geographical area becomes a field for a researcher.

**Interpretive reproduction**

Socialisation as commonly defined in the childhood studies paradigm. Refers to the interpretive approach towards socialisation which emphasises children’s active participation in cultural routines through a creative appropriation of information from the adult world in order to produce their own unique peer cultures. Children perform processes of interpretive reproduction to become part of adult culture and contribute to its reproduction through negotiations with adults (conf. Corsaro 1993; 1997).
Islanding of Childhood

The mass-scale modern operations of age-based segregation that give rise to forms of separating children’s lifeworlds from those of adults (conf. Gillis 2008).

Minority World

The highest Human Development Index nations which are demographi- cally and geographically smaller compared to the Majority World i.e. low Human Development Index nations. The terms are considered more accu- rately descriptive insofar as they describe what the nations are, as opposed to what they have or do not have.

Pedagogical Gaze

An instrumentalising gaze whereby one’s attention is directed towards a perceived child counterpart as an ignorant subject in relation to an episte- mologically superior, knowing self. In turn bestowing a sense of entitlement upon the self, to the ignorant other something. Also, an instrumental gaze where even scientific attention is directed towards the areas of children’s behaviour that guardians tend to focus on. The pedagogical gaze is akin to what has been described as the adultist position or adult-ideological posi- tion (conf. Bluebond-Langner 1978; Flascher 1978; Speier 1976).

Philosophical commitments

One’s loyalty to assumptions about the triangular scope of philosophy i.e. Being (ontology), Doing (ethics) and Knowing (epistemology), whether or not one is aware of it. Moreover, the common sense principles of logic one employs to work out and find a sense of meaning or make sense of quotidian life, also belong to the realm of one’s philosophical commitments. What exists and what does not? What is good or bad/right or wrong? Where do these notions come from e.g. God/Nature/Society? What is desirable in life? What is knowable? What is knowledge? What is truth? Who am I ? What am I doing? What is the meaning of (my) life? And so on, are scanty examples of fundamental philoso- phical questions, one usually has either a reflected or unreflected position on.
**Philosophical clearings**

Opportunities of self-reflexivity for adults that are illuminated in the presence of children, especially whilst playful engagement in the playfully co-constructed worlds. These opportunities illuminate the taken-for-granted relationship between the self and the surrounding objects. Accordingly, they give way for broadening the horizons of one’s consciousness.

**World**

A network of meanings.

**Overheating**

A macroanthropological description of the present state of globalised modernity i.e. the early 21st century Anthropocene Neoliberal world, beginning in 1991 with the end of the Cold War. The epoch is characterised by the acceleration of acceleration and exponential growth. As in physics - heat and speed are synonymous - the metaphor of overheating refers to that velocity and fullness of the current zeitgeist observable in the realms of environment, economy and culture. The central double bind of the epoch is obtaining between environmental and economic sustainability. A further characterisation of the epoch is a systemic clashing of macro and micro scales such that a heightened state of vulnerability, lack of trust and awareness of risk is observed in micro-scale responses to macro-scale phenomena (conf. Eriksen 2016).

**Unstiffening conceptual muscles**

Assuming dynamic psycho-physical stances while playing with children such that the borders of one’s taken for granted world (network of meanings) are relaxed and crossed. In turn, opening up to experiencing other fleeting and temporal, co-existing worlds regardless of their contradictory appearances.
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